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Tangible Property
I.
I.

REAL RIGHTS

Concept of Proprietary Rights

F

ROM time to time, the basic distinction between
proprietary or real rights (jura in re) and relative,
particularly obligatory, rights has been subjected to
severe sociological, economical, or logical criticism. 1 To
name only a few of the distinguished iconoclasts in this
topic, Adolf Wagner, 2 Vinding Kruse, 3 and Hohfeld 4 may
be mentioned. These arguments, which have impressed
1 I have treated this subject repeatedly; for a broad recent exposition, see
HANS PETER, Wandlungen der Eigentumsordnung und der Eigentumslehre
seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (Aarau 1949).
2 ADOLF WAGNER, 3 Grundlegung der politischen Okonomie ( 1894).
3 FR. VINDING KRusE, The Right of Property ( 1929), translated from the
Danish into German I (1931) 185, into English (1939) 131; UssiNG, "Le
transfer de Ia propriete en droit danois," 4 Rev. Int. Dr. Comp.
Most recently, the Scandinavian doctrines have been lucidly presented by
GoTTHEINER, Eigentumsiibergang beim Kauf beweglicher Sachen, 18 Z. ausl.
PR. ( 1953, published May, 1954) 356. With respect to the consequences in
the conflicts field, the most challenging point lies in the rule, especially distinct in Denmark, that the creditors of the seller are barred from attaching
or seizing in bankruptcy proceedings articles that have been sold without
any formality of payment or delivery. While the authors deny a distinction
between obligatory and proprietary rights, at least inter partes, it would
seem under the usual categories that the obligation concluded between seller
and buyer has an effect as to those persons deriving their rights from the
seller, an effect of relative relationship in rem, i.e., diminishing the ownership of the seller, a phenomenon that occurs not infrequently in other situations elsewhere. Should this effect be respected in another country to which,
e.g., the sold object were removed without delivery or other new events?
This offers an interesting problem which, however, needs fuller investigation
than is possible here.
4 HoHFELD, Fundamental Legal Conceptions ( 1923) 74 ff.

3

4

PROPERTY

some of the writers on conflicts law,S should be examined
in the light of comparative legal history as well as of
technical needs.
In both Roman and English legal history, a clear distinction has been made between actions in rem, claiming
directly against a thing, and actions in personam, directed
against a person. In the republican Roman procedure per
legis actionem in rem, as has become certain beyond any
doubt, the claimant seized the thing ( vindicatio), and only
when another claimant raised opposition, thereby acquiring
the role of defendant, 6 did the law suit commence. In the
classic Greek and early Germanic procedures, there were
analogous configurations. All such primitive actions' were
directed against an object rather than a subject; this "obligatio" was literally the binding of a person with a rope,
and agere in personam meant seizure of a man. All actions
were originally tort actions; when the vindicatio of a slave
or an ox was opposed by a contravindicatio, the issue was
which claim was wrongful.T
Thus, there was no fundamental difference in the thinking of Greece, republican Rome, and medieval Europe
about the essence of real and obligatory rights, whenever
they were distinguished from the corresponding actions.
Real rights, in Germanic and English law, are correctly
described as bundles of rights (or better, faculties) in
various quantities, essentially connected with possession
(seisin, Gewere) and, at least in the case of immovables,
endowed with effect as against third persons only through
11 Under the spell of Hohfeld, FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 527, speaks
of the "misleading expression jus in rem," as suggesting an "untenable theory"
or "futile" attempt to distinguish rights "in personam," and sums up: "All
rights are personal" (index, 726).
8 WLASSAK, "Der Gerichtsmagistrat im gesetzlichen Spruchverfahren," 25
Z. Savigny Stift., Rom. Abt. ( 1904) 8t at 160.
7
RABEL, "J1'X'l1 etovA7Jr und Verwandtes," 36 Z. Savigny Stift., Rom.
Abt. ( I9IS) 340. 386.
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additional publicity. These ancient ideas' permeated the
feudal law; remainders are outstanding in the common
law. Germanic concepts also have some bearing on the
Scandinavian customary law. Right and possession were
neatly separated by the Roman jurists, who crystallized a
learned concept of dominium, which is a power over a physical thing, "absolute," i.e., effective against everyone, and
unlimited in principle, but upon which public and private
law have imposed more or less considerable restrictions.
But once the common lawyers had disengaged tort and contract as well as property and debt, the Roman concept was
plainly helpful as a means of further clarification.
In the broad European development of concepts, the distinction is fundamental. An action in personam, as the
term denotes, is directed against one or several persons
indicated in the source of the right claimed by the plaintiff.
An action in rem opposes anyone who disputes the plaintiff's
right; out of a real right, an indefinite number of claims
may arise against persons as yet unascertained. Disregard
of these simple phenomena necessarily creates difficulties in
connection with such doctrines as limitation of actions, adverse possession, or res judicata.
Full ownership in a corporeal thing and lesser rights such
as easements and encumbrances, jura in re aliena, are tools
of our profession, indispensable for the technical language
of an advanced jurisprudence. Conflicts law has to use such
terms. They represent clear and practical concepts which do
not prejudice the contents of the rules, domestic or international.
2.

Objects of Real Rights

In all systems, ownership in a thing and the thing itself
have long been designated by the same word, such as the
Germanic tt eigen" and the English "property." The clivi-
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sions made by Roman jurists, res mancipi and nee mancipi,
res corporales and incorporales, species and genus, res in
nostro patrimonio (or commercio) and extra patrimonium,
for the most part are conceived as distinguishing legal rules
rather than their objects. Why should our own terminology
now be confined either to the things or the rights in them?
Attacking the usual language, Cook has claimed that tangible physical objects should always be called land and chattels, and as such be characterized as immovable or movable,
while interests in them should be termed realty, real estate,
or real property and personalty or personal property. 8 Such
strained language is unnecessary for lawyers who understand the traditional ambiguity; it is misleading precisely
in interpreting the legal rules distinguishing movables and
immovables, which primarily refer to rights and not the
objects of rights.
The objects of true real rights, however, are mere tangible, physical things, whereas rights in real rights, in debts,
in intangible goods such as industrial property, are constructions, as also are rights in aggregate units ( universitates rerum). We confine our discussion in the present
chapter strictly to the narrow class of real rights in individual (isolated) tangible physical things. It does not seem
important whether they are termed rights or interests. 9
They include legal and beneficial ownership as conceived by
the common law. Equitable interests are but somewhat
weaker real rights, 10 in contrast to mere obligations such
8 CooK, "Immovables and the Law of the Situs," 52 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1939)
u46, uso ff., reprinted in Legal Bases, Ch. 10, followed by FALCONBRIDGE,
Conflict of Laws 433, 436.
9 Cf. Restatement, Introductory Note to §zo8.

1 ° For a consequence of the distinction in conflicts
(Manitoba K.B.) [1948] 4 D.L.R. 419. The right to
in the absence of a lien, was personal property, situated
the seller was domiciled, the document executed, and
although the sale concerned Saskatchewan land.

law see Re Hole
the purchase price,
in Manitoba where
the price payable,
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as the right of a buyer to whom neither title nor constructive possession has passed. 11
Accordingly, we shall have to limit our main discussion to
particular assignments of property, that is, individual transfers inter vivos, excluding all general assignments. Only the
problem of characterization will make it necessary to enlarge the outlook.
II.

THE STATUTIST DocTRINE

The local situation of immovable property and the transfer of its ownership has a very large significance, extending to taxation, jurisdiction, succession, administration of
estates, social policy, and measures against enemy property.
In this field, old concepts are deeply rooted.
I.

Lex Situs

As historical research has shown, 12 the long life of the
statutum reale, or in the modern version, lex rei sitae, lex
situs, was prepared in the early middle ages by gradually
increasing emphasis on territorial power, in opposition to
the original principle that law is an order of personal
groups, tribes, cities, and peoples. In the first development,
reaching back into the Roman provincial organization, possession f)f the soil became the subject of tributes and taxation. Thereafter, jurisdictional power and competency on
territorial basis were strongly promoted by the feudal system. From the thirteenth century, the territorial rule in11 Insofar as equitable interests are not effective against everyone, they
resemble the category of relative real rights which has been developed in
German theory. Furthermore, modern theory begins to study more profoundly
the effects of obligations on third parties, cf. WILBURG, "Giliubigerordnung
und Streitverfolgung," 71 Juristische Blatter ( 1949) 29-33. There is great
need for comparative research concerning the problems respecting equitable
interests as sketched in the literature collected by WoLFF, P.I.L. (ed. 2) 583.
12 NEUMEYER, 2 Gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung 33 ff., 89 ff.; MEIJERS,
Bijdrage 58 ff.
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eluded land and increasingly also chattels. The result was
the conception that the territorial law governs not only persons (statuta personalia), but also things situated in the
territory (statuta realia).
2.

Movables Follow the Person

(a) Theoretical basis. The Italian, French, and Dutch
commentators drew a fundamental distinction between immovable and movable assets :13 immovables are subject to
the law of the place where they are situated, but mobilia
personam sequuntur or mobilia ossibus inhaerent, that is,
movables are governed by the law of the owner's domicil.
The French coutumes adopted this rule instead of the feudal
absolute lex situs.
It is doubtful, however, whether the rule was a remainder
of the ancient personality of law 14 or originated as a presumption that chattels are situated where their owner is
(particularly used by Bartolus in the matter of seizure.) 15
In the prime of the statutist doctrine and in French literature of the nineteenth century, the authors, though they
agreed on the rule mobilia sequuntur personam, always remained divided on its basis. 16 It is true that most of them
believed that movables have no situs-"personalty has no
locality," it was said in England: one line of authority deduced the rule from the personal law of the owner or of
the possessor ;17 another from the fiction that they are at the
13 2 LAINE 228 ff.
14

Thus MEIJERS, 49 Recueil (1934) III s88, 638.
FREYRIA, La loi applicable aux successions mobilieres (These, Lille
944) 48 ff.
16
2 LAINE 233; WEISS, 4 Traite 169 ff., as of 1912.
17 D'ARGENTRE, Comm. ad patrias Britonum leges (1621) art. 218 glossa
6, no. 30: Sed de mobilibus alia censura est, quoniam per omnia ex conditione
personarum legem accipiunt, et situm habere negantur, nisi affixa et cohaerentia, nee loco contineri dicuntur, propter habilitationem motionis et translationis. Quare statutum de bonis mobilibus vere personale est et loco domicilii
15
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place of his domicil.I8 The first, applying the statutum personate, which had the influential support of D'Argentre and
Pothier, was used in France in modern times to support the
proposition that succession to movables should be governed
by the national law of the deceased, as supplanting the law
of his domicil. The second view, including movable property under the statuta realia, by fiction considered domicil
as the territorial contact of property. This view finally
prevailed in English and American law, and, since 1939,
the traditional domiciliary law has also been definitely
restored m the French conflicts system relating to
inheritance.
Some French writers insist on speaking of two territorial
laws of succession, those of situs and of domicil. But the
domiciliary law of succession also may well be conceived as
an application of the personal law.
(b) Scope of the rule respecting particular assets (uuti
singuli"). The statutists also were not in accord whether
the slogan umobilia personam sequuntur'' included individual transactions, such as sale, gift, or pledge of isolated
chattels, so that in all cases immovables would be governed
judicium sumit et quodcumque judex domicilii de eo statuit ubique locum
obtinet; id. art. 447, glossa z; and I.r C. de Summa Trinitate, a.o. Among
the authors following him were BURGUNDUS, (see WEISS I.e.; FREYRIA I.e.
79 against LAINE), BOUHIER, POTHIER, and STORY §§ 3791f. Historical justifications have been proposed by MEIJERS, 49 Recueil ( 1934) III 638; NIBOYE'l,
S. 1940.1.49 j contra FREYRIA 109 If.
18 DUMOULIN, Obs. sur !'art. 41 du ch. II titre XII de Ia couttime
d'Auvergne: Fallit si habet bona alibi sita ubi potest amp !ius Iegare, quia
reliquum capietur in bonis alibi sitis scilicet immobilibus: quia ex quo habet
domicilium, mobilia censentur hie esse. This theory was perfected by RODENBURG, De jure quod oritur ex statutorum diversitate, tit. I, cap. II, tit. II,
. cap. II, no. 6, and particularly by JAN VOET, Commentarius ad Pandectas,
liber I. tit IV, pars II (De Statutis) no. XI. Other adherents were BOULLENOIS, MERLIN, FOELIX, and in Germany GAILL and HERTIUS. DUMOULIN'S
approach has been considered of historic merit by LAINE, z Introd. 246;
PILLET, r Traite 694; contra FREYRIA 103 If.

PROPERTY

10

by the lex situs and movables by the law of the owner's
domicil. The rule has been expressed in such generality in
the Prussian and Austrian Codes and very distinctly hinted
at in the French Code/9 It appeared later in other jurisdictions, including Quebec. 20 English decisions have accepted
this principle since 1790. 21 Lord Loughborough in 1791
called it "a clear proposition, not only of the law of England, but of every country in the world where the law has
the semblance of science." 22 Story expressly defended the
application of domiciliary law to all transfers inter vivos
of personalty because of its general utility; this doctrine
"could not fail to recommend itself to all nations by its simplicity, its convenience, and its enlarged policy." 23
A narrower theory, however, was favored by many statutists. Only for the purpose of succession and marital
property was the necessity commonly felt that movables
scattered in several jurisdictions should be subjected to a
common regulation. In France, on the eve of the Civil
Code, the writers applied the maxim merely to "universal"
assignments, only if the assets were situated in the same
state as the decedent. 24 Also in Germany this restricted
19 Prussia: AUg. Landrecht, Einleitung §§ 28, 32, 36.
Austria: AUg. BGB. § 300.
France: C. C. art. 3 par. 2: "Les immeubles, meme ceux possedes par des
etrangers, sont regis par Ia loi franr;aise." This provision, by its contrast to
par. 3 and its clear history, expresses the old theory according to almost a11
non-French observers.
Similar: Bolivia C. C. art. 3·
2 0 Quebec: C. C. ( I866) art. 6, par. 2.
Puerto Rico: C.C. art. IO (referring to the national law of the owner).
The Netherlands: Law of May IS, 1829, art. 7 (as the French).
Spain: C. C. art. IO.
Cuba: C.C. art. IO.
Mexico: C.C. ( I 928) art. I4.
21
Bruce v. Bruce ( I79o) 6 Bro. P.C. s66.
22
Sill v. Worswick ( I79I) I H. Bl. 665, 69o; Somerville v. Somerville
(I8oi) s Ves. jun. 750 ff.; Bayley, J. in In re Ewin (I83o) I Cr. & J. ISI,

IS6.
23
24

§ 379·
DllLAUMI!, Les conftits de lois

STORY

a Ia veille du

Code Civil (Paris I947) I84.
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theory appeared clearly in the eighteenth century, and later
was given prominence by Savigny. 25
The interpreters of the Prussian, French, and Austrian
Codes have given their legal texts forced constructions to
comply with this reduction of the movable-rule to general
assignments. 26
The Italian Code of 1865 retained the national law of
the owner to govern movables but only as a subsidiary
device: "except for the contrary provisions of the law of
the country where they are found." 27 The Italian literature prevailingly endeavored to minimize even the tenuous
rule thus remaining. 28 But the section of the Field Code,
adopted in four states in this country, has appropriated this
formula, "really not the happiest one," 29 by stating that
"Where the law of the place at which movables are situated
does not provide otherwise, movables follow the person of
the owner and are governed by the law of his domicil." 30
Of the Spanish provision, it is recognized that, in copying
the Italian text, it has omitted by error the essential restriction just mentioned. In regard to movables situated in
25
Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus civilis ( I756) I 2 § I7; SAVIGNY I76
ff. § 366; Zurich: Priv. Ges. Art. 2; Greece: C.C. (I856) art. 5 par I.
WACHTER, 24 Arch. civ. Pr. 293·
26
Prussia: DERNBURG, I Preuss. Priv. R. § 38 II; FoRSTER-Eccrus, I Preuss.
Priv. R. ed. 7 ( I896) 59 ff.; I BAR 6os.
France: NIBOYET, Acquisition 38; 4 WEISS I95·
Austria: I EHRENZWEIG I 97 § 26; WALKER in I Klang's Komm. 234;
OGH. (Feb. 8, I928) Io SZ. 57 n. 26.
On Quebec: see 3 JoHNSON 2I7 ff.
27 Disp. pre!. art. 7 par. I.
28
C/. I FIORE § 93; DIENA, 2 Principi 36 ff., 223 ff., and in Revue I9II,
563; CAVAGLIERI I 59; App. Milano (March 30, I909) Clunet I9IO, I323.
29
PACIFICI-MAZZONI, I Istituzioni di Dir. civ. Ita!. (ed. 5 by Venzi I925)
47I n. (g).
8
° California: C.C. (I949) § 946.
Idaho: Code ( I947) 67-IIOI.
Montana: Rev. Codes (I935) § 6803.
North Dakota: Revised Code of 1943 § 47-0701.
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Spain, public policy corrects most of the effects, but there
remain unfortunate possible consequences.31
The same change of mind occurred in the Anglo-American
doctrine during the last century. In England, it is true, the
old doctrine 32 in its generalized variant applying the domiciliary law to all transactions involving movables, has been
tenacious, and some decisions, loosely formulated, created
confusion between the three connecting factors: situs, actus,
and domicil. This has given rise to three theories and continues to preoccupy the textbook writers who usually take
pains to show how impractical the old doctrine is.38 Some
recent authors even treat the matter at great length as an
open problem. 34 In the United States, similar discussions
occur,85 but in the American courts the last decisions following Story's view were rendered half a century ago, 86 and
81 See TRIAS DEBES, Der. Int. Priv. 52 f.; AUDINET, Clunet I89I, IIISi
NIBOYET, Acquisition 43·
82 Sill v. Worswick ( I79I) I H. Bl. 665, 690, per Lord Loughborough;
In re Ewin ( I83o) I Cr. & J. ISI, I 56 per Bayley, J.
88 WESTLAKE I89 ff; DICEY (ed. 5) 6zo, rule I54 (ed. 6) 56I ff.; ScHMITTHOFF I8z; WoLFF, Priv. Int. L. § 490 ff.; MoRRIS, zz Brit. Yearbook Int.
Law (I945) 232; WORTLEY, Recueil I947 II at 75·
It seems sometimes also that a foreign title acquired by the lex situs to
choses in possession is merely recognized in the form of a presumption of
validity of title, such as the presumption of the correctness of foreign
judgments.
34 CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 430 ff.; GRAVESON, The Conflict of Laws (ed. z)
I99-ZI5. Cheshire and Wortley advocated the lex loci theory in a committee
of the Seventh Hague Conference on Int. Priv. Law against a great majority.
A new theory by Morris in DICEY, (ed. 6) 559 ff. and MORRIS, Cases (ed. z)
277, z89, claiming the "lex actus" as proper law, seems practically to agree
with lex situs, respecting tangible things with constant situs.
However, the present doctrine has been evidently expressed by Lord
Maugham, then judge in re An~iani [I930] I Ch. 407, 420, when he announced:
"I do not think that anybody can doubt that with regard to the transfer
of goods, the law applicable must be the law of the country where the movable is situate. Business could not be carried on if that were not so."
85
E.g., II Am. Jur. "Conflict of Laws" § 65.
86
See for the decisions reaching to Crapo v. Kelly (I87z) I6 Wall. (83
U.S.) 6Io, 6zz, and Whitney v. Dodge ( I894) IOS Cal. I9Z 1 38 Pac. 636,
STUMBERG (ed. I) 357 ff. In New York, the shift from the owner's domicil
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the dominant opinion has been contrary for much longer.87
At present, in transactions inter vivos, individual chattels
are subjected in principle to the domiciliary law of the
owner only by the above-mentioned sporadic provisions.
Among them, the Spanish rule alone states that movables
are generally governed by the personal, here the national,
law of the owner; and this is regretted. The older Italian
formulation of the domiciliary rule followed in the Field
Code is practically devoid of meaning.
(c) Exceptional function of the rule. Savigny, enouncing
the control of tangible movables by the lex rei sitae, nevertheless left a place for the lex domicilii, in the case of
movables, such as articles of personal use or chattels touching a territory merely temporarily, which have no permanent situation.38 Under the influence of his authority, the
Argentine Code recognizes the lex situs only as follows:
"movables permanently situated and which are held without the intention of removing them, are governed by the
laws of the place where they are located; but movables
which the owner always carries with him, or which are
for his personal use, whether he be in his domicile or not,
as well as those which are kept to be sold or carried to
another place, are governed by the laws of the domicile
of the owner." 89
To illustrate a permanent location, Velez Freitas in his
annotations mentions Savigny's example of a library in the
owner's house. Decisions have added bank deposits, 40 instruand the place of the transaction to the place where the movables are, seems
to have occurred as late as I930, according to Restatement, New York Ann.
V. I88, Introd. Note.
87 I WHARTON 674 §§ 297 ff. The first decisions against the domiciliary
law involved a ship and a cargo not to be found at the owner's domicil,
as STUMBERG (ed. z) 39I notes.
38 SAVIGNY I78 (trans!. I79) § 366, cf. below Ch. 57 n. I.
3 9 Argentina: C.C. art. II.
4
Cf., Cam. civ. za Cap. (June zz, I9Z5) 57 Gac. Foro 99, I6 Jur. Arg. I89.
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ments payable to bearer, 41 and mortgage certificates, 42 while
other decisions have declared the contrary. 48
The Brazilian law has been analogous;" the reform of
1942 retains the law of the owner's domicil for
"the movables which he carries or which are destined to
be transported to other places." 45
Modern theory, to be discussed later, recognizes some
such cases not warranting the normal rule of lex situs, but
does not apply the personallaw. 46
In the aftermath of all this, the C6digo Bustamante
establishes a presumption that movables are normally situated at the residence of the owner or possessor147-an arbitrary fiction. 48
(d) Obsolete remainders of the "mobilia maxim," thrown
out of the law of property, are sometimes cited in special
connections. In particular, this "misleading maxim" has
41

Cam. civ. Ja Cap. (Feb. 6, I928) 27 Jur. Arg. 33·
Cam. civ. 2a Cap. (Oct. Io, I930) 95 Gac. Foro 90. Cam. Civ. I Cap.
(Dec. 30, I94I) W. Sanford v. E. Sanford, Ley t. 25 p. 372, except in Rev.
Arg. Dir. Int. (I943) 385. For other cases see BAGUE 95 ff.
4 3 WALDEYER, Sucesi6nes Argentino-Aleman de intestato, Jur. Arg. I9SI-I
Doctrina 53 f.
44
Brazil, former Introductory Law of I9I7, art. 10:
"Property, movable or immovable, is subject to the law of the place where
situated; those movables, however, that serve his personal use or which he
has always with him, or which are intended for transportation to other places,
remain under the personal law of the owner.
"Unique Paragraph. Movables the situation of which changes during a
real action concerning them, continue subject to the law of the place in which
they were at the beginning of the suit."
45
Introductory Law of 1942 to the C.C., art. 8 §I. Cf., Uruguay: C.C.
art. 5 par. 2, extending the lex situs: "also to the movables which are permanently in the Republic." On the difficulties which make the lex rei sitae almost
always the most certain rule, see TENORIO § 548.
46
Infra 33·
47
C6digo Bustamante, art. 111, followed by Brazil: L. Intr. Art. 8 § 2.
48
WOLFF, Priv. Int. L. (ed. 2) 510 n. 2; see the controversy on the meaning between 2 SERPA LoPEZ § 229 and TENORIO § 373·
42
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often been attributed to the law of insolvency, but has no
standing there and appears now to be finally discredited. 49
3· Characterization of Movables and Immovables
The practical importance of distinguishing movables and
immovables for conflicts purposes has been narrowed, since
the conflicts rules of almost all countries have adopted the
lex situs for individual movables and many systems have
abandoned the distinction altogether, subjecting the whole
estate to one rule of succession or marital property. Nevertheless, what law determines "movability," is a question
preliminary to frequent issues of jurisdiction, enforcement,
bankruptcy, taxation, and others. The problem also has
retained considerable bearing on the general controversy
about characterization. It may therefore be treated here at
some length.
The traditional principle that the lex situs determines
whether a thing or interest is immovable, still prevails 50 but
has been challenged by a recent and growing group of
writers with their creed that the lex fori does everything.
Moreover, the application of the principle by the English
and American courts has produced certain peculiar points,
introducing a scarcely noticed third theory.
(a) The traditional characterization. The principle that
the lex situs determines whether an interest is movable, still
enjoys such world-wide prevalence that documentation is
unnecessary. 51 The practical purpose of this auxiliary rule
49 NADELMANN, "The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflict of Laws,"
59 Harv. L. Rev. ( I946) IOZ9 ff.; RAEBURN, "Application of the Maxim
Mobilia Sequuntur Personam to Bankruptcy in Private International Law,"
z6 Brit. Y.B. ( I949) I77, I89.
50 In I93 I Gutzwiller named only Niboyet as opposed.
5 1 Examples outside the common law:
France: Cass. Civ. (April s, I887) S. I889 1. 387: "Ia question de savoir
si certains biens sont meubles ou immeubles ne peut etre resolue que par
Ia loi du pays ou ils se trouvent;" (Aug. 5, I887) D. I888 I. 65, BEALE, z
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is obvious. It is still the Anglo-American conflicts law that
a decedent leaves separate estates in the jurisdictions where
they are situated and in addition an estate composed of the
movables situated anywhere. Frictions in the application of
this system can be avoided only if the question what is
movable is answered in all jurisdictions by the same method,
that is, in accord with the law of the place where the thing
is situated.
But to understand the historical idea of the entire institution, which is still so strong in so many countries, we have
again 52 to go back to the meaning of the statuta realia, as
it has slowly developed. A piece of land has a status as has
an individual. The object of law is land or an individual; a
statute is a statutum reale or personale, the objects of doubtful classification being collected in the statuta mixta. The
land is an individual object of rights, automatically-not by
any reference from a foreign conflicts rule-subject to the
power of the feudal superior and subject to donation, sale,
acquisition of marital interest, legacy, or intestate succession.
There is no tie between the lands of one man in several
territories. Hence, every sovereign determines the legal
rules exclusively governing the fate of the land, and quite
naturally also which things situated in the same territory go
with the land-such as serfs, herds, easements in neighboring lots, especially the objects affording continuous use as
"heritage," i.e., investment-and which do not, such as
Bouteiller enumerates as chatels or cateux: barns, stables,
and trees not bearing fruit. 53 Moreover, owing to the GerCases 6 (Russian mining concessions) ; Cour Paris (Feb. 14, 1938) Nouv.
Revue 1938, 380 (shares in an American mining royalty).
Italy: Trib. Como, assigned by Cass. Roma, (Nov. 7, 1899) z Rivista di
diritto internaz. e di legislaz. comp. (Napoli, 1899) 556, 559 f., cf., RENAULT
I id. ( 1898) 97 (Russian circus concession). C6d. Bustamante, art. uz, II3·
52 C/., supra Vol. I, 3z8, concerning marital property.
53
BOUTEILLER, Somme rural, I, tit. 74 (ed. 1603 p. 4Z9)·
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manic idea of property, various possessory rights may exist
simultaneously: those of the king, the barons, and the lower
vassals, or of the knight and the serfs. All these possessions and the respective present or future rights are naturally included in the concept of immovable right.
On the other hand, in the opinion of Dumoulin and his
followers, which has been adopted by the interpreters of the
French Civil Code, the last domicil of the deceased governs
the inheritance in all movables, not as the personal statute
but as the fictitious situation of the things. 54 This position
again required the law at the true situation to determine
what are movables; if the local statute classified a thing
under the statute real, the domicil had nothing further to
say.
The old writers give sufficient illustrations. 55 Boullenois
borrows from another author the case of a testator, domiciled in Paris, who left a hereditament in Normandy. Fruits
and grains were deemed to be movables under the Coudimes of Normandy from the day of Saint-!ean, but under
the Coutume of Paris only when they were cut. The right
opinion looks to the situs to determine the rights not only
of the legatees but also of the heirs among themselves:
The domicil affords the rule of the distribution, and for
this reason everything reputed to be movable at any place
must be distributed according to the law of the domicil; but
it does not regulate the nature and the quality of the property. 56 Bouhier determines immobilization of movables
serving an estate by the owner "under the Coutfrme where
these estates are situated" and knows that all writers are of
the same opinion. 57 Conversely, the situs decides whether
64 2 LAINE 233 If., 261, and for the last French doctrine before the Code,
DELAUME, Les Conflits de Lois a Ia veille du Code Civil ( 1947) ISO, 3 I6.
66 The following is taken from the admirable report by 2 LAINE 256 If.
66 BOULLENOIS, I Personnalite et realite des lois 841, quoting Basnage
against Beraut.
67 BouHrER, Observations sur Ia coutume de Bourgogne, ch. 21 No. 173·
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immovables in the natural meaning are assimilated to movables, as buildings ( cateux) in Artois, Lille, and Saint-Pol,s 8
and even, whether and to what extent the heir to whom
they devolve must support the debts burdening the movables.59
Very clearly all of this doctrine has been adopted by
Story:
"So that the question, in all these cases, is not so much
what are or ought to be deemed, ex sua natura, movables
or not, as what are deemed so by the law of the place
where they are situated. If they are there deemed part of
the land, or annexed (as the common law would say) to
the soil or freehold, they must be so treated in every place
in which any controversy shall arise respecting their nature
and character. In other words, in order to ascertain what
is immovable or real property, or not, we must resort to
the lex loci rei sitae." 60
This passage has been quoted time and again, but evidently not always with perception of its full meaning.
(b) The common-law rule. The Continental rule was
applied in the first half of the nineteenth century in England and the United States without difficulty. 61 A problem
arose when chattels real were to be subordinated to movables or immovables. Considering that terms of years
had been kept outside the feudal system and were still
ranked with movables in the "personalty," 62 that is, the
58

z LAINE z58.

59 z LAINE Z59·
60

447·
England: A series of decisions dealing with the character of Scotch
heritable bonds, immovable under Scotch Jaw: Johnstone v. Baker (Ch. 1817)
4 Madd. 474 note; Jerningham v. Herbert (Ch. 18z8) 4 Russ. 388, 391; Allen
v. Anderson (Ch. 1846) 5 Hare 163; cf. In re Fitzgerald [1904] 1 Ch. 573;
Train v. Train [1899] z Sess. Cas. 146.
United States: Chapman v. Robertson (N.Y. 1837) 6 Paige 6z7, 31 Am.
Dec. z64; McCollum v. Smith ( 1838) 19 Tenn. 34z, 33 Am. Dec. 147;
Minor v. Cardwell ( 1866) 37 Mo. 350
62 On the important reasons, see particularly z PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND
570 ff.; cf., HoLDSWORTH, 3 Legal History 18z ff. Not much credence is
due to a theory deriving the phenomenon from the undisputed fact that the
61
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assets not included in the succession by the heir, it would
have been possible to argue that leaseholds in English land
of a French deceased would follow the law of the French
domicil. But the English courts decided otherwise. In
fact, the memory of Sir Edward Coke's statement was
vivid:
"Now goods or chattels are either personal or real . . .
Real, because they concern the realty, as terms for years
of land or tenements, wardships, the interest of tenant by
statute staple, by statute merchant, by elegit and such like." 63
The courts, therefore, did not hesitate to classify a leasehold, though personalty in the view of English law, along
with real property as immovable for the purpose of applying the international rule of characterization. The consequence in the law of succession, however, until the reform
of 1925-1926, 64 was that the movables of a decedent domiciled abroad formed one inheritance, while his lands and
leaseholds in England constituted two further masses subject to different principles of transfer and liability for
debts. 65
These decisions on leaseholds go back to I 873; 66 however,
it is most interesting that New York and Maryland have
original purpose of English "real actions" was to provide recovery in kind.
This theory, by T. CYPR. WILLIAMS, "The Terms Real and Personal in English
Law," 4 L.Q.R. ( 1888) 394, has been followed by HERBERT TIFFANY, I Real
Property ( 1939, 3d ed. by Basil Jones) 5 § 3; but see 2 PoLLOCK AND
MAITLAND 181.
6 3 r Coke on Littleton u8b.
64 The distinction has retained its significance, when realty and personalty is
disposed of separately by will and for tax purposes. SNELL, Principles of
Equity ( 1939, 22nd ed.) 267.
65 See as to heritable bonds, Drummond v. Drummond, quoted by Sir
William Grant, M.R. in Brodie v. Barry ( 1813) 2 V. & B. 127, 132.
66 England: Freke v. Lord Carbery per Lord Chane. Selbourne (1873)
L.R. 16 Eq. 461, 466; Duncan v. Lawson (1889) 41 L.R. Ch. D. 394; and
others, see DICEY ( ed. 6) 52 5 n. 24.
Ireland: In the Goods of Gentili ( 1875) Ir. R. 9 Eq. 541. DeFogassieras
v. Duport (r88r) I I LRI 123.
United States: Restatement § 208, Special Note.
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3ubordinated leaseholds as personalty to the decedent's
domiciliary law. 67 The most frequent cases concerning
:hattels real have been testamentary trusts whereby land
should be sold (equitable conversion) and the proceeds used
in favor of certain persons. In municipal Anglo-American
law, the equitable interest of the beneficiary so created is
personalty. But for the purpose of conflicts law the courts
have stressed the immovable nature of the land when not
yet sold or reconverted at the death of the beneficiary, 68 and
depending on construction of a British legal provision, even
beyond this time limit. 69
Mortgage. Another particularly important example, m
addition to rent charges, 70 is the right of a mortgagee m
land.
Mortgage as a "right in re" is naturally an immovable.
This is recognized in all jurisdictions. The French Civil
Code aroused doubts in this respect, since article 526 enumerating droits reels fails to mention the hypotheque; the
corresponding characterization of the latter as movable by
67
Despard v. Churchill (1873) 53 N.Y. 192 (Californian law for New
York leasehold), cf., Restatement New York Ann. § 208; Craig v. Craig
(1922) I40 Md. 322, II7 At!. 756.
68 Following the lead of the Irish judge Andrews in Murray v. Champernowne (I90I) 2 I.R. 232; In re Berchtold (I923) I Ch. I92·
Canada, Sask.: Re Burke [I928] I D.L.R. 3I8.
United States: Clarke v. Clarke (I899) 178 U.S. I86; Ford v. Ford (1888)
70 Wis. I9, 33 N.W. I88; Norris v. Loyd ( I9I8) I83 Iowa IOS6, 168 N.W.
557; cf., Paul's Estate ( 193I) 303 Pa. 330, I 54 At!. 503. A wrong turn was
taken in McCaughna v. Bilhorn (1935) IO Cal. App. (zd) 674, 52 Pac.
( zd) 102 s, where, as a first step, the land was construed as personalty; see
Note, so Harv. L. Rev. ( I937) at usz.
69
See s. 22, ss. s, Settled Land Act, I882, 45 & 46 Viet., c. 38; In re Cutliffe's
Will Trust [I940] I Ch. s6s, noted 54 Harv. L. Rev. ( I940) I34. criticized
by FALCONBRIDGE, I8 Can. Bar Rev. ( I940) s68-s73 and Conflict of Laws
SIS, but contra CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 425; and in particular Re A.S. Creek
[I936] N.S. Wales St. Rep. I86. On a strange result see DICEY (ed. 6) 527,
comment on In re Middleton's Settl. [I947] Ch. 583 (C.A.).
7
Chatfield v. Berchteldt ( I872) L.R. 7 Ch. App. 192; In re Anziani
[I930] I Ch. 407, 424.
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older writers 71 has continuously misled German authors. 72
Yet the present French civil law writers declare article 526
to he incomplete and "certainly susceptible of generalization." 73
The debt, secured by mortgage, in itself, is, of course, a
movable, and its validity is governed by the international
private law of obligations. 74 However, whenever the economic value of a mortgage is involved,-and this counts
decisively in the distribution of inheritance-a sane view
will include the debt in the assets of the mortgagee, and
subject both to the lex situs. Anglo-American courts have
not doubted this conception/ 5 except in isolated Canadian
cases and decisions of New Zealand and Australia, all of
which mistakenly have applied precedents respecting taxation rather than conflicts law. 76 A holographic will executed
in Louisiana, therefore, cannot dispose of a mortgage interest in Ontario. 77
71 See, e.g., BouHIER, Obs. sur Ia coutume de Bourgogne, ch. 2 5 §§ 9, 19;
29 § 36.
72 KAHN, I Abhandl. 81 took this from LAURENT 7 Dr. Civ. 208 § IS2,
followed by LEWALD 175; WoLFF, Priv. Int. L. § 482, ill. p. 512, and others.

But Laurent emphasized nevertheless the Belgian contrary characterization
and advocated the lex situs for determining whether a hypothec is immovable, or whether there is a chattel mortgage (449 § 385).
73
COLIN ET CAPITANT I (ed. 11) 747 § 931; PICARD in 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT
(ed. 2, 1952) § 93·
14 This is also recognized in the United States, 2 BEALE 946 n. 2 s. 225.1;
11 Am. J. 337 § 39·
75 England: Johnstone v. Baker ( 1817) 4 Mad d. 474 n; and other old
decisions, see CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 422; In re Hoyles [1911] I Ch. D. 179, as
construed by Maugham, J., in In re Anziani ( 1930) 1 Ch. D. 407, 423.
United States: It is true that Restatement§ 245 omits to repeat § 225.
Australia: Re Donnelly (1927) 28 N. S. Wales St. Rep. 34·
Canada: Re Gauthier [1944] 3 D.L.R. 401.
Scotland: see ALEx. DoNALDSON, 4 Int. L. Q. (1951) 1oo-102.
76 Canada: cases following Dalrymple Estate, Hogg v. Prev. Tax Commission [1941] 3 W.W.R. 6os; [1941] 4 D.L.R.; so1 see FALCONBRIDGE, Conflicts of Laws 480 ff., 492 ff.
New Zealand: Re O'Neill [1922] N.Z.L.R. 468.
Australia: Re McClelland v. Trustees, Executors and Agency [1936] 55
C.L.R. 483; Re Young [1942] Viet. L.R. 4; see DICEY (ed. 6) S25 n. 26.
11
Re Landry and Steinhoff [1941] O.R. 67, [1941] 1 D.L.R. 699.
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The same result seems certain in French conflicts law; as
early as I 83 7, the Court of Cassation defined the scope of
the lex situs, according to article 3, paragraph 2, C.C., to
"embrace in its generality all rights of ownership and other
real rights, claimed on these [French] immovables." 78 It is
true that express confirmation by the writers is scarce. 79
Similarly, les situs applies in Quebec, 80 Austria, 81 Brazil, 82
and probably commonly.
Only in Germany are the authors unsure, due to an article
in the Civil Code ( § I 55 I, paragraph 2), prescribing that
in a marital community of acquests and gains a hypothec is to
be counted among the movables belonging to the community
property. Although this rule has been said to contain a
conflicts rule, 83 it would seem to be applicable only as a
part of German substantive law and perhaps merely to the
mentioned species of community property. There is authority for considering a hypothec and a land charge as subject
to lex situs. 84
78

Cass. civ. (March I4, I837) P. I837.I.ZII, S. I837-I.I95·
It has been given by BARTIN, 3 Principes I97 for the "constitution of the
right in re itself," as contrasted with the contract. But we understand to
the same effect LEREBOURS-PIGEONNillRE (ed. 5) 464 § 353; BATIFFOL, Traite
§ 537·
80
3 }OHNSON 308, 33 I.
81
WALKER 339· In domestic Austrian law the contrary view is followed in
I Klang's Komm. n78.
82
OcTAVIO RoDRIGO, Dicionario de Direito Internacional Privado ( I933) 54·
On Cuban hypotheses see Fair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A.
3, I937), 9I F. (2d) 218.
83 M. WOLFF, D. IPR (ed. 3) I7I applies this rule to foreign land of either
spouse. In his first edition, Io6 § 30, this legal characterization seemed to be
used for all regimes of matrimonial property but only to be referred to
German land.
84
RG. (Dec. 7, I92I) I03 RGZ. Z59 invoked the situs of mortgaged land
only as an additional criterion for the purpose of jurisdiction over the mortgage right. Yet KG (Dec. 2I, I935) JW I936, z466, at z469, Nouv. Rev.
I937 98 (supra Vol. I, p. 53I n. 55) infers therefrom that a mortgage is
a right in land subject to lex situs and concludes a fortiori that a land charge
(Rentenschuld, BGB. § II99) abstracted from any obligation by the German
legislation-although movable according to § I55I-is likewise characterized,
and an object of foreign "special provisions" on land reserved in EG. art. z8.
Also RAAPE D. IPR. ( ed. 3) 407 expresses the same view as our text.
79
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If so, the German treatment of a German hypothec in a
German-governed marital case would resemble the AngloAmerican solution in succession cases. As soon as a British
or American court finds that a mortgage on English, Canadian, or American land is an asset in a succession, it applies
the law of the situs; but since under the substantive law
involved mortgage is personalty, it may be treated differently from real estate law. The differences have been largely
reduced in England since the land law reform of 1925 85
and in most American states. Nevertheless, it is still stated,
at least in case a testator has established different dispositions for realty and personalty, that the mortgaged premises
and the thereby secured debts are "personal assets in the
hands of an executor or administrator, to be administered
and accounted for as such," viz., administered and distributed as personalty, although rules of administration for real
property apply in case of sale and other dispositions. 86
It must be taken in this sense when it is said that English
law looks primarily at the debt, not the charge. 87
It should be noted that the courts in these cases have been
compelled to create a new category of interests. The statutist rule rests on the automatic separation of immovables
by the individual territorial organization; what is immovable in Austria is immovable in the meaning of any
inheritance law, and subject to the normal Austrian succession in land. What, then, is the criterion for selecting
English or American immovables that are not "real
property" ?
85

WILLIAMS, Executor. (ed. 13, 1953) 303 § 527; supra n. 64.
Restatement §225 If.; Ohio Gen. C. Ann. (Page 1938), § 10509.68;
Wisconsin St., 1951 § 312.10; Minnesota St. 1947, § 525.38. Model Probate
Code§ 127.
87 MONSARRAT AND MAW, The Administration in England of Estates of
Foreigners, etc., Foreign Law Series No.4, ( 1935) 271 (rather misleading for
foreigners) .
86

24

PROPERTY

The English courts have obscured their position by explaining that they had to make a concession to international
comity and therefore determine the question in conformity
with the Continental division of movables and immovables.
An English judge, taking this motivation too seriously, concluded that with respect to mortgages situated in Ontario,
no such resort to categories other than personal and real
property was needed. 88 He has been criticized because there
should not be in England different systems for common-law
countries and for the rest of the world. 89 But the result was
obviously right, although it should not have been based on
terminology and alleged concessions, but simply on the fact
that characterization in Ontario was identical with the English in all points.
What the English courts really intended, in using (as they
had done before) the continental distinction of immovables
and movables and applying it to chattels real, was rather
unfavorable to the alien laws. English leaseholds of a
French deceased were excluded from the French succession,
although they could not be treated as devolving to the heir,
and had to form a third object of successions. Since the
land laws of 1925, of course, inheritance to chattels real
and movables differs only in minor respects.
The clearly formulated view of Beale, shared by many
writers, is also misleading:
"Leasehold interests"-"are immovable, since they are interests in land and cannot be removed from the power of
the land prevailing at the situs of the land." (If positive
law decides otherwise, it does so only after it has been
found applicable under the Conflict of Laws principle.) 90
88

Farwell, L.J., in In re Hoyles [I9II] I Ch. 179.

89 ROBERTSON, Characterization 200 f.
90
2 BEALE 932 f., but 937 § 209.1 recognizes

correctly that the lex situs
decides the question whether land to be converted into personalty is a
"movable."
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Thus, the criterion would be natural irremovability,
reviving the original distinction of the Romans between
res immobiles and res quae moventur aut sese movent. 91
This, however, contradicts Story and would never conform
to the old rule, established upon the legal concept of an
immovable interest that varies from territory to territory.
And it does not suffice.
In fact, the characterization of equitable conversion has
proved a matter of statutory interpretation, and has accordingly been made dependent on the lex situs. 92

Illustration. A testator, dying domiciled in Illinois, established a trust of California land to be sold and the proceeds
to be applied to the purposes of the trust. The will, holographic, was bad in Illinois but valid in California. Since
California shares the theory that the interest of the beneficiary was in the land, the will was valid. 93
The same is true, as a matter of course, for the classification of fixtures which, for all purposes-including eminent domain, mortgage, conditional sale, bankruptcy, and
taxation-are judged according to the local rules of their
situation. 94 Modern laws, it is true, tend to emphasize
91 ROBERTSON, Characterization zo6, zii, on this assumption, suggests "that
the nature of tangible property as movable or immovable should be determined by the objective test of what the property in fact is."
92
Bates v. Decree of Judge of Probate (1932) 131 Me. 176, 183; Restatement § 209; Iowa Annot. §209 cites two decisions for but one against lex fori;
New York Annot. § 209: "Unsettled." Cf., GooDRICH {ed. 3) 509 § 166.
9 3 McCaughna v. Bilhorn (1935) 10 Cal. App. (zd) 674, 52 Pac. (zd)
1025, noted 49 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1936) 994. so id. IIS2 (not quite justifiedly
critical).
94
E.g., Coxe, C.J., in Bergh v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. (C.C.A.
2, 1905) 136 Fed. 368, 370; Triumph Electric Co. v. Patterson (1914)
zii Fed. 244 (conditional seller against a real estate mortgagee); Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Co. of St. Louis v. Lauchli (1941) u8 F. (zd)
607 (conditional sale); Gardner, C.J. in U.S. v. Becktold Co. (C.C.A. Mo.
1942) 129 F. (zd.) 473 (for what equipment must the federal Government
condemning a building compensate?). See, for instance, the extension of
realty in Nebraska, Joiner v. Pound (1948) 149 Neb. 321, 31 N.W. (zd) roo.
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physical movability more than use in defining fixtures. 95
British and American courts, therefore, have not generally deviated from the universal exclusive characterization
of immovables by the lex situs. They have had to modify
a long-accepted property categorization into a more natural
conception of certain interests, producing surprising results
for foreign courts applying the common-law principles of
inheritance. But this development also has evolved within
the national law and may and does vary among the commonlaw jurisdictions.
(c) The lex fori theory. Bartin, one of the two inventors
of "qualification" according to the lex fori, initially recognized as an exception the distinction of movables and immovables in view of the indisputable advantage of determination by the lex situs. 96 Niboyet has opposed even this
isolated exception. 97 More recently, both these writers and
an increasing number of others 98 have compromised on a
doctrine proposed long ago by the German writers Bar,
Stobbe, and Kahn :99 where the choice of law refers to the
lex situs, the applicable internal law of the situation should
distinguish as it pleases. But when a conflicts rule of the
forum or a foreign conflicts rule applied by renvoi distinguishes between movables and immovables, the lex fori or
the foreign domestic rule, respectively, characterizes the
nature to be attributed to property.
95
PICARD in 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT ( ed. 2 1 1952) § 64, states that present
French law stresses merely movability. The German practice (BGB §§ 9397) is more complicated.
9 6 BARTIN, Etudes 52 sub II.
97
NrBOYET, Manuel § 418, and z Repert. 411 n. 27.
98 BARTIN I Principes 236 § 88; MELCHIOR 144 § IOI; LEWALD I75 f.;
1
NIBOYET, 3 Traite 365 § 957; 4 id. ZI6 § 1153; M. WOLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 3)
56; WoLFF, P.I.L. (ed. z) su: (contrary to 4 Rechtsvergl. Handw. 390);
BATIFFOL, Traite 3I9 §298; 2 SCHNITZER (ed. 3) 5I3. It would seem that
the position of FALCONBRIDGE's Conflicts of Laws 435-445 is different. Against
NIBOYET, LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 273 § 256.
99 KAHN, I Abh. 8z, agreeing in part with the theory of I BAR 6zz; STOBBE
I § 32, 63.
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Our problem lies with the second part of this theory,
namely, the interpretation of the conflicts rules which commonly, except in a few treatises, do not specify what they
mean by distinguishing movables and immovables. This
omission is very easily explained. Before the new learned
assault, nobody doubted that the lex situs decides this question; the treaties have sometimes expressly said so. The
new theory itself seems to leave a broad avenue for a renvoi
from the forum to the situs.
Why must the lex fori qualify in the first instance? Usually, no other justification is offered than a brief reference
to the self-constituted theory of lex fori qualification.
Niboyet adds his endeavor to protect domestic conceptions from corruption:

"If, to ascertain whether property situated outside France
is movable or immovable, we consult the law of the situation, we depend on a foreign law for the operation of our
own system of solving conflicts. If it proclaims immovable
property that in France would be movable, this is enough to
exclude French law, applicable to succession in movables,
and inversely. There is, hence, an effacement that nothing
justifies and a contradiction with the very foundation of the
entire theory of qualifications . . . . It is inadmissible that
the foreign law should consider things movable which for
us are not so ... " 100
These lines are reproduced to show with what narrowminded arguments the development of conflicts law, or for
that matter, of any international order, has to cope. To
satisfy the mentality of the distinguished, though ill-advised,
adversaries of the old rule, we may, in their own style,
advance a triple battery of "arguments," historical, logical,
and practical.
History: what justification is there to reverse a centuryold rule, one of very few that are universally recognized,
100 NIBOYET,

3 Traite 365-6, 366-7.
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a rule adjusting the differences between the various systems,
once of feudal states and now of national laws? The very
principle of lex situs, which no one appears to wish destroyed, is inevitably connected with the auxiliary rule in
question. When a French court leaves the devolution of
English land to English law, it means immovables recognized as such in England. Otherwise, there would be an
English succession to movables, considered immovable in
France, and a French succession to interests situated in England and there considered immovable. Such a jumble was
unheard of in the old times.
Logic: Why is it so plain that a reference to the English
law of immovables may concern things which are not immovables in England? What logic requires, furthermore,
that an English immovable must be held a movable because,
if French, a like thing would be so considered?
Practicability: The writers here discussed have induced
the German Reichsgericht to render the first decision ever
made in their favor ;101 it is now constantly invoked as
support.
A Czechoslovakian national dying with domicil in his
country left a factory in Saxony, Germany. Under the
Austrian Civil Code, § 300, then in force in Czechoslovakia,
immovables are devised and distributed according to the law
of their situation. The court concedes that the Austrian
literature construes this as leaving characterization to the
situs; this would be the German law. But it prefers to look
for the Czechoslovakian determination, approves the finding of the lower court that under the Czechoslovakian law
(for some not reported reason) the German factory is a
movable, and attributes it to the foreign succession.
101
RG. (July s, 1934), 145 RGZ 85, IPR spr. 1934, 13, Nouv. Revue 1935,
Sz, with an excellent criticism by Mezger of the specious arguments by which
the court has been diverted from previous better solutions.
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Granted for the sake of argument that a Czechoslovakian
factory would be a movable under the analogous circumstances in Czechoslovakia 102-why should§ 300 A.BGB. not
be construed as referring to the lex situs to determine its
character-as the Austrian and world tradition has assumed? What sense, also, does it make to consider a German factory left by a Czechoslovakian citizen as a movable,
although it would be an immovable when belonging to a
German? And what should an American court do to accommodate this situation? Here, the primary rule subjects the
factory situated in Germany to German inheritance law.
The entire meaning of the principle would be shattered.
Suppose an English leasehold in a German succession.
Must the German court declare the English interest movable because, there being no such type in Germany, a German
lease is movable? Should the English court for this reason
renounce English inheritance law for immovables? It will
do nothing of the sort, and harmony is destroyed once more,
for the sake of scholastic speculations.
In fact, a Hungarian author declares that a Hungarian
court should treat an English lease as movable and an English court a Hungarian lease as immovable. 103 Correctly, on
the other hand, in Austria, where a lease of land may be
transformed into a real right by public recording, the lex
situs is recognized as decisive. 104
If a mortgage in Michigan for the purpose of German
marital property really should be regarded in Germany as
movable, the mortgagee's interest is most certainly an immovable for any American court.
It is submitted that the old rule, practiced in England
and the United States, is superior in all respects.
102 See contra STUBENRAUCH, I Comm. (ed. 8) 371 n. 2; but KLANG's
Komm. 1178 is very vague.
108
ARATO, 17 Z. ausl. PR. ( 1952) xo.
104
BOLLA 85.
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III. Lex Rei Sitae
1.

The Rule

It is at present the universal principle, manifested in
abundant decisions and recognized by all writers, that the
creation, modification, and termination of rights in individual tangible physical things are determined by the law of
the place where the thing is physically situated. 105 The rule
relates to the physical things in which the real right in question exists. The law of the place of "the keys of a house,
the stones of a dry wall and the detached or duplicate par1° 5 Legal Provisions:
Quebec: C.C. art. 6.
Brazil: Ley In trod. art. IO.
Czechoslovakia: Int. Priv. Law, § 36.
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 22.
Egypt: C.C. art. IS.
Greece: C. C. art. 27.
Italy: C.C. ( I942) Disp. Pre!. art. 22.
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. IO.
Liechtenstein: C. C., Property Law, art. I I.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6.
Syria: C.C. art. I9.
U.S.S.R.: (interstate) S. Ct. Ruling (Feb. Io, I93I), 2 GsovsKI I3 No.2.
Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Uruguay with the restrictions supra n. 39, 44·
Treaty of Montevideo (I889) art. 26, (I940) art. 33·
C6digo Bustamante, art. IOS, 112, 113.
By Practice:
England: Westlake (ed. I, 1859) c. VIII; Cammell v. Sewell (I858)
3 H. & N. 6I7i (I86o) 5 H. & N. 728, Exchequer Chamber, and prevailing
opinion at present.
Austria: OGH. (Feb. 8, I926) 10 SZ. 57 No. 26,
Belgium: POULLET, §§ 265, 268 f.
France: Cass. req. (March I9, I872) D. I874.I.465, S. I872.I.238; (May
24, 1933) s. 1935-1·257·
Germany: ROHG. (Sept. 5, I873) u ROHGE. 22 N. 7; RG. (Oct. 20,
1882) 8 RGZ. uo; (Feb. IS, I884) I I RGZ. 52, Clunet I886, 6o8 and constantly; RG. (Oct. 8, I92I) I03 RGZ. 30, 3I (movables); RG. (Oct. I8,
I93S) I49 RGZ. 93 (immovables).
The Netherlands: Hooge Raad (June 22, I934) W. 128I5, N.J. I934, I493;
I VAN HASSELT 140, cf,, I34·
Switzerland: BG. (Jan. 2I, I9IO) 36 BGE. II 6; (June 6, I912) 38 BGE.
II 166; (June 26, I912) 38 BGE. II I98 and constantly. For Swiss immovables belonging to a Swiss national domiciled abroad the special provision,
art. 28 NAG. refers to the law and tribunal of his canton of origin as
opposed to the lex situs, but the result is at present simply Swiss property law.
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tions of machines, 11106 not the place of the house, wall, or
the machine, is decisive for the characterization of fixtures ;107 whether an easement exists depends on the law of
the place where the land to be charged is.
The rule, furthermore, is primarily concerned only with
the problems of property law, not of obligations. Opposition by a few very isolated scholars has never carried much
weight. A new theory, dividing the cases between the lex
situs and a ulex actus," established by the English writer
Cheshire, must be likewise rejected. 108
The quasi unanimity in this field is easily understandable,
since here sheer territorialism is assumed even in the most
modern systems. In the relevant part, the American Restatement, with its strong and consistent emphasis on the
legislative and judicial power of the state where the land
or chattel is situated, expresses a universal doctrine. Contrary to a confusing reference to party autonomy, still appearing in the Chilean code, 109 the parties cannot determine
the applicable law.
The supporting reasons are no longer speculations on the
status of things nor on sovereignty as was still the fashion
in the nineteenth century, with occasional remainders in
backward theory. No more is the idea, popular with certain French authors, that the "organization of the property
regime" is necessarily exclusive and its territorial expression in law must be a uloi de police et de surete," unconditionally imperative, entirely acceptable. As a consequence of
106 10 Encyclopedia Britannica, Fixtures (ed. II, I9IO-I9II) 451, cited
by FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws n. (9.).
107 2 ZITELMANN 303.
108 CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 563 (somewhat corrected in ed. 4, 435 ff.) asserts
that the lex situs is not the appropriate system in every case, but the proper
law for the transaction postulated by him is not neatly distinguished from
the assignment or other transfer, supra Vol. III, p. 78. Cheshire's theory
is continued by SCHMITTHOFF (ed. 1) 190, cf., 185. An exhaustive refutation
is now given by the editors of DICEY (ed. 6) 561 ff.
109 Chile: C. C. art. 16: an exception to lex situs is made if the contract
determines otherwise, but as a subexception Chilean law applies where the
contract should have effect in Chile.
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this idea, it has been recently asserted that in a French
court a contract made abroad, transferring land situated in
France, is void, if a ucause" in the French meaning is missing, or if the property is inalienable under French law. 110
But if so, it would be due to the conflicts rule rather than to
an automatic effect of an imperative territorialism. The only
necessary effect of the French territorial law is that of excluding foreign transfers from enforcement. Whether an
obligatory sales contract or even an assignment of the ownership has some effect in foreign countries, should not be a
concern of French territorial law; French public law is certainly not interested at all in foreign obligatory contracts,
French domestic private law merely has to deny effect in
France to the contract and to the transfer, while it is the
province of French and foreign conflicts law to state that
the French regulation deserves preference with respect to
the property, though not necessarily the contract, aspect of
the transaction.
For conflicts law, however, it may well suffice that an old
and unchallenged tradition has resulted in a universal principle, natural in view of the physical and economic integration of the property in the territory and affording the
easiest available certainty to the state of the situation, to all
interested parties, and to prospective successors and
creditors.
Justifications of the principle by individual writers have
produced an inclination to admit exceptions in situations
where the reason alleged by the individual writer for the
lex situs does not apply, as for instance,. in the case of
voyaging goods. The lex situs, however, would lose much of
its practical reliability if it were subjected to any exceptions
at all, especially if it allowed party autonomy as has repeat110 NIBOYET,

4 Traite

199,

255·
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edly been suggested. That there is no law at the place where
the thing is-as in the waves of an ocean-or that this
place is unknown, or casual and temporary, constitute no
exceptions to the rule, but instances where it cannot be reasonably applied in fact. And that transfer of title may be
deferred or conditioned purely according to the intention of
the parties, is a part of Anglo-American and Latin domestic
laws, but not of their conflicts rules.
If the law of the place of situation forms an ordinary
conflicts rule (though universally applied and therefore
most precious), no mystery inherent in "laws of surety and
police" is implied. The municipal systems mutually concede, by the conflicts rule, exclusive control of private rights
in the immovables and movables situated in their territories,
on the understanding that the effects of private transactions
complying with the actual law of the situation are recognized so long as the location lasts and, when the location of
movables changes, so long as the new location does not
require a modification of the legal condition.
Our task is much simplified by this statement, since we
may attribute to the lex situs indiscriminately all the domestic rules regarding the existence of rights of private law in
immovables and movables, whether these rules, in the last
resort are intended to serve public or private interests. At
a later juncture, of course, we shall have to survey the conflicts rules regarding territorial change of the locality of
tangible movables.
((Situation." It must be noted that movables have not
always been deemed "situated" for the purpose of conflicts
law wherever they may be found at a certain moment.
Occasionally, temporary location has been considered immaterial so as to favor a foreign situs ;111 removal to another
111

/nfra Ch. 56.
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state without the consent of the owner has been ignored in
the United States;112 and ships and travelling goods are
objects of a comprehensive controversy. 113
While, for the application of the ordinary conflicts principles regarding a tangible chattel, Savigny and his school
required that it should have a permanent location, the word
"permanent" should not be taken literally. Neither do we
require more than a merely physicallocation.114
2.

Property and Contract

Transfer of title. Speaking of the scope of conflict rules
on contract, and especially sales of goods, we have had the
opportunity to state that at present, almost unanimously,
transfer of title is sharply distinguished from promises to
transfer title. 115 This distinction is also made in countries
where property can be transferred through mere consent as
at common law and in the large family of systems following the French Civil Code. The contract containing the
promise is governed by its specific law,-for instance, the
law stipulated by the parties or the law of the place where
the parties are domiciled and contract. But the problems
regarding transfer of property,-such as those of the time
when, or the conditions under which, the transfer becomes
effective; of whether acquisition from a nonowner has
effects, and, in the common-law system, of the capacity to
alienate and acquire-depend on the law where the thing
is at the critical time.
Transfer of movables. While the contractual part of a
112 Infra Ch. s6.
113 Infra Ch. 57·
114 RAAPE, D. IPR.

(ed. 3) 37:z, against Niboyet.
See Vol. III, p. 76 If.; and on the relationship between marital property
law and lex situs,· Vol. I pp. 335-343. Add, e.g., Scotland: 13 Encyclopaedia
of the Law of Scotland 130; DoNALDSON, 4 Int. L. Q. 1951, 106, and about the
frequent confusions, also see CAEMMERER, r:z Z. ausl. PR. ( 1939) 675, 698.
115
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transaction respecting movables is commonly recognized, the
part governed by the lex situs has been often overlooked
and, in recent times, doubted by some courts and writers.
Imagining that in English or French law property passed
by "contract," they would extend the proper law of the contract beyond its obligatory effects. Thus, Cheshire contends
that if two Englishmen make a contract in London, whereby
goods lying in Paris are sold, English law determines not
only whether the goods are fit and merchantable but also
whether the transaction is formally valid and whether a
right of property has passed to the buyer; a title to goods
claimed to have been derived from one of the parties to a
transfer must be determined by the lex actus of the original
transfer. 116 No proof is adduced for this mixture of obligation and ownership.
The question has been more thoroughly investigated with
respect to the Code Napoleon. Bufnoir117 recalled and
Josel Kohler 118 in an erudite study confirmed how, starting
from Celsus' construction of the constitutum possessorium, 119
practitioners have continuously worked to replace the transfer of physical possession as part of a conveyance by less
cumbersome formalities and finally by mere consent. The
Postglossators, the Italian and French documents, the great
wealth of French coutumes and from the sixteenth century
authors such as Tiraquellus 120 and Ricard, 121 drew attention
to various contractual clauses in deeds, such as the clauses
of usufruct, lease, precarium, constitutum simplex, or simply
the uclause de dessaisine saisine." These clauses early hecame ude style" and were presumed to be implied when they
116

CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 437•
BuFNOIR, Propriete et Contrat ( 1900) 39 ff., especially 42, 45·
118 JosEPH KoHLER, Vertrag und ttbergabe, r8 Archiv. f. biirg. R. (1900) r.
119 Dig. 41, 2, r8 pr.
120 TIRAOUELLUS, De iure constituti, IV Jimitatio 31; KoHLER Joe. cit. 37·
121 RICARD, Traite des donations entre vifs et testamentaires, part r,
ch. IV, sect. II, dist. r § 917 ff. ( ed. 1783) p. 235. KoHLER Joe. cit. 38.
117
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were mtssmg. The Code, after different projects, adopted
the traditional conception. Immovables as well as movables
are considered transferred when a contract of sale, exchange,
or donation is made and the parties do not indicate that
they postpone the transfer of the title. Literally, the text
of article 1138, setting the transfer on the time for which
it is promised, says just this; 122 the current construction also
reaches the same result. The clauses of divestment and
vestment, substituting the effective surrender of possession,
have always been a part of the conveyance, not of the
obligatory contract. The same is obvious for their legal
implication.
The consequences for their classification in conflicts law
are now realized in France.123 Passing of title depends on
the respective agreement of the parties, which regards the
property, not the obligation, but is ordinarily to be ascertained from the clauses or circumstances of the contract. 124
If no other clue emerges, title passes instantly by virtue of
the implied clause, or better, the subsidiary legal rule. All
this is naturally governed by lex rei sitae, which must prevail in case it is different from the law governing the obligatory contract, as may happen even in case of sale of immovables.
Also under the light of rational analysis, the effect of a
party agreement on the passing of title is a question of
property and not of obligation. Therefore, we may disregard the opposite view, even though English judges may
have erroneously adhered to it, which has not been proved.
Lease of land in Roman and modern German law is a
122
BuFNOIR, supra n. II7; DESBOIS, Clunet I93 I at 292; ARMIN JON, 2 Precis
(ed. 2) n6 § 28; PICARD in 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT (ed. 2) 628 § 620.
123
NIBOYET, Acquisition ( I923) I24 ff. and repeatedly since; PILLET, I
Traite §§ 33, 352; 359-366; PICARD, loc. cit.
124
Recently, GoRE, 45 Revue Trim. D. Civ. ( I947) I6I, discusses the
French opinions for the various situations involved, but seems to tread on
thin ice.
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mere contract producing obligations ;125 this is also true of
French law, although the tenants of commercial premises
and of rural land have been protected in various respects. 126
At common law, however, leasehold, conceived as an estate,
a real right created by a conveyance, in strict opposition to
contract, 127 constitutes a jus in re. Correspondingly, lease
on the Continent is subject to the conflicts rules concerning
contracts, whereas at common law the law of the situs alone
is traditionally called in to function, and this is the rule of
the United States, as alleged by Beale. 128 In this matter, it
is the contractual element of the agreement that was neglected.
However, American courts have stressed the contractual
character of those party obligations that do not touch the
use of the premises. 129 The duty to pay rent and damages
for anticipated breach of contract by the tenant was early
recognized as an exception to the prevalence of lex situs/ 80
Thus, rights in rem under a lease are governed by lex situs,
125

BGB. §§ 535, 581.
See in particular the laws on propriete commerciale, last deer. July I,
I939; and the postwar legislation, Ord. of Oct. I7, I945 and Law, April I3,
I 946, on rural leases.
127
See BuRBY, Real Property I43; WILLISTON, 53 Harv. L. Rev. ( I940).
896.
128 2 BEALE § 222.1. Of his seven citations, however, two are against him;
in four, situs and place of contracting were identical, as Beale concedes p.
I2I6 when talking of obligations; only in Galleher v. O'Grady ( I9I7) 78
N.H. 343, IOO Atl. 549, lex situs is applied without mentioning the place
of contracting; in this case the issue was the existence of the (principal)
debt to pay rent after a partial eviction, clearly a contractual problem.
The same simple application of the law of the situation occurs again in
Hotz v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City (1939) 108 F. (2d) 216. In
Richardson v. Neblett, I22 Miss. 723, 84 So. 695, IO A.L.R. 272, the problem
is different, viz. whether a domiciliary administrator of an estate may collect
rent as personal property. See also recently McCrow v. Simpson ( I944) I4I
F. (2d) 789.
129 IS A.L.R. (2d) II99-I209.
130 1 WHARTON, Ch. VII and § 276 If.; BuRBY, loc. cit.; IS A.L.R. (2d)
1203.
126
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but as far as payments and mutual rights under covenants
are concerned, lex loci contractus applies. 181
Similarly, when a landlord in Chicago leased local premises to a shoe store firm of Baltimore which became bankrupt, the federal judge held that although any rights in rem
created by the lease were governed by the lex situs ( Illinois), any rights in personam created by virtue of its covenants were subject to the law of the place of contracting
(Maryland) .182
Hence, the "contract" also covers the landlord's failure
to make repairs, covenants to pay taxes, rights of warranty
for fitness, etc. 133
However, this does not exclude situs as a subsidiary contact in cases not distinguished by party choice of law184 or
special circumstances. Such a special case occurs where
both parties have their domicil in one state, in which they
also negotiate and conclude the lease; the law of this state
applies even though the object be foreign land. 185 On the
other hand, when the lease is "made" or "executed" or
"delivered" in the state where the land lies, American
courts have not hesitated to apply the law of that state, 136
131
In re Barnett ( 1926) 12 F. (2d) 70, 77, cert. den. 273 U.S. 699, not
mentioned by Beale; here the second Circuit Court reversed the decision
cited by 2 BEALE 943, n. 7 in favor of lex situs ( 12 Fed. (2d) 70) ; followed
in U.S. v. Warren R. Co. (1952) I27 F. (2d) I36 with respect to "the
contractual rights and obligations created by the leases."
182
In re Newark Shoe Stores, Inc. (D. C. Md. I933) 2 F. Supp. 384.
133
IS A.L.R. (2d) uos ff.
134
France: Trib. Seine (June I, I926) Clunet I927, 400; See alsc
DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 629 on the presumption that the parties had the lex
situs in mind.
Germany: RG. (Jan. 29, I90I) I2 Z. int R. II3·
135
2 FRANKENSTEIN 332 against RG (Oct. I4, I897) JW. I897. S8I Nr.
57· Contra Austria: OGH. (Oct. n, I934) r6 S.Z. No. 210.
136
Amer. Realty Co., Inc., v. Eastern Tire and Rubber Co. ( I93 r) 274
Mass. 297; Bondy v. Harvey (1933) 62 F. (2d) 52I; Franzen v. G. R.
Kinney Co. (1935) 218 Wis. 53·
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131

even though one party signs elsewhere.
In a recent obiter
dictum, it is true, the place of contracting was preferred to
that of the land, but this would have been a meager ground;
the decision finally was rested upon an express and clear
clause of the contract. 188 In Eurpose, lex situs furnishes the subsidiary rule 39 in the same manner as for sales
of immovables, although the situs may be confused with the
place of contracting.
Conditional sales. It needs only a brief reminder that
the usual conditional sale combines two distinguishable
transactions, a sales contract and a conditional transfer of
the title. The mistake of subjecting both elements to a contractual test such as the law of the place of contracting
occurs in American courts 140 and abroad. 141
Co-ownership likewise, in any of its forms, as a real right
is subject to lex situs, in distinction to the contract for creation of the right. 142
187
Cassidy's Lt. v. Rowan ( I9I7) I63 N.Y. Supp. I079, 5I C.J.S. 8Io § 205
n. 44· The Canadian corporation signed in Canada but received the completed instrument ("delivered") in New York.
138
Lee Wilson & Co. v. Fleming ( I94I) 203 Ark. 4I7.
139 England: St. Pierre v. South American Stores [I937] I All Eng. Rep.
206-C.A.: owners in Paris, tenants in England, law of Chile applied as

lex situs.
Austria: OGH. (Oct. II, I934) 10Z. ausl. PR. (I936) 790.
France: Cass. civ. (May 3I, I932) D. I933·I.I7I, S. I933·I.I7, Clunet I933,
347; and Cass. req. (Nov. 2, I937) Nouv. Revue I937, 766 referring to the
same case, invoke submission, party agreement, and lex loci contractus, but
all coincide with the situs; cf., NIBOYET, Revue I929, 592 If.
Germany: RG (Nov. II, I89I) 3 Z. int. R. I57; (Oct. I4, I897) JW.
I897. 58I No. 57; (Apr. 29, I90I) JW. I90I 452; (Dec. 7. I920) IOI RGZ.
64; 2 BAR Io8; NussBAUM D. IPR. 232.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law. art. 8 ( 2).
Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (Jan. 2I, I927) Seemann v. Oswald,
6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 65S·
Switzerland: 2 MElLI 77; 2 SCHNITZER (ed. 3) 621.
140
Supra, Vol. III p. 82; 87 A.L.R. (I933) I3o9; I48 A.L.R. (I944) 375·
Cf., IS A.L.R. (2d) (I950) I3I4 If.; STUMBERG, "Security Interests," 27 Iowa
Law Rev. ( I942) at 532 If.
141 Even 2 FRANKENSTEIN 65, who stresses the importance of lex situs,
declares that reservation of property belongs to the obligatory contract. See
2 GoLDSCHMIDT I66 If. against Cod. Bustamante, art. II8 If.; 2 BUSTAMANTE
(ed. 3) II3 § 93I.
14 2 2 ZITELMANN 330, cf. 363; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 23I §n56.
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3· Right of Stoppage in Transitu
This right of an unpaid seller, as developed in England
since I 690 and stated in the Sales of Goods Act, I 89 3, results in a lien in case of the buyer's insolvency. 143 The
seller does not cancel the sales contract : he simply recovers
possession. But in most systems, bankruptcy of the buyer is
required; in certain systems, goods may be recovered although transportation to the buyer has been completed
before the commencement of bankruptcy, or even after it;
and particulars vary especially with respect to the rights of
a bona fide holder of a document or title, who has purchased from the buyer. In addition, there are different
theories within the same system:
The nature of this right of recovery is very controversial
everywhere; some consider it a right in rem (cancelling the
transfer?) making possible to sue a third acquirer not protected by good faith; others recognize but an obligatory
claim unsuitable against third acquirers. Some teach that
the claim is intended to retransfer the goods to the seller;
the demand of separation would dissolve the sales contract
as an effect of non-payment. Others assert that the sales
contract is not affected; the claim would merely result in the
retransfer of the goods, the re-establishment of things as
they would have been without the delivery, so as to put the
seller again into a position to exercise his right of retention;
not ownership but possession would be revindicated/ 44
Since the systems differ so widely and especially on the
proprietary or merely contractual character of the right,
the entire solution evidently must be left to the law indicated by the territorial situation of the goods. This, it
would seem, points to the law of the place where the goods
are at the time of stoppage. 145
143
144

§§ 44-46; United States, Uniform Sales Act, §§57-59·
DOLLE, "Konkurs," Rechtsvergleichendes Handwiirterbuch, 137·

145

Infra

100.
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In Inglis v. Usherwood 146 stoppage was obviously permissible according to Russian law, as against the English
law of the buyer's domicil, since the contract was made in
Russia between the seller and the buyer's local agent and
the goods were still in the Russian port of departure. The
decision, therefore, has been regarded as reconcilable with
the lex situs theory in general, although it is not conclusive
for it. 141 No case better in point seems to be known.

Illustration. Cheshire, to demonstrate his singular theory
of lex actus, submitted the following example:
"An English merchant, by a contract made in London,
sells to a Swedish buyer copper stored in a warehouse in
Antwerp. He draws on the buyer for the price and transmits the bill of exchange and the bill of lading to the buyer
to secure acceptance. The buyer destroys the bill of exchange, but delivers the bill of lading to X in Stockholm
without receiving value from him. The seller stops the copper in transit before it reaches Stockholm. Let us further
suppose that the stoppage is unlawful by Swedish law." 148
Supposing with Cheshire that the sales contract is under
English law, we cannot take for granted, nevertheless, that
"the right to stop the goods is an incident of the original
transaction." This would be true for English law; but
whether English contracts law is applicable to the right of
stoppage, and furthermore to the conflict between the seller
and the holder of the bill of lading, cannot be simply decided under the law of the sales contract. If the stoppage
is localized in Sweden, stoppage in itself is certainly permissible so long as the goods have not reached the buyer. 149
(I8oi) I East SIS.
Against CHESHIRE'S ed. 3 S79 see editor of DICEY (ed. 6) S6I-S6Z.
148 CHESHIRE (ed. 3) S8I. I have to note, however, in the proofs, that this
passage is omitted in Cheshire's fourth edition.
14 9 Sweden: Sales Law § 39·
146

147
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But of course, the right of the seller has no effect against
bona fide purchasers having acquired under Swedish law. 150
English law has nothing directly to say about all this, although it does decide what the effect on the contract is.
The following chapters will first deal with the application of the principle to rights in immovables and in movables insofar as they are thought to remain in one jurisdiction (Chapter 55). Thereafter, the problems raised by removal of a chattel to another jurisdiction, that is, by the
change of lex situs, will require separate discussion (Chapter 56).
1 5° Sweden: Marit. Law § 166;
Anhang zu §§ 39-41, n. :u-z8b.

1

ToRE ALMEN, Skand. Kaufrecht, 653,

CHAPTER

55

Scope of Lex Situs
I.
I.

CREATION OF REAL RIGHTS BY TRANSACTION

Capacity to Dispose and Acquire

T

HE Anglo-American doctrine has maintained the full
dominance of the situs over the capacity of the parties.
The lex situs determines the ability to convey and to
accept or hold an interest in land 1 as well as in a chattel.
But the reference of this principle to movables has not been
so firm, either in England where opinions are divided in
the absence of authority, or even in this country. 2 Story
held with the great majority of authors of his time that
since movables were subject to the personal law of the
owner, capacity was also governed by the law of the
domicil. 3
1 Immovables (constant practice) : Birthwhistle v. Vardill ( 1840) 7 CI. &
Fin. 895; Bank of Africa Ltd. v. Cohen ( I909) 2 Ch. I29, I3S, I43; on
objectionable grounds, see DICEY (ed. 6) 53 I; CLARENCE SMITH, I Int. &
Comp. L.Q. (I9S2) at 470; CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 5SI.
.
Scotland: Ogilvy v. Ogilvy's Trustees ( I927) Sc.L.T. 83; Black v. Black's
Trustees (I9SO) Sc.L.T. (Notes) 32; DoNALDSON, 4 Int. L.Q. (I9SI) I02.
Canada: Landry v. Lachapelle [1937] 2 D.L.R. 504.
United States: Restatement §2I6; 2 BEALE 94I §2I6.1; GooDRICH (ed. 3)
148, 474; CLARENCE SMITH, "Capacity in the Conflict of Laws," I Int. & Comp.
L.Q. (I9S2) 447.468.
2
Movables: United States: Restatement § 255; cf., 2 BEALE § 333·3• 340·I;
GooDRICH § IS4 n. 83.
England: For lex situs also as to movables, WESTLAKE § ISO, cf., § 165;
FOOTE 279, cf., 2SI•
For the law of the domicil, except for gifts and commercial transactions,
DICEY (ed. s) 6o6, rule ISI; M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 523 § 499 (generally); (Scotch) Black case supra: Lord Mackintosh held a trust settlement of a married woman domiciled in Transvaal invalid under Transvaal
law respecting movables everywhere.
3
STORY §§ 367, 368; I FOELIX §§ 6I, 87, 92, 93; see CLARENCE SMITH
(supra n. I) on Louisiana, Ohio and New Hampshire (infra n. 9).
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On the Continent, the broad expanse of lex situs in transactions involving land has been followed occasionally,
notably in France. 4 The present doctrine, however, is entirely fixed in favor of the personal law, that is, the national
or domiciliary law. 5 This view is so strong also in Latin
America that a provision of the Argentine Code, literally
taken from Story, has been explained away. 6
Apart from the problems concerning corporations, 7 the
question has lost much of its practical importance by the
emancipation of married women. It is still encountered
under numerous systems when a married woman encumbers
her land for the benefit of her husband, 8 and of course with
respect to the disabilities of lunatics and minors.
In no system is importance attached in principle either
to the place where an instrument of conveyance is executed, 9
4 France: See on and against the older decisions involved, PRUDHOMME, "De
l'application de Ia loi de l'etranger 'repute absent' par sa jurisdiction nationale
aux immeubles situes en France," Clunet 193Z, 53, commenting on Trib.
Civ. Seine (April z4, 1931) ibid. 83, which opened a path to the personal law.
Austria: WALKER 135 n. 55 cites a similar decision, OGH. (Oct. zo, 19Z4).
Greece: Cass. (195Z Nr. 3Z3) 5 Rev. Hell. 310: a stock corporation possessed
land in Lesbos, now Greek; its right was denied not because it was an
alien but because under the former Ottoman law of situs a stock corporation
had no capacity to have possessory rights in land.
5 Louisiana: Augusta Ins. & Banking Co. v. Morton (1848) 3 La. Ann. 417.
France: Cass. Civ. (April q, 193z) D. 193Z.1.89 note Basdevant, S.
193Z.1.36I note Audinet, Revue 193z, 549·
Germany: EG.BGB. art. 7·
Switzerland: C. C. Final Disp. art. 7b par. z: national law governs
capacity to dispose of foreign land, whereas for Swiss land capacity according to Swiss law suffices.
6 Argentina: C. C. art. 10, see the literature in z ROMERO DEL PRADO,
Manual Z55 ff.; this author himself, Z7z, seems to interpret "capacity of
acquisition" as meaning the ability of the thing to be an object of property.
7
See Vol. II, p. 73·
8
Cf., Restatement §zz5 comment (b); GoODRICH 391; DIENA, Dir. reali
z87 § 8z.
9
But see Proctor v. Frost ( 1938) 89 N.H. 304, 197 Atl. 813; cf., CooK,
Legal Bases 274; GRISWOLD, 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) IZo6; a mortgage on
New Hampshire land by a married woman securing her husband's debt is
declared valid against the law of the situs according to Massachusetts law,
with emphasis on the place of execution, although the court could have
better invoked her domicil in Massachusetts; see Note 51 Harv. L. Rev.
~•;;38) 1444.
Cook has inspired the editors of DICEY (ed. 6) 531 to
original suggestions.
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or to the place where the obligatory contract is made, or
to any contact of its performance. Civil law, however,
has the well-known exceptions enabling foreigners to contract in the forum with the capacity they would have under
the domestic law. In Germany, this exception allows a
foreigner to dispose of his German immovables or of his
movables situated anywhere, though not of his foreign
immovables. 10
Some modern writers, once more, seem dissatisfied, each
with the rule of his own country. Cook declared the law
of the situs undesirable and seemed inclined towards the
law of the domicil, 11 while Niboyet advocates the lex
situs. 12 Recalling the assumption that the American conflicts rule on capacity to contract is sound in reference to
business matters 13 and that for sales contracts respecting
land a subsidiary rule should refer to the lex situs, 14 it seems
consistent to prefer the lex situs.
This result cannot be based on a renvOI. Repeatedly
scholars have attempted to trace the lex situs to a renvoi
from the law of the domicil, or vice versa to derive the
personal law from a concession by the lex situs. Both assumptions are historically unfounded, since both personal
and real statutes were the elements of the statutist doctrines. Nevertheless, we may accept determination of
capacity by the law of the situation much more easily if at
the same time we admit that capacity may alternatively be
granted by the law of the domicil, on the basis of a renvoi
by the lex situs.
10 Germany: EG.BGB., art. 7 par. 3; RAAPE, D. IPR. 373 f., illustrates.
A Hungarian (then held minor at 22 years) sells a painting hanging in
Budapest and transfers ownership by contract in Germany; after having
brought the chattel to Germany, he tries without success to plead minority.
11 CooK, 52 Harv. L. Rev. at 1269 n. 48.
12 NIBOYET, 4 Traite zos § 1148; 38S § 1196; s id. so8 § IS3I·
13
Supra, Vol. I, p. I9S·
14 Supra, Vol. III, p. 104.
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(a) Exclusive lex situs. In the older civilian doctrine/ 5
the Anglo-American, 16 and a German-influenced group, 17 lex
situs exclusively governs the formalities of transactions creating, modifying, or terminating real rights, as opposed to
the contract promising a transfer. 18 Hence, compliance
with the law where the conveyance is made or a deed delivered is not primarily sufficient. The rule locus regit
actum is not applicable in this opinion. Accordingly/ 9 the
courts put it up to the foreign law of the situation, irrespective of the lex fori, to prescribe registration, 20 or execution
of a mortgage before a court. 21
In the United States, however, the statutes in a number
of states respecting their own land, in turn, recognize a
conveyance executed in another state under the form used
there, 22 and thus restore to a degree the idea of locus regit
15 Prussian A.L.R., Einleitung §us, cf., FOERSTER Eccws, Pr. PR. I (ed.
s) 6o n. 29; 2 FIORE §§ 83 x-833; DIENA, Dir. reali 152.
16 England: Adams v. Clutterbuck ( 1883) 10 Q.B.D. 403; In re Hernando
( I884} 27 Ch. 284.
United States: Restatement§§ 217, 256.
17
Czechoslovakia: Priv. Int. Law art. 7, 36.
Germany: EG.BGB. art. u par. 2; BGB. §§ 313, 925, cf., x BAR 6xs; 2
ZITELMANN 336 j RG. JW. 1928, 2454 j KG. ( 1925) 44 ROLG. IS2·
Greece: C. C. art. 12.
Italy: Disp. Prel. (1942) art. 26 par. 2.
Japan: Priv. Int. Law art. 8 par. 3·
Montenegro: Code on Property ( 1888), art. 799·
Poland: Priv. Int. Law, art. 6, no. 3 (mentioning only immovables).
Also: Montevideo Treaty, art. 26, ( 1940) art. 32. Cod. Bustamante, art.
140 (semble).
18
Supra, Vol. III, p. xo8.
19
Doe dem. Seebkristo v. East India Co. ( 1856) xo Moore P.C.C. 140,
sometimes cited as permitting oral transfer, is based on the Hindu law of the
grantor rather than the coinciding le% situs.
20
Hicks v. Powell ( 1869) L.R. 4 Ch. 741; Norton v. Florence Land &
Public Works Co. ( 1877} 7 Ch. 332.
21
Waterhouse v. Stansfield (1851) 9 Hare 234i (1852) 10 Hare 254·
22
Restatement (immovables): § 217, comment d.; on the laws extending
their compulsory force even to the obligatory contract, see Vol. III, 109.
The states of the Union having such statutes as of 19II have been noted
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actum. In this case a true renvoi is created. The Restatement expressly points to these statutes as an exceptional permission of renvoi with respect to land. 28 They
are much less frequent, however, than the analogous concessions respecting formal validity of wills. The civilian
laws of this group are more rigorous; the German Code
directly excludes the principle of locus regit actum. 24
(b) The French-influenced group, however, directly applies the maxim, locus regit actum, except when the provisions of the situs are intended to protect third persons
or, what is sometimes synonymous, serve the general social
interest. 25 It has been concluded that two Italian nationals,
by a marriage settlement in England without a public
official, may transfer Italian land, and that two foreign
nationals may so transact anywhere outside Italy in the
form of their national law, in both cases contrary to the
municipal Italian rules. On the other hand, by a special
express provision of the French code 26 and those following, 27 a mortgage on domestic property cannot be created
by LoRENZEN, 20 Yale L.J. ( I9II) at 433, and see cases in GooDRICH 454
n. 5·
Ontario: Re Mills [I912] 3 D.L.R. 6I4, 3 O.W.N. 1036.
To the same effect among the member states, Cod. Bustamante, art. I36.
23 Restatement § 8 (I).
24
EG.BGB. art. II par. 2. See also, e.g., the old application of arts. 7 and IO
of the Dutch "General Provisions," Hof Gelder land (May 6, I856) W. I765:
Dutch law as to Dutch immovables does not admit renvoi.
25
France: WEISS, 4 Traite 205 and cit.
Italy: DIENA, Dir. reali 89 and cit. n. I; 292, 319; but see App. Milano
(March 30, I909) Clunet I9IO, I323 (pledge in France of goods situated
in Italy).
26
France: C.C. art. 2I28; followed in The Netherlands, C.C. art. I218, and
the Dutch colonies.
27
Luxemburg: C.C. art. 2188 and Monaco: C.C. art. I966.
Netherlands: C.C. art. I:u8.
Haiti: C. C. art. I895·
Dominican Rep.: C.C. art. 2I28.
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in a foreign country, a rule considered anachronistic and
not to be enlarged by analogy. 28
(c) Irrespective of the contrast of doctrines just indicated, whenever at the situs measures of publication-recording in land register, transcriptions or inscriptions, title
publication, etc.-are required, they can only be effectuated
in the country and district of the thing. 29 The C6digo
Bustamante, article 136, states that provisions establishing
and regulating registers of property and imposing them as
necessary as respects third persons, are "of international
public order." More clearly said, according to the universal force of lex situs, these provisions are essential for
the recognition of real rights in any court.
Another consideration is exemplified by a Swiss decision;
a German certificate of mortgage, a negotiable paper, was
ineffectually transferred in Switzerland; to transfer the
mortgage, the parties should have observed the formalities
described in the German code. 30
28 In 1894 DIENA, Dir. reali 291 n. 5 cited much literature to this effect;
see esp. VALERY in Clunet 1928, 926; BEVILAQUA (ed. 3) 346 and §§ 34, 36.
The French provision is rejected, e.g., in:
Belgium: Mortgage Law of Dec. 16, 1851, art. 77·
Italy: C.C. (1865) art. 1990; (1942) art. 2837.
Argentina: C.C. art. 3129.
Bolivia: C. C. art. 1475.
Brazil: TENORIO 407 § 544 calls the French provision absurd.
Chile: C. C. art. 24II.
Colombia: C. C. art. 2436.
Ecuador: C.C. art. 2430.
El Salvador: C.C. art. 740.
Nicaragua: C.C. art. 3823.
Portugal: C. C. art. 964.
Uruguay: C. C. art. 2324, C.Com. art. 768.
29 Italy: Disp. Pre!. art. 26, par. 2. Of course, an exception is made, e.g.,
for automobiles registered in Italy under the D.L. March 15, 1927, n. 436/Law
Feb. 19, 1928, n. 510, further disposal of which needs inscription in Italy to
have effect against third persons in Italy. MORELLI, Elementi 140; BALLADORE
PALLIERE DIP I62.
30 App. Bern (Nov. 19, 1936) 73 ZBJV ( 1937) 620.
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3· Structure of the Right
As the speaker for the unanimous Supreme Court of the
United States said in 1869, the law of the situs of land conveniently determines "descent, alienation, and transfer, and
. . . the effect and construction of conveyances." 31 Except inheritance and marital property, the same broad rule
obtains with respect to all other tangibles.
Hence, the doctrine of all countries agrees 32 that the
lex situs determines:
whether only certain enumerated proprietary interests are
admitted, as in the Austrian and German system ( numerus clausus), or parties may create new kinds of interests, as is permitted in common law and is controversial in France ;33
what intrinsic requirements exist for conveyances, releases,
adverse possession, prescription, attachment, etc. This
includes also the requisites of consent, delivery of an
instrument or a chattel, and good cause (justus titulus),
good faith, and other elements of acquisition from a nonowner;84
the nature of the interest created ;35
the construction of a deed, with due consideration of the intention and knowledge of the draftsmen ;36
whether creditors of the conveyor may attack an alienation
outside of bankruptcy proceedings. 37
31

Mr. Justice Miller in McGuon v. Scales (U.S. x869) 9 Wall. 23, 27.
See, for instance, the American cases cited by GoODRICH, "Two States
and Real Estate," 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1941) 418; and the German cases in
NUSSBAUM, D.IPR. 304.
33
PICARD in 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 54, § 48.
Spain: no numerus clausus, according to the dominant opinion, but
contra Fed. Puis Pefia, Tratado der. cio Espafiol III vol. x (1951) 20.
34
Corresponding with Restatement§§ 215, 257.
35
Restatement §§ 221, 258.
36
Restatement § 214; but see Taylor v. Taylor ( 1945) 3 xo Mich. 541, 17
N.W. (2d) 745, 157 A.L.R., for primary regard to the intention of the parties.
37
Restatement § 218, comment f.
32

so
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Illustrations. (i) Floating charges are invalid in Scotland; this covers documents situated in Scotland embodying
a part of the charge and the entire encumbrance if the company has its registered office in Scotland. 5 8
(ii) In Germany the owner of real property may have a
mortgage on his own land, in Switzerland an "open rank"
for a mortgage to be given by him, in Austria a right to
dispose of a mortgage discharged by him. 89 No applications for registering a different type are accepted.

4· Place
As a rule, the requirements of the lex situs may be complied with at any place 40 by an act, which, on the other
hand, may mean nothing under the law of such place. This
is particularly true of the transfer of movables. 41 Goods
stored in Chicago may be transferred by sales contract
under common law; the contract may be made anywhere.
Thus a transfer of goods stored in Argentina was validly
made in New York, without interference by the New York
statutory requirement of an inventory for bulk merchandise
sales ;42 and goods stored in Brazil were validly transferred
in Germany. 43 In both cases the Latin-American laws of
property were satisfied by an implied constitutum possessorium.44
Foreign judgments. Of course, the forum will not recognize a foreign judgment adjudging an interest in an im38 Shop Fronts (Great Britain) Ltd. in Liqu., per Lord Birnam (I950),
see DONALDSON, 4 Int. L.Q. (I9SI) I09.
39
BGB. § u63; ZGB. art. 8I3; Ost. ABGB. § 469 and in case of cancelling the mortgage, a priority for three years III Teilnovelle § 37·
40
See against former teaching by SAVIGNY I87 f. and I BAR 633: 2 FIORE
§ 832; DIENA, Diritti reali I67; NIBOYET, Acquisition 292.
41
OLG. Hamburg (May IS, 1894) 5 Z. int. R. 286.
Austria: OLG. Wien (July IS, I948) O.J.Z. I948, No. 654, Ob. Riickstattungs-Kommission (Feb. I2, I949) id. I949r No. 355·
42
Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Hessey (C.C.A. 4, Md. I935) 76 F. (2d)
645, 648, cert. den. 296 U.S. 595 (Lowendahl v. Hessey).
48
RG. (Sept. I6, I9II) Bay. Z. I9I2, 45·
44
Argentina: C.C. arts. 2602, 2387.
Brazil: C.C. arts. 675, 620.
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movable or movable as of the time when the things were
situated in the forum. 45

II.
I.

SPECIAL APPLICATIONS OF

Lex Situs

Remedies

Civil law sharply distinguishes right and possession. But
also possession, as a legally defined factual situation with
determinated legal conditions and effects, is a matter of
lex situs. 46 Civilian authors, therefore, say that lex situs
rather than the law governing inheritance decides whether
possession ends with death or is a subject of succession, u _
a point, however, that needs inquiry-and that lex situs
rather than lex fori determines whether possession may be
recovered. 48 Certainly, the lex situs governs not only the
remedies based on ownership or minor interests but, in
principle, also the remedies based on possession as such,
that is, older or superior possession. At common law, the
same result follows as a matter of course from the nature
of a real right as a right to possession.
The conflicts situation, however, is overshadowed by the
jurisdiction of the court of the situs. "No real action or
action to recover possession of a tangible thing, whether
land or chattel, can be maintained outside the state where
the land or chattel is situated." 49 A similar exclusivity
45 Canada: Chassy v. May (1921) 68 D.L.R. 427, affirming 29 B.C.R. 83:
a judgment in the United States adjudging an interest of a free minor in
Canada has no effect; the plaintiff invoking it is not a bona fide purchaser
and acquires no title.
46 Greece: C. C. art. 27.
Italy: Disp. Pre!. art. u.
Egypt: C.C. art. 18.
Poland: P.I.L. § 6 (I).
For the unanimous continental literature, see, e.g., 2 FRANKENSTEIN 81;
NIBOYET, 4 Traite 229 § IISS·
47
2 ZITELMANN 951. See infra Ch. 65.
48 I BAR 626.
49
Restatement§ 613; 3 BEALE 1652; GooDRICH ( ed. 3) r69 If.
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of jurisdictions exists universally by old tradition 50 for
actions based on rights in immovables. 51
As a natural consequence of this attitude, in actions derived from real rights, at least those respecting land, the
local court applies its domestic law on a large scale.
Nevertheless, the matter is not quite clear. It would
seem that a more exact statement might be as follows:
At common law, lex fori applies in the threefold function as procedural law, lex situs, and lex delicti commissi.
( I) As far as remedies are considered a part of procedural
law-which traditionally goes a long way-the actions relating to property are subject to the domestic law of the
court having jurisdiction in rem, irrespective of the whereabouts or residence of the owner. ( 2) The existence of
possession and of real rights depends on the substantive
law of the forum, qua lex situs. And (3) trespass or dispossession or conversion by severing crops, lumber, minerals,
etc., from the land, are governed by the same system as
lex delicti commissi. (In addition, only recently somewhat challenged, 52 trespass to land produces merely a "local
action," exclusively bound to personal jurisdiction at the
situs, although the action is merely for damages.) In fact,
there does not seem to exist any authority either in England
or the United States for the application of a law other than
that (of the municipal law) of the situs, to determine the
conditions and effects of a real action. Also, respecting
50 Not by attraction from choice of law, as arguments upon the codes assume, esp. the French literature, lastly BATIFFOL, Traite 700 and citations n.
1.
Originally, jurisdiction in rem was even the basis for the principle of
lex situs.
51 E.g. France: C. Proc. Civ. art. 59 par. S·
Germany: ZPO. § 24.
Italy: C.P.C. art. 21 par. I.
Argentina: C.P.C. art. S·
Brazil: C.P.C. art. 136.
52 Judicial abandon of the theory in Minnesota and Arkansas: see note, 6
Vanderbilt L. Rev. (1953) 786-789.

SCOPE OF LEX SITUS

53

such claims as to recover damages for mesne profits, which
can be sued upon separately, 53 no doubt about the applicable
law has been expressed, to my knowledge; probably the
land has always been found to be the place of the wrong.
Among the remedies for disturbance and deprivation of
the enjoyment of movables, detinue must be separated from
trespass and conversion. Presumably, detinue is always
considered a part of the procedural law of the forum.
More adequately, the same result would be based on the
cause of action which is unlawful refusal of restitution, to
be localized at the court. Trespass and conversion have
retained the character of tort. Here, it may happen that
the place of wrong is different from the situs at the time
of the action.
The Continental literature, however, differentiates several groups of actions. According to the Romanistic tradition, in a long development from the second century
A.D., the petition of recovery (rei vindicatio) by which
an owner sues a possessing nonowner, covers various claims,
distinguishable in conflicts law. 54 As the German Civil
Code distinctly expresses the large range of vindication, 55
the owner's action may be analysed as comprising three
groups of claims:
( 1 ) The tangible thing and, according to circumstances,
the tangible proceeds still existing in their specific form 56
are the direct subject of the proprietary right and clearly
governed by lex situs.
( 2) Proceeds and gains converted into the property of
53

England: Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 214.
United States: Restatement §222; the case cited contra in Illinois Annotations, p. 71, MacDonald v. Dexter, 234 Ill. 517, 85 N.E. 209, has a different
subject.
54 Fundamental, 2 ZITELMANN 237, 303.
55
BGB. § 985.
56
§§ 987 par. x, 990·
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the possessor 57 are recoverable by claims derived by law
from the objective violation of ownership, but of the nature
of obligations; their measure is determined by analogy to
unjust enrichment.
( 3) Damages for delay in restitution, or compensation
for omitted earning of proceeds, or for destruction, deterioration, or other impossibility of restitution by fault, 58 are
objects of other obligations ex lege.
The claims under ( 2) and ( 3), though included in the
complex scope of one action in rem, are not necessarily
governed by lex situs. Some writers have applied the tests
adopted for extra-contractual obligations. 59 Zitelmann resorted to a renvoi by the personal law of the debtor to
lex situs. 60 Lex situs is right, but for another reason. 61
As we have found, 62 claims for unjust enrichment should
be governed by the law of the underlying relationship, and
this is the law of the situs when claims for profit are raised
separately as a consequence of transformations such as innocent conversion. These demands are based upon the
property right and included in the enlarged scope of the
action in rem. Convenience, not necessity, directs us to the
lex situs.
A concurring tort action, of course, is subject to the law
of the place of the wrong.
Finally, an analogous rule is commendable for counterclaims of the defendant, which he may be able to oppose
to the action for recovery, or which, in some systems, he
57

58
59

§§ 987 par. x, 988, 993·
§§ 987 par. 2, 989, 990.
2 FRANKENSTEIN 29; M.

60 2 ZITELMANN 240.
61 RAAPE IPR. 382

WoLFF,

IPR. ( ed. 3) I79·

reaches the same result through emphasis on the
identical life relation on which both claims are based.
62
Vol. III, p. 372 If.
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may use in a separate action, particularly on the ground of
expenses incurred for the object of the claim. 63
In sum, the lex situs may well be universally recognized
as determining the remedies based on a violation of real
rights.
2.

Documents of Title

Certain commodity papers contributing to the transfer
of title in goods are treated legally in different ways in the
several systems. These regard not only the requisites for
their recognition but also their effects in the twofold respect: whether the document legally represents the goods,
and whether it is negotiable on order or on the bearer. In
the English, 64 American, 65 and German 66 jurisdictions, bills
of lading, 67 warehouse receipts, air bills, and delivery orders
are "documents of title" (German: Traditionspapiere) ,
with the meaning that under certain conditions transfer
of the paper transfers the ownership in the goods. The
French law denies this effect, although practically the transfer of property rights through consent produces similar
effects, when parties use such instruments. 68
What law, however, determines whether issue or endorsement and delivery of the document by themselves
transfer the ownership in the goods? And whether by the
63 2 FIORE § 788; 2 ZITELMANN 252; DIENA, Dir. reali 337; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 90; GUTZWILLER 1596.
64
England: (not negotiable) ; Bowen, L.J., in Sanders v. Maclean ( r883)
I I Q.B.D. 327, 341 C.A.: "During this period of transit and voyage, the
bill of lading by the law merchant is universally recognized as its symbol."
65
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. s. 40, 41; Uniform Bills of Lading
Act §§ 3 r, 32; Federal Bills of Lading Act §§ 30, 31 ; the entire doctrine
is unified in the proposed Uniform Commercial Code, s. 7-502.
66
Germany: Com. C. § 364.
61
Other functions of bills of lading have been discussed in Vol. III, p.
273 If.
68
RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. § 1910; cf., LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT, s Traite
§§ 714, 715; RG. (May 7, r88o) r RGZ. 415 (Rhineland law).
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acquisition of the instrument the holder acquires more right
than his predecessor had?
In one view, the law governing the obligation of delivering the goods also governs the quality of the instrument in which the obligation is formally laid down. In
the case of a bill of lading, the law of the port of destination has been advocated, under the influence of the German
approach. 69 Probably the same result would find sympathy
by many friends of lex loci solutionis.
But by far the dominant opinion, adopted by the Restatement, predicates that:
"Whether the title to a chattel is embodied in a document is determined by the law of the place where the chattel
is at the time when the document is issued." 70
Illustration. Goods were stored in a bonded warehouse
in Scotland; the owner endorsed and delivered in England
the warrants as security. The pledgee lost his case to an
arresting creditor of the owner. Although under English
law the warrant would have represented the goods, under
Scotch law, the warehouse keeper should have been notified
of the pledge. 71
Only this view is consistent with the all-inclusive scope
of the lex situs. It is at the same time in harmony with the
advisable choice of law for the contract of transportation,
based on the port where the bill of lading is issued.
69
WoLFF, IPR. (ed. 3) I74· In the Seventh Hague Conference of
I.P.L., I9SI 1 (Actes p. I06), Prof. ALTEN (Norway) contended that a bill of
lading may be said to embody the claim against the carrier but not the
goods. It would not be a universally acceptable proposition that the instrument cannot embody the property in the goods.
70 Restatement § 26 I (I).
England: Inglis v. Robertson [1898] A. C. 6I6, by clear implication, see
CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 584 j HELLENDALL, I7 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1939) at 2I.
France: NIBOYET, Acquisition ISs; 4 Traite 622.
Germany: RG. (Dec. 8, I927) II9 RGZ. 215 (semble), cf., NussBAUM
D.IPR. 3I2 f.
Netherlands: VAN BRAKEL I87 § I43·
71
Inglis v. Robertson [1898] A.C. 616. Closely analogous, Hallgarten v. Oldham (Mass. 1893) infra n. 77·
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It must be warned, however, that complications are possible. Transfer of goods may be effected through transfer
and endorsement of documents, according to the law of the
place where the goods are at the time of the issue of the
documents. But not even in Germany, where this doctrine
is most developed, is transfer disregarding the document
excluded. 72 Great doubts, moreover, are caused in common
law and French-influenced law by the role attributed to the
intention of the parties. Does title pass on shipment of
the goods to the carrier or on the arrival of the bill of
lading to the buyer, bank, or agent? We have encountered
this question before. 73 Also the various trade clauses provoke uncertainty. 74 In the normal overseas sale C.I.F.,
it may be recalled, the American law presumes that the
seller contemplates giving up his title by shipping, and preserving merely a "security title," 75 a theory not generally
shared.
At this junction, other questions are prominent. If the
paper is endowed with the ability of transferring ownership
by the law of the place where it is issued, is this law determinative of all subsequent transfers? 76 Or is it true
that quite as the lex situs of the goods at the time of the
issue determines the initial character of the document, the
law of the place where the goods are at the time of their
ulterior transfer determines the function of the endorse72

RG. (Dec. 8, I9Z7) 119 RGZ. 215, z17: assignment of claim for
possession.
73 Vol. III, p. 64.
74 Cf., God, 45 Rev. Trim. D. Civ. ( 1947) 169 If.
75 The correct American doctrine has now been shortly formulated in
opposition to the strange language of the Uniform Commercial Code (Section
z-sos and 2-509) by WILLISTON, "The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code," 63 Harv. L. Rev. (1950) 561, sSI If. The problem,
being substantive, will be discussed in another work.
76
RAAPI!, IPR. 377 If.
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ment? 77 The latter theory would gravely impair the usefulness of negotiable instruments and probably has never
been adopted in practice. Once a bill embodies the title by
the lex situs of the goods, it serves internationally until its
end. Merely the contract of transfer of a bill as a piece
of paper and the form and effect of endorsement must be
sanctioned by the law of the place where the paper is
situated at that moment.
However, a profound discussion of the nature of bills of
lading has been occasioned in Germany by the case where
the carrier involuntarily loses possession of the goods or
fraudulently alienates them. The courts and the majority
of writers assume that the translative effect of the bill depends on the constructive possession of the goods that the
holder exercises through the carrier. Deprived of this
material power, the holder is limited to the obligatory claim
against the carrier and a claim against the possessing third
party. 78 Presumably, most systems agree on the result.
In any case, despite its theoretical underground, this conception would seem to pertain to the law governing possession of the paper at the time of each transfer.
3. Easements
Restatement § 222. "The creation, transfer and termination of non-possessory interests in land are determined
77 z FRANKENSTEIN 58 restricts the ubiquitous force of the paper to its
obligatory effects; HELLENDALL at Z3 invokes Holmes, J., in Hallgarten v.
Oldham (1883) 135 Mass. r, 46 Am. Rep. 433· But the decision deals with
goods stored in a Boston warehouse at all material times and correctly subjects the effect of the endorsement of the warehouse receipt to Massachusetts
law. The problem in question did not turn up.
HELLENDALL 25 n. 44 also cites NIBOYET, Acquisition 195, who does not
express the same opinion and in 4 Traite 622 expressly denies it; and BARTIN,
3 Principes 236.
78
KARL AUGUST ECKHARDT, "Die Traditionswirkung des Konossements,"
in Rechtswiss. Beitrage zum 25. j. bestehen der Handelshochschule Berlin
(1931) 62.
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by the law of the state where the land is." Such interests
are "easement, profits and licenses in land." Since the interest diminishes the powers of the owner, the law of the
servient land is naturally competent to impose the burden.
This, again, is a universal principle and includes contractual as well as legal charges. 79 An illustration of the
latter by a Louisiana case has been discussed earlier. 80
Is this unquestionable rule inappropriate for the purpose,
residential or agricultural, for which servitudes are created? 81 No. The needs of the restriction must he recognized by the state of the situation of the land upon which
the use shall rest. A view requiring that both laws agree
to the restriction 82 is certainly inacceptable.
The scope of the rule includes the permissibility of the
charge, the conditions of its creation ;83 its extinction by
lapse of time, destruction, or merger of ownership; its
transfer, etc. Lex situs must also govern legal obligations
with which a real interest is burdened, irrespective of tort,
such as when a usufructuary has to give security to the
owner, or must indemnize him for proceeds unlawfully derived or for illicit changes of the object. 84
Equally, the lex situs, and not the lex fori, decides
whether an obligation is personal to an individual landowner or runs with the land ;85 whether, vice versa, the
79 France: Cass. (April 20, I89I) Clunet I892, zoo; DIENA, Dir. reali 203
§ 57; 2 FIORE § 8 53; VALERY § 6I6; WEISS, 4 Traite 230 f.; 2 FRANKENSTEIN
98; GuTZWILLER IS99 c; NIBOYET, Revue Droit Int. (Bruxelles) I933, 47I;
MATOs 424; BATIFFoL, Traite SIS§ 5I2.
But see the singular provisions of C6digo Bustamante arts. I3I ff.
8 Caldwell v. Gore ( I932) I75 La. SOI, I43 So. 387, I44 So. ISI; supra
Vol. II, 330.
81 BATIFFOL, Traite SI6 n. I § 512.
82 2 ZITELMANN 328, 565 n. 258; WoLFF, D. IPR (ed. 3) I So, n. II. Contra,
2 FRANKENSTEIN 98 n. 20; supra Vol. II, p. 331·
83 E.g., whether immovables are created "by destination."
54
GUTZWILLER IS99·
85
Restatement § 222, comment b. Cf. supra, Vol. III, no ff.
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successive owners of the serving land have the duty of
positive acting, as, for instance, of maintaining a wall or
an aqueduct in good repair; and whether a liability to pay
money or furnish labor (surviving in modernized form
from the old institutions of tithe and peasants socage in
many present laws) is merely due as a land charge 86 or
implies a personal liability of the successive owner.
4· Encumbrances
(a) In general. The authors of Article 9 of the American Uniform Commercial Code have had the felicitous idea
of largely unifying, for the purpose of their rules, almost
all types of transactions creating collateral rights in chattels
as security for debts. Irrespective of their juristic forms,
chattel mortgage, trust receipt, conditional sale, bailmentlease in goods and documents, are thus joined in the category of security transactions, superseding the present uniform laws covering parts of the ground. The Code further
includes security by accounts and contracts rights. In conflicts law, we ought rather to deal, as with one class, with
all transactions providing security by tangible movables.
Whether the creditor immediately acquires possession
need not be distinguished fundamentally. But intangibles
are different.
Again, the law of the place of the material situation
effectively determines the existence of real rights. In the
case of any security for a debt, it is universally agreed that
lex situs decides whether a real right must be accessory to
a debt, which it is not in all juristic types of security. The
lex situs, it is recognized, does not necessarily govern the
debt. The debt may be under a different law stipulated by
the parties or judicially selected. Also a promise to create
or transfer a mortgage may have its own law.
86

Restatement § 231.
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Illustration. A Belgian debtor secured his debt to another Belgian by an act in Belgium, pledging goods which
he had in France in custody of a third person. The Belgian
court rightly applied Belgian law to the debt, and French
law to the pledge and its sale. (French law, by the way,
recognizes a pledge made abroad, in contrast to a hypothec.) 81 It had been argued that the creditor possessed
the goods through the bailee and the goods were therefore
to be considered situated in Belgium. The court rejected
this fiction. 88
Nevertheless, although the obligations may follow a distinct law, when we look for a typical subsidiary rule, contracts promising to convey a charge on land ought to be
subjected to the law of obligation prevailing at the situs, 89
quite as other contracts "relating" to land. This is particularly persuasive when the buyer of land assumes the personal debt underlying a mortgage. 90
(b) In particular. The lex situs includes the following
incidents :91
on what objects a pledge may exist ;92
what is a real right of security; the nature of legal
or equitable right, a mortgage, pledge, or lien; or,
in other words, the validity and effect of such
right ;93
87

See also NIBOYET, 4 Traite 453·
Trib. com. Bruxelles (Jan. 29, 1930) Clunet 1931, 452.
France: BATIFFOL, Traite 517.
Germany: KG. (Dec. 2r, .1935) JW. 1936, 2466 at 2469 (supra ch. 54 n.
83) respecting the personal debt although not very clearly reasoning.
Italy: CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Priv. 165.
90
Austria: OGH. (June 26, 1930) JW. 1931, 635 (personal debt secured
by mortgage on German land and assumed by the vendee of the land as
sole debtor; applicability of the German law on revalorization).
Germany: RG. (Jan. 12, 1887) 4 BOLZE Nr. 22, cited by NusSBAUM 300
n. S· On necessary application of le:r situs to the assignment of the debt
according to BGB. § I I 54, see M. WoLFF, Sachenrecht § 159.
Brazil: BEVILAQUA 346.
91 See Restatement, statements cited in the following notes, and for liens
§ 230 and charges § 231.
92
RG. (Dec. 7, 1921) 103 RGZ. 259·
93
Restatement §§ 225, zss, 265, 279·
88
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the assignment of such interest and whether a mortgage may be transferred without the debt secured; 94
the defenses of the owner, as, e.g., referring the
creditor to other securities ;95
the power to redeem mortgaged land, after a foreclosure sale and after limitation of action for the
mortgage debt has run ;96
the discharge of mortgages: whether payment after
the maturity of the debt suffices; which satisfaction
is needed; whether an attaching creditor may discharge the mortgage. 97
On these lines it should be settled that any foreign type
of security is to be recognized, except in the narrow field of
public policy. A "bailment and lease contract" of Pennsylvania must not be construed in Georgia as a sale with reservation of title. 98
The situation is different when the goods are in the
forum and the transaction occurs abroad. The title of
three cars, deposited in France, was conveyed by a French
company as security for a loan by a Dutch firm, in a transaction in Germany in the German style of a fiduciary transfer of ownership (Sicherungsiibereignung), and German law
was expressly stipulated. The French Supreme Court rejected the creditor's claim of ownership in the debtor's
bankruptcy, because the acquisition by the creditor of the
94

Restatement § zz6.
Austria: Inversely OGH. (Dec. 4, 1906} 43 Gl. U. 612 Nr. 3586 allows
an Austrian debtor to refer the creditor to a Swiss mortgage according to
Swiss law, which is questionable except where the entire debt was governed
by Swiss law.
9 6 Restatement § 228.
n Restatement § 229.
Austrian OGH. (Jan. 26, 1904) 41 Gl. U. 47, Nr. 2586: who bears the costs
of a receipt required for canceling the incumbrance in the land register?
98
In Motors Mortgage Corporation v. Purchase-Money Note Co. ( 1928)
38 Ga. App. 222, 143 S.E. 459, this was done merely in the absence of proof
of the Pennsylvania law, to satisfy the common Jaw.
95
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cars without judicial formalities would run counter to the
prohibition of a lex commissoria in contracts of pledge, imposed by the French lex situs. 99 The decision has raised a
complicated dispute 100 and is questionable. But on the one
hand, the foreign transaction, except for the sanction, was
recognized as creating a real interest, and on the other
hand, the law of the country where the goods are situated
at the time of the transaction is indeed entitled to restrict
its sanction to those foreign types that correspond to the
transactions admitted in the forum. Here, for once, the
usual process of assimilation to domestic types is not
objectionable.
(c) Satisfaction. In the civilian codes, the chapters of
conventional securities contain provisions defining their
purpose in the case of default. They say whether the
creditor may claim possession of a land or chattel serving
as security without physical apprehension; appropriate the
thing against the debt (lex commissoria); appropriate it
for a price judicially foreordained; have the thing sold in
public auction under or without court supervision, etc. Do
these provisions and the analogous customary rules belong to the substantive real relationship or to procedure?
The Restatement subjects method and effect of foreclosure,
with or without judicial proceedings, to the lex situs. 101
The substantive characterization is commonly recognized,
but this has sometimes been derived from the obligatory
relationship between pledgor and pledgee rather than from
the effects of the real interest; therefore lex loci contractus
would have applied. This is inexact. 102 An obligation,
99

Cass. req. (May 24, 1933) S. 1935·1.257, Rev. Crit. 1934, 142, Clunet

1935. 381.
100 See the various arguments by NIBOYET, Rev. Crit. 1934. 143; 4 Traite
454; BATIFFOL, Rev. Crit. 1934, 631; S. 1935·1.257: LIGEROPOULOS, 8 Repert.
520 No. 28 ff.
101 Restatement§§ 227, 228.
102

C/. infra, Chapter 56.
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whether resting on the pledge contract or on the law, creates
merely a "shall," not a "can." Lex situs governs these
questions with the force of public policy and procedural
compulsion, and controls the binding force of the contract
and what a former lex situs may have permitted. This is
evidently the American doctrine, 103 although in one opinion
the law of the contract governs the right to redeem a
security. 104
Lex commissoria has been usually prohibited since the
Emperor Constantine and therefore is void at the situs as
¥ell as, by public policy, in other courts. 105
(d) Liens. There is an abundant and sometimes obscure variety of obligations and real encumbrances going
under the names of liens, privileges, and rights of retention. As a principle, it is settled that the lex situs decides
whether a right has the character of a real interest/ 06 An
author said even that "it is the lex rei sitae that decides and
decides alone whether an alien is admitted or not to avail
himself of (the privilege) and there is no account of either
the law of the state to which the parties belong or that
presiding at the origin of the obligation." 107 However,
the lex situs must not create the right, it has merely to
control its qualification. As the Institute of International
10 3

Annot. 64 L.R.A. 354·
Annot. 57 A.L.R. 707·
OAG. Rostock, Dec. 17, 1857, 19 Seuff. Arch. 651 No. 107; DIENA,
Dir. reali 315 § 93·
106 Restatement § 279 (despite ambiguous drafting); Cf. 2 Beale § 230.1.
Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (May 10, 1899) Clunet 1900; 1012.
England: London & Provincial Leather Processes Ltd. v. Hudson [1939]
2 K.B. 734·
France: NIBOYET, Acquisition 237·
Germany: 81 RGZ. 283; NUSSBAUM 314 f.; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 91. The liens
of innkeepers (BGB. § 704), forwarding agents, warehouses, and carriers
(HGB. §§ 410, 421, 440) are legal pledges.
Italy: DIENA, Dir. reali 336; id. 3 Dir. Com. Int. 549·
Switzerland: BG. (June 6, 1912) 38 BGE. II 163, 166; (May 13, 1914)
40 BGE. II 203, 208.
107
WEiss, 4 Traite 267.
104

105
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Law once formulated the principle, the lex situs has the
function "to limit or exclude ... the effects of privileges
established by the law governing the legal relationship to
which the privilege is attached." 108
Hence, a privilege, granted at the forum for debts of a
certain kind, extends to foreign-governed debts of the same
or a comparable kind. But in the most recent French
literature, it has been asserted that the priority of enforcement, accorded by the French Civil Code to the fee of a
physician who treated a deceased person in his last illness,
is not allowed to a Belgian physician whose claim is under
the identical Belgian law. 109 The French draft on private
international law, article 52, submits privileges to the law
of the place where they are exercised by seizure or otherwise.110 This, except for maritime law, is a step backward.
The Berne Convention on rail transport of goods has
adopted an international statutory recognition of the liens
of rail carriers. The French text speaks of "gage," which
means pledge, but corresponds with a common-law general
lien by operation of law. In (my) translation:
Article 2 I § I. The railroad has the right of a lienor
upon the goods for the total debt indicated in article 20.
These rights subsist so long as the goods are in the possession of the railroad or a third person holding them on its
behalf.
108 Institute

of Int. Law, Madrid ( 1910), 24 Annuaire 394 art. 3, Revue

19II, 573•

France: Trib. com. Seine (Sept. 6, 1906) Clunet 1907, 366; NrBOYET,
Acquisition 216.
Germany: RG. (Jan. Io, 191I) 24 Z. Int. R. 322, 324; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 901
91 1 231.

109 Belg. Trib. Liege (Nov. 141 1907) Clunet 1908, 565; BARTIN, 3
Principes 257 § 428; NrBOYET, 4 Traite §§ u83, 1219, especially p. 467, who
also insists that a foreign lien must be identical with a French type, 472 § 1222.
110 Lours-LucAs, Rev. crit. 1952, at 59 If., proposes the law of the obligation to which the lien attaches.
'
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§ 2. The effects of the lien are governed by the laws
and regulations of the state where delivery is made. 111
5. Limitation of Actions
An action to recover land in Manitoba is barred by lapse
of time according to the statute of the province of
Manitoba, irrespective of the fact that the land patents
had been signed in Ottawa. 112 With respect to land, this
application of the lex situs is naturally universal, 113 since
the judicial jurisdiction is generally likewise localized.
Movables, however, though following the lex situs, are
subject to the principles concerning the change of situs. 114
III. INTANGIBLES

The old controversy about the situs of debts has its
parallel in the question whether "intangible things," ((biens
incorporels," in general are governed by a law of the place
where they would be deemed situated. When the exclusive
rights of authors and inventors matured to recognition, it
helped them to be labeled literary, artistic, or industrial
property, names still in misleading use in many countries.
A more perspicacious analysis has taught, long since,
that debts have no situs and lack the all-purpose contact
that tangible things have. Copyright and patent rights
belong to the large group of rights in incorporeal
objects that have been termed absolute rights in the
German pandectistic theory. They are analogous to rights
in tangible objects insofar as they contain dominance over
an object and produce actions against any person violating
111
Convention of Berne of October 23, 1923, art. 25, 77 League of Nations 367 ff., HuDSON, 2 Int. Legislation at 1433; Rome draft of Nov. 23, 1933,
art. 25, HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation at 548.
112
Oliver v. The King (1921) 59 D.L.R. 2II, 21 Can. Ex. 49·
113
Treaty Montevideo (1889 and 1940) art. 52; Cod. Bustamante art. 230.
114
Infra Ch. s6 j Shelby v. Guy ( 1826) II Wheaton 361; RAAPE, IPR.
(ed. 3) 382; Cod. Bustamante art. 231: the law of the place where the
prescription is achieved j BUSTAMANTE, 2 DIP. §§ 1303-6 j 2 VICO 244·
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it. But because the object is imagined rather than realthe work of the mind, the new procedure or product of
industrial expertness-it cannot be localized. 115 Furthermore, when these exclusive faculties were created, they were
not endowed with the unlimited scope and duration of the
age-old rights in re. By a compromise between the protection and promotion of the creative human mind and the
interests of national culture or economy, the modern laws
of copyright, patents, designs, and models, define with more
or less generosity the exclusive field of the privilege and
its period of time.
On the ground of these facts, the rights in question have
been commonly conceived as purely national creatures of
territorial sovereignty. Progress in international courtesy
has merely been accomplished by extending the enjoyment
of this territorial right to foreign subjects, an achievement
in the field of the condition of aliens. 116 The vehicles were
the treaties, except for two decisions of the Tribunal de Ia
Seine according foreigners the enjoyment of the French
copyright laws without a treaty. 117
In France, however, a theory has been set forth, rejecting the traditional view and contending that intellectual
property is as good an object of conflict of laws as any
chattel. This implies that the rights are not confined to a
territory but are universal, so to speak, of transitory rather
than local enforcement. Bartin, undertaking to establish
a conflicts rule, speaks of the law of the place of the first
publication as lex rei sitae. 118 This theory even claims
115

Vol. III, p. 75, dealing with the contract to transfer it.
See Vol. II, p. 295· This view has been expounded in an excellent article
by BouCHER, Clunet 1932, 26.
117 (Feb. 14, 1931) Clunet 1932, II3; (Dec. 6, 1933) Clunet 1934, 907,
Revue crit. 1934, 420.
118 BARTIN, 3 Principes 71, 73·
116
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validity for the existing laws. 119 The facts, however, re·
fute this view radically.
If a conflicts rule governed, for instance, copyright,
which is not so necessarily territorial as patents and their
kind, a French book would enjoy French copyright in the
United States. Nothing is farther from the truth. No
state allows other than a domestically acquired copyright
to be invoked against counterfeiting. The United States,
of course, in addition requires special reservations and deposits for such acquisition.
That the international copyright conventions have to
select a local contact for extraterritorial protection of
authors is true. They have preferred, in case of publication, the place of the first publication to the nationality or
the domicil of the author. The reason is certainly not that
the manuscript or original is situated there, 120 but the fact
that publication is the entry of the work of thought into
the external reality.
The Berne Convention takes from the place of publication the condition that the law at this place confers
copyright in its own territory, not because this law should
govern abroad but because the other states see no cause
to protect a work not protected even in its country of origin.
And the duration of the right according to the same law is
the maximum granted by the other countries, for the same
reason and not because the law of origin has a positive
extraterritorial effect.
We may, hence, dismiss this subject from the conflict of
laws.
The Berne Convention declares in the case of nonpublished works that the country of which the author is a sub119 Thus, most
120 As BARTIN,

eloquent, BATIFFOL, Traite
supra n. II7 suggests.
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ject is the country of origin. 121 This conforms to the conception that the right to publish or of priority is a right of
personalty and subject to the personallaw. 122
Aggregates. Commercial enterprises and agricultural
estates have been increasingly recognized as units of partially independent existence in the commercial and procedural
literature, and form also the subject of various laws.
Nevertheless, neither has the recognition become clear and
comprehensive enough nor have conflicts rules been prepared giving preference to such parts of enterprises as
goodwill or real leasehold right so as to create an exception
to the lex situs of the immovables or movables with which
the enterprise is connected.
121 Convention of Berne, art. 9, of Berlin and Rome, art. 4·
Int. Legislation at 2468.
12 2 Supra, Vol. I, p. 102.
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Removal of Chattels
1.

PRINCIPLES

)\ FTER considerable international discussion in the
civil law countries, agreement has been reached on
the basic principles suitable to movables changing
their position. The American doctrine is consistent with
these principles, although the courts are not always conscious of rules transcending "comity." The English opinions
seem slowly to accept the same standards.
For the sake of simplicity, acquisition of real rights will
be primarily envisaged; but modification and termination of
such rights follow the same principles.
A chattel, subject to real rights in one territory (X), is
moved to another territory (Y), hence to a new lex situs.
The situations are conveniently distinguished by the authors, according to the criterion whether a transaction intending the acquisition of a right prior to removal of the
chattel has been completed in the jurisdiction of X, with
success or without success, or has been left uncompleted
when it is moved to Y.

.l"l.

I.

Successfully Completed Acts

Real rights in a movable, validly created under the law
of one state, X, persist with extraterritorial effect after the
movable has been transported into another state, Y. It
does not matter that the same right could not have been
created in Y, whose law has more exacting conditions. 1

zs

1 WAECHTER,
Arch. Civ. Prax. 387;
NIBOYET, Acquisition 81 and 4 Traite § II94·

DIENA,

England: Cammell v. SewelJ (r86o) 5 H. &

70

N.

Diritti Reali 163 If.;
728,

LoRENZEN,

Cases

REMOVAL OF CHATTELS

71

When, for instance, title in a piano, exhibited in a showroom in New York, passes to a buyer by consent, the ownership of the buyer remains intact if the piano is brought to
Argentina, the law of which requires delivery for transfer
of title. Recognition is given as well in the United States
as in Argentina and in third countries. 2
A German farmer once bought a horse in Mainz where
French law was in force; when the horse arrived on the
Rhine bridge, it hit a passerby. He was liable for the injury
as owner, even though the horse had already reached the
territory of Roman law. 3
Thus, the universally recognized working of the law of
the situation, most remarkable in itself, is extended to the
period of time subsequent to that situation. The effects of
the former lex situs include formalities, consent, and all
other intrinsic requirements of conveyances, except, in the
civil law courts, capacity of the parties/
Recognition, however, does not include the capacity or
incapacity of the chattel to be transferred when it is removed to another jurisdiction. Although the domestic law
of the situs determines for its own purposes whether a thing
is alienable at all (in commercia) and the specific person
who may acquire, other jurisdictions are not committed to
recognttton. Thus, slaves serving on an estate in Kentucky and considered immovable were held to lose this
(ed. 4) 6I3; Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank [I90S] I K.B. 677; DICEY
(ed. 5) 6o8; FALCONBRIDGE, 8I U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I933) at 820.
United States: Rabun v. Rabun ( I86o) IS La. Ann. 47I; Sleeper v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. (I882) IOO Pa. 259; GooDRICH (ed. 3) 475 n. 88.
France: App. Rouen (Jan. 28, I878) S. 1878.2.54·
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Nov. n, 1892) 49 Seuff. Arch. 208 No. uS (although speaking of lex loci contractus instead of lex situs) ; OLG. Hamburg
(May 18, 1894) 5 Z. Int. R. ( 1895) 286; and subsequent common practice.
Greece: App. Patras ( 1904) 16 Themis 347, Clunet 1907, 1197.
2
See cases cited by GooDRICH 475 n. 87.
To analogous effect: RG. (Sept. 16, 1911) Bay.
1912, 45·
3
OLG. Darmstadt (Dec. 31, 1897) 29 Puchelt's Z. franz. C.R. 688.
4
Switzerland: App. Bern (June 22, 1926) 62 ZBJV. ( 1926) 474·
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character when brought to Missouri. 5 The analogous decision of a French court that a Spanish church chalice, res
sacra and "extra commercium" in Spain, and carried to
France, where Baron Pichon, a collector, purchased it, was
transferable, 6 has won notoriety in the conflicts literature.
The modern cases of "nationalization" and confiscation,
however, have been the subject of fundamental controversy
far beyond the realm of private international law.
Ordinarily, when we apply a foreign law to an act we
also apply subsequent changes in this law. But can lex
situs X, having created a property right, abolish it subsequently although the chattel meanwhile has been removed
from X? This is claimed for the French annulment of
acquisitions during the German occupation of chattels later
deported from France, notwithstanding the expectation that
other states would not recognize such destroying effect. 7
Primordial political reasons may justify exorbitant exceptions. The rule must be that the power of lex situs is exclusively exercised during the period in which the thing is
situated in the territory.
Indeed, the power of the actual situs is unlimited.
Normally, it modifies the incidents of the right, replacing
the creating law, for instance, as to the legal restrictions
to the exercise of ownership, or the period of time allowed
to an usufruct. It decides whether a pledgee is entitled
to self-appropriation of a pledge in case of default of redemption, although this is not merely a procedural question,
etc. 8
But though the new law is sovereign, international life
requires restraint. That the present situs should not rec5

Minor v. Cardwell ( 1866) 37 Mo. 350, 356, 90 Am. Dec. 390.
Trib. civ. Seine (April 17, r885) Clunet r886, 593·
NIBOYET, 4 Traite 372 f., § 1193 n. I.
8
Supra Ch. 55, p. 17.
France: BATIFFOL, Note to Cass. req. (May 24, 1933) S. 1935.1.257·

6
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ognize foreign-created rights when their kind is unknown
to the forum, is untenable as a general proposition. Even
where the types of admitted real interests are exclusively
enumerated and regulated, as in Germany, the consequence
is merely that foreign created rights are assimilated to
domestic categories.
Nonrecognition generally is to be encountered only on
the ground of repugnance to specific institutions, as when
the transaction lacks necessary publicity or is usurious in
the eyes of the forum. This is public policy in its ordinary
aspect. 9
Defenses. Since an interest acquired in X has international effect, equal effect must be attributed to certain
restrictions and objections acquired under a law which at
the time was the lex situs. This is normally the time when
the defendant acquired possession. If such defenses are
based on substantive grounds under the law of the place
where the defendant acquired the object and the defense
thus was created opposable to every holder of the interest,
they are protected everywhere. 10
An outstanding example is the right of a bona fide purchaser to reimbursement of the price paid by him, under
rules going back to the thirteenth century, 11 and adopted in
the former Prussian Landrecht, the French and many other
codes, including that of Louisiana. 12 There is also a cor9

Infra II.
RG. (Nov. I4, I89I) 28 RGZ. I09, III (place of pledging); App. Bern
(June 22, I926) 62 ZB]V.474 (action of the dispossessed owner of securities
against the purchaser); DIENA, Dir. Reali I6J; I MElLI 395; NIBOYET, Acquisition 297 n. j 2 FRANKENSTEIN 7I, n. Io6,
Egypt: C.C. art. I8.
Czechoslovakia: Priv. Int. L. § 39·
11
For France, see PICARD in 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT (I952) 393 § 394 n. 3·
12
Prussia: A.L.R. part. I, Title I 5, § 26, French C.C. art. 2280; Louisiana
C.C. ( I870) art. 3507; Netherlands B. W. art. 637; Italy former C. C. ( I86s)
art. 709; Switzerland C. C. art. 934 par. 2. Cf., Austria: ABGB. § 33 I.
10
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responding rule in England and New Y ork. 13 The French
provision allows the owner of a "stolen" or lost movable
to sue a possessor who purchases at a fair or market or in
a public sale or from a merchant dealing with similar
goods, provided that he reimburses the price paid. The
German courts have construed this provision as granting
a substantive right, though it can be used merely as a dilatory defense. This construction is reasonable. Whereas
some laws permit the owner in such cases to recover without compensation, and others do not allow any recovery,
the solution in question is a compromise of old date. This
defense ought to be placed on the same plane of property
rights as the results of the more extreme provisions.
Therefore, since the purchaser of a stolen car in a French
public sale does not acquire ownership (before completing
adverse possession in three years, article 2279 paragraph
2) but acquires a counterclaim for recovery of the price
against an action by the owner, he may assert it in any
country. 14 It does not matter under what law the plaintiff
acquired his title (unless he acquired title afterwards in
good faith free from previous encumbrances), or whether
the lex fori includes a similar provision.
It has been held, however, in an old German case that
the possessor cannot transfer his protected position when
he conveys the chattel to a third person in a state permitting the owner unconditional recovery. 15 This is in13
Viz., where an apparently authorized selling agent transfers title through
a commodity paper:
New York: Factor's Act, Pers. Prop. L. s. 43, ss. 3: nothing shall prevent
the true owner of a merchandise from demanding or receiving merchandise
upon prepayment of the money advanced.
14
Common opinions: OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 19, 1894) 49 Seuff. Arch. 386
No. 229: a diamond pin stolen in the domain of the Prussian Code which
permits unconditional recovery, was sold to a bona fide purchaser in Hamburg requiring compensation of expenses; Hamburg law applied. Accord:
1 BAR 633 f.; KosTERS 715; I MElLI 396; WALKER 365; see DuDEN 43·
15
RG. (March 19, 1898) 41 RGZ. 152, Clunet 1900, 635; approved by
LEWALD 183 § 243, but contra RAAPE IPR. 384 referring to BGB. § 986.
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acceptable. The owner, in the case involved, lost possession of securities by theft in Hamburg. The securities
were sold in Paris between bankers; hence, the owner could
recover them only against payment of compensation. Should
the same owner acquire more rights by a new change of
hands between other persons, this time in Germany, only
because German substantive law allows full recovery of
stolen goods? This result is inconsistent with the undisputed transferability of ownership acquired in one country
to successors in other countries. Under all the laws mentioned, the right to reimbursement ought to be conceived
as a proprietary right exercisable as a defense.
2.

Defective Acts

If an acquisition was attempted in X but failed to be
effective through absence of a required element, the deficiency cannot be cured merely by removal of the chattel to
another territory.
Illustrations. (i) To vary a well-known American case/ 6
a diamond entrusted to a broker in New Jersey and there
pledged by the latter to an innocent purchaser, is not effectively pledged. The result is not changed if the stone is
brought to New York, under whose Factors' Act an innocent pledgee prevails over the owner.
(ii) In the old English case of Inglis v. Usherwood, 11
delivery on board a chartered ship in the port of lading,
Petersburg, under English law would have been equivalent
to delivery to the English buyer. But under the Russian
lex situs, the transfer was cancelled by repossession of the
goods in the port. The English court recognized this after
the goods had been landed in England.
16 Charles T. Dougherty Co. v. Krimke (1929) ros N.J. Law 470, 144
At!. 617, LoRENZEN, Cases (ed. 4) 6r6, mistakenly decided the case by extending New York law to a pledge in New Jersey, cf., 38 Yale L.J. ( 1929)
988; STUMBilRG (ed. 2) 394; GoODRICH (ed. 3) 477·
17

(
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I
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(iii) Acquisition in Berlin of securities to bearer by a
banker operating as commission agent made him the owner,
although under the law of Hanover the principal domiciled
there would have directly acquired title. 18
By consequence, mere removal to another state also does
not help the creditors of the acquirer.
The scope of this rule, however, will be better tested in
connection with the effects of the new lex situs.
3· Events in the Second Territory
The law of the second situs, state Y, determines the effect
of new events, such as a sale, a pledge, adverse possession,
seizure, and legalliens. 19
Illustrations. (i) In the English leading case of Gammell
v. Sewell 20 the title acquired by sale of the cargo on board
a Russian ship by the master in a Norwegian port, the
actual situs, was sufficient to defeat the English owners,
suing for conversion, although the sale would not have
been valid in England.
( ii) Horses were sold by a conditional sale in Hesse,
under German common law, and validly acquired by an
innocent purchaser while situated in Prussia. 21 Instruments
to bearer, stolen in Germany, were sold at the London stock
exchange and validly acquired by English law. 22 Most
American courts decide in the same manner. 23
(iii) Under Austrian law the cars of an Austrian railroad were included in a mortgage (immobilized, "hypothecated"), but while, in Bavaria, unless such mortgage was
recorded, they could be seized as independent movables,
18

RG. (Feb. 15, 1884} II RGZ. 52.
Switzerland: BG. (June 26, 1912) 38 BGE. II 194, 198: lien of the
Swiss carrier on goods sent from London and Brussels.
2
Cammell v. Sewell (186o) s H. & N. 728, 157 Eng. Rep. 1371.
21
OLG. Frankfurt (Julys, 1890) 4 Z. int. R. ( 1894} 148.
22
RG. (Oct. 6, 1897) JW. 1897, 573·
23
See infra.
19

°
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subject only to rights of pledge. 24 Seizure by a creditor was
therefore allowed.
An example of a special situation has been furnished by
the persistence of the common law hostility against security arrangements where the creditor is deprived of possession. Thus, a horse was mortgaged in Maryland by recordation without delivery of possession, third persons
being charged with knowledge of the incumbrance. But
brought to Pennsylvania, the horse was acquired by a bona
fide purchaser, because under the law of this state chattel
mortgages were ineffective against third persons. 25 Conversely, title was retained in a conditional sale in Pennsylvania of a safe and valid only between the parties. But
when the safe was subsequently removed to New Jersey,
under the law of the new situs, the title of the owner became superior to the right of a thereafter attaching creditor
of the buyer. 26 The creditor's objection in this case is
interesting, as it seems theoretically well to describe the
plaintiff's title as originating in Pennsylvania in the character of a right too weak to resist a judgment and execution
or claims of other new acquisitions. But the court replied
elegantly; also under this original law the buyer had no
right to sell and make title to a purchaser under all circumstances. In fact, acquisition of rights defeating the
reserved title depended on the lex situs of the time of
acquisition, that is, New Jersey law. The law of Pennsylvania subsequently has become the same, although under
the Uniform Act conditional sales and under a special
24 Bay. ObLG. (Nov. n, z882) 38 Seuff. Arch. 213; analogous Oberapp. Ger. Koln (Jan. 4, z834) 19 Rhein. Arch. 234, see RoBERTSON, Characterization 2n; OLG. Karlsruhe (Dec. 12, 1892) 25 Puchelt's Z. franros. Civilrecht 46: cabs "immobilized" and mortgaged in Basle, validly seized in
Baden by the owner's creditor.
25
MacCabe v. Blymyre ( 1872) 9 Phila. 6zs.
26
Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton ( z886) 48 N.J. Law 410, 7 At!. 418.
Similarly about a bailment Cooper v. Phil. Worsted Co. (1905) 68 N. J.
Eq. 622, 6o At!. 352 (under different name).
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act 27 chattel mortgages were effective when recorded in
the state, and therefore the courts no longer consider chattel
mortgages repugnant to the domestic public policy. 28
An excellent exception to the effect of the second situs
has been established in various American cases. When a
chattel is removed to another jurisdiction by force or fraud
in favor of a creditor so that he may attach the chattel at
the new location, this situs is disregarded and jurisdiction
denied. 29 The Ontario court similarly has released a seizure
obtained by a creditor who cunningly induced a friend to
bring a boat from the Detroit side of the bordering river
to Windsor. 30
It does not seem, however, to be a basic idea of the
American decisions that consent of the owner to a removal,
as such, exposes him to the effect of disposals by other persons in another state. This would amount to a waiver
where no such intention can be presumed. 31 What the
courts in increasing cases have done, is to stigmatize wrongful removals, assuredly also in pursuance of the common
law attitude protecting titles. This current is openly displayed when recordation in Y is omitted (infra, III, 4).
4· Incomplete Legal Situations
More controversy is encountered in the cases where an
act in X has not ripened either to failure or to success.
27

Act of July 15, 1936, First Ex. Sess. P.L. 47 (21 P.S. § 842).
Kephart, J., in McCurdy's Est. (1931) 303 Pa. 453, 154 At!. 707;
Baldridge, J., in Personal Finance Comp. of New York v. General Finance
Co. ( 1938) 133 Pa. Super. Ct. 582, 587.
'
29
Timmons v. Garrison (Tenn. 1843) 4 Humph. 148; Deyo v. Jennison
(Mass. r865) ro Allen 410; Sea-Gate Tire & Rubber Co. v. Moseley ( 1933)
161 Okla. 256, r8 Pac. (2d) 276 (all dealing with deceit); cf., the English
decision Hooper v. Gumm (r867) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 282, concealment of the
mortgage by the mortgagee.
3
Canada: Houghton v. May (1910) 22 Ont. L. R. 434, aff'd 23 id. 252.
31
But GooDRICH (ed. 3) 483, 487 f., criticizing the role given to the consent,
and also MORRIS, 22 Br. Y. Int. L. 245, expound different points of view.
28

°
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The most discussed instance is sale and dispatch of goods
from a country, where delivery is required to pass the title
-Argentina, Germany, Switzerland-to another jurisdiction considering consent sufficient to do so-United States,
France, Italy. Does title pass on the border? Before the
first World War, German shippers sent goods to English
buyers, and the goods arrived in England but, whether lost
or seized, were never received by the consignees. Had the
title passed? Two opposite opinions have been advanced.
(a) Since the requirements for transfer of ownership
are unfulfilled so long as the goods are in territory X, the
seller remains the owner until in Y a new act, such as an
agreement or adverse possession, complying with the law
of Y, transfers the title, without regard to what happened
in X. 32 For adherents of the vested rights theory, it is
obvious that no such right existed in X.
The Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal gave this
logically indisputable conclusion an unnatural twist in contending that the intention of transfer required by the English Sales of Goods Act was missing, because German merchants had contrary intentions suggested by the German
code. 83 This is a fictitious assumption of an intention, extending German legal conceptions of property questions to
English territory, whereas the merchant mind is notoriously
indifferent to these questions. 34
(b) In the contrary view, the facts existing at the
moment when the situs changes are evaluated under the
3 2 BARTIN, 3 Princi pes 2 33 ; DESBOIS, CJ unet I 93 I, 309 at 3 I 5 requires
that the title must be based on the lex situs as of the time of its alleged
acquisition; NIBOYET, 9 Repert. 23I, Nr. 57; I04 Traite 374 (requiring a new
sale in France) ; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 390.
33 E. Liittges & Co. v. Ormiston & Glass, Ltd. ( I926) 6 Recueil trib. arb.
mixtes 564; Biisse v. British Manufacturing Stationery Co. (I927) 7 id. 345·
34
RABEL AND RAISER, 3 Z. ausl. PR. (I929) 62, 67; RAAPE, IPR. 38I,
394 n. 36. An anticritique by HELLENDALL, "Res in Transitu, etc.," I7 Can.
Bar Rev. (1939) 7 at 17 misses the point.
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new law. 35 A sales contract and goods dispatched in Germany, at the moment when the goods cross the frontier to
France become sufficient operating facts to exercise the
3ame effect as if they had occurred in France or England. 86
:-Iowever, the j~stification of this result varies somewhat. 37
Either the rule of article 2279: En fait de meubles, possession vaut titre, is interpreted as protecting the transaction
between the possessor and a purchaser in good faith; this
transaction is construed from the facts that took place
abroad. Or the great principle of article 2279 is understood broadly to protect possession as such, rather than
the transaction, against the claim of ownership; hence the
buyer, as soon as he possesses through the railway or the
forwarding agent, acquires title.
Conforming to the latter variant, when a chattel is innocently purchased from a nonowner in England where no
title is acquired, and thereafter imported into France, the
purchaser may now enjoy the French usucapion of three
years (article 2279 paragraph 2) .88 It seems surprising
that article 2279 should operate without regard to article
IIJ8. But it does have its peculiar history. 89 Yet respecting conflicts law, both opinions are inexact, because the
entire question is exclusively concerned with the municipal
35
OLG. Zweibriicken (July 13, 1898) xo Z. int. R. 220, S. 1901-4·25; RG.
(May 7, x88o) x RGZ. 415; 2 ZITELMANN 337·
36
DIENA, Diritti Reali 175 ff.; 2 FIORE § 818 j 4 WEISS 212 j 8 LYON-CAEN
ET RENAULT § 1291 j see cases in NIBOYET, Acquisition 397 ff. j and id. 9
Repert. 230 §§ 49, 51 j 2 FRANKENSTEIN 69.
37
LEWALD 187, § 248; RAAPE, IPR. (ed. 3) 393 f. (apparently in contrast
top. 381) j BATIFFOL, Traite 5II n. I.
38
Cass. civ. (March 141 1939) S. I939•I.I82 j LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE
§ 355i SURVILLE § 174; BATIFFOL, Traite 510.
39
See the valuable study by WALTER MERK, "Die Entwicklung der
Fahrnisverfolgung im franziisischen Recht," 7 Rhein. Z. f. Zivil. u. Prozessrecht ( 1914) 81, 173, at 218 ff.
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law of the new situs. 40 In conflicts law, the second situs
has to work with its own system and with the facts occurring
during its own reign. True, it must not be required that
all party declarations should be faithfully recited on the
territory of Y as if a void sales contract were to be cured.
We understand well what the parties intend. But as the
ways of the law go, this continued intention ought to be
in some manner manifested. Receipt by the buyer's forwarding agent or by the railway, if considered the buyer's
agent, suffice for this purpose.41
II. LocAL PuBLIC PoLicY

r. NewYork
While we shall have to note remarkable exceptions accorded by American courts to foreign-created security interests (infra III), exceptional favor has been shown
sporadically to the law of the forum. In litigation between
citizens of New York, the New York Court of Appeals
has restored property rights when chattels were removed
from the forum without the owner's consent and the rights
were lost abroad under the foreign law. 42
In Edgerly v. Bush/8 two horses were mortgaged in
New York State, then taken by the mortgagor to Quebec
and sold by a trader to a bona fide purchaser who, as the

°

4 Contra: BATIFFOL, Traite §§ sos, so6, who bases his position on his
theory that our problem should be solved in analogy to a (questionable) intertemporal doctrine distinguishing between the regime of subjective rights
(which is the new statute) and the procedure of acquiring these rights
(governed by the old statute). Cf. infra n. 53·
41 RABEL-RAISER, 3 z. ausl. PR. 67; in this conclusion followed by
HELLENDALL, supra n. 34 at 18.
42 BEALE, "Jurisdiction over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel," 40 Harv.
L. Rev. ( 1927) 8os against the Edgerly case. Note, "Jurisdiction over Movable Property Brought into a State Without the Owner's Consent," 24 Harv.
L. Rev. ( 1911) 567.
48
Edgerly v. Bush (r88o) 81 N.Y. 199.
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court understood it, 44 acquired title according to Quebec
law. When the horses were sold another time to the
defendant, a resident of New York, but remained in
Canada, the mortgagee sued with success for conversion.
The court recognized that the defendant acquired title in
Canada although he knew of the mortgage, but as the
property was taken out without the consent of the plaintiff, the foreign rule was overcome by the domestic policy.
Wylie v. Speyer 45 was suggested by the preceding decision.
Railway bonds were stolen from the plaintiff's New York
bank deposit; coupons from them were bought after maturity validly at a German stock exchange by the bank of
Speyer & Co., who sent them to their New York affiliate
for collection. Under New York law the coupons, acquired
after maturity, were ordinary property to which the court
declared the law of the forum applicable as against the
former German lex situs.
The arguments employed in the two decisions have been
refuted by Beale and Goodrich. 46 The first decision was
the more shocking as the chattels had remained outside
New York and even in the very jurisdiction in which the
recognized acquisition had occurred. The Restatement has
refrained from formulating a general preference of older
rights in case of removal without the consent of the entitled
person, although it adopted such rules in favor of chattel
mortgage and conditional sale. 47 But it apparently discourages the state into which the chattel is brought without
44 Wrongly, see Quebec C.C. art. 1489 and FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of
Laws 381 n. (f).
45
Wylie v. Speyer (N.Y. 1881) 62 How. Pr. 107. GoODRICH (ed. 3)
479, n. 102 observes that in both cases the court maintained the domiciliary
law of the owner and did not mention the removal without the consent of
the owner.
46
GoODRICH supra n. 45·
47
Restatement§§ 268, 275.
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the consent of the owner from taking "jurisdiction," 48
which is a very strange idea.
Neither in England nor Canada, nor in any civilian country, have such unprincipled singularities been known. 49 It
seems promising that these decisions have not been followed, although the New York court has not yet clearly
abandoned its special favor for its domiciliaries. What
would become of the universal rules, included in the lex
situs, if every court were to protect only its own citizens,
flouting rights acquired abroad?
France

2.

A law of 1872 bars the acqutsttwn of lost or "stolen"
instruments to bearer, registered in a "bulletin des oppositions," under the assumption that the mere fact of publication in the bulletin destroys any purchaser's good faith.
The courts have applied this exclusion of bona fide purchase
in the widest sphere, even to foreign-created securities and
to foreign thefts or losses. Registered instruments are
therefore always recoverable in France, irrespective of any
interest created abroad at a temporary situs. 5°
This ruthless practice, fully inconsistent with the cherished doctrine of vested rights, has been analyzed and
severely criticized in the older French literature and in
other countries. 51 Present French writers tend to excuse
this defiance of international order as a legitimate exercise
48

Restatement § 49, Caveat and Comment to Caveat.
FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 384 f.
5
French Laws of June IS, I87z, Feb. 8, I90Z, March 8, I9IZ, and special
laws concerning losses during the wars. Banknotes and French governmental
securities, excepting railway bonds, are excluded (art. I6). The bar to circulation does not affect separate coupons of interest or dividend (art. z par. 7,
of I872).
51 LYON-CAEN, I9 Annuaire Inst. Int. Law ( I902) I 59; PILLET, I Traite
778 § 375 and Principes 564 § 3I4i DuDEN, "Der Rechtserwerb vom Nichtberechtigten," 8 Beitr. Ausl. PR. 92 ff. and in 8 Z. ausl. PR. (1934) 642.
49
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of territorial power. 52 After several other lame explanations, a distinguished author asserts that the intertemporal
principles serve as analogy and that the question is one of
domestic rather than of conflicts law. 58 I must disagree
on both counts. It is certainly a conflicts problem whether
foreign-acquired rights are to be enforced against domestic
interests; and respect for an intervening foreign law may be
due even though an analogous new domestic regulation was
and ought to be deprived of retroactive force.
In Germany 54 and Switzerland/ 5 the courts have stated
that a banker acts with gross negligence if he fails to organize and supervise a continuous and exact list of lost or
stolen securities notified by the police or other authorities.
But for international needs it is not helpful to dictate to
the world. What is required is a reliable network of international notification. Although at present bank deposits
and safes operate as preventives of theft, an international
convention for co-operation is recommendable.
III. SECURITY INTERESTS 56

The American courts agree with the civil law doctrine on
the principles described above, but have developed some
special rules respecting conditional sales and chattel mortgages. This requires a discussion of the security interests
in tangibles, in which we include all legal forms of transactions intended to procure security to a creditor for satisfaction of his claim by providing him with a true real right
in a tangible movable thing.
The transactions creating such rights also comprise obliga52

NIBOYET, 4 Traite 432.
BATIFFOL, Traite 512, cf. supra n. 40.
54
37 RGZ. 71; 41 id. 207; 28 id. 109.
65
BG. (Nov. 24, 1899) 25 BGE. II 840, 846 f.; Trib. com. Bern (Sept.
17, 1946) 83 ZBJV. ( 1947) 79·
56
See supra Ch. 55, III.
53
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tions and are connected with procedural steps. N evertheless, primary importance prevailingly attaches to the measure of recognition a security enjoys at a new situs as respects attaching creditors and bona fide purchasers.
Using the American statutory terminology, 57 we may
speak of "creditor" and "debtor" to indicate generally the
parties to a security agreement.
The fact that in American law no certain line divides
mortgages and pledges from privileges in execution and
therefore "title" and "lien" doctrines are in strife, has
increased the uncertainty in this field. The draft of a
Uniform Commercial Code-"Secured Transactions"claims to be independent of this controversy. Whether or
not this draft deals exclusively with true "interests in
goods," these must be here our primary object. The socalled liens, hence, are included, if under the competent
law they are real rights. But this restriction does not seem
very important respecting liens created in the United States.
Here it may be assumed that liens are presumptively real
interests.
At the outset, it should be remembered that under all
circumstances a security interest must have been validly created under its lex situs of the time. 58 Reservation of title
in Louisiana, 59 or if not recorded in Switzerland, 60 is void;
hence, the buyer's title is considered absolute also after removal to another jurisdiction. 61 Moreover, it may be important whether in the state where it is originally created,
e.g., a conditional sale protects the seller against bona fide
57 Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 58. The Draft, Uniform Commercial
Code, 9-105 ss. 1, d. i, etc., speaks of "secured party" and "debtor."
58 Restatement§§ 272, z8o, comments. See supra 70 ff.
59
Motors Securities Co. v. Duck ( 1939) 198 Ark. 647, 130 S.W. (zd) 3·
60 Swiss C. C. art. 715; cf. infra n. 89.
61 A different theory once obtained in Germany with respect to a prohibition by the Jaw of Oldenburg, RG. (Feb. z8, 1893) JW. 1893, 207; (July
7, 1899) id. 1899, 581.
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purchasers or an execution creditor (as in the great majority of American states) or not (as in Illinois 62 ) •
1.

Normal Principles

A validly established interest persists despite any change
of situs, but the new situs governs new acquisitions by
third persons, detrimental to that interest. A purchaser in
good faith or (in the Romanistic tradition) a buyer at
a public auction, if protected by the property law of Y,
prevails over the creditor invoking the law of X, according
to universal conflicts law. As a rule, in Continental laws
attaching creditors of the debtor or purchasers in bad faith
have no more rights than the debtor; the prior creditor's
real right is superior. 63 However, state Y may accord
priority to certain liens acquired at the new situs over the
old title. 64
Thus, in civil law jurisdictions, state Y applies its own
rules on the acquisition of real rights on its own territory.
If these rules confer on a bona fide purchaser a title free
from previous charges, a foreign security interest perishes
exactly like a domestic one. 65
At common law, the general conflicts rule leaves state Y
equally free to determine priority, 66 but in the American
courts conflicts law and municipal law are mingled through
an interpretation of the internal statutes, which produces
62

Western Union Cold Storage Co. v. Banker's National Bank ( 1898)

176 Ill. z6o, sz N.E. 30.
63

FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 405.
E.g., Universal Credit Co. v. Marks (Md. 1932) 163 Atl. 810, cf., 87
A.L.R. at 1312.
65
Germany: OLG. Frankfurt (July s, 1890) 4 Z. int. R. (1894) 148
(horses sold conditionally in Hesse, but sold in Prussia; the bona fide purchaser wins).
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (May 8, 1930) W. IZISO, aff'd., HR.
(March 27, 1931) W. I23II, N.J. 1931, 701 (instruments mortgaged in Holland but sold abroad, foreign purchaser wins).
66
Restatement §§ 269, 276; MoRRIS, 22 B.Y. Int. L. at 238 ff.
64
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varying results. Two currents have been in opposition. It
is the "traditional policy of the common law to protect
the owner rather than the innocent purchaser." 67 Hence,
sometimes we find attaching creditors of the buyer-who
enjoy publicity rights-and bona fide purchasers, despite
the property law of Y, subordinated to the foreign-created
security right. 68 On the other hand, there exists authority
to the effect that an attaching creditor is preferred over a
vendor, bailor, conditional vendor, or mortgagee, if the law
of the situs of the chattel at the time so provides. 69
In view of the prevailing confusion, it should be remembered that all these tendencies are to be regarded as exceptions to the rule that (I) the law of X creating a security
interest is respected in Y, subject to the extent that (2) new
events exercise their influence according to the general law of
property of Y. To stress this rule is important, if for no
other reason, because decisions in Y conforming to this
rule are assured interstate and international force. Not
every fancy solution of a court of Y would be entitled to
recognition, and we know of retaliation even in an American sister state. 70
61

FALCONBRIDGI!1 Confiict of Laws 383.
This seems to be the basis of the doctrine respecting removal without
consent, infra sub 4· But Olivier v. Townes (La. I824) 2 Mart. N.S. (La.)
93 is no support, as Stumberg (ed. I) 3S9, 36I seems to think. The Louisiana
court failed to recognize the sale of a ship on the high seas which was correctly perfected without delivery, because the court unjustifiedly applied
Louisiana property law. It did not decide that Louisiana creditors have
precedence over foreign vested rights.
69
STUMBERG (ed. I) 36I, black letters. The text of ed. 2 has been changed
at page 393 to make clear that this is a minority view. For a more detailed
survey, see STUMBI!RG, "Chattel Security Transactions and the Conllict of
Laws," 27 Iowa L. Rev. ( I942) S28.
70
Retaliating against the former rule of Texas (infra n. 81), Union
Securities Co. v. Adams ( 192S) 33 Wyo. 4S 1 236 Pac. SI3, so A.L.R. 23;
Forgan v. Bainbridge (1928) 34 Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. ISS much criticized,
see GoODRICH (ed. 3) 487 § IS8. Contra, Arkansas, Hinton v. Bond Discount
Co. ( 1949) 214 Ark. 718, 218 S.W. (2d) 7S refused to retaliate, as also New
Mexico and Louisiana. See 13 A.L.R. (2d) at 1319·
68
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Approaching the restrictions on the two parts of this
rule, the first objection to the extraterritorial effect of the
interest conferred by X may be based on disapproval in
Y of the law of X.
2.

Public Policy

Foreign security rights have been disregarded because
their creation under the law of X did not comply with the
publicity requirements of Y. Thus, recognition has been
denied to mortgaging 11 or retaining of title 72 without surrender of physical possession to the mortgagee or a third
person. Also, the new situs has been said to reject a rule
of X that the pledgee retains his right when he loses possession against his will. 73 General legal hypothecs of the
former German common law and of French law have been
refused enforcement in other territories where mortgages
must be charged upon specific objects. 14 Emphasis in such
decisions is due to a strongly felt public policy rather than
to the mere lex situs, which in itself must not defeat the
foreign-created right. 75
It so happens, by the inscrutable wisdom of national lawmaking, that Louisiana rejects conditional sales executed
71
England: Liverpool Marine Credit Co. v. Hunter (I867) L.R. 4 Eq.
S2, ( I868) L.R. 3 Ch. App. 479 H.L.: English mortgages on a ship in-

effective in Louisiana.
France: Cass. req. (March I9, I872) D. I874.J.465, S. I872.I.238; (May
24, I933) Rev. Crit. ( I934) I42.
Austria: A.BGB. §§ 45I, 452.
72
Germany before the Civil Code: RG. (Nov. 25, I895) 6 Z. int. R.
424; OLG. Braunschweig (Sept. 20, I894) ibid. 5IO.
73
French C.C. art. 2076 extinguishes a pledge in every case where the
creditor loses the pledge; German C.C. § I253 par. I only where the creditor
voluntarily returns it.
74
Oberapp. Ger. Jena (July 7, I853) I6 Seuff Arch. I; Prussia: Ob. Trib.
(April 8, I875) 3I id. 257 No. I94·
75
I WHARTON 709, § 3I7 b.
Germany: RG. (Feb. 28, I893) JW. I893, 207, 3 Z. int. R. 622.
The Netherlands: Rb. Maastricht (June 26, I930) W. I2354, N.J. I93I 1 8.
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in the forum 76-seller's credit-but the Supreme Court
and recent legislation permit chattel mortgages-banker's
credit-while Switzerland after much struggle has admitted
reservation of title under recording, but strictly disapproves
of trust receipts ("Sicherungs-lJbereignung"), though recently with weakening vigor. 77
Under no policy should a court deny recognition in principle to a foreign incumbrance on movables brought to the
forum, merely because the type is alien to the domestic law,
as has occurred in a few American decisions. 78
3. Recording
The precarious legal situation of a chattel on which a
mortgage or a vendor's title has been validly constituted,
is intended to be stabilized by the machinery of public recording. This protection, of course, ought to cease when
a dealer, especially of an automobile, is permitted by his
mortgagee or conditional seller, to resell. The American
courts try to cope with this complication, either by assuming that in such case recording of the reserved right is not
constructive notice to a purchaser for value or its effect is
counteracted by estoppel or waiver. 79 In other cases, difficulties arise where recordation is required at the new situs
76 Louisiana: Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co. (1908)
121 La. I 5z, 46 So. I93· Conditional sales executed in other states are recognized; see Note 13 A.L.R. (zd) 13:15. A similar tendency is ascribed to
the Supreme Court of Colorado by MAcDONALD, "Enforcement of Foreign
Conditional Sales in Colorado," 6 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. ( 1934) 221, 222.
77 Switzerland: The Federal Tribunal has recently-BG. (July 5, 1946)
72 BGE. II 235, 35, Praxis 1946, No. 146-made it clear that a fiduciary
transfer to a creditor, well-known also in that country, is a good title for
ownership, and what it objects to is merely transfer without real surrender of
possession, or, perhaps even merely transfer by constitutum possessorium, as
GUHL, 183, Z. Bern J.V. 489 suggests; see also 0FTINGER, Zurcher Komm.
Abt. IV (1952) 2(c).
78
See 2 BEALE § 273.1 n. 3·
79 See 136 A.L.R. ( 194:1) 821, under III discussing the effect on creditors
of the dealer.
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but the creditor does not comply with the formalities. In
the strictest view, the situs applies its ordinary requirement
to all chattels situated in the forum irrespective of their
original location. 80 In the United States formerly the
courts of Texas drew this consequence, 81 and other states,
notably Colorado, 82 showed or show an analogous attitude 83 which, once, was eloquently expounded by the
Supreme Court of the United States. 84 Statutes in increasing number expressly announce that all chattels
brought into the state must be recorded to preserve previous security titles. 85 Since a French law of 1934, automobiles must be registered in France with their foreign-created
8 0 This is also the effect of not utilizing the very strong protection afforded
by registration in Peru L. 6565 of March IZ, 1929, on which see DELGADO,
Compendio ( 1938) 41.
81 Texas: Consolidated Garage Co. v. Chambers (1921) III Tex. 293,
231 S.W. 1072, 1074 (conditional sale, Cal.); Farmer v. Evans (1921) III
Tex. 283, 233 S.W. 101 (chattel mortgage, Okla.). But contrary, exempting
foreign executed and recorded mortgage liens from the Texan Certificate
of Title Law: Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz (Tex., Sup. Ct. 1950) 226 S.W.
(2d) 843·
82
Colorado: Commercial Credit Co. v. Higbee ( 1933) 92 Colo. 346, 20
Pac. (2d) 543 (domestic attaching creditor preferred over a Californian
conditional vendor); American Equitable Assurance Co. v. Hall Cadillac Co.
(1935) 93 Colo. 186, 24 Pac. (:zd) 98o; Castle v. Commercial Investment
Trust Corp. ( 1937) 100 Colo. 191, 66 Pac. (2d) 804 (local buyer against foreign conditional vendor). See MAcDoNALD, Conditional Sales, 6 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. ( 1934) :z:z1.
88 Alabama: Pulaski Mule Co. v. Haley & Koonce (1914) 187 Ala. 533·
Maryland: Universal Credit Co. v. Marks (1932) 164 Md. 130, 163 At!.
8Io (conditional sales).
Mississippi: Patterson v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. (Miss. 1948) 37
So. (2d) 306.
84
Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works ( 1876) 93 U.S. 664,
LORENZEN, Cases 685.
85
13 A.L.R. (:zd) 1320; 1341 adding Kentucky, North Carolina and West
Virginia. On New Mexico Law 1947, see Cheatham Cases ( 1951) 613 n. 2.
These statutes oppose the inclination of many courts to exempt conditional
sellers' rights from the duty of recording; see HoNNOLD, Cases and Materials
on Sales and Sales Financing (1954) 408.
But see despite the Michigan Statute Comp. L. 1948 § 566, 140, St. Ann. (1953)
§ :z6929, the majority in Metro-Plan v. Kotcher-Turner Inc. (1941) 296
Mich. 400, 296 N.W. 304.
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pledges or title conditions, lest they be considered free of
charges. 86
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, however, allows ten
days after the entry of the chattel in Y for recording of the
rights acquired in X. 87 When this period elapses, subsequent recording still provides priority over later charges. 88
The Swiss view is similar. A reservation of title
(Eigentumsvorbehalt) must be recorded at the domicil of
the purchaser and is maintained in case the latter changes
his domicil, only if recorded again at the new place. 89 No
such delay is actually granted in case the object is imported
by a Swiss purchaser. Thus, a conditional sale made in
Germany informally, under German law, is ineffective as
soon as the car enters Switzerland. It has been said that
if the movable returns to Germany, the reserved title revives, although conflicting interests created in the meantime
enjoy priority. 90 This would be an unwarranted breach of
principle. The efficacy of the lex situs should not be split
and limited to territorial effects.
In all these cases, the right of the debtor is deemed ab86
Law of December 29, 1934, D. 1936.4.898; NIBOYET, Rev. crit. 1935,
545 j LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 5) 467 § 355 n. I. If a chattel mortgage
registered in France is lost abroad to a purchaser in good faith, it does not
revive according to the just opinion of NIBOYET, I.e.; Contra, LEREBOURSPIGEONNIERE, I.e. (note omitted in ed. 6), followed by BATIFFOL, Traite su
par. 505 n. 2.
87 Sec. 14; ef., BOGERT, 2a U.L.A. 129.
88
Bent v. H.W. Weaver, Inc. (1928) 106 W. Va. 164, 145 S.E. 594i
White v. E.C. McKallor Drug Co. ( 1933) 239 App. Div. 210, 268 N.Y.S. 371.
89
Swiss C.C. art. 715; BG. (Jan. 21, 1910) 36 BGE. II 1; (March 30,
1916) 42 BGE. III 173; App. Bern (Dec. 12, 1913) so ZBJV. s6o.
Liechtenstein: C. C., Property, art. 175.
90
BATIFFOL, Traite 5 II n. 2 j 2 SCHNITZER {ed. 3) 520. By an analogous
conclusion, in case of an automobile, hypothecs registered in France under
the law of Dec. 29, 1934, are said to have precedence over pledges subsequently created abroad if the car returns to France; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE
(ed. 5) 467 n. 1. Contra, M. WoLFF, Sachenrecht § 159, in case a product of
a land included in a hypothec in X is removed to Y where it becomes free
from the incumbrance; it remains so when returning to Y.
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solute for the benefit of new purchasers and attaching
creditors. 91
Interesting American decisions except a chattel, mortgaged 92 or bought under conditional sale, 93 from the requirement of recordation if it is only temporarily present in
the forum. One might say, the chattel is treated as a res
in transitu. But a much more intensive exception to all
these systems exists in the United States in the following
case.
4· Removal Without the Creditor's Consent
Outside of the United States, no example is known in
which the domestic formalities of Y for security interests
are differently construed for domestic and foreign-created
security interests. 94 This, however, happens in the great
majority of American courts, and has been proclaimed by
the Restatement and a few statutes. If the removal
to Y is wrongful against the creditor, he maintains his
rights even without the prescribed registration in Y. 95 If
the creditor has consented to the removal, in the prevailing
opinion, the new lex situs exercises its normal effect, that
91

Supra n. 61.
Flora v. Julesburg ( 1920) 69 Colo. 238, 193 Pac. 545; as noted supra
n. 76, MAcDONALD observes that the Colorado Court favors chattel mortgages,
in contrast to reservation of title.
93
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Walters ( 1949) 230 N.C. 443, 53 S.E.
(2d) 520, 10 A.L.R. (2d) 758. See 13 A.L.R. (2d) 1346.
94
FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 384 f.
95 Edgerly v. Bush ( 188o) 81 N.Y. 199; Restatement §§ 268, comment c,
275; Mich. Comp. Stat. 1948, § 566, 14oa; Virginia Code 1950, § 55-99;
GoODRICH§ 157; Note, 87 A.L.R. 1314; 13 A.L.R. (2d) 1318. BEALE, "Jurisdiction over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel," 40 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1927)
8os, and the Restatement, Caveat to §49 and Comment, even assert that under
common law a state does not exercise jurisdiction over a chattel brought into
the state without the consent of the owner. See contra Note, 37 Yale L.J.
(1928) 966, and cf., Note, 41 Harv. L. Rev. (1928) 779; WATSON, 7 Tul. L.
Rev. (1933) 451, 452; GoODRICH§ 156; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 381.
For Louisiana see DAINOW, 13 La. L. Rev. (1953) at 235·
92
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is, "any dealings with the chattel in the second state" 96
create the same effect as under domestic law. A small
group of abnormal decisions destroying the interest in the
case of consent to removal is erroneous. 97 Consent could
have such effect only if it were a waiver.
The highest New York court has invoked common law
against its own statutory provision for registration. 98 An
automobile was bought in California, brought without the
consent of the seller to New York, and sold there to an innocent purchaser. The court explained that in California
the seller still had a right superior to a subsequent bona
fide purchaser from the buyer, and that this law agreed
with the New York common law. Conforming to the
ancient rules of narrow statutory construction, the court
restricted the recording statute so as not to affect common
law and the right acquired in California. This was based
on the text of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, but the
futility of the reasoning makes it clear that the traditional
superiority of the legitimate owner is favored, although
the result is directly opposed to the abnormal preference
for domiciliaries of New York.
The American exceptional favor for foreign-created conditional titles and mortgages is unique. It seems to me that
it belongs to the considerable group of tolerance rules arising in the American interstate sphere ;99 as such it is a remarkable phenomenon. So long as no uniform law for the
nation organizes a reasonable system of measures by which
a creditor can safeguard himself with ordinary diligence,
the courts are anxious to protect legitimate credit against
96

Restatement §§ .z69, 276.
(ed. 3) 483. Cf. supra n. 31.
Lehman, J., in Goetschius v. Brightman ( 1927) 245 N.Y. 186, 156 N.E.

97 GoODRICH
98

66o.
99
See Vol. I, 340 (married women's capacity); II, 412, 427 (usury), 565
(Sunday contracts), III, 177 (liquor sales).
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dishonest frustration unknown to the creditor. Their
remedy, however, endangers quite similarly legitimate
interests of other persons dealing in good faith and unable
to guess the origin of the transferor's possession. That
they may believe themselves well protected by the recording
statute of the forum makes the legislative situation still
worse.

5. The Concept of the First Situs
In a line of American decisions, the principles are modified by submitting a conditional sale not to the lex situs of
the goods at the time of the contract but to the law of the
place whereto the parties intend the goods to be sent by
the seller. The alleged reason is ordinarily that the transaction is not completed until delivery/ 00 by analogy to the
theory of the last act completing a contract and fixing the
place of contracting. 101 But the conditional agreement occurs while the goods are not yet delivered; delivery, on
the other hand, does not transfer the title until payment.
Any analogy to the unfortunate theory of the last act is
thereby excluded.
However, a court tending to confuse in the conflicts field
property and contracts theories and mingling lex situs and
lex contractus, approaches nevertheless the correct result
when it identifies delivery to the carrier in X for shipment
to Y with "performance" and applies the law of X as the
state of both contracting and performance.102 The situs
100

See z BEALE 1002 n. 4·
Knowles Loom Works v. Vacher {1895) 57 N.J. Law 490, 31 Ad.
306; GooDRICH 484102 E.g., Marvin Safe Comp. v. Joshua Norton {1886) supra n. z6, at
48 N.J. Law 415. The problem of stating at what phase a conditional sales
contract is "executed" is serious, for instance, in the case of bankruptcy or
insolvency of either party, a question much discussed in Germany. See RiiHL,
"Die Vergleichsordnung und der Verkauf unter Eigentumsvorbehalt," 56
Zeitschr. f. Deutschen Zivilprozess (1931) 154, who found no help in foreign
laws, p. 165.
101
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of the thing at the time of the contract should simply be
respected, without opportunistic exceptions.
It is true that Stumberg has suggested that the place
where the chattel in the contemplation of the parties is to
be habitually used, should be considered the most substantial connection of both obligation and security. 103 This,
however, is an unnecessary exception to the settled significance of the situs, substituting to a certain territorial place
an uncertain place dependent on party intention.
American legislation. Evidently conflicts law has very
inadequately dealt with the problems of credit by sellers
and bankers within the states of the United States, not to
speak of international relationships, once more to be qualified as desperate. In the case of automobiles sold by conditional reservation of title in the United States, even the
domestic situation of retail dealers between the wholesale
dealers or manufacturers retaining title but allowing sales
and the buying public is a source of contradictory judicial
opinions. 104 With a view to the interstate complications,
103 STUMBERG, "Chattel Security Transactions and the Conflict of Laws,"
27 Iowa L. Rev. ( 1942) 528, 536 and n. n.
104 Note, "Record of Chattel Mortgage on, or Conditional Sale of an
Automobile," 136 A.L.R. (1942) 82r; see also Note, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
( 1940) 367.
And see on the doubts relating to liens, FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws
401; cf., BEALE, 33 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1919) 8rs f. and now in particular
HONNOLD, Cases (supra n. 84) 573, who states the usual preference given the
conditional seller over the repairman, at least where the seller retained the
certificate of title. The decision in Willys-Overland Co. v. Evans (1919)
104 Kan. 623, r8o Pac. 235, emphasizes the local policy of protecting the
workman repairing a transient car. What about the carrier's lien confronting
a conditional seller's title? The Uniform Commercial Code refrains from a
provision (sec. 9-104c), although it gives priority to the lien acquired for
services of material (sec. 9-310) in the line of the decisions, and by generalizing privileges accorded in the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. The German
courts recognize the priority of a carrier's or forwarding agent's lien acquired
in good faith (on the current transportation only) over a conditional seller's
title. See KARL JoSEF PARTSCH, Zuriickbehaltungsrecht (Diss., Wiirzburg
1938) 47·
No doubt, a carrier assuming transportation in Y has as extensive a
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the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and the special state
statutes on recording and certificates of automobiles have
tried at least four different methods for reconciling the
legitimate interests of an unpaid seller and an innocent purchaser. But in a recent study it has been demonstrated
that the "skip-state" operator, buying a car on a down payment in X and reselling it for full value in Y or Z, is
blooming despite all these laws. 105 Evidently, the proposal
in the Uniform Commercial Code prolonging the time for
recording at the new situs from ten days to four months 106
would be a strangely one-sided reform. Only consistent
regulation, with stricter supervision of recording and reciprocal official information, as Leary proposes, would
furnish an adequate remedy.
On the international plane, neither the present attempts
nor the advocated reforms provide a serious hope of reconciliation.
Effective universal help is merely available in the sphere
of facts rather than that of the rules. Careful methods
of issuing certificates of registration, a duty of careful investigation of the secondary seller's title by the buyer, and
conscientious inquiries by the responsible officers in execution sales, may help to educate all concerned and minimize
the conflicts.
statutory or conventional lien as state Y grants him. But if the carrier
loads the goods in X and delivers them in Y, which law decides on his right
and priority in the absence of interstate and international regulations?
105
LEARY, "Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles," 96
U. of Pa. L Rev. ( 1948) 4SS· See also the survey of recent court decisions
on the dubious effect of certificates of title of motor vehicles "showing or not
showing liens," 13 A.LR. (2d) at 1326-1329.
106
October 1949 Revision, sec. 8-109, CCU. sec. 9-103 (3). The text speaks
merely of two jurisdictions involved: that "in which it was last situated" and
"this state." The number of states possibly involved is, of course, unlimited.
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IV. ADvERSE PossEssiON

If a title is acquired by completed adverse pos·session
under the law of the lex situs/ 07-or a permanent defense
against any aggressor or certain persons-it is recognized
wherever the chattel is subsequently brought. 108 The older
literature, however, split into a variety of opinions respecting the case where the period of acquisition by lapse of
time has merely begun to run in X and a new lex situs, Y,
prescribes a different period. 109 The Restatement takes
up one of these old and long refuted ideas. 11° From the
conception of the statute real, it was deduced that each of
several subsequent situations should be considered as effecting a part of the acquisition. In one view, hence, the necessary period of possession should have been computed in
proportion to the several spaces of time during which the
chattel has been possessed under the several territorial
laws. 111 Instead of this impossible method, the Restatement proposes the application of the longest period required
by any one of the states in which the chattel has been.
Confessedly, 112 no American decision has authorized this
arbitrary solution.
An unfinished period as such does not generate any effect.
In the only view consistent with the principles, therefore,
107

It would seem that a minor effect of adverse possession, as occurs in
common law respecting land, must be characterized as extinctive limitation
of action. The English Limitation Act, I939, Sec. 3(I) (2), now recognizes
extinction of the title.
108 Universally settled.
Restatement par. 259 comment a; GooDRICH (ed.
3) 478 n. 98. In England it is said that "positive or acquisitive prescription"
that transfers ownership goes to the substance of a transaction, CHESHIRE
(ed. 4) 641 f.
109
See SAVIGNY I86; I WHARTON 821 f.; I BAR 637 § 237; ARMIN JON,
"L'usucapion, etc.," I Melanges Pillet I9; NIBOYET, IO Repert. 289.
110 Restatement § 259, comment b.
111
I MElLI 397·
112
Restatement, Tentative Draft No. 3 ( 1927) § 279, Special Note.
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the law of the last situs decides exclusively. This opinion
is universally dominant. 113

Illustration. If X requires four years andY three years,
the Restatement requires four years/ 14 and the prevailing
opinion three years. 115
The prevailing theory must be followed to the extent
that the factual requirements for adverse possession are
indicated by the property law of the last situs. At the
same time, it will ordinarily be true that a time of possession exercised under a previous lex situs is good enough to
satisfy the last law, so that the past periods of possession
may be counted in the required period. Consequently, acquisition may be completed at the crossing of the frontier
if y has a shorter period than X. 116
In a more precise elaboration of this reference to previous law, where no acquisitive prescription in stolen chattels
is permitted in X, it has been said that adverse possession
under the law of Y, not knowing such restriction, merely
runs from the removal to Y. 117 Also suspension and interruption are governed by the new law. 118
113
E.g., SAVIGNY I86; I WHARTON 821; DIENA, Dir. Reali I36, I74; cf.,
Z3 Annuaire (I910) 246; Z FIORE § 8I8; Z ZITELMANN 347; WEISS, 4
Traite zo8, ZI2; NIBOYET, Acquisition 329; Z FRANKENSTEIN 78; Z SCHNITZER
(ed. 3) 522.
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. IO (semble);
Liechtenstein: C.C., Property Law, art. I3, par. I.
Rumania: C. C. art. 33 ;
Nicaragua: C.C. art. VI I8, I9;
Montevideo Treaty, art. SS;
C6digo Bustamante, arts, 227 f.
114
Expressly so, Restatement illustration,§ 259, comment b.
115
See also WATSON ]R., "The Doctrine of Adverse Possession," 7 Tul. L.
Rev. ( I933) 451, 4S4·
116
DIENA, Dir. Reali 171, I7S; 2 ZITELMANN 348; DESPAGNET 1186 § 420;
(order public territorial) ; SURVILLE § 174; VALERY 896 § 6zz ; Z FRANKENSTEIN 79; 2 ALCORTA 469 f.; MATOS 422 § 302.
117
WEISS, 4 Traite z12; M. WoLFF, IPR. (ed. z) IS6. The application
to France depends on the controversial interpretation of C.C. art. ZZ79·
118
See z ROMERO DEL PRADO, Manual Z8I on the civil law reference to
the personal law for determining capacity to sue.
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In a weak middle solution, advanced in the Austrian
draft and adopted in Poland, the possessor has an option
between the old and new laws of situs. 119
The dominant opinion is no doubt preferable.
119

§ 49·

Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6 par.

2;

Czechoslovakia: Int. Priv. Law
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Ambulatory Chattels
I. Goons

IN TRANSIT

N accordance with Savigny's theory, 1 a well-considered
doctrine assumes that the reasons for allowing the law
of the situation to decide on the rights in a thing presuppose a stable localization and do not include "chattels
in transportation" (res in transitu).

I

In order that a tangible movable should be subject to the
law of a territory, it must have a permanent location, its
place of destination. This relationship is missing if a
chattel from the viewpoint of its destination touches a territory but temporarily, such as merchandise dispatched, the
baggage of a traveler, land and water vehicles and vessels. 2
Before carriage, goods sold are no longer included in this
exceptional group ;3 these are discussed above. 4 The question is what law governs when ownership is transferred
during the time a chattel is in transit.
Despite the many opinions expressed on this subject, it
would seem that the doubt inherent in this question should
be further reduced in scope. Goods in transit, if stopped
intentionally at a specified place for a sufficient period, may
be seized ;5 they may also become subject to a lien of the
earner. There is no doubt that lex situs applies in such
1
SAVIGNY § 366 (tr. Guthrie) 179; ROHG., (Apr. 26, 1872) 6 ROHGE.
So, No. 14, 28 Seuff. Arch. No. 2.
2
REGELSBERGER, Pandekten 172.
3
Thanks to NIBOYET, Acquisition 70. They still appear in Brazil: Lei
Introd. 1942, art. 8 § I, but ESPINOLA, Lei Introd. 470 § 210 seems to restrict
the new version of the article to chattels of uncertain situation.
4
Supra 40.
5
NIBOYET, 4 Traite 622; VALERY 898; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 50.

IOO

AMBULATORY CHATTELS

101

cases. Moreover, in maritime transportation, goods are
regularly transferred through endorsement of the bill of
lading, the law of the place of the document prescribing
the requisites of transfer of the paper. Transactions affecting a ship or aircraft are commonly considered to be
governed by the law of the flag. 6
The needed emergency solution, hence, is restricted to
chattels during interstate rail or truck transportation, when
their temporary place is casual or unknown to the parties.
This group, however, includes transshipment. Writers
have advocated the domicil of the owner, 7 the ordinary
lex situs,S the law of the contract, 9 and strangely, choice
of law by the parties ;10 the two last opinions, deserting
the principle of real rights, are prejudicial to third persons.11 The law of the place of destination 12 or delivery
is especially favored/ 3 justifiedly insofar as it is the first
securely foreseeable point and evidently preferred by the
courts when they are thus enabled to apply their own law. 14
6 BATIFFOL, Traite so8, 509 § 503; for aircraft, LEMOINE, Traite de droit
aerien (I947) I75 contra RIESE, Rev. fran~. droit aerien (I95I) I3I, I43·
7
SAVIGNY (Guthrie) I85; I WHARTON § 30I; WESTLAKE, I4 Revue Dr.
Int. (Bruxelles) 287; 2 FIORE § 834;
Argentina: C. C. art. u.
Brazil: Lei In trod. I942, art. 8.
Siam: Priv. Int. L. art. I6 (2).
8 I BAR 6o8; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 3 I I.
9
Cases cited by I WHARTON 736; cf., CHESHIRE ( ed. 2) 438. ASSER ET
RIVIER 99; WEISS, 4 Traite 205.
10M. WOLFF, IPR. (ed. 3) I74·
11 HELLENDALL, "Res in Transitu in the Conflict of Laws," I7 Can. Bar
Rev. ( I939) 7, 33·
12 SURVILLE ET ARTHUYS 232 § I76 j NIBOYET, Acquisition I07 j 2 FRANKENSTEIN 54; LEWALD I9I; decisions and authors cited 9 Repert. 236, Nos. I08
If. j LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE § 355; 2 SCHNITZER ( ed. 3) 526 j BATIFFOL,
Traite 507 § 502.
Germany: RG. (Sept. I6, I911) Recht I911 No. 3476, Z. f. Rechtspflege in
Bayern I9I2, 45: stones sent from Brazil on their way to Germany.
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law ( I889) art. 28 (cargo on high
seas).
13 Int. Law Ass. Oxford draft I932, art. 4·
14 RABEL-RAISER, 3 Z. ausl. PR. 64 f. For the same reason, BARTIN, 3
Principes 23 I.
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Such an idea may account for the provision in the draft
of a Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act § 43, 3, that chattel
mortgages should normally be registered at the place of
situation, but:
"Where at the time a mortgage is given, goods covered
thereby are in transit or are intended to be and within a
reasonable time actually are put in transit, such goods are
to be taken for purposes of this section as located at the
place of destination." 15
While the place of destination of goods transported is
not usually also the place of their permanent location, this
solution may suffice to cover the gap in which fall the narrow group of cases indicated above. A subcommittee of
the Seventh Hague Conference discussed a more complicated solution on the basis of the laws of the place whence
the goods are sent and where they are delivered ;16 the committee did not agree on this point.
II.
1.

RIGHTS IN SHIPS IN GENERAL

17

Present Theories

A confusing variety of opmwns on the subject of real
interests in seagoing vessels is not surprising in view of the
unlimited, even chaotic, condition of the maritime laws,
but it contrasts with the dearth of conclusive judicial
authority. The older doctrine treated ships like any other
chattels, referring to the law of the temporary situation
whenever one could be ascertained. 18 Voluntary transfer
15 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (1926) at 440.
16 Actes de Ia Septieme Conference 1951, p. 92 art. s, 101 art. s. For the
place of dispatch, also ARMINJON, 2 Precis (ed. 2) 126 § 31; BALLADORO
PALLIERI, DIP. 220; MONACO, Efficacia 213 § IIS·
17 HELLENDALL, supra n. II, at 109 ff.; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 476 ff., 538 ff.;
ABRAHAM, Die Schiffshypothek im deutschen und ausliindischen Recht
( Oberseestudien, Heft 20), ( 19 so) 302 ff.
18
RG. (Feb. s, 1913) 81 RGZ. 283; and still in England, The Jupiter
No. 3 [1927] P. 122; in France, Trib. civ. Tarascon (March 27, 1931)
Clunet 1932, 423.
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of a ship while it was on the seas did not suggest a special
conflicts rule but was allowed to take place by consent without delivery, as it is still provided (although now requiring
registration), even in Germany, 19 as an exception to the
principle of tradition.
This doctrine is not so improper as often believed, insofar as the rules prevailing for the removal of a chattel
are certainly applicable in principle also to ships. For
instance, the old case of Hooper v. Gumm would have to
be decided likewise today under analogous circumstances.
A mortgage was validly constituted in the United States
under American law without being registered in the ship's
papers. The vessel was then sold in England for value
to a purchaser without notice. The mortgage would have
been recognized and held superior to the English purchaser
but for the estoppel, incurred by the mortgagee consenting
to the concealment of his mortgage. 20 A maritime hypothec validly created in Rotterdam was subordinated to a
subsequent mortgage acquired by an innocent mortgagee
when the vessel was registered in Germany. 21
The basic conception of vessels as objects of rights,
however, has changed. On the one hand, registration
has obtained an ever increasing importance. On the other
hand, the modern literature continuously emphasizes the
special nature of ships, 22 and declares the principle that all
transactions affecting interests in a ship are governed by
the law of the place of registration, and its representative,
the law of the flag. 23
19 Germany: Law on Ship Registration, (Nov. IS, I940) § z par. I, for
registered ocean vessels; C. Corn. § 474 for nonregistered ocean vessels.
20 ( I867) L.R. z Ch. z8z.
21 RG. (June I4, I9II) 77 RGZ. I.
22 France: Cass. civ. (June 24, I9IZ) S. I9IZ.I-433: ships are taken out
of the group of regular movables.
23 United States: I WHARTON 784 § 356.
England: WESTLAKE§ 150; DICEY (ed. 5) 996.
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However, neither principle satisfies all needs. The
writers, therefore, make tentative distinctions, according
as the ship is on the high seas or in territorial waters ;24
transactions occur in the country of registration or
abroad ;25 or there is title transfer, creation of liens, or
seizure. 26 Occasionally, there has been resort to the lex
loci contractus or actus, or even to the intention of the
parties, 27 disregarding situs and flag. Certain courts disregard everything but their own law.
The courts are largely uncertain or vague. It is claimed
that English courts apply the law of the flag 28 as well
as the lex situs, at least if the ship is not on the sea. 29
German courts are often believed by foreign writers to
adhere to the lex situs 30 and by recent German authors to
follow the law of the flag. 31 In the United States, a foreign
France: The great majority of all writers sustain the general rule of the
law of the flag. LYON-CAEN, Clunet I877, 479; NIBOYET, Acquisition I I4;
id., Manuel 646; PILLET, I Traite 742; RIPERT, I Droit Marit. (ed. 3)
502 § 436; VALERY I3IS; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 24I § 229; NIBOYET,
IO Repert. II No. 27. Contra: Weiss, 4 Traite 3IO ff.
Germany: Citations in MELCHIOR 493 n. I; LEWALD I92; M. WOLFF, IPR.
(ed. 3) I74; NussBAUM 313·
Italy: C. Navig. art. 6; ownership, the other real rights and the rights of
security in vessels and aircraft, as well as the form of publicity for the
acts of creating, transferring, and extinguishing such rights, are regulated
by the national law of the vessel or aircraft.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 488.
Institute of Int. Law, 8 Annuaire ( I88s) I26.
24 WHARTON AND WESTLAKE, [.c., MELCHIOR 492 f.; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 475;
HELLENDALL, supra n. II, II I.
25 HELLENDALL, supra n. II, II5.
26 NussBAUM, D. IPR. 3I4; LEWALD I92 f.
2 7 United States: See decisions infra n. 34·
The Netherlands: App. Den Haag (June 30, I9I6) W. I008S, Clunet I92I,
280.
Germany: LEWALD I93 f.; Obergericht fiir die Britische Zone (July 7, I949)
2 N. Jur. Woch. 784.
28 E.g., WESTLAKE 202 § ISO: the personal law of the owner.
20
HELLENDALL, supra n. II.
30
E.g., NIBOYET, IO Repert. I6 No. 70; GRIFFITH PRICE, The Law of Mari~
time Liens ( I940) 2I3.
31
LEWALD, NussBAUM, M. WoLFF, supra n. 23.
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authority apparently has found total inconsistency. 32 Assuredly, the only known decision of the Supreme Court in
33 recognized assignment of a ship forming part of
I 873
an insolvent estate to the assignee in insolvency under the
law of Massachusetts, the state of both the domicil of
the owner and the port of registration. Similar coincidences occur in other cases. 34 It may be conceded that the
decisions neglect the scope of the problem and are not too
well-considered. But they can be reconciled.
River boats. Despite the frequent assertion that fluvial
navigation is an internal subject for the country of navigation,35 its principles have been laid down in a European
convention of 1930, providing satisfactory rules on the
basis of registration in one country. 36 This accomplishment suggests a basis for improvement as respects maritime
vessels.
Distinguishing the various situations, we may discover
somewhat more agreement in this important and never constructively summarized international matter.
In the first place, it is agreed that the law of the place
32

NOLDE, zz Revue Dor. ( 1930) 36.

33 Crapo v. Kelly (1873) 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 610, 630, 638.
34 In Koster v. Merritt ( 1864) 32 Conn. 246, the situs coincided

with the

locus actus.
Lex loci actus was asserted in Thuret v. Jenkins ( 18zo) 7 Mart. (La.)
318, but the ship was also registered at that place. In Southern Bank v.
Wood (1859) 14 La. Ann. 554 and Moore v. Willett (186z) 35 Barb. S.C.
663, the locus actus was also the residence or domicil of the ship owner.
This has been noted by HELLENDALL, supra n. u, 117.
35 Germany: Prussian Ob. Trib. (Nov. 13, 1868) 24 Seulf. Arch. No. 102;
ROHG. (April z6, 187z) 6 ROHGE. No. 14. But the German delegation
proposed at the Geneva Conference (infra n. 36) the principle of lex situs,
see Vogels, 5 Z. ausl. PR. (1931) 311.
The Netherlands: Rb. den Bosch (March 7, 1919) W. 10497, N.J. 1919, 461.
36 Convention of Geneva, 1930, on the registration of inland vessels, rights
in rem over such vessels, and other cognate questions. L. of N. Off. Publ.
1931, VIII, z-5, Conf. U.D.F. 57-60; HuDSON, 5 Internat. Legislation No.
276; comment by NIBOYET, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles, 1931) 303 and in 4
Traite 569 If.
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of registration exclusively decides whether a ship is seagoing.37
We shall deal presently with ownership and mortgage,
created by agreement, in ships. The conflicts rules concerning ship mortgages were doubtful for a long time, quite as
their operation was precarious. But most countries have
introduced ship mortgage legislation in increasing detail,
and in the Brussels Convention of 1926 (infra n. 54), a
unitary law, that of the flag, has been established for mortgages, hypothecations, and other similar charges. Since
then, there has been a common and growing inclination
to apply to ship mortgages the same principles as apply to
ownership. The great hopes with which these reforms
were adopted, however, are acutely impaired by the absence
of international uniform preference of liens in ships. Although foreign ship mortgages are readily recognized, their
enforcement depends on the competition of other more or
less privileged actions against the ship, which must be
discussed separately (infra III, 2).
2.

Situations: (a) The ship is in home waters

As long as a vessel finds itself in the country where it is
also registered, the law of this country clearly governs the
real rights. 38
(b) The ship is on the high seas

J7 oluntary alienations. Probably all laws intend to impose compulsorily observance of their own respective provisions on domestically registered vessels. Thus, registration and other formalities of the home port especially are
required for sales, conveyances, and mortgages. This is
87
I VAN HASSELT
88

357·

This is the case envisaged by British Merchant Shipping Act, 18941 s. 24.
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certain for numerous countries. 39 Any transfer within
the country is included. A transfer made in another
country, at least to a national of the home country, without complying with the formalities would either be held
entirely invalid or ineffective against third purchasers in
good faith registering in the home state. 40
However, if the vessel is not registered in the country
where the transfer occurs, the law of the flag is indispensable to avoid an impossible legal situation in third
jurisdictions. 41 The home port is, moreover, the one to
which the ship will regularly return and where it takes more
than a casual or temporary stay. 42
Nevertheless, the question exists whether mortgages may
also be established and transferred under the local law of
a foreign port with full effect, without registration at the
39 United States: Ship Mortgage Act of June s, I920, c. 250, § 30, subsec.
c. 4I Stat. 1000, 46 U.S.C.A. 6I4 § 92I.
England: British Merchant Shipping Act, s. I and 265.
France: Laws of July 10, I88s, art. 33, July s, I9I7, requiring registration
in France for mortgages constituted abroad on French ships; WEISS, 4 Traite
3 IO ff.; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 498 § U29.
Germany: Now: Law on Ship Registration (Nov. IS, I940) §I par. 2
(acquisition and loss of ownership in a vessel entered in a German ship
register is determined by the German law). Previously: OLG. Dusseldorf
(Nov. 23, I909) I08 Rhein. Arch. I87, aff'd, RG. (June I4, I9II) 77 RGZ.
I; BAR, Int. Handelsr. 423. An express statutory rule for mortgages is
missing, ABRAHAM (supra n. I7) 305.
4
France: Cass. civ. (June 24, I9I2) S. I9I2.I.433, Clunet I9I3, I47·
Germany: 77 RGZ. I, supra n. 38; under § I, par. 2 of the Ship Registration Law; WiiSTENDORFER, Neuzeitl. Seehandelsrecht (I947) 75, states that
the case of a transfer abroad to a foreigner is doubtful.
41 United States: Crapo v. Kelly {I872) I6 Wall. (83 U.S.) 610, concurrent opinion by Mr. Justice Clifford at 639: "as if the ship was moored
at her wharf."
Scotland: Schultz v. Robinson and Niven (Court of Session, I86I) 24
Sess. Cas. 120: Prussian ship sold by a bill of sale while on the high seas;
title passed under Prussian law, although under Scottish law entry in the
beil brief would have been necessary. Applicable in English courts, according to DICEY (ed. 5) 997·
France: Common opinion, supra n. 23.
Germany: WiisTENDORFER, supra n. 40, p. 75·
Italy: C. Navig. art. 6, I3.
42
2 FRANKENSTEIN 471.

°
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The negative answer will follow from later

(c) The ship is in foreign waters.
Involuntary assignments.
Despite occasional deviations/8 it may be assumed that attachments, seizures, and
judgments in rem by a legitimate territorial authority, accompanied by sale of a vessel, are internationally recognized.44 A justifiable exception has been made in the
country of registration, when the foreign court disregards
a previous transaction valid by the law of the forum ;45 this
exception should even enjoy extraterritorial force.
Unjustifiedly, however, the French Court of Cassation,
in its only decision in point, has proclaimed that a mortgage in a French vessel cannot be purged by a foreign
sale of the ship, but only by application of the French
procedure, that is, in a French court. 46
17 oluntary alienation. Transfer of title and mortgaging
43
England: The Segredo, otherwise "Eliza Cornish" (I853) I Spinks
Ecc. & Ad. 36: British ship, because of unseaworthiness sold under the law
of Fayal; sale not recognized under "general maritime law;" but the decision
is overruled by Cammell v. Sewell ( I86o) 5 H. & N. 728, as interpreted in
subsequent cases. See HELLENDALL, supra n. n, II4 f. against DICEY ( ed.
5) 999·
44
United States: Olivier v. Townes (La. I824) 2 Mart. (N.S.) 93; Green
v. Van Buskirk (I866) 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 307, (I868) 7 Wall. I39; dictum
in Crapo v. Kelly (I872) I6 Wall. 6Io, 622 respecting assignment and insolvency; cf., KuHN, Comp. Com. 240.
England: Cammell v. Sewell {I86o) 5 H. & N. 728; Castrique v. Imrie
( I87o) L.R. 4 H.L. 4I4, per Lord Blackburn: British ship sold upon a
competent foreign judgment; The Jupiter No. 3 [ I927] P. I22.
The Netherlands: I VAN HASSELT 359·
45
England: Simpson v. Fogo ( I863) I Hem. & Mill. I95 repudiates a
judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana for the sale of a British ship;
the Louisiana court had discarded a mortgage given on the high seas valid
under English law.
46
France: Cass. civ. (June 24, I9I2) S. I9I2.1.433 rejects a judicial sale
of a French ship in England, because an attaching French maritime lien
could not be extinguished without French formalities. The case is thus
decided contrarily to the House of Lords in Castrique v. Imrie, supra n. 44,
and to the German decision, LG. Schwerin (Jan. ro, I9IO) Leipz. Z. I9II, 52.
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is the center of controversy. If a ship lies in a foreign
port, should such contract comply with, and the effect be
governed by the local law, 47 or the law of the flag (place
of registration) ? 48
A compromise attempted by Dutch courts points primarily to the "personal law" of the ship, i.e., of the port of
registration, but concedes minor consideration to the nationality of the transferor and the place of the transaction.49 However, in the only decision of the Dutch
Supreme Court, registration of a sale and conveyance in
Belgium was respected, although the ship was being built
in a Dutch dockyard, with the result of preferring the
foreign buyer to domestic creditors. 5°
French doctrine inclines to the largest scope of the law
of the flag, advocated by the authors. Nevertheless, certain decisions have repudiated formless transfer of ownership of a British ship from one Englishman to another,
because the French requirement of publicity was not satis47 England: Hooper v. Gumm ( I867) L.R. 2 Ch. 282, with respect to a
mortgage on an American ship registered in the United States, cf., CHESHIRE
(ed. 3) S9I· Cf. The Jupiter No.3 [I927] P. Izz; Russian flag immaterial
for subjection to Soviet nationalization.
France: WEISS, 4 Traite 3 IO If. against the dominant opinion.
The Netherlands: H.R. (Jan. 22, I934) infra n. so.
Colombia: C. com. marit. arts. IS, I9, 34· I RESTREPO-HERNANDEZ IS9
§ 365.
48
England: DICEY (ed. 5) 996: "the balance of reason is in favor of
making the law of the country to which the ship belongs decisive as to
voluntary transfers of ships."
France: See supra n. 22.
Germany: Law of the flag of foreign ships, WusTENDORFER, supra n.
39 at 75·
Italy: C. Navig. art. 6.
The Netherlands: VAN BRAKEL I89 § I46.
Spain: C. Com. arts. I7, 573, and Regulation of the Mercantil Register,
arts. I49, I 52; with primary effect of private law, GARRIGUES, 2 Curso de
Der. Mere. ( I940) 626 f.; cf., I GAMECHOGOICOECHEA, 2 Trat. de Derecho
Maritimo Espaiiol (without year) 59 If. For mortgages, C.C. art. I875 and
Law of August 2I, I893, art. I4, GARRIGUES, ib. 622.
49 I VAN HASSELT 357•
50
H.R. (June 22, I934) W. I28I5, N.J. I934, I493, I VAN HASSELT 426.

I IO

PROPERTY

fie d. 51 Niboyet also contends that for the same reason
sales of German vessels in France should comply with
French publicity requirements, whereas German courts
should observe French law in disposing of French vessels. 52
This goes too far. But it is a well-known valid argument
in favor of the law of the place of registration that third
parties should be informed by a decent record at the home
port. Indeed, the Convention of Geneva of December 9,
1930, generally speaking of all voluntary transfers of
fluvial vessels, provides:
Voluntary transfer inter vivos of the rights of ownership
in a vessel shall be governed by the law of the country of
registration if that law requires as a condition for the transfer, or at least for the effect of this transfer as to third
persons, either the inscription in a register for the publicity
of the rights, or the transfer of possession to the acquirer. 53
Voluntary securities. The same idea that sufficient public
registration in the home port is required in principle, underlies the Brussels Convention of 1926 for the Unification
of Certain Rules of Law relating to Maritime Mortgages,
and Liens, 54 the first significant step toward a firm international recognition of rights in vessels. Yet this convention has been adopted neither by the Anglo-American nor
51 App. Rouen (July 31, 1876) Clunet 1877, 428, simulation suspected
without proof; Trib. Saint-Malo June 27, 885) Clunet 1886, 196; approved
by NIBOYET, Acquisition 514 and 4 Traite so1 n. 1. Contra: LYON-CAEN,
Clunet 1877, 481.
Also the German Reichsgericht once rejected a Russian hypothec filed
with the ship documents only, RG. (Oct. 2, 1912) So RGZ. 129, contra, 2
FRANKENSTEIN 478.
52
NIBOYET, 10 Repert. 12 Nos. 39, 43·
53 Supra n. 35, art. 20 (I).
54
Convention pour !'unification de certaines regles de droit relatives aux
privileges et hypotheques maritimes, signee a Bruxelles, le IO avril 1926,
120 L. of N. Treaty Series No. 276s; HuDSON, 3 Int. Legislation No. ISS;
BENEDICT, 6 American Admiralty 78; 2 Recueil Niboyet et Goule 464. In
force among 17 states. Comments: RIPERT, Precis de droit maritime 153;
BRUNETTI, I Dir. marittimo 561; SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN, I Dr. marit.
et dr. fluvial so.
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the Central European countries, although France participates in it.
Voluntary securities obligating the ship may be of two
classes. Loans secured by bottomry in cases of proved
emergency during a voyage are evidently recognized, if
they comply with the local law. The case has become rare,
but should a real emergency occur requiring such a loan
without giving the shipowner an opportunity to act at home,
recognition is due. 55
Longer standing credit is provided by means of ship
mortgages ( hypothecs). Recognition of a foreign ship
mortgage, or any conventional conveyance of real security
in ships, now is universal as an institution, since the great
majority of states interested in seafaring have introduced
this type of rights into their municipal laws. The governing law cannot yet be said to be clearly settled everywhere.
But it would seem that the principle of the Brussels Convention is actually followed, to the effect that a mortgage
complying with the law of the port of registration of the
vessel is likely to be recognized not only in France 56 but
in any country, 57 although no holding squarely in point
55

DICEY ( ed. 6) 666.
See NIBOYET, 4 Traite 538 If.
57 England: Hooper v. Gumm (I 887) L.R. 2 Ch. 282; American mortgage,
not recognized because the action was defeated by estoppel ; The Colorado
[ 1923] P. 102: French mortgage; The Zigurds [ 1932] P. II3: Latvian
equitable assignment.
Germany: Oberapp. G. Oldenburg (May x8, x86x) 17 Seuff. Arch. Nr.
xu: Hanover mortgage; RG. (Feb. 9, 1900) 45 RGZ. 276, 278: Dutch
mortgage; "No doubt, the vessel at the time of the creation of the mortgage,
belonged to an owner domiciled in Holland from where the vessel was also
managed."
Italy: C. Navig. art. 6; formerly Cass. Turin (Dec. xo, 1906) 22 Revue
Autran 714: English mortgage; recognized despite the Italian prohibition of
forfeiture (pactum commissorium).
The Netherlands: VAN OPSTALL, Scheepshypotheek, (Thesis, Leiden 1932)
305.
Norway: Law of May p, 1929.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 488.
Sweden: Law of May r8, 1928.
56
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exists in the United States. 5 8
That mortgagees registered at one port lose their priority,
where registration is transferred to another country and
purchasers or creditors are recorded in the new register, 59
accords with the general principles.
Other events. Illustration. On a German ship, leaving
New York and sailing in the harbor between New York
and New Jersey, a steward found in a stateroom a roll of
banknotes. The German court defined the rights of the
finder under the identical laws of New York and New
Jersey. If the discovery had been made later on the high
seas, German law would have been applied. 60
Conclusion. International law concedes many and important prerogatives to the state whose flag a ship flies.
Prevailing opinion even recognizes a real right under public
international law of the state in whose ports private ships
are registered. 61 In accordance with this fact, the existing
laws and conventions and the general impression conveyed
by the literature allow a reasonable way out of the present unsettled doctrine. The law of the flag is indispensable
during the time a vessel is on the high seas. It is the most
suitable law for the creation and transfer of real rights
by voluntary private transactions also when the ship is in
foreign territorial waters. In view of the advantages of
the publicity obtained by central registration in the home
port and of the considerations of public policy familiar to
58 United States: The Secundus (D.C.N.Y. 1927) 15 F. (2d) 713, 1927 Am.
Marit. Cas. 641, contains only an indication that a French preferred mortgage
would receive the preference given to it by French law, RoBINSON, Admiralty
435 in fine.
59
RG. (June 14, 1911), Ned. Scheepsverband M. v. Coblenzer Volksbank,
77 RGZ. 1. On recognition of unregistered foreign mortgages, see ABRAHAM
(supra n. 17) 313.
60
OLG. Hamburg (May 14, 1904) Hans. GZ. 1904, Beiblatt no. 122, citing
2 BAR 609, 6 14.
61 This theory has been eruditely supported against adversaries by
UBERTAZZI, Studi sui diritti reali nell'ordine internazionale, Milano 1949·
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some countries, it is highly advisable for such voluntary
transactions to give normally exclusive force to the law of
the place of registration.
On the other hand, the law of the port where the ship
lies must have competence to regulate involuntary assignments and in emergency cases securities established by
special agreement.
III.

MARITIME LIENS (PRIVILEGES BY LAw)

Anglo-American admiralty law recognizes charges upon
ships for services done to the ship or injury caused by it,
accruing by law and enforceable by an action in rem. English writers in the nineteenth century developed various
theories as to the nature of these liens, among which that
of Marsden 62 was adopted in the English courts. This
so-called "procedural theory" regards the lien as "a form
of proceeding to compel an appearance" by the owner of
the vessel. In consequence, the vessel is not liable if the
owner is not personally liable, and if he is, his responsibility is unlimited. 5 3 The American courts since 1809 have
followed the "personification theory," later expounded by
Holmes, 64 regarding the ship as liable, and alone liable,
without personal obligation of the owner; this lien remains "indelible" irrespective of a change of ownership. 65
The theory of Holmes and of the American courts corresponds with the medieval institution of "fortune de mer,"
one of the applications of pure liability of a thing
(Sachhaftung). The premise of the procedural theory that
62

MARSDEN, "Two Points of Admiralty Law," 2 Law Q. Rev. (1886)

357; id. Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty, vol. 1 (London 1894).
63
HEBERT, "The Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens," 4 Tul. L. Rev.
( 1930) 381, 385.
64
HOLMES, Common Law 25 ff.; The City of Athens (1949) 83 F. Supp.
67, 1949 Am. Mar. Cas. 582, aff. (C.C.A. 4, 1949) 177 F. (2d) 961, 1950
Am. Marit. Cas. 282.
65
MAYERS, Admiralty Law and Practice 8.
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the owner is personally liable cannot be maintained in case
of a new owner. 66 And practically, to dispense with the
idea of a proprietary right, as the procedural theory now
pretends, or to merge maritime liens with the obscure category of actions in rem, confuses the international situation
which requires recognition of foreign-created rights, even
though foreign privileges of priority may be rejected.
The Continental laws in part rest upon the same foundation of the ship's obligation, as in particular does the
German system, but, including the common law, there are
at least five different systems of allowing privileged rights
in the case of a judicial sale of a vessel. They are based
upon heterogeneous ideas, granted to very different classes
of creditors, and differ greatly in regulating the rank for
satisfaction by the proceeds of the sale. 67 The task of finding suitable conflicts rules for this matter, after strenuous
efforts, was given up by the numerous successive international conferences. In the 192o's, unification of the substantive rules was believed easier. But the resultant unifications by both the Brussels Convention on liens and mortgages of 1926 and the Geneva Convention on ships registration of 1930 had to leave a multitude of minor liens to
the pleasure of the lex fori. 68
The Brussels Convention, however, for the limited
domain of its member states, enumerates five types of
privileged liens enjoying priority over registered mortgages, while the national laws may grant other liens rank66

The Bold Buccleugh (1851) 7 Moo. P. C. C. 267.
See in the first place, RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. (ed. 3) II9 If. §§ IIS7I 160; for the Anglo-American laws, ROBINSON, Admiralty 363 If., 434 § 62;
GRIFFITH PRICE, The Law of Maritime Liens (London 1940) with comparative surveys which seem somewhat questionable; for Germany, WusTENoORFER, Neuzeitliches Seehandelsrecht ( 1947) u8 If.
68
PLAISANT, Les regles de conftit de lois dans les Traites ( 1946) 141; also
with comment on the effects of bankruptcy on the choice of law according
to the existing conventions.
67
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ing after those first two groups. 69 Among other provisions,
a somewhat vague uniform rule is established, requiring preliminary notice of "a sale" to the register office, in order
that privileges should be extinguished by the sale.
Jurisdiction to enforce foreign-created liens may at times
be absent, particularly in English courts. But this is a
rare case in other countries and scarcely occurs in the
United States.
Recognition and priority must be strictly separated in
regard to liens; the question of rank affects also conventional securities.
I.

Recognition of foreign-created liens

The great majority of the decisions refer to those liens
which arise by force of law from services rendered to the
vessel.
(a) Repair and supply. It is perfectly settled that persons acquiring a lien on the ship or the cargo by furnishing
repairs or "necessaries" under the law of the place where
the services are rendered are protected in other countries. 70
In the usual conflicts terms, the applicable law is characterized as lex loci contractus or as lex situs. 11 The law
69 Brussels Convention, cited supra n. 54, art. 2, liens privileged in cases
of certain expenses, employment, salvage, etc., accidents of navigation, and
necessary contracts of the master.
70
United States: Mills v. The Scotia (D.C.N.Y. 1888) 35 Fed. 907, 909,
"the law of the place of transaction;" 1 WHARTON §§ 322, 358.
Canada: Sir Douglas Hazen, L.J.A., in Marquis v. The Astoria [1931]
Ex. C.R. 195, 199: "where the services are rendered" quoting The Scotia;
and since, usual formula in Canada; the remarkable decision, Harney v.
Terry [1948] 1 D.L.R. 728 uses the term lex loci contractus.
Scotland: Constant v. Klompus ( 1912) so Scot. L. Rep. 27. For more
details see GRIFFITH PRICE, 57 L.Q.L.R. ( 1941) 409.
71
United States: The Graf Klot Trautvetter (1881) 8 Fed. 833; The
Olga (1887) 32 Fed. 329; The Scotia (1888) 35 Fed. 907; The Kaiser Wilhelm II ( 1916) 230 Fed. 717; The Woudrichem ( 1921) 278 Fed. 568; The
City of Atlanta ( 1924) 17 F. (2d) 308, 1924 Am. Marit. Cas. 1305, 9 Revue
Dor ( 1925) 396: (lex loci contractus); The Northern Star ( 1925) 1925 Am.
Marit. Cas. II3S, 12 Revue Dor (1925) 238.
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of the flag has been sharply rejected in this country. 72

Illustration. Necessaries were supplied to an American
ship in Boston. American law grants a maritime lien, while
in Canada merely a statutory lien of much minor importance exists. Canadian courts, nevertheless, recognize the
American lien, arguing that otherwise they would promote
fraudulent removal of lien-bound American ships to Canadian ports. 73
Italian conflicts law applies the law of the flag also to
maritime privileges. 74 Therefore, two American decisions
have resorted to renvoi. When a German ship had taken
bunker coal in an Italian port, the Italian reference led to
German law, under which no lien existed, because the supplier knew that the charterer rather than the owner had
to pay. 75 This clear and reasonable adoption of the theory
England: The Colorado (I923] P. I02.
Scotland: Constant v. Klornpus (I912) so Scot. L. Rep. 27.
Canada: Sup. Ct. in The Strandhill v. Walter W. Hodder Co. (1926]
S.C.R. 68o, 4 D.L.R. 8oi; Harney v. M.V. "Terry'' (Ex. Ct. of Can. 1947)
[I948] I D.L.R. 728.
France: Trib. civ. Tarascon (March 27, I93I) Clunet I932, 423, where the
editor protests that the fictitious situation of a ship is the place of its
matriculation.
Germany: RG. (Feb. IO, I9I3) [The Colorado] Warn. Repr. I9I3, 302 No.
254, citing I BAR 6I3, 65I; EMIL BoYENS, 1 Das deutsche Seerecht ( I897)
§ 22e; OLG. Stettin (Sept. 29, I93I) IPRspr. I932, uo No. 55·
Greece: App. Athens (I933 No. 1095) Clunet I934, I053i it is true that
the flag coincided with the place of the accident.
The Netherlands: I VAN HASSELT 359·
But see also infra n. 8 5·
72
United States: The Kaiser Wilhelm II, supra n. 7I.
73 See the citations supra n. 70, Canada.
74
Italy: Now, likewise, Dis. Prel. C. Navig. arts. 6, I3.
75
Cilento v. S.S. Rickmers ( I924) I924 Am. Marit. Cas. 97I, 8 Revue Dor
I98, applying §§ 486, 53 I of the German Commercial Code. Under similar
facts, Socied. Anon. Ricardo Ganlino v. S.S. Coastwise ( I923) I923 Am.
Marit. Cas. 942, 6 Revue Dor. 357· On knowledge of the supplier, see
the analogous provisions of the American Ship Mortgage Act of June s,
I920, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 97I-973; see, e.g., The Kongo ( I946) ISS F. (2d) 492,
I74 F. (:zd) 67, I946 Am. Marit. Cas. 1200; Univ. Nat' I Bank v. Horne
( I946) 65 F. Supp. 94, I946 Am. Marit. Cas. 585.
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of renvoi seems to have escaped the attention of the many
writers clinging to the unfortunate Talmadge case. 76
A foreign writer believed, in 1930, that the American
decisions on the subject commonly adopted American mari·
time law. 77 This does not square with the decisions/ 8
(b) Wages of master and crew. A decision by the
famous admiralty Judge Brown, of 1887, held that even
the priority of liens arising for the wages of crew and
master ("those on board") "among themselves" should
be determined by the law of the flag, although the rank
of liens arising from the contracts concluded by the master
followed the law of the place of contracting. 79 An old
English case concerning the wages of a master of a foreign
vessel was decided under the lex fori. 80 More recently in
The T agus ( 1 903), the Argentine law of the flag was
applied, but the privilege of the master was extended, by
British law of the forum, from the last voyage to all back
salary. 81 Recently, however, the Canadian Court of Exchequer in a learned judgment applied the general theory
that liens follow, according to their contractual or delictual
occasion, the law governing the contract or the tort. 82
Claims for wages of master and crew consequently fall
under the law of the flag.
76

See, ultimately, Note, 48 Mich. L. Rev. (1950) 702.
BARON NOLDE, 22 Revue Dor (1930) at 50 f.
78
See also PRICE (supra n. 29, 67) 212. In The Hoxie (1923) 1923 Am.
Marit. Cas. 937, the supplier was deemed to be an American mother company of the Danish firm; in The Lydia ( 1924) 1924 Am. Marit. Cas. roar,
the court recognizing foreign liens as arising under general maritime law
explained that English law was not pleaded and that the decision was based
on conversion in the United States; in The Coastwise ( 1923) 1923 Am.
Marit. Cas. 942, American law was applied as law of the flag by renvoi
from Italian law, supra n. 75· Other cases must be explained by historical
development, as especially in respect to priority, cf., infra n. 88.
79 The Olga ( 1887) 32 Fed. 329; The Angela Maria ( 1888) 35 Fed. 430;
The Belvidere ( 1898) 90 Fed. 106.
80 The Milford (1858) Swabey 362.
81
The Tagus [1903] P. 44·
82 Harney v. M.V. "Terry" (1947) [1948] I D.L.R. 728.
77
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(c) Injury. Under the same theory, emphasizing the
substantive character of the problem, lex loci delicti applies
in tort cases. A stevedore, injured through the fault of
those in charge of unloading chemicals from a Norwegian
ship in Victoria, British Columbia, was denied recovery in
the United States, because no maritime lien existed in the
Canadian province. 83 In the case of collision on the high
seas where no place of wrong exists, American courts apply
the Act of March JO, 1920, concerning "Death on the
High Seas by Wrongful Act." 84
(d) Carrier's default. Still in the same order of ideas,
passengers, mistakenly left ashore by a Rumanian steamer,
were allowed to sue in rem against the vessel only after the
law of Rumania was found to justify such action, since that
country was the place where the contract of carriage was
entered and the voyage was to be ended. 85
With respect to the existence of a right to sue in rem
against the vessel, based on a lien, the fairly settled present English, Canadian, German, and American doctrines
thus may be summarized as follows: The law of the flag
is resorted to insofar as wages of seamen are concerned
and as a substitute for the ordinary applicable territorial
law, in the case of events on the high seas. Normally, a
lien, presupposing a contract, is connected with the port
where the ship is situated at the time of the contract, and
a lien protecting a tort claim with the territorial waters
in which the wrong was committed.
83
The Cuzco ( 1915) 225 Fed. 169, The Apurimac ( 1925) 1925 Am. Marit.
Cas. 604, I I Revue Dor 224: American law was preferred to the Peruvian
law of the flag, respecting injury to a seaman aboard a Peruvian vessel in
an American port, caused by the vessel's unseaworthiness, following The
Scotland {r88r) 105 U.S. 24; Koziol v. Fylgia, 1953 Am. Marit. Cas. 220:
injury on the high seas, Swedish law of the flag.
84
The Buenos Aires (C.C.A. z 1924) 5 F. (2d) 425.
85
The Constantinople (D.C.N.Y. 1935) 15 F. (2d) 97, as commented
upon by ROBINSON, Admiralty 439·
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These, indeed, are the firmest connections available in
this matter. Whether the lien or privilege is recognized
in the domestic law of the forum is entirely immaterial. 86
Over this point, it is true, isolated decisions, particularly
older ones, have stumbled. And French objections on the
ground of public policy may be possible. 87
2.

Priority

In a line of older American decisions, the application of
foreign law to mortgages and liens was extended to the
question of their precedence in the distribution of the proceeds in an executory sale. 88 Such generosity is no longer
displayed anywhere in the world. Eminent writers have
urged in vain uniform treatment of recognition and priority
of liens, now basing their doctrine, in contrast to the former
emphasis on the situs as of the time of the creation of the
right, rather on an all-embracing dominance of the law of
the flag. 89
Quite commonly the priority between mortgages and liens
and among liens is determined according to the law of the
forum. 9 ° For justification, it is ordinarily contended that,
86 See, e.g., the Canadian decisions supra n. 70, and the Reichsgericht
(Feb. IO, I9I3) cited ibid., against OLG. Rostock (July 7, I09) 65 Seuff.
Arch. No. 34·
87 Cf., NIBOYET, 4 Traite 547 ff.; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. (ed. 3) §§ 116I ff.
88
The Velox (I884) 21 Fed. 479; The Olga (I887) 32 Fed. 329; The
Angela Maria (I888) 35 Fed. 430; The Belvidere (I898) 90 Fed. I06.
89 Particularly forceful, RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. 124 ff. §§ 116I-1164.
90 United States: Brown, J., in The Scotia (I888) 35 Fed. 907, 911, citing
STORY §§ 323, 423 b, d.; The Oconee (I922) 280 Fed. 927; RoBINSON,
Admiralty§ 62; Note, 26 Harv. L. Rev. (I9I3) 358.
England: WESTLAKE § 35I; The Colorado [I923] P. I02.
Canada: Sir Douglas Hazen, L.J.A., in Marquis v. The Astoria [I93I]
Ex. C.R. I95, I99·
Scotland: Robert Clark v. Bowring & Comp. ( I908) S.C. 1168, rejecting
the claim of an American firm for monies paid in New York.
France: see for citations, RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. I3 I § 1168.
Denmark: Comm. and Admir. Court (March ZI, I939) U.F.R. 1939, 589;
(Jan. 3, I950) S.H.T. 1950, 46; Clunet I954, 502.
Germany: RG. (Nov. 25, I89o) I Z. int. R. 365; (Feb. 9, 1900) 45 RGZ.
276, 28I, IO Z. int. R. 472; (Feb. s, I9I3) 8I RGZ. 283; and others; z BAR.
199·
Netherlands: H.R. (June IS, I9I7) W. I0139, N.J. I9I7j 8u.
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although foreign-created rights are recognized, their rank
is a matter of procedure. This is an untenable assertion. 91
Enforcement presupposes a substantive quality of the right
to be enforced. It should also not be believed that executive sales proceedings, frequent as they are, furnish the
only situation in which the order of the rights is important.
Clearly, priority pertains to the substantive part of the law.
Nevertheless, this does not decide the conflicts problem. When courts and writers have considered the advantages and disadvantages of lex fori and the law of the
flag, there are arguments for either. The resort to the
domestic law of the casually competent court rewards the
shrewdest creditor choosing the place of attachment. Where
the law of the flag determines the existence of the right,
its coexistence with the lex fori, governing the priority, is
a source of conflicts. 92 The judicial sale, for instance,
purges rights, irrespective of the law of the flag. On the
other hand, it must be conceded that unity of treatment
for rights originating all over the world under disparate
laws can be guaranteed by the lex fori as well as by the
law of the flag which would logically require (and has been
said to establish) a total subjection of all these rights to
the unitary law of the home state. In this matter, the law
of the forum agrees too well with the usual conceptions
of admiralty judges, to be erased for reasons of theoretical
elegance, or even convenience.
It can be better understood than in other matters, that a
court would think as a Dutch judge has said, in pondering
the virtues of the law of the forum and the law of the flag
for distributing proceeds of an executive sale of a vessel:
A Dutch judge cannot be forced to recognize privileges of
91 2 FRANKENSTEIN 491,
92
NIBOYET, 10 Repert. 17 No.

84, 18

No.

93·
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enforcement not existent in our country to the detriment of
our own subjects. 98
Normally, and in this matter with better foundation than
ordinarily, the courts analyze foreign rights and equalize
them with a type provided from those available in the
domestic law. 94 It may happen that a French ship mortgage thereby gains a better position in England than at
home, 95 and a Dutch ship mortgage has a preference over
liens in Germany which it does not have in the Netherlands, 96 which shows an unhappy method of comparative
research by legislators.
Again, if the law of the forum is not explained by a nonexistent procedural character of priority, it may rather be
based on the emergency function of this device, an idea
that may have practical consequences. The older American
cases, mentioned before, applied the various foreign laws
governing the individual rights. This, in application to
recognition, though not to priority, is also the dominant
attitude of the present courts, as demonstrated above. It
follows that whenever these laws produce identical results
of rank, they should prevail over the lex fori. In fact,
such an exception has been made by the Dutch district court
of Rotterdam. When the laws governing the competing
93

399·

Rb. Rotterdam (Dec. 2, I927) W. 118I7, N.J. 1928, I27, I VAN HASSELT

94 United States: The Graf Klot Trautvetter (I881) 8 Fed. 833.
England: The Zigurds [I932] P. 113.
Canada: Harney v. M.V. "Terry" ( 1947) [I948] I D.L.R. 728.
Germany: RG. (Jan. 20, I913) 57 Gruchots Beitrage I037; OLG. Hamburg
(Jan. 30, 1894) and (Feb. 25, I899) Hans. GZ. I894, Hbl. No. 32 and Hans.
GZ. 1899, Hbl. No. 65; FRANKENSTEIN 493 n. 90.
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Jan. 20, I937) W. 1937, no. 879; Hof
den Haag (Feb. 5, I937) W. I937 no. 875.
95 The Colorado [I923] P. 102.
96
RG. (Feb. 2, 1900) 45 RGZ. 276, with the curious observation, p. 283,
that the Dutch mortgage is not lesser in value because there the privileges
are of prior rank; does, thus, the mortgage gain "in value" if invoked in
Germany?
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claims, such as a mortgage contracted in Norway and an
English lien for supply, agree on their rank, the lex fori
is disregarded. 97 Thus, the emergency function of the
domestic law of the court is perceived and adequately
limited. Assuredly, the court for this purpose had to solve
a difficult task of comparison.
IV.
I.

RIGHTS IN AIRCRAFT

Municipal Laws

Although the national statutes relating to rights in air
vehicles, despite some growth, are comparatively few, they
have gone in different directions, making the sorely needed
unification very difficult. A convention of I 948 had to be
reduced for the most part to uniform rules stating requirements for extraterritorial recognition. Even so, of the
nineteen signatories, the United States is the only major
power that thus far has ratified the Convention. 98
The cardinal differences 99 turn around the nature of airplanes as simple chattels or special objects of rights; the
existence and function of registers for private law purposes; the types of security for financing the acquisition of
rights ;100 and the treatment of the valuable engmes, accessories, and spare parts.
97
Rb. Rotterdam (May 5, I924) W. 11245, N.J. I925, 907, I VAN HASSELT
381; accord, same court (Feb. 23, I928) W. 11822, N.J. 928, 778, I VAN
HASSELT 402, cf., p. 359·
98
Convention on Rights in Aircraft, Geneva, June I9, I948, I948 U.S. Av.
R. 554; 4 Schweiz. Jahrb. Int. R. (I947/48) 297, ratified by the United
States and Pakistan; ratifications by Chile and Mexico were declared inacceptable by the United States because of their reservations.
99
See especially LEMOINE, Traite de droit aerien (Paris I952) ; OTTO
RIESE, Luftfahrsrecht (Stuttgart I949); A. RABUT, Le transfer de propriete
des aeronefs, Rev. franc;. de droit aerien (I950) IOj GAY DE MoNTELLA,
Principios de derecho aeronautico (Buenos Aires I950); MoLINA, Nociones
de derecho aeronautico (Tucuman I95I); SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT, On Air
Law (London I95I); M. DE JONGLART, Traite elementaire de droit aerien
(Paris I952).
100
See especially WILBERFORCE, "The International Recognition of Rights
in Aircraft," 2 Int. L. Q. ( I948) 421.
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In a development analogous to that of maritime law,
aerovehicles are still regarded in some countries as ordinary chattels subject to lex situs, 101 but the corresponding
modes of transfer of title and constitution of rights in
aircraft are progressively being replaced by registration,
not requiring a transfer of possession. 102 The Convention
of 1948, though not in force, exercises some influence in
this respect. Very few states, however, have a register
specially designed for private law transactions; the others
use the register of immatriculation, created for purposes
of public law and police, if they have such. Also in the
United States the register of the Civil Aeronautic Authority serves for recording title and security transactions, 108
although particular state statutes provide for recording
of liens. 104
Effect of Recording. The American federal statute expressly states that registration with the Civil Aeronautic
Board, though mandatory for the operation of an aircraft, does not furnish conclusive evidence of ownership
in a law suit. 105 It has been held, in consequence, that a
conditional sale without registration is not void. 106 A comprehensive decision 107 explains that recording with the Civil
10 1 England: SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT, I.e. § 507A.
Switzerland: BGes. Dec. 21, 1948; GuLDIMANN, 10 NF. Z. Schw. R. 19
ff.; RIESE ET LACOUR, Precis de droit aerien (Paris 1951).
102
France: LEMOINE, I.e., 173 states that airplanes are meubles par nature,
but deviate in seven points from the principle; likewise:
Italy: C. Navig. art. 861 concerning title; but arts. 1022-1037 regulate the
hypothec completely.
Cf., Uruguay: Law Dec. 3, 1942 § 8.
103
Civil Aeronautics Act (June 23, 1938) 49 U.S.C. §§ 521, 522, 1948 U.S.
Av. R. 554, 577; Act June 19, 1948, on recordation of ownership of aircraft,
aircraft engines, and spare parts, 49 U.S.C. § 523, 1948 U.S. Av. R. 578.
104 Infra u8.
105
49 u.s.c. § 52I(b).
106
Bishop v. B. S. Evans East Point Inc. ( 1949) So Ga. App. 324, 56
S.E. (2d) 134.
107
Jack Marshall v. Bardin (Kansas 1950) 216 P. (2d) 812, 1950 U. S.
Av. 292.
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Aeronautic Board is only necessary "to enable the purchaser to operate the aircraft legally or to deal with the
title as by a new sale or pledge;" that is, the protection is
given to persons "who have dealt on the faith of the recorded title and to whom it would be a fraud to give effect
to unrecorded titles to their detriment." Hence, an attachment obtained by a money creditor of the recorded owner
who had sold the plane by an unrecorded sale, was disapproved. As, however, this creditor was also said to
have had knowledge of the sale, the theory of the case is
difficult to define.
Recording is considered an essential requisite of a purchase in Italy, 108 Spain, and other countries; 109 much debated, this view seems finally to prevail also in France.110
Likewise parallel to the progress in maritime law, the
creation of true rights in re has been reached in various
forms through the medium of registration: hypothec, 111
chattel mortgage, conditional sale or hire purchase, equipment trust, and fleet mortgages. On the other hand, these
types have very different characteristics, and more than any
others, the question of separate security transactions concerning accessories has divided the views. While motors
108 Italy: former law Aug. 20, 1923, art. 7; Cod. Navig. art. 865: For
the effects provided for by the Civil Code, the acts, constitutive, translative,
or extinctive of title or other rights in re aeromobiles, or quotas thereof, are
made public by transcription in the national aeronautic register, etc.
109 Spain: see supra n. 48.
Uruguay: Law Dec. 3, 1942.
Venezuela: Law July 14, 1941.
11
France: Law May 31, 1924, arts. II and u: "£'inscription au registre
vaut titre," is interpreted very differently, but RIPERT, 1 Dr. Marit. (ed. 3)
§ 430, states filing brings certainty as one in the German Grundbuch, followed by RABUT, I.e. 16; JONGLART, I.e. 94 § 84.
111
HOFSTETTER, L'Hypotheque aerienne (these Lausanne 1950).
France: Law of May 31, 1924, art. 14, prescribes analogy to the fluvial
hypotheque (Loi of July s, 1917), a much criticized solution, see LE GoFF,
l.c. 541 § 107 S·
Italv: C. Navig. arts. 1022 ff.

°
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permanently connected with planes are incapable in many
civil law countries of forming an independent object of
security, 112 the American statute admits liens on aircraft
engines, propellers, appliances, and spare parts by mere
recording. 113 This contrast seems to be among those fatal
to unification.
2.

Conflicts Rules

The Convention of 1948, by making international recognition dependent on recording, intended to encourage the
establishment of registers of any kind, if only available to
record private rights. The eligible types of rights for
which this protection was provided were enumerated in a
broad catalogue. But the text failed to define the validity
of the acquisition of the rights. It is therefore controversial what law governs the conditions and effects of the
conveyance as contrasted with the conditions of recording.
The question has been discussed in connection with the
problem of the nationality of aircraft which was doubtful114 but is increasingly fixed by the immatriculation.
Nevertheless, in conflict law the significance of situs or
flag, 115 as well as of the place of contracting or of the
parties' intention, 116 are not favored. While the American delegate to the 1948 Convention, Calkins, thinks the
courts would prefer the law of the place where the plane
is habitually held, 117 the question must be regarded as unsettled. Evidently the necessary experience is not yet
available.
112

But see for Germany§ 93 BGB.; RIESE, Luftfahrsrecht 259·
49 u.s.c. §§ 522, 523·
114 LE GoFF, Traite de droit aerien ( 1934) 183 § 339·
115 RIESE, Luftrecht 28o; RIESE ET LACOUR 121 § 128.
116 WILBERFORCE, I.e. 426.
117 CALKINS, "Creation of International Recognition of Title and Security
Rights in Aircraft," 15 J. Air L. and Comm. (1948) 156, 160, citing N.W.
Airlines v. Minnesota ( 1943) 322 U.S. 292 •
113
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A peculiar situation exists in the United States in the
federal-state relation.
Recording with the Civil Aeronautic Board is insufficient
to create recognition of a chattel mortgage in New York,
where compliance with the local lien law is indispensable.118
A state lien is also needed when a chattel mortgage has
been defectively described at the federal level. 119 On the
other hand, a chattel mortgage recorded under the federal
regulation has been held to enjoy priority over a state lien
for repair .120
118
Aviation Credit Corp. v. Gardiner (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) 4 Misc. 798,
22 N.Y. S. (2d) 37, 1948 U.S. Av. R. 633- This would be changed by U.C.C.
sec. 9-302, 2(a).
119
United States v. United Aircraft Corp. ( 1948) So F. Supp. 52, 1948
U.S. Av. R. 473·
120
Veterans and Express Co. (1948) 76 F. Supp. 684, 1948 U.S. Av. R. 178.
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Principles
I. SouRcEs

T

HE law of bills and notes has developed in the law
merchant through many centuries. Although it has
not everywhere been so responsive to mercantile habits
and conceptions in such relatively 1 high degree as in the
English courts, after they absorbed cases involving negotiable instruments from the merchant courts, the special
requirements of commercial needs are observed in all jurisdictions. 2 Most important of all, formal, simple, and reliable documentation of obligations is the primary characteristic. And, of course, as one of the oldest means of
international commerce, bills and notes should satisfy this
requirement also during their travels through several countries. Unfortunately, usage and legislation, producing
different rules, have impeded the unity of purpose. Conflicts law, at least, could have been expected to provide a
clear and easy co-ordination of the national differences.
The unification of conflicts law, however, that was obtained
in Geneva, after long and intensive labor at the most successful of all international commercial conferences, is limited
as respects both territorial domain and material problems.
1 Even the English courts, as is well known, submitted the merchant
practice respecting bills of exchange to such common-law doctrines as that
of consideration.
2 Argentina: C.Com. art. 738 expressly mentions in connection with the
laws also the commercial usages of the place where the instrument is
executed.
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The Written Laws

(a) Communities. The Montevideo Treaty of International Private Law of I889 established a series of conflicts rules relating to negotiable instruments, 3 which were
substantially reproduced in the C6digo Bustamante. 4
The Hague Uniform Regulation of I9IO-I9I2, predecessor of the Hague Convention of I930, was adopted as
law in Yugoslavia, Turkey, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua,
and Venezuela.
The uniform conflicts rules stipulated in Geneva in I930
for bills of exchange and promissory notes-cited hereafter as Geneva Rules 5-and in I 9 3 I for checks have been
ratified by eighteen states, including Soviet Russia and
Japan, but no American country. 6 The core of this legal
community consists of the two groups developed either
on the French system or on the German W echselordnung
of I 848. The influence of the latter enactment, one of the
most outstanding legislative works of all times, has been
fortified by the German and Italian literature. German
and Italian doctrine, in fact, is the natural counterpart of
the common-law decisions in this matter,
The Anglo-American group, although without an international agreement, is fairly united by the substantive rules
of the British Bills of Exchange Act, I882, 7 and the Uni3

Argentina and four other states: See Vol. I, p. 29.
Fifteen Latin-American states, see Vol. I, p. 32 ff., but without much
visible effect on the practice. A comprehensive comment is offered by Josi!
ANTONIO CORDIDO FREYTES, Les conflits en matiere de lettre de change dans
Ia Convention de La Havane (these Paris 1954).
5
The substantive Geneva treaty on bills of exchange and promissory
notes will be cited as Geneva Convention.
6
Austria (1932), Belgium (1932), Denmark (1932), Danzig (1935),
Finland (1932), France (1936), Germany (1933), Greece (1931), Italy
(1932), Japan (1932), Monaco (1934), Netherlands (1932), Norway (1932),
Poland ( 1936), Portugal ( 1934), Sweden ( 1932), Switzerland ( 1932),
U.S.S.R. (1936).
7
The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 and 46 Viet. Ch. 61.
4
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form Negotiable Instrument Act, in which all states of
the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Colombia,
Panama, and the Philippines participate. The conflicts
rules, however, contained in the British Act (section 72),
unhappily drafted, were omitted in the American Act and
are replaced in this country by a confusing set of largely
uncertain maxims.
If, hence, the two groups of the common-law and the
Geneva Rules have to be in the forefront of our discus. sion, nevertheless the fragmentary character of these principal materials must be kept in mind. Even the Geneva
Rules, though more complete than the provisions on conflict of laws in the Hague Uniform Law of 1912, 8 are
greatly disappointing because of their restricted scope. The
Convention on the substantive law itself is incomplete. The
Conflicts Rules have more omissions. Particularly, there
is no provision on the essential requirements of validity of
the contracts involved; on negotiability of the instruments;
on the transfer of obligations by indorsement; on identification of a person as holder. Neither do they determine
the law governing the duties of the holder; the procedures
of enforcement and of annulling titles lost or destroyed;
the conflicts respecting "provision" (cover) ; accommodation bills; or the effect of limitation of action or preclusion
impairing the rights of the holder.
The effects of the obligations are more fully treated in
the English Act and the Latin-American treaties, which,
however, in other respects are even more fragmentary.
(b) Isolated laws. Outside the conventions, some countries of the former French-Latin group have remained isolated, such as Albania, Dominican Republic, Honduras,
s They were restricted to form and capacity; on similar laws see
643 j TRUMPLER I 54·

1
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Mexico, 9 Spain, and of the former German group Bulgaria,
Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. The impact of
the present Soviet law is unknown to the writer.
(c) Scope. The scope of the special conflicts matter
seems to coincide with the extent of the law of negotiable
instruments. The Anglo-American acts include "bills of
exchange, cheques and promissory notes." The comparable older Continental laws were merely concerned with
drafts (lettre de change, cambiale, gezogener W echsel)
and notes (billet a ordre, vaglia or pagher6, eigener ·
Wechsel). More recently, separate enactments codified the
rules on checks.
To use correct language, we are forced to restrict our
principal survey to bills of exchange and notes, or even to
bills alone, although on most subjects the rules are the
same in the larger categories. Some special problems of
checks will be examined thereafter.
2.

Main Differences of Internal Law

Opposite principles remain between the Anglo-American
laws and the Continental groups, which are principally
represented by the Geneva Conventions. We find ourselves
today in essentially the same situation as Lorenzen (p. 20
ff.) described in I 9 I 9, after the Hague but before the
Geneva unification. 10 It is therefore appropriate to follow
his lead in enumerating what now remain as major substantial differences.
9

Mexico: General ley de titulos y operaci6nes de credito, 1932.
See for full analysis HUDSON AND FELLER, 44 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1931) 333;
WIGNY, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) 1931, 8os; AscARELLI, Actes Congr.
Rome, 303-3 n.
10
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Continental Laws

Elasticity of form

Rigorous formalism

Promise of interest allowed

Geneva : only if the bill
is after sight

England : bill cannot be in a certain foreign currency (contra
United States)

Contra

Bill to bearer admitted

Not admitted

Consideration necessary

Contra

Conditional indorsement allowed

Contra

Indorsement after maturity
equivalent to bill at sight

Merely an assignment

Reasonable time of presentation
for acceptance

Fixed periods, Geneva
art. 34: one year

Time for deliberation 24 hours

Geneva art. 24 : the following day

Acceptance not dated in bills at
sight may be completed by holder

Geneva art. 25 al. 2: the
holder must make protest

Partial acceptance not allowed

Contra

Indorsements following a spurious signature invalid

Contra

3· Special and General Law
The special statutes on bills of exchange, etc., do not exhaust the requirements and effects of the obligations or
"contracts" of which they speak. The uniform rules are
supplemented by the national special rules on negotiable
instruments called for by the broad reservations and gaps
ieft by the Geneva Convention and to a much smaller ex-
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tent by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. 11 And
there is a large domain, which varies and sometimes is
very large, left to the general law of contract. Accordingly, we must evidently divorce the conflicts rules of the
special matter from the general conflicts rules, so often
applied by so many courts to "contracts" in general, although we also have to co-ordinate the two groups. In
this respect, lack of thought is manifest in almost all systems.
Terminology. To obtain a clearer view of this subject,
distinctive language will be indispensable. It does not exist
in the common-law sphere, but it does in the Continental
doctrines. German theory significantly speaks of W echselerkliirung, W echselrechtssatz, and W echselanspruch, contrasting these with the declarations, rules, and claims of
the "general" or "common" law. Likewise, Italians and
French lawyers use the adjectives cambiario and cambial
respectively, in opposition to what is outside, extracambiario.12
It is proposed that the terms cambial and extracambial
may be employed to indicate a necessary and greatly, though
not entirely, neglected distinction also in American law. 13
The obligations created by the acts of issue, indorsement,
acceptance, etc., are often governed by the special "cambial"
law as far as its limits are defined by the special conflicts
11
See, e.g., City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. ( 1939)
105 F. (2d) 348.
12
See the elegant definition by ANGELONI, La Cambiale 38: These obligations are literal and complete in the sense that their content is exclusively
determined on the basis of what results from the instrument which must
suffice for itself. Cf., the Mexican thesis by ALMANZA, infra n. 47, 18;
and see now Mexico: S.C., Amparo, Julio 4, 1952, 2 Rev. Fac. Der. (1952)
254 no. 8, using Ley de Titulos y Operaciones de Credito, art. 5, to distinguish the relaci6n subjacente from the literal obligation.
13
The effect of the distinction is well expressed, for instance, in Alcock
v. Smith [1892] 1 Ch. 238 speaking of an obligation: "This is not a question
arising on the bill as a piece of paper or chattel."
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rules. If a relationship, however, is uextracambial," as
certainly should be recognized, e.g., in the case of the relationship underlying a writing on the bill, the special conflicts
rules generally will not be competent, although there may
be doubts and questions. (/nfra II, 4).
Another concept, difficult to do without, is what the
Italian writers understand by 11letteralita" and the Germans
have emphasized by their theory that the obligations flowing from the bill are essentially conditioned by their written form: obligation by the writing, "scriptural" obligation.
Despite theoretical differences in the various systems, it is
not true that Anglo-American law ignores the role of writing. This may most clearly be perceived when a bona fide
holder for value is attributed just what the writing in the
bill assures to him.
These two new terms, cambial and written obligation,
may suffice to facilitate our language. 14
II.
1.

THE RoLE OF THEORY

Municipal Theories

Anglo-American writers seem commonly satisfied with
the language of the Acts speaking of the "contracts" appearing on negotiable instruments. (BEA s. 27 ( r) ; NIL
s. 1 6) , without analyzing the elements of these transactions. German and Italian literature, on the contrary,
abounds in controversies and constructions respecting either
the foundation or the nature of the special law on bills and
notes. 15 So much industry and cleverness has been expended
14 A further differentiation was made by older writers such as GRiiNHUT,
I I; KARL LEHMANN, Lehrbuch Hand. R. ( ed. 2) 613, 646, calling cambial
private law, Wechselzi'Uilrecht, those parts of the general law to which the
law of bills refers without incorporating them, e.g., capacity, form, effects of
contract. However, no effect on the formation of conflicts rules has ever
been suggested.
15 For a complete though short review see MossA, Cambiale 27-125.
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in this field that a reaction was due. The draftsmen of
the Geneva Convention on the substantive law were very
anxious not to be influenced by any theory, and insisted
on being motivated exclusively by reasons of expediency. 16
Some commentators, therefore, declare it unnecessary to
continue the old disputes. 17 Other scholars, however, investigate the Convention in search of its theoretical basis,
yet the variety of their conclusions somewhat defies their
efforts.
Whatever the truth of this matter may be, our study of
the conflicts rules ought to start from a twofold statement.
On the one hand, not only the Geneva product but
virtually all present statutes do not purport to express any
theoretical foundation. Their history in the law merchant
is too old to depend on modern dogmatism. What supports them is mercantile convenience, mixed with lawyers'
techniques, and, in the conflicts sphere, guided or misguided
by the well-known mechanical rules.
On the other hand, contempt of theories is to be avoided,
insofar as they explain legislative half-thought by discovering the rational underground. It would be difficult, indeed,
to determine the most decisive local connections, established
by an international bill of exchange, if we lacked clarity
about the nature of the acts composing such a bill. This
will appear conducive to a study of the different connecting
factors such as delivery in common law and signature in
civil law, the nature and extent of defenses, limitation of
action, relationship between principal and guaranteeing
debtors, etc.
Theories were wrong in claiming that they explain the
16

Conventions on bills, annex II art. 16; on checks, annex II art. 19.
For information, see especially CAMILLO TROJANI, Teorie Cambiarie e
Iegge uniforme (Roma 1936) ; HEINZ WIERS, Wechselannahme und Theorien
im neuen Wechselgesetz, Kiilner Rechtswiss. Abh. N.F. Heft 19 (MannheimBerlin-Leipzig 1935).
17
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entire peculiarity of negotiable instruments, covering the
relationships of drawer, acceptor, indorsers, and indorsees.
We must recognize likewise that the legal ideas behind the
particular, municipal or conflicts, rules are not mysterious
theories of the kind of the popular doctrine discovering
behind the favor granted to the good faith of a holder
an effect of the appearance that his endorser was the
right creditor (theory of apparent right, Rechtsscheintheorie). But every single rule has a purpose that must
be clarified and justified by a legal idea, as part of a system. This is theory enough. In this connection three problems may be considered in the first instance.
2.

The Cambial Contracts

The original concept of a contract based on a bill was
coined by the old lawyers in view of the function served
by bills of exchange at the time. The contract between
the issuer and the recipient of the order to pay was a
written delegation of a debt, saving the effective transportation of a sum of money, to be paid at a distant
place. The French Ordinance of 1673 was accordingly
interpreted by Pothier, 18 who was followed by more recent authors. This contract included both the delegation
or assignment of a debt agreed upon against consideration
( valuta) and the delivery of the instrument as performance
of the issue. Yet it was also possible to distinguish these
two elements as pactum de cambiando and issue against
valuta, a distinction often made in former German works.
The French rule that the cover, the debt of the drawer
against the drawee, is assigned by the bill is another derivative of the delegation.
In the common law, the contracts written in the bill are
18
POTHIER, Traite du contrat de change, Oeuvres de Pothier ( 1847) vol. 4,
p. 473 ff.
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cornerstones of the legal system of bills. But what do they
mean? Lorenzen 19 regretfully defines this contract as
the ordinary concept expressed by this word, without regard to the important fact that the obligation arises from
the form of the bill rather than from mere agreement; this
contract should not be burdened at all by the requirement
of consideration.
Our question is this: Does the "contract" as the word is
used in the acts still mean the ancient contract of delegation? If I am not mistaken, the answer should be negative,
and what is meant is the pre-existent agreement presupposed before any formal contract is executed. It is the
agreement between the immediate parties that the bill
should be delivered with the signature of one party; hence,
delivery of the bill, in correspondence with, "in order to
give effect" to, 20 that agreement completes the transaction.
This, of course, is simple language, neutral in itself to more
searching analysis. But it does not justify the common
notion of a "contract" including the entire legal transaction
between the parties in question. Hence, the constantly
urged opposition between the common-law emphasis on
delivery as last act of the "contract" and the civil-law stress
on the signature does not appear a priori quite convincing.
On the Continent, quite a number of theories underlie
a "contract" to assume cambial obligations. This is a
different concept. What the parties agree upon by this contract has primarily nothing to do with their basic relationship such as sale, payment, or gift, but is limited either to
unilateral issue of the bill or to issue plus delivery. Be19 LORENZEN

29.
20 National Exchange Bank v. Rock Granite Co. (1911) ISS N.C. 43, 70

S.E. 1002: In view of the rule that a contract is executed where "the same
becomes a binding agreement," the courts hold that the liability of an indorser is controlled by the laws of the state in which the note is indorsed
and delivered.
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tween these two variants there was much controversy; recently, however, the theory, once proposed by Einert, regarding the unilateral "creation" of the instrument by the
drawer as the source of the obligation has lost most of its
following. There is a marked tendency among leading
writers toward a combination of the written declaration
by drawer or indorser, with a contract between him and
the payee or indorsee, respectively, concluded by the delivery of the bill (German Begebungsvertrag). The
German Reichsgericht has adopted this theory with respect
to issuance and indorsement, though not acceptance. 21 It
has been contended that this is also the best foundation
for the rules of the Geneva Convention. 22 But even if this
is correct, which must not be examined here, it should not
imply in any case that all states, members of the Convention, have agreed on the high degree of abstractness ascribed to the German obligation written in a bill of exchange. This leads us to a problem not yet considered
in the conflictS literature.
3· Influence of Underlying Relationships
To define the problem, a few facts of the municipal
systems ought to be borne in mind.
The problem scarcely regards the provisions of all legal
systems whereby either "a bona fide holder," or "a holder
in due course for value" is protected against the defenses
that his debtor may draw from his underlying relationship
with another cambial debtor. The position of this privileged holder is independent of the ground on which prior
holders acquired their own positions. This phenomenon
21 RG. JW. 1928, 231; 134 RGZ. 33; formerly this theory was also applied
to the obligation of the acceptor, 24 RGZ. 87; but this was abandoned,
delivery not being required. 74 RGZ. 353, cf., 134 id. 34·
22
Hence, the German Reichsgericht maintains its twofold theory, s. last
note; 162 RGZ. 338; PRIESE-REBENTROST 4, 7·
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is analogous to many other situations where a bona fide
purchaser is protected. Particulars of requirements vary,
but no fundamental divergence of views is in issue.
If, however, we set aside this case, most important in
practice but exceptional in the organization of the law of
bills, there is a basic difference of degree in which the bill
is detached from the underlying relation. The German
law of negotiable instruments has elaborated a rigorous
separation of the obligation flowing from the writing on
the bill and the "cause" or legal ground of the undertaking.
The debt arises from the signature and is enforceable even
though fraud, error, duress, or dissent mar the underlying
agreement, 23 as is apparent when the holder sues his own
indorser who fails to appear in court. The defect must be
alleged and proved by the defendant. This is essentially
the reborn classical Roman law of stipulatio and exceptio
doli or exceptio pacti. In the French system, the writing
produces but a presumption of the validity of the written
obligation. Common law does not even recognize this
much, although it is very difficult to ascertain its exact conception. Without doubt, basically the efficacy of every obligation in the bill presupposes the fulfillment of all requirements for validity and enforceability of contracts.
This conceptional divergence has its principal importance
in procedural situations such as nonappearance of the defendant, summary procedure on instruments or privileges
of enforcement, traditional in civil-law countries, but is
not devoid of substantive effects.
What, then, ought to be our approach to the following
simple cases?
23
The Reichsgericht (March 20, 1941) 166 RGZ. 306, overruling its own
former practice, stated that the debtor cannot oppose defenses of his indorser to a bona fide holder even though the latter is also creditor of the
underlying debt.
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In a lawsuit in Germany, the holder-for some reason
not a holder in due course-sues on a bill issued in Chicago
and indorsed to him in Frankfurt, Germany. The defendant drawer, an American in Chicago, pleads usury in
the contract between him and the payee. Or the signature
of a French drawer, defendant against a subsequent indorsee, upon an indorsement made in Germany, is attacked
in a German court under evidence of fraud. Are these
defenses to be construed under German lex fori? Under this
law, this would mean the existence of a full right arising
from the writing and of a mere defense based on unjust
enrichment or on the tort of a collusive conspiration. Under
Illinois law, there would be no obligation, nor under French
law, after rebuttal of the presumption. Is the German conception even applicable in all countries, because the rights
of the holder are acquired under German law ex scriptura?
No I Such approach would be detrimental to international circulation by exaggerating the power of local laws
at the cost of the law under which the issue occurred. In
other words, the law of Illinois or France, governing the
validity and effect of the drawer's obligation, also determines what influence its own general law of contracts should
have on the cambial obligation. Merely in favor of a
privileged bona fide holder, a very large exception frees
him from restrictions of prior holders, and, as we shall see,
even models for him a new law of acquisition.
A similar case occurs when an English drawer proves
that no valuable consideration has been given either between drawer and drawee or between indorser and the
present holder. The holder has no right at common law.
In the exaggerated German system, he has a claim which
must be repelled by a defense strongly controversial in the .
literature. 24
24 ULMER, Festgabe fiir Heck (133 Arch. Civ. Prax 1931) 213-ZIS·
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Generally, it may be submitted that the influence of the
underlying transaction on the obligation based on the bill
is governed by the same law governing this obligation.
This trivial result points to an important method. The
special conflicts rules are deemed to refer to so much of
the ordinary law of obligations of the decisive place as
the domestic law of this place prescribes. This principle
will help answer our next question.
4· Scope of the Cambial Rights
"Extracambial" (general law) obligations are naturally
controlled by their own laws rather than by the law of the
place of issue or indorsement or payment, the preferred
contacts of cambial conflicts rules. A sale of goods produces obligations governed, e.g., by the law of the seller's
domicil. If the buyer accepts a trade bill of exchange, he
enters into an obligation under the law of the place where
he has to pay, which is normally his own domicil. The
seller may transfer both his debts to the same person, e.g.,
his discount bank, and the causes may be joined in a law
suit. But the causes of action remain different.
The questions whether the drawer has to furnish the
funds to the drawee, 25 and whether the drawee is bound
to honor the bill by acceptance and payment, depend merely on the underlying relationship between drawer and
drawee, such as bank account, letter of credit, confirmed
documentary credit, or other credit arrangement. Most
25
ARMIN JON ET CARRY § 453; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 339 § 178; G.
ARANGio-Ruxz § 85 against the older opinion of French Cass. civ. (Feb. 6,
1900) Clunet 1900, 6os; DIENA, 3 Tratt. § 217; 0TTOLENGHI §55; PILLET, 2
Traite 845; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 373; WEISS, 4 Traite 460.
On the question whether the provision is transferred and by which act, see
Geneva Rules art. 6, vol. 3, p. 442; cf., ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 341 § 180;
otherwise DICEY (ed. 6) 683. And see on various connected problems
HUPKA, Wechselr. 272.
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authors apply the law of the drawee's domicil. 26 More
correctly, Arminjon invokes the law of the contract existing between drawer and drawee. 27 That holders do not
know whether there is a duty to accept, is certainly a disadvantage, but not one caused by conflicts law.
Illustrations. (i) A bill issued in Germany, payable in
Switzerland, was attacked by the acceptor on the ground of
immoral consideration. German law governed the cambial
requirements, but Swiss law was applied to determine
whether good morals were offended. 28
( ii) A bill of exchange was issued and accepted in the
state of Monaco and payable in Rouen, France; the defense
of the acceptors against the action of the holder was that
the bill was given for payment of a sales price higher than
the amount of the bill, to evade the tax laws, and that the
debt depended on a certain condition. The Tribunal of
Rouen allowed the action under the alleged law of Monaco.
In correct application of the Geneva Rules, not the law
of Monaco, but French law as lex loci solutionis governed,
under which only a rebuttable presumption obtains for the
existence of cover and the French provision avoiding a
debt for fiscal fraud was inapplicable to a Monaco transaction. The alleged unfulfilled condition belonged to the
extracambial relationship, effective between the original
parties, though not against a holder in good faith. 29
(iii) A buyer paid a part of the price by indorsing a
promissory note of a third person which was not honored.
The court in Puerto Rico denied recourse of the seller
against the buyer ( C.C. I I 70, derived from Spanish C.C.
art. I I 70) on the theory that NIL abolished such claim.
In reality, recourse in the underlying relationship is not
affected by the cambiallaw. 30
26

4 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT § 646; DIENA, 3 Tratt. I I8 ff. § 227.
ARMINJON ET CARRY § 438, p. 498 n. I, 2; ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 326
§ I7I; against other opinions, cf., LoRENZEN I48 n. 3 I3-law of the place of
presentment; DICEY (ed. 6) 683.
28 App. Zurich (Sept. I7, I929) 29 Bl. Zii. R. 298 No. I23.
29 Trib. com. Rouen (June I7, I949), Roganne v. Quevillon, S.I950.2.4I,
Clunet I9SO, 554, with critical notes.
so Paris v. Canely (I9S2) 73 D.P.R. 403; Note, 22 Rev. Jur. Un. P.R.
( 1953) 43·
27
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Two doubtful cases have been dealt with by the Geneva
Conflicts Rules. One regards the so-called claim for unjust enrichment recognized by law where an extinguished
bill is excluded as a cause of action. This claim is construed in Germany as a residue of the "cambial" claim. 31
The other case is that of a French bill dishonored and
lacking cover, so that the holder has no extracambial hold
on the drawee, but under French law still enjoys a claim
on the ground of the bill against the drawer, even though
he lost his recourse through negligence. 32
The Geneva treaty leaves both these cases to be determined by the law of the place of issue, although merely
with force within the territory of this law. 88 This is an
arbitrary and unsatisfactory escape. 84
Cover. The Hague and Geneva Conferences proved unable to unify the conspicuous diversity of the laws concerning the assignment of cover ("provision") .35 By express
statement, it was left to the national laws to decide whether
the drawer has to provide cover at maturity and whether
the holder has "special rights" in the cover. 36 Conflicts
rule 6 adds the provision that:
"The question whether there has been an assignment
31 See STAUB-STRANZ, art. 89 n. 2, and other comments to the Wechselordnung. See also ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 380 § 209.
3 2 France: C. Com. art. u6, par. 6.
33 Hague Convention, art. 6; Geneva Convention, annex II art. IS·
34 For other subjects on the fringe of the law of bills see MoNACO I7.
35 Supra Vol. III, p. 4I5 f., 44I ff. The particular laws are described
by JoAQUIN VIJIL TARDON, La provision de Ia lettre de change (Paris/Lausanne I939) and the problems surveyed by ERNST E. HIRSCH, Der Rechtsbegriff Provision-im franwsischen und internationalen Wechselrecht (Marburg I930).
86 Annexe II to the Geneva Convention, art. I6.
The legislators, thus,
though inserting the assignments into the formal cambial law, separated them
from the Convention. In this spirit, Italy used separate legislation to introduce transfer of the underlying debt of the drawee in special cases, although
requiring a formal clause on the instrument. See MossA, Cambiale I79 § SI;
ANGELONI, Cambiale 765; R.D. Sept. 2I, I933 Nr. I34S, L. Jan. IS, I934 n. 48,
art. I on bills secured through assignment of debts derived from supply of
merchandise.
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to the holder of the debt which has given rise to the issue
of the instrument, is determined by the law of the place
where the instrument was issued."
The complex of problems thus excluded from the uniform set of rules, once prevailingly considered as of cambial
nature, is of uncertain delimitation as respects the general,
"civil," law. 37 It would seem settled, however, that lex
loci contractus governs the conditions of the transfer (e.g.,
whether there is an assignable debt or what is "cover"),
the form of the transfer (by a written clause or by the
force of law, that is, the fact of the issue), and at what
time the assignment occurs (at issue, or at the time of the
drawer's bankruptcy or at maturity). 38 It results also
from the long debates that the relationship between the
holder and the drawee as well as the holder's preference
over the creditors of the drawer depends on the law of the
place of the issue. 89 However, the rights and duties existing between the drawer and the drawee remain in the
sphere mentioned above governed by the law of their contract.
The draftsmen chose the law of the issue against the
strongly advocated minority view that the law of the place
of payment is most directly concerned. 40 In the law of
checks, in fact, the latter contact .was adopted. This
controversy and the further question whether the effect
of the issue of a bill on the assignment of cover is really
a cambial matter (as we think is the case), may explain a
curious proposition by the editors of Dicey.41 They char37 Cj., supra n. zs and see the recent writings: ARMIN JON RT CARRY § 453;
ARMIN]ON, DIP. Com. §§ 178-ISo; G. ARANGIO-Rmz § 85 where the partly
different views of older writers are cited.
38 HUPKA 273; ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 339 § 178.
39 STAUB-STRANZ, art. 95 n. s and cited German writers.
40 This was still the proposal of PERCRROU in the Conference, Comptes
rendus 364.
H DICEY (ed. 6) 683 in fine.

q.6

BILLS AND NOTES

acterize this problem as one not pertaining to the bill but
to assignment and conclude that "a cheque drawn and issued in Scotland" (where cover is deemed to be assigned)
on a London bank should not operate as an assignment
of the drawer's balance in England. This solution is inacceptable in the member states of the Geneva Convention
as well as in the United States. Speaking of checks, the
lex loci solutionis would be quite reasonable, b~t only with
respect to cambial effects. As the English Act now stands,
it presumably prescribes the lex loci contractus; 42 and
an assignment of a simple debt ought to be governed by
the law of the place of transfer rather than by the law of
the debtor. 43
Again, if in the absence of any assignment by cambial
law, the parties to the issue of a bill make an accessory
special contract of equitable assignment, this, of course, reenters into the noncambial sphere; and this is true notwithstanding the duty of diligence, which the payee or
holder must observe where the bill is not paid. 44
Enforcement Privileges. The old instrumenta guarantigiata permitted the creditor immediate enforcement without preceding law suit for judicial ascertainment and condemnation. Such privileges still exist, particularly for enforcing a claim upon bills of exchange. In German law,
there is no doubt about the procedural nature of this faculty
of the creditor. 45 In Italy, however, the decisions were
divided on the characterization of the effects of a bill en42 BEA sec. 72 (2); the second paragraph on inland bills in this case
is not applicable because of sec. 53·
43
Supra Vol. III, p. 433 f., 415 f.
44 England: Banner v. Johnston (I87I) L.R. 5 H.L. I57; Ex parte Dever
in re Suse ( I884) I3 Q.B.D. 766.
United States: 6 C.J.S., Assignments § 6o, esp. p. III2 relating to checks.
45
RG. 9 RGZ. 430 and JW. Igo6, 7I6, n. IS· Once, it is true, SALPIUS,
I9 Z. Handelsr. ( I874) I, 64, had to refute a theory connecting the law
of protest and notification with the executive force of bills.
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abling the holder to enforce without judgment. The
majority considered the executive effect of the bill as a
material quality of the obligation, controlled by the law of
the place of the issue, hence accessible also to foreign
bills. 46 Learned opinion, 47 sanctioned by the Supreme
Court, correctly emphasized the procedural nature of the
problem, calling for the law of the forum. 48 Hence, foreign
bills sufficient as such under their law of issue should have
enjoyed the privilege. The legislation of 1933, however,
has restricted this consequence to bills so enforceable under
their law of issue. 49
In the United States, clauses permitting the creditor to
confess for the debtor, in order to reach at once a confession judgment, are prohibited in most, but not all, jurisdictions. An unsettled controversy has brought up the
most diverse answers to the question which law applies. 50
III.

PRIVATE AuTONOMY

Prevailing judicial authority in the United States 51 as
well as in Europe 52 has taken it for granted that the free46 App. Venezia (Feb. 23, 1928) Rivista 1929, 273; (May 16, 1930) id.
1931, 544i Cass. Ita!. (Nov. 23, 1934) Foro Ita!. 1935 I 17; App. Napoli
(Dec. 8, 1935) Rivista 1938, 185; cf., DE NovA, Revue Crit. 1950, 362, n. 16.
47 CHIOVENDA, Principii di diritto processuale civile (ed. 4, 1928) 130, 253;
L. MoRTARA, Manuale della procedura civile (1926) vol. 2 § 790; D'AMELIO,
Scritti 271; Bosco, Rivista 1929, 278; BALDONI, id. 1931, 548; MoNAco, 3
Giur. Comp. DIP. 44; CAVAGLIERI in Banco, Borsa e Titoli di Credito 1942
I 130 ff.
Mexico: C. Com. art. 1391, IV: H.R. ALMANZA, Los Conflictos internacionales de !eyes en materia de Titulos de credito (Thesis, Mexico 1940)
23, criticizes the lack of reciprocity.
48
Cass. Ita!. (June 17, 1929) Foro Ita!. 30 I 101; App. Milano (July
16, 1932) Foro Lomb. 1933, 464 cited by CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 400.
49
Decree of Dec. 14, 1933, no. 1669 (Bills of Exchange Law) art. 63;
MoRELLI, Dir. Proc. Civ. Int. 25 § 12.
50
BEUTEL-BRANNAN (ed. 7) 290 ff., § 5 (2) j Note, 13 A.L.R. (2d) 1312
(1950); DEAN, Ann. Survey Am. L. (1950) 48.
51
STORY § 317 i 2 WHARTON §§ 447 ff.
52
SURVILLE § 484 j 2 FRANKENSTEIN 426 j HAUDEK 15 1 43 j RAISER 22 ff.,
34 ff., 42; KESSLER 141-143; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 297 § 150.
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dom of the parties, in the limits as it exists in the various
countries, extends to bills and notes. The American decisions, from early beginnings in Massachusetts, applied the
intended law of the contract, although this law was variably
identified. It has frequently been argued in this country
and abroad that the law of the place of drawing or endorsing governs because intended by the parties to the issue
or to an indorsement, or that the place of payment is decisive because it is contemplated when a note is made or
acceptance is declared or even in other cases. 58 In an important practical application, an intentionally wrong indication of a place of issue in a bill of exchange has been
recognized as valid for the reason that the parties may
thus determine the applicable law. The C6digo Bustamante
in its primary rule of the matter declares for the law intended by the parties. 54
All these borrowings from freedom of contract are unnecessary. Hypothetic intention is now replaced by objective criteria ;55 a false date presents a problem of its
own. 56 Assuredly, no positive law prohibits express agreements to select a law; 57 to have effect, however, within the
cambial relation, the agreement would have to be written
in the bill, 58 such as "Pay according to the law of Panama;"
and such a clause seems to be extremely rare.
Without a clear direction by the instrument's wording,
the nature of negotiable papers is repugnant to party agree53
SALPIUS op. cit. n. 26, 17, taught that the place of payment is intended
by the parties to govern the acts necessary for exercising and preserving recourse; RENAUD, Wechselrecht, followed this view, but changed it later
(ed. s, § 8).
54
Cod. Bust. a. 264 ff. ("a falta de convenio"), criticized by CoRDIDO
FRI!YTI!S (supra n. 4) 40 f., 93, 96, 98.
55 Supra Vol. II, 436 ff.
56
Infra Ch. 61.
57
France: Paris (Aug. 18, 18s6) D. r8s7.1.39; (June 17, 1899) S. 1900.1.22S.
Germany: RG. (Jan. IS, 1894) 32 RGZ. us.
58
See the excellent argument of RAISER 51 ff.
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ments outside the writing. Clauses not visible on the face
of the instrument can have no effect except between the
parties to the agreement. To accord private autonomy
where- it does not belong compromises its necessary functions elsewhere.
The editors of Dicey's sixth edition to the same effect
oppose the traditional doctrine of the proper law in matters of negotiable instruments. 59
This is also the case of the times allowed by the laws for
presentment, protest, and notice. Modifications of the
periods of time or of the sanctions, allowed in certain
limits, must be indicated in the bill to affect third parties.
Another matter is interpretation of the cambial declarations. As the Italian Supreme Court puts it, neither the
principle of letteralita nor even that of formalism prevents
an interpretation of the declarations according to their true
meaning. Thus, which of several signatures was that of
the drawer, should be ascertained from the instrument but
with the aid of all circumstances. 60
IV.
I.

THE BILL AND THE AccEssoRY OBLIGATIONS

Principles.

(a) The principle of the basic bill. Section 3 (I) of
the British Act defines the formal requirements of a bill.
It must contain the person who shall pay, the payee, the
sum to be paid, the time of maturity, and the place of
payment. Observance of these requirements is a condition
for the existence of any right to be based on the bill; they
are the common basis of the obligations of drawer and
59 DICEY (ed. 6) 68I; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law § 468; WIGNY, Revue
Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) I93I, 8u; ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 298 § I so; 2 PERCEROU
ET BOUTERON I79 § 210.
60 Italy: Cass. (Jan. IS, I940) Riv. Dir. Com. I940 II 237, 8 Giur. Comp.
D. Com. n. 3 I.
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acceptor as well as of all indorsers and other obligors. The
German name for this basis is Grundwechsel. Its substance is analyzed as a mandate by the drawer to the
drawee to pay, or in a note, the promise of the maker to
pay. English expressions are "the bill," "the instrument,"
"the order or promise to pay." In more pregnant language, Lorenzen speaks of the original contract in contrast
to the ((acceding" contracts. In conflicts law the basic bill
is doubtless subject to one, "the single" law, whereas the
supervenient writings produce obligations either submitted
to several laws or forming the subject of profound doubts.
Again, consciousness of these contrasting concepts saves
notable error and confusion. How could one so ignore
the fundamental concepts as to advocate the law of each
indorsement for determining the maturity of the bill!
The American courts properly oppose the place of issue
to that of payment, although all other contacts should not
be excluded a priori.
"The drawer of such a bill does not contract to pay
the money in the foreign place on which it is drawn but
only guarantees its acceptance and payment in that place
by the drawee ... His contract is regarded as made at
the place where the bill is drawn," with the conclusion
that "the necessity of making a demand and protest and
the circumstances under which the same may be required
or dispensed with are incidents of the original contract
which are governed by the law of the place where the
bill is drawn rather than of the place where it is payable. They constitute implied conditions upon which
the liability of the drawer is to attach according to the
lex loci contractus." 61
(b) The principle of independence. The great majority
of the courts in all countries have shown a remarkable unity
61

875·

Amsinck v. Rogers ( 1907) 189 N.Y. 252, 82 N.E. 134, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.)
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in establishing the leading idea that the various obligations
arising from declarations on the bill are governed by several laws, each by its own independent law. 62 In the United
States, this principle has been stressed from the beginning
in early Massachusetts decisions 63 and carried out more
consistently than in English law. 64 The statutes and conventions have all followed the same path, despite mounting
opposition.
The reasons for this attitude are plain. Historically,
the principle is connected with the rule, locus regit actum,
working separately in every contract documented in the bill.
It is argued, as usual, that a signer intends to be bound so
far as the law of the place of contracting goes. "The law
of the place of contracting and independence of contracts
in a bill stay and fall together." 65 More impressive, a
bank discounting a bill or a creditor taking it in lieu of
payment does not want to inquire into foreign laws controlling anterior written obligations. 5 6 The courts seek to protect
a resident of the forum as well ·as to avoid foreign laws.
2.

Difficulties

The coexistence of the single law of the bill and the
several independent laws of the accessory obligations is
the most potent cause of disunity. In view of the disconcerting divisions that arose in American decisions, a unitary
law once postulated by Pothier 67 has been sought with
62
On this subject see in the first place LoRENZEN'S book and RAISER 58
ff., both with comparative research.
63
Z WHARTON §§ 449 ff.; I DANIEL §§ 895 ff.
The only clear deviation,
in Shanklin v. Cooper (Ind. I846) 8 Blackf. 41, was overruled in Hunt v.
Standart (I86o) 15 Ind. 33, 77 Am. Dec. 79·
64
RAISER 41.
65
GUTTERIDGE 16 (ser. 3) J. Comp. L. at 67.
66
Both RAISER 59 and STUMBERG ZSS ff. emphasize this point.
67 See I DANIEL § 901; MINOR 396; Committee of Legal Experts of the
League of Nations, Doc. pn!par. 8.
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particular energy in this country, aiming at "interdependence" rather than "independence." 68 But the law of the
place of payment, most frequently resorted to in this
effort, too evidently failed to help as a general criterion.
The Geneva Rules disregarded the countercurrents to
the dominance of the two principles, and merely established
certain exceptions in favor of a single law. Severe criticism
attaches at least to one of these exceptions, while others
have been missed.
The great problem remains almost as it was posited by
Lorenzen in I 9 I 9: What questions are attributable to the
law governing the bill as a whole and what questions ought
to have their own law? This will be the subject of all following discussions. Clearly, the idea of independent obligations is naturally limited by the basic requirements for
the validity of all obligations in the bill. We should not
forget that the law thereby applicable includes construction
and general rules.
Examples of settled solutions. (i) A bill is issued in
France without indicating a time for payment and circulates
in England. French law governing the original contract
also determines the manner in which the day of payment
should be filled in. 69
( ii) Where the amount of the sum is written in figures
and letters contradicting each other, the law of the issue
determines which amount is decisive. 70
(iii) If the bill is "payable to P," the law of the place
of issue determines whether it is payable to order ( BEA,
s. 8, 34) or non-negotiable (NIL, s. 8). 71
68 POTHIER, Contrat de change § 155 (for protest) ;
314; PILLET, 2 Traite 856 If.
69 Infra Ch. 6r, IV.
70
ARMIN JON ET CARRY 489 § 432.
71 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 283.
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\iv) Whether a drawee may pay upon a forged indorsement and whether, therefore, the drawer is liberated, is
determined by the law of the place of payment as that
governing the position of the drawee. 72
72

Caras v. Thalmann (1910) IZ3 N.Y.S. 97, infra Ch. 6z.
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Formal Requirements
I.
I.

FoRM AND SuBSTANCE

Essential Requirements

The traditional Continental doctrine is so accustomed
to distinguish between formal and intrinsic requirements of
acts and between validity and effects of obligations, that the
writers unhesitatingly extend these notions to the law of bills
and notes. In this spirit the Geneva conflicts rules establish
different rules for "form" (article 3) and "effects" (article
4), although they entirely fail to mention the material requirements.
English and American authors reject any distinction between formal and material validity/ although it is controversial whether the English statutory rule on validity
and "interpretation" includes "effects."
At the same time, Anglo-American law generally is less
rigorous in establishing invalidity of obligations for lack
of written expression. They do not require, for instance,
the indication of the paper as bill of exchange, of the date
or place of the issue ;2 in the United States, however, the
order clause is essential, 3 unless the paper is payable to
bearer.
The true situation has been explained by a number of
1
LORENZEN 99 f. and in 30 Yale L. J. s6s; BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. I;
GUTIERIDGI!, I6 (Ser. 3) J. Comp. L. 62-66.
2 BEA s. 3 ; NIL s. I and 6 against Gen. Conv. art. I and 2.
3 NIL sec. I (4) against BEA art. 8 (4) ; Gen. Conv. art. II. For other
points of comparison see WIGNY, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) I93I at 8os.
I
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authors. 4 All essential formal requirements involve the
necessity of a written word or clause in the bill and at the
same time are an integral part and condition of the content
of the contract. The statutes enumerate them exhaustively. A more appropriate category than form is that of
"extrinsic" requirements, contrasted with "intrinsic" conditions, such as cause or consideration and consent. 5
"Form," thus, is not a satisfactory category of conflicts
rules on negotiable instruments. The rules using this term
are extended by interpretation to broader concepts. But
the only adequate and also the widest concept is that used
by the American courts: validity of the contract, which includes "form and substance."
Yet, such outstanding statutes as the British Act and the
Geneva Rules employ narrower language and provoke
doubtful interpretations.
2.

Narrow Enactments

Sections 72 (I) and ( 2) BEA subject both "form" and
"interpretation" of drawing, indorsing, etc., to "the law of
the place where such contract is made." An active controversy whether "interpretation" includes validity on material
grounds is still going on. 6 Chalmers advocated broad construction.7 Recently, however, new doubts have arisen from
the desire to apply the law of the place of payment to the
bill in general. 8 On the platform of the dominant doctrine,
Chalmers' construction is certainly right.
4 DESPAGNET 988; 0TTOLENGHI 8 I; LoRENZEN 100; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 422;
VEITH, 4 Rechtsvergleichendes Handworterbuch 493·
5 G. ARANGIO-RUIZ 183 ff.
6 BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. I; NIBOYET, Manuel 6 57 n. 4; GUTTERIDGE r6
(Ser. 3) J. Comp. L. 62.
7 CHALMERS (ed. rr) 236.
8 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict 283; DICEY (ed. 6) 691, advocating the Jaw
of the place of payment.
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Article J, paragraph 1 of the Geneva Rules runs as
follows:
"The form of any contract arising out of a bill of exchange or promissory note is regulated by the laws of the
territory in which the contract has been signed."
Article 2 deals with capacity and article 4 with effects;
both apply, in principle, the same lex loci actus. Nothing
is said about other requirements of validity. This defect
must be, and commonly is, cured by extensive construction
as in the British Act. Since the law of the place of signature governs "fprm," capacity, and "effects," intrinsic
validity cannot escape the same law. This result creates a
partial uniformity with American practice and lessens considerably the importance of the concept of form.
Nevertheless, the following survey is forced by the existing legal situation to proceed from "form" to "material
validity" to "effects." Not only are the obligations of an
acceptor and a maker governed by special laws under various rules, but the enacted laws have piled up distinctions
and exceptions just in regard to formalities.
Concept of Form. In this matter, the contention, maintained by this writer, is commonly accepted that conflicts
law must have an autonomous concept of form, viz., the
external expression of a transaction. 9 To the same effect,
the English leading case, Guaranty Trust v. Hannay, has
subordinated to the rule on "form" the question whether
a chain of indorsements is interrupted by an agent signing
for the payee or an indorsee, without indicating that he is
an agent. 10
9
Supra Vol. II, p. 497·
10 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay [1918] I K.B. 43, [1918]
2 K.B. 623. Cf., Koechlin et Cie. v. Kestenbaum [1927] I K.B. 616, 897,
per Bankes, L.J., 899 per Sargant, L.J., and comment by the editors of
DICEY (ed. 6) 685.
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3· Scope of Form
Although a sound construction of the statutory and conventional provisions may be satisfied with certain analogies
to the rules on "form," their direct application goes rather
far into the province of the substantive function of essential
form requirements. The rule, referring formalities to
the law of the place of acting, has been applied, e.g., to the
questions:
Whether the instrument is complete in form 11
Whether a contract in a bill is unconditional 12
Whether a clause indicating the consideration ("Valuta
clause") is essential, 13 or
Whether an indorsement in blank is admitted, 14 and
Whether acceptance may be declared orally, according
to one decision of the United States Supreme Court, 15 which
is contradicted by another decision 16What law determines the treatment of an incomplete
declaration, which, however, complies with the formal
essential of the law of the issue? 17 For instance, a bill is
issued in the United States and sent to France to be filled
in when an indorser is found. In one view, American law
should prescribe how the instrument should be completed,
because no new contract is made by the agent in France. 18
11 Editors of DICEY ( ed. 6) 68 s n. 77 find this "illogic but convenient,"
but I do not see why it is not a necessary incident of the lex loci.
12 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay, supra n. 8, found no
conflict because the bill was not conditional under both laws; Koechlin v.
Kestenbaum, supra n. 8.
18
NoRBERTO PINERO, La Letra de Cambio (Buenos Aires 193z) 193•
14 Admitted in the common law and Argentina, prohibited in the Geneva
Convention and most civil-law jurisdictions.
15 Scudder v. The Union National Bank of Chicago (1875) 91 U.S. 406.
16 Hall v. Cordell ( 1891) 14Z U.S. 116. Both decisions use fictitious assumptions of party intention.
17
See the exhaustive comment by LoRENZEN 88-90. American courts have
dealt with very few problems concerning pure form. See z BEALE nBs
§ 336.1.
18
Thus, applying art. 3 of the Geneva Rules, ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 301

J ISZ·
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Under another view, French law decides, since the local
law is better suited to regulate the formal requirements. 19
But since a bill carrying a blank permissible under the law
of the issue is a valid instrument, the first view is correct.
Only where the bill is deemed to be issued in the second
country should it be considered subject to the place where
it is completed.
Likewise, the law of the issue determines whether undesirable additions to the normal initial context of a bill
should be taken as not written or make the bill void. 20
II. Locus REGIT AcTUM

In a notable unanimity of principles, all laws agree that
the "form" of an act contained in a bill or note is subject
to the law of the place where this act is done.
1.

Imperative Function

In this matter, lex loci actus has commonly preserved its
imperative force. 21 But, curiously, French courts, from the
beginning of this century, developed the tendency to convert the principle to its general modern role as merely permissive, creating an option between lex loci and the national
law of the parties. 22 Under the Geneva Rules, now in
force, there can scarcely be a doubt, also in France, that
the parties may not choose their national law. Only the
provisions reserving the application of the national law to
the states have the power of derogating from the law of
the place of the act. The domiciliary law is entirely excluded.
19

Cf., ARMIN JON ET CARRY 472, and Gen. Conv. art. 13 par. 2.
On the difference, Swiss BG. (Feb. 28, 1930) 65 BGE. II 66; cf., 74 RGZ.
339; RG. Jur. Woch. 1935, 1778 against the case of 21 ROHGE. 169.
21
DIENA, 3 Tratt. 22 §§ 209-212.
22
DIENA ib. p. 33· Cf., supra Ch. 55 and Ch. 58, III.
20
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Where is' the act done ?

The problem is old. The statutists usually discussed the
case where a bill of exchange signed by the drawer or indorser in one place is sent to the payee or indorsee staying
in another place. Jan Voet solved it as follows:
"Quia vero, in quibusdam circa cambiorum jura variant
leges et consuetudines variarum regionum, notandum est,
in decidendis circa haec controversiis spectandas esse leges
loci illius, ad quem litterae cambii destinatae, et in quo vel
acceptatae, sunt, vel acceptari debuerunt, non item loci uncle
missae; cum illic contractus intelligatur celebratus, ubi implementum eius destinatum est." 23
This doctrine was fully adopted in England. Sending
and receiving the document completing the act constitute
the test of the applicable law. On the Continent, the contrary doctrine prevailed. The signer assumes his obligation by the signature itself, which in some systems may also
dispossess him of the title. 24 These antagonistic theories
have been perpetuated with certain modifications.
(a) The Common-Law Doctrine. According to the
British Act 25 and established American practice, 26 the applicable law is determined by the place where a bill is delivered by the drawer, or indorser, with his signature.
Delivery is legally defined as
"transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one
person to another." 27
Leaving out, for the moment, the acceptor, who is treated
differently, what reason is given for this important rule?
The statutes themselves seem clearly to indicate that delivery is essential inasmuch as it "completes" the act. 28
23

Comm. ad Pand. L. XXIII, tit. II§ xo.
3 Tratt. 25 n. I.
25
BEA sec. 21; NIL s. x6. Canada: BEA ss. 2, 31, 32, 39, 40, 41, 178.
26
Ludlow v. Bingham ( 1799) 4 Dal. 47; Restatement § 312.
2 7 BEA s. 2; NIL s. 191.
28
BEA s. 21; NIL s. 16: completions to the act.

24 DIENA,
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The latter proposition is literally true; if a hill is signed
on a Sunday and delivered on Monday, it is not deemed
to fall under the Sunday statutes. 29 Hence, the theory that
the place of the final act in the course of concluding a contract determines the law applicable to the contract, has been
applied here-this is Beale's teaching. 30
Not believing in the soundness of this theory, I think
that it does not even do justice to the common-law doctrine.31 However, at this juncture, it is important to note
the large qualifications of the principle.
Where the signer is authorized to send the hill by mail,
it is remembered that the English postal regulations prevent the sender from reclaiming a posted hill; therefore,
the place where the signer mails the letter is deemed to he
the place of delivery. 32 (This theory is not readily applicable to foreign mail in case the sender of a letter may
retrieve it from the post.) 33 In the absence of authorization and of estoppel, the decisive place would he where the
postman hands out the paper. 34 But this case is quite rare.
In domestic business, it may he taken as the rule that the
"contract" is completed by a unilateral act quite as ordinary
29

In re Estate of Martens (1939) 226 Iowa 162, 223 N.W. 885.
definition by 2 BEALE 1047 f. of delivery as the final act making
the contract binding is corrected by FALCONBRIDGE 276 f.: the issue is completed by the delivery, but the binding force depends upon the applicable
law. However, our problem is why common law has derived this rule
from the binding force of delivery.
81 lnfra Ch. 61.
32 England: Ex p. Cote In re Deveze (1873) L.R., 9 Ch. App. 27, 31 f.,
per Mellish, L.J.; Klein worth v. Comptoir National d'Escompte [1894] 2
Q.B. 157; Thairlwall v. Great Northern Railway [1910] 2 K.B. 509
CHALMERS ( ed. 12) 52 n. I.
United States: Trego v. Cunningham's Est. (1915) 267 Ill. 367, 108 N.E.
350. Restatement§ 314.
33 In re Deveze (1873} L.R. Ch. App. 27, 31 f.; C.A. in Chancery, per
Mellish, L.J.
34
Lysaght v. Bryan ( 1850) 9 C.B. 46, 137 E.R. 8o8.

30 The
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contracts are concluded by mailing acceptance, 35 and this
also in the United States, despite modified postal rules. 36
This act, theoretically, is independent of the transfer of
ownership; but again, the transfer of title will usually coincide with acceptance according to the intention of the
parties. As delivery may be constructive, it can be effected
by what is called in civil law constitutum possessorium. 87
Since signing and sending, thus, occur at the same place,
the result approaches closely the Continental legal situation. Yet, this is not all. According to the statutes, a valid
and intentional delivery is presumed when a signer is no
longer in possession of the bill ;38 and the same is "conclusively presumed" in favor of a holder in due course. 39
A holder in due course is not required to deliver the original
bill to the payee in order to exercise his indorsement
rights. 40 "Where the instrument or an acceptance or any
indorsement thereon is dated, such date is deemed prima
facie to be the true date of the making, drawing, acceptance,
or indorsement." 41 Finally, an indorsement is presumed
to be made at the place where the instrument is dated. 42
Although the last provision no longer fits the circumstances,
the other rules are of high practical value, notably the non35 It may also be recalled that an insurance policy indicating that it
is signed, sealed, and delivered may be kept by the insurance company for
the disposition of the insured and is then deemed to have been delivered.
Xenos v. Wickham (1867) L.R. z H.L. at 31:z. This has been generalized
for deeds.
36
Dick v. U.S. ( 1949) 8z F. Supp. 3:z6, for this reason rebelled against the
mailbox theory, but see Note, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 140-14Z.
37
Pennington v. Crossley & Sons ( 1897) 13 T.L.R. 513.
United States: 6 C.J.S. 513 n. 63, cited with approval by Seawell, J., in
Everett v. Carolina Mortg. Co. (1939) z14 N.C. 778, I S.E. (zd) 109, 113.
3S NILs. 16 i.f. BEA s. ZI (3).
39 NILs. 16 sent. 3; BEA s. ZI (z) i.f.
4
City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. (Fla. 1939)
105 F. (zd) 348, 350.
4 1 NILs. 11; BEA s. 13(1).
42
NIL s. 46. See also Chemical Nat. Bank of N.Y. v. Kellogg ( 1905)
I83 N.Y. 9Z, 75 N.E. 1103.
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rebuttable presumption in favor of the bona fide holder.
American courts also have held that the place at which an
instrument is dated is deemed prima facie to be the place
of delivery 43 and that this presumption is conclusive for
the benefit of a holder in due course. 44
{b) The Civil-Law Doctrine. The place where the signature is written has been selected on the Continent because it is said to be easily identified either by the writing
or by other evidence. This practical motive inspired the
draftsmen of the Geneva Rules, who definitely were unwilling to subscribe to any theory of unilateral creation of obligations. But, again, is this reason convincing? The answer
largely depends on the solution of the question : whether
the "place of the signature" means the true place where it
has been executed or the place where the instrument says
that the signature was made.
Locus verus or locus scriptus? This is an old and unfortunately still controversial problem. Pothier wrote that
the absence of a date or an error in it cannot be held against
the drawer or the acceptor, no more than the omission of
the place where the bill is written. 45 Yet modern prevailing opinion clings to the place of signature in its true form
and denies that ignorance of a holder should be protected
when he believes in a falsely alleged place. 46 To be sure,
43 LoRENZEN 84 citing Lennig v. Ralston ( 1854) 23 Pa. Sta. 137; Second
National Bank v. Smoot (D.C. 1876) 2 MAcARTHUR 371; Parks v. Evans
(Del. 1879) 5 Houst. 576.
44
Towne v. Rice ( 1877) 122 Mass. 67; LoRENZEN 85 n. 95·
45 POTHIER, Contrat d'echange (4 BUGNET 486) § 36.
46
Austria: OGH. (Oct. 6, 1905) 19 Z. int. R. 285; BETTELHEIM 109.
France: App. Colmar (March u, 1933) Rev. Crit. 1934, 138; and Note
NrBOYET.
Germany: (formerly) OLG. Niirnberg (May 6, 1925) JW. 1926 384;
check issued in Germany, dated at New York; the presumption that the
issue was in New York is adopted but held rebutted by the fact that the
check, as early as four days after issue, was negotiated in Germany. BAR,
Int. Hand. R. 384; M. WoLFF, Festgabe fiir Wieland ( 1934) 457; STAUBSTRANZ 85 n. 3, 91 n. 15.
Italy: Dri!NA, 3 Tratt. 26.
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there is a rebuttable presumption that the place written is
the true place. 47
A contrary opinion which originated in Germany maintains, however, that the written place enjoys preference,
whenever its law subjects the debtor to a stronger liability.48 Certain authors of this group restrict this view to
the protection and choice of bona fide holders. A justification has often been sought in the general freedom of
the parties to select the applicable law by choosing an
appropriate place and indicating it as the place of signature.
At present, on the ground of the Geneva Rules, the
dominant opinion follows the impressive majority of the
commission drafting the Geneva Rules who gave unmistakable approval to the strict requirement of the real
place. 49 Diena was particularly eager in advocating this
ngor. Although the presumption in favor of the written
place is conceded, 50 no holder enjoys a defense against the
proof that the signature was affixed at a place not visible
on the bill. 51 Where the fictitious character of the indication is evident on the face of the instrument, the court
47 23 RGZ. 500. It is presumed that a merchant signs a bill at his
business place, a private person at his domicil.
48 Germany: ROHG. (May u, 1872) 6 ROHGE. 125; RG. (Jan. 15,
1894) 32 RGZ. 115, 117; 91 id. 130 (with respect to bills issued "abroad");
KG. (May 22, 1916) 35 ROLG. 2; and constant practice of the 13th division.
IPRspr. 193 I 96; 1932 95 and 101; 1933 46; JW. 1932 754, and see supra
n. 8. 2 BAR 182; 2 GRiiNHUT 579 n. 35; I MEYER 651; 2 id. 368; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 426; NuSSBAUM 319; ULMER, Wertpapiere 286.
Italy: MossA IX 3 Annuario Dir. Comp. 367 ff.; MoNACO 109.
Switzerland: BG. (April 6, 1900) 26 BGE. II 258; (April 3, 1912) 33
BGE. II 135; (July 7, 1914) 40 BGE. II 407.
49 A German proposal in favor of the written place was rejected, Comptes
rendus 352, 430.
50 PRIESE-REBENTROST, Art. 92 n. 2.
MoNACO 108: the literal wording has
preference over the not mentioned reality.
51
ARMINJON ET CARRY 474; G. ARANGIO-RUIZ 149 ff.
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has to note it ex offi.cio. 52 However, not everyone shares
this view. 53
In case a written place or date is mtssmg, some laws,
such as the Geneva Convention (article 1) with respect to
the drawer's or acceptor's signature, declare the obligation
inexistent. Where this is not the law, 54 it is commonly
assumed 55 that the place of the signing may be proved by
means of evidence allowed at the forum. If no evidence is
presented, much favor is shown for the law of the domicil
of the obligor, 56 because this place is usually known to the
parties or is easily ascertainable. It is also normally just
the place where the signature is expected to happen.
Delivery in municipal civil law. Our comparison would
be entirely defective, if we were not to appreciate the forceful European debates about the role that delivery, that is
transfer of the title in the paper, exercises in the law of
negotiable instruments. Without accepting every shade of
any of the various doctrines, it seems, indeed, almost obvious that a normal creation or transfer of a bill is composed of three acts: agreement, signature, and delivery,
of which the first in the Germany theory is extracambial.
Some authorities lay all the weight on the contract of delivery (Begebungsvertrag). But even theories starting
from the idea that the main part of the entire transaction
is the unilateral act of signing, at present consider delivery
among the essential elements. Thus, in the view of a
52

App. Colmar (May II, 1933) Rev. Crit. 1934, 138.
See infra n. 61. The Kammergericht upheld its practice, supra n.
41 j (Nov. 4. 1935) JW. 1936, 2102, contra: RILK, ibid.,· KNUR UND
HAMMERSCHLAG, Kommentar zum Wechselgesetz (1949) art. 92 n. I. See
HUPKA 253, RAISER 57; ULMER, Wertpapiere 285 agrees in principle but
gives the holder a choice to qualify his claim in accordance with the real
place of signature, apparently the result of GRUNHUT, supra n. 41.
u BEA s. 4. 12; NIL s. 129, 13; Portuguese C. Com. art. 282.
55 See MONACO III f.
56 SALPIUS, 19 Z. Handelsr. ( 1874) II j 2 BAR 182 j 2 MEYER 368 j BETTELHEIM IIOj RAISER 55·
53

FORMAL REQUIREMENTS

165

leader of scholarly research, the unilateral act of signature
creates the cambial obligation only under the legal condition that the contract of delivery of the instrument follows. The full legal effect is brought about by the two connected acts. 57 Of course, in the case of a bona fide holder,
the contract of delivery is complemented by the protection
of bona fides.
Rationale. The Anglo-American modifications of the
axiomatic function of delivery obviate largely the disadvantages connected with the fact that the place of delivery
is never visible on the bill. But the principle is defeated by
the exceptions, and the reliance of conflicts rules on presumptions and fictions also is a sign of an unsound theory.
On the other hand, the German theory gives the signature exclusive importance, in contradiction to the necessity
of delivering the bill for any normal purpose. Moreover,
the insistence on the real place of signing, ultimately deriving from a credence in the magic power of lex loci actus,
is palpably wrong, while granting a choice of position to a
bona fide holder merely shows that the main rule is inept.
It seems that the draftsmen of the Geneva Rules drew an
exaggerated conclusion from what they thought might be
a fraude a la loi in the case of a minor who fakes a place
where he would be of full age; in the case of formalities,
such fear of fraud in business matters is even more unrealistic than with respect to capacity.
The damage done thereby to international circulation of
bills cannot possibly be repaired by excepting the case where
the signer is supposed to have advisedly submitted to the
57 ULMER, Wertpapiere 41 ff., 53·
The impressive Italian literature
reaches a similar conclusion. The act of creation, whether conceived as a
factual act (MossA, CARNELUTI'I, RAvA) or as a legal transaction
(ASCARELLI), combines with the act of transfer or issue (emission), consisting of delivery and acceptance; see the summary by G. ARANGIORUIZ, 133 f.
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law of the written place. Even if party autonomy were
to be recognized in the law of negotiable instruments
(which is a wrong theory) uncertainty of proof and arbitrariness of its judicial admission are unsound elements.
Likewise the idea of estoppel, adduced in some American
decisions against others, 58 is a precarious corrective.
Whether the misled holder may sue the signer of an instrument with a false date by action in tort, 59 a poor substitute, 60 depends too much on the circumstances to be a
real help. The only way out is the frank statement that,
at least in the case of a bona fide holder, the written place
alone is what counts; this has been judiciously advocated
even under the equivocal text of the Geneva Rules, in defiance of the draftsmen, especially Diena. 61
3· Conclusions
In a considered review of the Geneva debates, Gutteridge 62 connects the test of delivery with the commercial
requirement that the paper should be in the hands of the
payee or indorsee, and prefers it for instruments to bearer
(where all systems agree), for giving a paper in escrow,
and for documents in C.I.F. contracts and bankers commercial credit. With respect to the ordinary instruments
to order, Gutteridge considers that the problem, restricted
to the liabilities of drawer and indorser and to circulation
outside territorial limits, could be solved in either way,
especially because usages may be changed to increase the
cases where signature and delivery coincide.
58
Watson v. Boston Woven Cordage Co. ( 1894) 26 N.Y.S. 1101; Chemical
Natl. Bank v. Kellogg ( 1905) 183 N.Y. 92, 75 N.E. 1103; Contra: Basilea
v. Spagnuolo (N.J. 1910) 77 Atl. 531.
59
M. WoLFF, Festgabe fiir Wieland ( 1934) 459 ff.
60
MONACO 102.
61
WIGNY, Rev. Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) 1931, 804: Quod non est in cambio,
non est in mundo; HuPKA 250; RAISER 57 ff.; VEITH, 4 Rechtsvergleichendes
Handworterbuch 509; MoNACO 105 ff. § 30.
62
GUTTERIDGE 16 (ser. 3) J. Comp. L. at 71. M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. L.
§ 464 goes over to the delivery test. See also DICEY ( ed. 6) 688 n. 4•
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In my opinion, both systems suffer from theoretical
prejudices and should make place for a more earthy conception. Delivery, taken as the "final act," and signature,
taken as the exclusive creative force of the obligations, are
both incompetent to govern. To restrict their pretended
scopes, rebuttable and unrebuttable presumptions are inadequate.
In the case of a place written in the bill, a bill intended
to circulate-and there is really no limit to the territory
where a negotiable instrument may circulate-it is difficult
to understand why this date should not indicate the place
of contracting in the meaning of conflicts rules. The true
main ground on which the contracts arise and the basis
for the peculiar working of a bill, is the writing. It is
definitely the only practical answer to the much ventilated
problem of locus verus v. locus scriptus, that whenever a
place is indicated on the bill, this place determines the
applicable law. That immediate parties are always subject to the defenses inherent in their underlying relationships and third persons may be liable for tort are selfevident counter-instances rather than the basic rule in the
matter.
In the absence of a writing in the bill indicating the place
to which the conflicts rule looks, the common-law approach
is superior for a very conclusive reason. As will be noted
more explicitly, when the transfer of cambial rights is to
be examined, the mechanism of negotiable instruments at
common law has preserved a similar structure for title
and obligation, appealing to business men. In contrast to
the German and Geneva systems, the incidents of obligation and property in the life of a bill of exchange are intimately connected. One act, delivery of the instrument,
transfers obligatory rights as well as title. There is no
difference between them as respects, for instance, good
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faith. There need not be any subtle difference where a bill
is mailed to the cambial successor. Thus, not as the "last
act" in creating the obligation but as the act effectuating the
domination of the bill by the grantee in respect of both
obligation and title, delivery is naturally the right contact
for choice of law. Since the transfer of title depends on
the lex situs, Anglo-American courts sometimes have naively but with adequate results submitted also the obligation
to the law of the situation of the paper. 63
The difficulties of evidence, conspicuous in the learned
discussions, are minimized by this approach. Where the
paper actually was at the moment of a contested transfer,
rather than where the signature was made, is not so hard
to discover. To ascertain the situs of a tangible thing
at a given date, usually causes so little concern that we
scarcely hear of it in international property law.
Of course, the acts transferring title are different in the
various systems. This difficulty would be removed if the
Romanistic doctrine requiring traditio for the transfer of
tangible things were abandoned in this application. Not
only would international harmony be achieved, but within
the Central European systems themselves obligation and
title would no longer be governed by incongruous rules.
Interpersonal law. A check was issued by an Englishman in Shanghai upon a local branch of an American bank
corporation, at a time when Great Britain and the United
States enjoyed extraterritorial jurisdiction through their
own courts in Shanghai. 64 Should the law of the place of
payment be identified with the Chinese Law of Bills of Exchange and Checks? It seemed evident that it was the
Negotiable Instruments Act of the American state in which
the bank was incorporated, that governed.
68
64

See for more detail, infra Ch. 61.
See my report and opinion, 6 Z. ausl. PR. 336-341.
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I6g

EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE

British Law
By proviso in Section 72 (I) (b),

"Where a bill, issued out of the United Kingdom, conforms, as regards requisites in form, to the law of the
United Kingdom, it may, for the purpose of enforcing payment thereof, be treated as valid as between all persons
who negotiate, hold or become parties to it in the United
Kingdom."
This proviso is intended to make negotiability in England
independent of defects attached by the foreign law of its
origin. The parties must have negotiated in England and
the lawsuits occur in England, and probably the action must
be for payment. Favor is not granted to inland transactions as such but only to those from which an actual recourse between domiciliaries arises. These two features approach the provision to two exceptional Continental rules
presently to be quoted.
2.

Geneva Rules

(a) Article 3, paragraph 2, inspired by the German legislation of I 848, after stating the law of the place of signature, continues:
"Nevertheless, where the obligations subscribed in a bill
of exchange or a promissory note are invalid according to
the provisions of the preceding paragraph but conform to
the law where a subsequent obligation is subscribed, the
irregularity of the first obligations does not affect the validity of the subsequent obligation."
The I940 draft of the Montevideo Commercial Treaty,
article 26, follows this example.
Thus, the original bill may be void under the basic law,
or an indorsement invalid under the law of its place of
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signature, but subsequent contracts are valid, if they comply with the formal requirements of the place where they
are written, and this validity is recognized in all member
states, inclusive of the country of issue. Such contracts
may be acceptance, indorsements, aval, or intervention for
honor, all regularly presupposing a valid basic bill.
On the other hand, the exception is not limited to an instrument invalid on the ground of formalities. The issue
or preceding indorsement may be invalid for any cause
under its own law, although not under the law of the subsequent contract.
The provision also does not require that the holder
should inquire into the foreign law and be in good faith
about it. The purpose is to favor circulation in all cases.
This paragraph, therefore, disregards the principles of
the convention in several respects. But were this exception
the only one, it might possibly be defended as a forceful
addition to the independence of indorsements and other
accessory contracts in the interest of convenience. It is
the same tendency that impells the American courts to
establish each contract on its own conditions.
Unfortunately, paragraph 2 is accompanied by a second
exception. Together they destroy whatever fabric the
Rules may claim.
(b) Geneva Rules, article 3, paragraph 3, states under
the influence of another old German rule, but by mistake
even enlarging this questionable provision, 65
65
See HuPKA 246 ff. A German proposal intended only to reproduce
art. 85 sent. 3 of the German Wechselordnung of 1908 (also Swiss C.O. of
r88r art. 823 par. 3, Austria W.O. of r8so art. Ss par. 3) referring to
engagements entered by a national (German) toward a national (German)
abroad. This is a (misplaced) application of the lex patriae communis.
But in Asser's formulation adopted in the Rules, the national may transact
with any national or foreigner, only the enforcement being restricted to
nationals. However, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria have used the
reservation to its full extent.
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"Every contracting State has the faculty to prescribe that
the obligations assumed in bills of exchange and promissory
notes by one of its subjects abroad shall be valid with respect to another of its subjects within its territory, provided that they are clothed in the form of the national law."
It is not required (as it was in article 85 of the German
Act) that the subject of the enacting state should have
transacted with another subject of the state. On the other
hand, under the former German law, supervening contracts
with a foreigner, or even between foreigners, were regarded as valid in Germany if they conformed to the law
of the German place of contracting, whereas now in regard
to a foreigner the law of the place of contracting operates
with the ordinary restrictions.
This second exception comes near to the British special
rule for foreign bills. Both are indefensible nationalistic
residues. 66 Yet paragraph 3 has been welcomed as good
law for emigrants. 67
The practical significance of these rules may be illustrated:
(i) A bill of exchange drawn in England by A and delivered to B, payable to the bearer, is valid everywhere by
the law of the place of contracting. If issued in Italy it
would be void under the same principle; but B nevertheless
would win his recourse against A, if he sues in England
according to proviso (b), though not in the United States
nor in any other country outside those following the Bills
of Exchange Act.
Had B indorsed the bill issued in Italy to C in Italy, and
C to D in England, mailing it from Italy, the case would
66 DIENA, 3 Tratt. 78; e.g., protectionism not inspired by a neat, precise,
well-determined principle. To the same effect GurrERIDGE r6 (ser. 3) J.
Comp. L. at 64, who, however, does not seem to include the English proviso
in his regret; HIRSCH, JW. 1930, 1341; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 292 § 147.
67 Cf., MoNACO 132 and cited authors.
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seem outside of proviso (b). Again, if C is an Italian
national and indorses the bill to another Italian, effect is
given in Italy under the Geneva Rule 3, paragraph 3, and
the Italian Bills of Exchange Act.
( ii) A bill issued in Germany not containing the word
"Wechsel" or a corresponding word in a foreign language
used in the bill, was void under the old law and is so under
the Geneva Rules (art. I, no. I). If it is indorsed in
England to a firm carrying on business in England, the
holder may sue in England under proviso (b), though
the drawer could not. 68 Supposing the English indorsee
indorses the bill to D in the United States, D cannot sue
anywhere, unless the court were to change over to the law
of the place of payment, as is, regrettably, possible in the
United States.
In any case, the liability of the drawer or indorser depends on what the other party chooses to do. 69 And discriminations are made according to criteria not in conformity with the standards of equality of a freely circulating
commercial paper. The worst consequence, of course, is
that a debtor can be sued who has no recourse left against
previous warrantors; but this happens also on the mere
ground of the principle of independence.
68 DICEY ( ed. 6) 687, Ill. 4·
69 GUTTER.IDGE 16 (ser. 3)

J. Comp. L

at

64·
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Validity in General
I.

INTRINSIC REQUIREMENTS

T

HE existing statutes contain only fragmentary conflicts rules, if any, on the subject of essential validity
of the contracts in negotiable instruments/ There is,
however, agreement on the proposition that formal and
material validity ought to be subject to the same law. 2 This
law also determines what ordinary requirements of contracts are to be modified or abandoned in order to promote
the easy negotiation of bills, and what municipal rules are
to supplement the special cambial rules. 3
I.

Capacity

The general conflicts rules concerning capacity of contracting are normally also applied to the capacity of signing
bills and notes. 4 Capacity thus is governed by the personal
law (of nationality or domicil) or the "law of the place
of contracting" (better the law of the contract), or a mixed
system. In England, the habitual hesitation recurs. 5 Ameri1 Generally speaking, lex loci contractus is applied in Argentina, C. Com.
art. 738, see 4 VICO 105 § 106; Mexico, law of Aug. 26, 1932, on titles and
operations of credit, art. 2 52-2 54·
2 BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. I; LoRENZEN 99 ff. and in 30 Yale L.J. s6s;
GUTI'ERIDGE, 16 (Ser. 3) J. Comp. L. 62.
3 Supra Ch. s8, pp. 133-134· On the cases: HuGO FISCHER, "The Law Governing Capacity with Regard to Bills of Exchange," 14 Mod. L. Rev. (1951) 144,
ISI·
4 For a survey see 1 MEYER 646; VEITH, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch
491 ff. In Argentina (C. Com. art. 938, cf., 4 VICO § 109), Brazil (Ley
Introd. 1942 art. 9, par. r); in Chile (C.C. art. 14, 15) and many other
Latin-American countries, the domicil governs with the reservations for the
domestic national law discussed in Vol. I, p. 117 ff.
5 For domicil WESTLAKE, for lex loci contractus DICEY (ed. 6) 682 n. 58.
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can courts seldom have resorted to the domiciliary law;
they employ the lex loci contractus. 6 Thus, a married
woman domiciled in Michigan and signing in Michigan a
mortgage and note as security for her husband, was not
allowed by the Michigan court to raise the defense of
coverture or a defense of misrepresentation, according to
Michigan law, because the note was delivered to a bank
in Ohio. 7
The Geneva Rules, ignoring the experience of the common law, have established a system no one can ever defend.
In the first place, the Rules base their main provision
(article 2, paragraph I) on the nationality principle, unsuited for such an eminently international commercial matter. A decisive motive was the fear of "fraude a la loi,"
that eternal preoccupation of older European writers. 8
Else a minor might go to a country where he is regarded
as of full age-this was a familiar argument. But what
practical importance has such a possibility, and "how can
an English banker have all the national laws on capacity
in his head?" 9
The next consequence had to be admission of renvoi, to
the heartfelt grief of its foes:

"If this national law declared competent the law of
another country, this latter law applies." (Art. 2, par.
I, sent. 2).
An attempt to restrict this unwelcome addition was made
by interpreting the reference as meaning exclusively the
internal law of the country referred to. 10 This would,
illogically, exclude "Weiterverweisung."
6 LoRENZEN 63.
State of Ohio, ex rei. Fulton v. Purse ( 1935) 273 Mich. 507.
8
DIENA, 3 Tratt. 52 j 2 GRUNHUT 570 n. 6 j 2 MElLI 327.
9 GuTTERIDGE, I.e. 61.
10
DIENA, Comptes rend us 347; HUPKA 238; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 283.
An analogous argument in HIRSCH, JW. 1939, 1338.
7
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Illustrations. (i) (Hupka's example of a vicious circle.)
An Englishman domiciled in England issues a bill of exchange in Buenos Aires. England refers to Argentine
law as lex loci contractus; and allegedly Argentina would
refer back to England as the domicil. The latter assertion
agrees with the usual radical arguments ad absurdum but
is totally inadequate. There is in fact no further reference.
The English conflicts rule itself must be construed, without
any help of the Geneva Rules, to refer to the substantive
Argentine law. Certainly, England has in this case no
reason to make Argentina arbiter of the choice of law.
Lex loci contractus governs because of the presumption
(right or wrong) that the parties know it best. Even the
English domicil is not considered in England an obstacle
to applying the foreign lex loci actus.
( ii) A national of Chile, domiciled in New Y ark, indorses a bill in France. Although Chile refers to the
domicil, it would not make sense to apply New Y ark law
while the New York courts apply French law. A reference
to the domicil means entire abandonment to the law at
the domicil.
Also the objections that renvoi complicates the task of
the judge 11 and needs lawyers to apply it, 12 have no more
force here than in general.
Corporations and other legal bodies are not mentioned
in the Geneva Rules. 13 Without doubt, their capacity is
determined by their personal law, that is, in the eyes of the
member states, the law of the principal seat. An American court will evidently apply the law of the state of incorporation; it would not apply the law of the place of
acting. 14
Exceptions. Article J, paragraph 2, states:

"If, however, the obligations entered into by means of
a bill of exchange or promissory note are not valid accord11 G. ARANGIO-RUIZ 178.
12 GuiTERIDGE, I.e. 6o.
18
AssER, Comptes rendus
14

347 If.

Supra, Vol. II, 4, 27 If.
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ing to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, but are in
conformity with the laws of the territory in which a subsequent contract has been entered into, the circumstance
that the previous contracts are irregular in form does not
invalidate the subsequent contract."
A signature is valid if given in a territory where the
signer would have capacity. This was already conceded by
many laws 15 as a needed qualification of the personal law.
The exception is more generous than in the French Lizardi
case and the analogous provisions; also a foreign lex loci
contractus is a recognized source of capacity. 16
Yet, again, another proviso, paragraph 3, allows each
member state to exclude for its own courts the exception
of paragraph 2, if a national of this state has contracted
abroad. Thus the Rules turn away from their course and
discriminate among territories and nationalities. "The
validity of the contract varies according to the court." 17
Conclusion. The awkward and cumbersome legislation
of Geneva has been deservedly criticized. 18 A better solution is furnished by the American practice. The law governing a contract in a bill must also determine the requirements of capacity. Domicil would not be a better test than
nationality. The parties cannot be required to examine
more than one law to ascertain the value of a signature.
However, the best rule is more liberal. As generally for
15

Belgium: Law of May zo, 1872, art. 3·
France : C. Com. art. 114.
Germany: WO. (1908} art. 3·
Great Britain: BEA sec. 22.
Scandinavia: Law of 188o, art. 88.
Switzerland: C. Obi. ( 19II) art. 721.
16
Supra, Vol. I, 188.
17
MONACO 46; ARANGIO-RUIZ 178.
18
See, e.g., HUPKA, and G. ARANGIO-RUIZ, I.e.,· WIGNY, Revue Dr. Int.
(Bruxelles, 1931) 784 ff.
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contractual obligations, 19 capacity under the personal law
deserves to be considered as an optional basis of validity.
Although once Lord Esher thought that a "minor," though
capable under his domiciliary law, cannot be made liable on a
bill in England, 20 the optional validity according to either lex
loci contractus or lex domicilii is winning adherents. 21 Security
of commerce, harmed by an unlimited importance of the
personal law, is fostered by its auxiliary consideration.
2.

Consent

There is no doubt that, like all other "essential requirements," consent to signature and delivery, as distinguished
from the "contract giving rise to the issue," is governed
by the law of the place of execution. 22
3· Consideration
The requirement of consideration was introduced into
the law of bills of exchange when the common-law courts
had assumed jurisdiction over this matter. 23 But the doctrine was modified in several respects ;24 notably, valuable
consideration in this field need not come from the promisee, 25 and its existence is presumed. 26 However, the principle was applied in the case of illegality in M oulis v.
Owen/ 7 where a foreign check was considered governed by
English law because payable in England and its purpose
to cover play at baccarat was regarded illicit under English
19
Supra Vol. I, and more recently CHESHIRE, International Contracts. A
related proposal is made by FRANKENSTEIN, Projet d'un Code Europeen de
Droit internat. prive (Leyden, 1950) art. 58 ff.
20
In re Soltykoff [1891] I Q.B. 413.
21 LoRENZEN So.
22
The former German Wechselordnung, article 85, included this point in
"ts term "essential requirements."
28
ULMER, Festgabe fiir Heck ( 133 Arch. Civ. Prax.) 178.
24
See LoRENZEN 28 n. 72.
25
BEA sec. 27; NIL sec. 25.
26
BEA sec. 30; NIL sec. 24.
27
[1907] I K.B. 746. Cf., Lord Mansfield in Robinson v. Bland (1760) 2
Burr. 1077; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict 311; DICEY (ed. 6) 682,691.
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law; this invalidity of the loan comprised all accessory
obligations. The latter may be void also under their own
lex loci contractus. 28
In no case is failure of consideration a defense against
a holder in due course. 29

Illustration. In American municipal law, it is controversial whether the maker of a note which he entrusted
to a fiduciary payee may set up the defense of failure of
consideration against a holder who purchased from the
payee in breach of trust and with knowledge thereof. 30
No such defense is given against a holder in good faith.
For conflicts law, there is no reason why lack of consideration, though a defect under the original applicable law,
should be strong enough to break the position of a bona fide
holder protected by the law of his purchase.
The exceptional option of the most favorable law granted
by American courts to creditors attacked on the ground of
usury has been discussed before. 31
Another means to avoid the defense of failure of consideration was sought by the Supreme Court of the United
States, when it resorted to the Louisiana law of the place
of payment instead of the New York law of the place of
delivery, 32 in order to effect the presumed intention of the
parties, an inadvisable method of dealing with conflicts
rules.
4· Other Incidents
The law of each contract also governs the permissibility
of stipulations of interest and conditional indorsements,
28

Canada: Story v. McKay (1888) 15 O.R. 169; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict 316.
England: BEA sec. 29 ( 3).
United States: NIL sec. 28, 58.
France: ARMINJON ET CARRY 475 § 417.
Italy: MoNACO 121 ff.
30
See BRITTON (1943) 487 ff.; PALMER, 48 Mich. L. Rev. (1950) 255, 261.
31
Supra Vol. II, 408.
32
Pritchard v. Norton {1882) 106 U.S. 124.
29
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mostly identified with questions of form, and, of course,
the necessity of delivery of the instrument.
II.

ACCEPTANCE

The contract of acceptance normally shares the prmciples of the law of bills of exchange. It consists of presentment for acceptance and the acceptance necessarily
written in the bill, plus return, i.e., delivery of the bill. In
case of acceptance before issue, the acceptor writes his
signature, which again becomes effective by delivery, though
this is delivery by the drawer to the payee.
An "anomalous" 33 provision of the American Negotiable
Instruments Act, 34 however, allows any form of declaration
effective by notification 35 without delivery. On the other
hand, the Geneva Convention permits a drawee who wrote
his acceptance on the bill to revoke it until he returns the
instrument. 36 According to what seems to me the better
construction, it is not the unilateral act of the drawer that
forms the acceptance (as was the theory of the German
Reichsgericht), 37 but the written acceptance plus either return on presentment or delivery to the payee. 38
Revocation, thus, merely strikes down an incomplete act.
It may be asked whether these requirements of acceptance
should not be governed by the law of the place where the
bill is returned (delivered) or signed. In fact, the Bill of
Exchange Act (art. 7 2 ( 1) ) expressly treats the form of
acceptance on the same footing as the other contracts and
calls for the law of the place where the acceptance "contract" is made. But when an American drawee notifies
33

HUDSON AND FELLER, 44 Harv. L. Rev. (1931) at 356.

34

NIL sec. 134, 135.
BEA sec. z; NIL sec. 191.

35
36

37
38

Geneva Conv. art. z9.
Z4 RGZ. 90; 77 ib. 141.
ULMER, Wertpapiere 207 j ANGELONI 173 § u8.
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acceptance by letter sent to Japan without signing the bill,
and the recipient takes the bill for value "on the face
thereof," the contract is presumably "made" in the United
States and therefore binds the drawee, while in the inverse
case a Japanese drawee would not be bound wherever the
contract would have to be concluded. For this reason and
the sake of simplicity, it may be a better solution to extend
the law of the place of payment to the questions of validity.
We shall see that it is now greatly preferred over the law
of the drawee's domicil and of the acceptance itself, as
respects the effects of acceptance. 39

III.

SPECIAL CONTRACTS

Accommodation Paper

I.

The English Act ( s. 2 8) and the American Act ( s. 29)
recognize the liability, to a holder for value, of a party
signing as a maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without
receiving value and for the purpose of lending his name.
The courts hold that an accommodation paper has no
legal inception until it is received for value, so as to allow
the accommodator until then to revoke his signature. 40
Hence, the conflicts requirement of delivery is not fulfilled
until the accommodated party delivers the paper to a holder
for a value, and this act determines the law applicable to
the issue. 41
This conflicts problem does not exist in civil law. If
someone signs a bill in the interest of another person,
though with the understanding between the two that the
promisor should not bear a burden, he enters into a serious
39

Infra Cb. 62, I.
v. Cortner ( 1921) 145 Tenn. 482, 492, 239 S.W. 1069; Dean v.
Lyde (1931) 223 Ala. 394, 136 So. 857.
41
Welsh Co. v. Gilette (Wis. 1911) 130 N.W. 879; Stubbs v. Colt (1887)
30 Fed. 417; 2 BEALE 1059•
4

° Fox
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obligation. Any third holder may avail himself of it, even
if he knew of the agreement. 42
The common-law tradition, indeed, rests upon a confusion, familiar to former jurisprudence, between simulation, which does not bind, and a serious declaration to be
bound to any party to the bill except the accommodated
person. The Uniform Commercial Code, section 3-415,
gives a considered new regulation qualifying the accommodation party as a surety; this sets him in conflicts law
at the side of the avalist, presently to be discussed.
2.

Aval

The act of guaranteeing an obligation in a bill or note,
unknown to the common law of England, is now recognized
in all statutes. 43 It is also uniformly agreed that this act
has its own law. Most older writers justify such independence by drawing an analogy with the law applicable to
suretyship, 44 while the Montevideo Treaty of I 889 upon
the same analogy but following the ancient approach to
suretyship applies the law governing the "guaranteed obligation." 45
Nevertheless, an aval is not conditioned by the intrinsic
validity of the principal debt nor is it restricted to the
amount due on the latter. 46
In consequence, it is now agreed that the admissibility
42 France: App. Caen (May 30, 1899) D. 1900.2.508; Req. (March n,
1935) D.H. 210, S. 1935·1.175; I PERCEROU ET BOUTERON 36 § 41. On the
dangerous position of French banks taking in "effets de complaisance"
without most strictly examining whether the drawer is really a creditor
of the drawee and therefore lacking "bonne foi" and action against the
acceptor, see HAMEL, 2 Banques et operations de banque 750 ff.; id.,
"L'unification de droit en matieres d'instruments negociables" (Int. Bar. Ass.,
3rd Int. con£., London, 1950) printed 1950, The Hague, p. 320.
Germany: RG. (Feb. 24, 1928) 120 RGZ. 207; STAUB-STRANZ, art. 17 n. 26.
43
LORENZEN 32-34•
44
4 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT§ 655; STAUB-STRANZ (ed. 6, 1909) art. 86 n. 8.
45
Montevideo Treaty Com. ( r889) art. 31.
46 2 GRtiNHUT 579 n. 33; DIENA, 3 Tratt. § 231; 2 MEYER 374; WEISS, 4
Traite 461; LoRENZEN 174 n. 420; ARMINJON ET CARRY§ 445·
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and form of an aval are determined by the law of the place
where it is "given," that is, signed or delivered, respectively.47 An Italian decision added a presumption, rebuttable only by the document, that the aval is written at the
place of the issue of the bill. 48 Another Italian decision, 49
however, examining the question of form, rejected the law
of the American state where the avalist attached his signature, in favor of the law of Italy to which he sent the bill
and where the drawer signed subsequently; 49 insofar as this
solution was based on the certain rule that the aval did
not take effect until the bill was issued, the conclusion was
objectionable because form and effect are indistinguishable.50 But the result agrees with the presumable American conception of the role of delivery in such a case.
3. Acceptance for Honor
In the same manner as for aval, it is a constant conclusion that the contract of an acceptor for honor-the now
rare "intervention"-is an independent transaction, subject to the law of its own place of making. 51
In old cases of special contracts, the same conflicts rules
respecting form, capacity, and material validity are used as
for issue and indorsement.
47 Montevideo Treaty Com. Terr. ( 1940) art. 23; cf., ARGANA, in Segundo
Congreso, Rep. Arg. 223; 4 VICO 95 § 95; Cod. Bustamante, art. 268; Geneva
Rules, art. 4, par. 2; MoNAco, Rivista ( 1942) 288 n.l.
48
Italy: App. Milano (Nov. 25, 1929) Mon. Trib. ( 1930) 184.
49
Cass. Ita!. (Jan. 14, 1941) Foro Ita!. 1941 II. 1055.
50 MONACO, Rivista ( 1942) 286.
51 Treaty of Montevideo, Com. art. 32; Geneva Rules, art. 4, par. 2;
DIENA, 3 Tratt. 159; LORENZEN 174; RAISER 89; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com.
330 § 174·
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Circulation
I.

THE CHAIN oF HoLDERS

E shall consider here the position of the payee and
subsequent indorsees. Under the universal approach,
the sequence of holders is disintegrated or dissected into as many links subjected to different laws as
there are jurisdictions containing places of contracting.
The law of the place where an indorsement occurs governs
the transfer of the rights included in the bilU Such division,
in addition to the various other connecting factors used in
the conflicts law of bills, is bound to raise problems of
classification. They have been regarded under three aspects:
The rights inherent in the possession of the bill;
The rights acquired by the formal succession against third
persons;
And the relationship between a single indorsement and
the basic bill.

W

1.

The Effect of Possession: "legitimation"
While little Anglo-American authority seems available, 2

1
England: BEA sec. 72 (2) according to the prevailing meaning of "interpretation."
United States: LoRENZEN 139.
France: WEISS, 4 Traite 443·
Germany: 2 BAR § 306.
Italy: DIENA, 3 Tratt. 94 § 222.
Geneva Rules, art. 4, par. 2, speaking of "the effects of the obligations
produced by the signatures • . . ;" Treaty of Montevideo, Com. L., art. 29 ;
Cod. Bustamante, art. 226.
2
Note, 95 A.L.R. ( 1935) 658.
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tt IS agreed on the Continent that an indorsement has a
threefold function:
(a) The possessor of the bill who is either named or
covered by a blank indorsement has the ostensible power
of indorsing the bill in the eyes of the indorsees;
(b) The indorsee possessing the bill has the power to
present the bill to the drawer or acceptor;
(c) Under the same circumstances, the drawee is entitled to pay to the indorsee with liberating effect.
In conflicts law, these problems are generally included
in the broader questions concerning the rights of the holder.
According to the principle of independence, the individual
legal systems prescribe the particulars. Thus, the law of
each place of indorsement determines whether an indorser
is a reliable transferor, while in the relation between indorsee and drawee the unsettled rivalry of the place of indorsement with the place of payment persists.
2.

Translative Function of Indorsement

Again, the Continental doctrine distinguishes three effects
of indorsement :3
(a) Indorsement transfers the right flowing from the
bill against acceptor or maker;
(b) It procures the indorsee the position as holder "in
due course" or "in good faith" respectively;
(c) It makes the indorser liable for warranty.
Moreover, however, indorsement completed by delivery
transfers "title," meaning ownership in the paper of the
instrument. (The expression should not be used otherwise,
and notably should not include the debt.)
Taken as an isolated act of transferring tangible property, this conveyance is naturally subject to the law of the
3 LUIZ M. RAMIREZ B., "Capacity under the Negotiable Instruments Laws
of the Americas," 43 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1944) 559 ff.; ]ACOBI, Wertpapiere 249
ff.; STAUB-STRANZ, s6 n. 19j RILK (1933) z; II ROHGZ. zso.
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place where the instrument is situated. Anglo-American
law, however, consistently connects both title and obligation; they are transferred by the same act of delivery.
Correctly, therefore, English decisions in modern times
have determined the entire translative effect of indorsement as a unit, although sometimes, with undue emphasis on
the property aspect, speaking only of the lex situs for chattels!
Elsewhere, the same approach is adopted for bills payable to bearer 5 or issued or indorsed in blank. But in bills
to order, Continental doctrine holds it possible that at the
place of signature an indorsement may create effective
creditor rights, although at the place of delivery property
in the bill is not effectively acquired. 6
In fact, the divorce of obligation and title is old in
German legislation and now also persists on the basis of
the Geneva Convention, which treats merely the obligation
and not the title. On the one hand, the particular rules
on bills develop the doctrine of the holder in good faith;
on the other hand, the laws of property provide for the
protection of a purchaser in good faith of movables. It is
characteristic that not even the concept of good faith is
the same; in German law ignorance of a defect by gross
negligence counts as bad faith in acquiring title to a chattel,
but as good faith in acquiring rights against acceptor and
indorsees. 7 Hence, opinions are divided in cases where
title and obligation seem to part ways. In the prevail4 Alcock v. Smith [I892] I Ch. 238; Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank
[I904] 2 K.B. 87o; [I90S] I K.B. 677; Koechlin v. Kestenbaum [I927]
I K.B. 6I6, 889; Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay [I9I8] I
K.B. 43; [I9I8] 2 K.B. 623. On the problems of title see BRITrON, Bills and
Notes ( I943) 734 If.
5 See authors cited by 2 FRANKI!NSTEIN no; RAISER 102 If.
6 ULMER, Festgabe fiir Heck ( 133 Arch. Civ. Prax.) 192; DuDEN, Eigentumserwerb 68; WOLFF, Priv. Int. L. ( ed. 2) 551; German W.O. ( 1908)
art. 74, 82; Geneva Convention, art. 16, 17.
7 German W.O. ( 1908) art. 74, 82; Geneva Conv. art. 16, 17; German
BGB. § 932.
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ing view, the right accruing from the bill follows the right
in the bill, which agrees with the true content of the common-law principle. Minority opinions, however, hold that
the title passes by the indorsement itself. 8
There can be no doubt that the commercial view represented in the Anglo-American rules excels by its unity and
simplicity. All translative effects of the transaction are
simultaneously derived from the law of the place where
the instrument is situated at the time of delivery.
3· The Doubtful Scope of the Principle of Independence
There does not exist a visible guiding idea for defining
classification of problems that fall under the scope of the
individual law of the place of an endorsement, rather than
under some other conflicts rule respecting particular incidents of the bill of exchange. Even worse, no general
agreement exists about the relative weight to give the law
under which the obligation of a signer (A) is entered into
and the law under which a subsequent signature (of B)
confers rights (to C) against the precedent obligor (A).
Our main materials consist in isolated groups of judicially treated topics and the respective comments or equally
sporadic literary problems. Accordingly, we have to look
for the desirable legal rules through the study of particular
situations.
Only one general application of the several laws principle, although even this with qualifications, seems to be
universally admitted, viz. the rule that the obligation of
warranty is governed by the law of each indorsement. 9
This law determines the time, place, and currency of the
8
RAISER 109 denies application of BGB. § 952 whereby an instrument
follows the creditor's right. ULMER, I.e. 192 ff., would apply § 952 "to a
certain degree."
9 United States cases cited by LORENZEN 122 n. 232; RAISER 59; KESSLER
138.
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warranty, as well as the requirements and extent of the
liability. It includes the permissibility of conditional obligations (commonly ineffective) 10 and of partial indorsements (commonly void) ;11 and the questions whether the
indorser's liability is subsidiary to that of the drawer or
in solidum for all warrantors, 12 whether the recourse must
run through the entire chain or may jump to remote mdorsers, 13 etc.
Where acceptance is refused, the law of the place of
indorsement determines whether the holder may resort to
the guarantors for payment 14 or security ;15 it de.cides also
whether release of the principal debtor has effects on the
secondary obligors. 16
Hence, the law of the basic bill, though determining the
primary obligations, does not affect the liabilities of recourse.
But that we have not reached a complete solution is shown
by the next following doubt concerning classification.
II.

WHICH LAW OF INDORSEMENT PREVAILS IN DETERMINING
THE RIGHTS OF HoLDERS?

This is a curious aspect of the principle of independence.
Suppose A indorses to B in state X, and B indorses to C
10 Permitted in BEA sec. 33; NIL sec. 39; prohibited in Geneva Convention, art. I2, par. I.
11 Not permitted by BEA sec. 32 (2) ; NIL sec. 32; Geneva Convention,
art. 12, par. 2.
12 Williams v. Wade (Mass. I84o) I Metcalf 82; ARANGIO-RUIZ 252 and
cit. in n. 1.
13 United States, whether previous suit against maker or acceptor is necessary: Williams v. Wade (Mass. I84o) I Metcalf 82; Trabue v. Short
( 1866) 18 La. Ann. 257; Wei) v. Sturgis (Ky. 1901) 63 S.W. 602; 2
WHARTON § 452 ff.
DIENA, 3 Tratt. § 222.
14 Geneva Convention, art. 43; BEA sec. 43; NIL sec. I5I·
15 Former German W.O. art. 25; French C. Com. (1807) art. 120; I
MEYER 464; now Egypt: C. Com. mixte art. 12 5; C. indigene 119.
16 Spies v. National City Bank ( 1903) I74 N.Y. 222, 66 N.E. 736, 61
L.R.A. 193 a.o.
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in state Y. The two laws define differently the position of
indorsees, for instance, as to protection of good faith against
defenses of duress, fraud, mistakes, lack of consideration,
lack of delivery. A seems to obligate himself just to what
the law of the first indorsement compels him, no less and
no more. However, C acquires rights under the law of
the second indorsement, rights that may be larger or narrower than what B acquired. The analogous question arises
if A is the drawer and B, the payee, indorses to C in another jurisdiction. In other words : is the obligation of A
definitively fixed by the law of X or is it subsequently modi~
fied by the law of Y?
This problem has been discussed incompletely in several
applications, two of which follow:
1.

Defenses of Warrantor

Continental writers have believed that the American
courts in the matter of defenses almost always look to the
law of the particular obligor. 17 But in the United States
no substantial authority exists on the question, since almost 18 all decisions to which we may resort concern the
obligation of primary obligors upon promissory notes. Yet
we may submit that American courts are prepared to go
along with the English comments on the Bill of Exchange
Act, Section 7 2 ( 2), and the prevailing Continental opinion.
According to these, in any case, it is the law of the place
of the indorsement by which the individual holder acquires
17 See HUPKA 264.
18
LORENZEN 134 n. 264 cites Ory v. Winter (La. 1826) 4 Mart. N.S.

zn,

for the proposition that when a party contracts under the law allowing him
a certain defense, he is protected against a holder who is a holder in due
course under the law of his contract. But the reasoning of LORENZEN 141 ff.
seems to evaluate grounds pro and contra and to arrive at a contrary result.
The majority of the cases, increased by Stout v. American Nat!. Bank and
Trust Co. (Miss. 1942) 7 So. (zd) 824, apply lex loci contractus and seem
to think of the place where the holder purchased the bill.
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his position that decides on the admissibility of defenses
against him. 19
This law, thus, on the one hand determines what requirements the holder in due course (or bona fide holder)
must fulfill, e.g., whether bad faith requires positive knowledge of a defect of title 20 or also includes "dishonesty," 21
lack of "honest, credible confidence," 22 or requires "knowingly acting to the detriment of the debtor." 23 The latter
formula has been understood as excluding any consideration of negligence; the holder is protected except when he
acts with direct or indirect intention. 24 Also the burden of
proof is subject to this law. 25
On the other hand, all defenses that law X may concede
to A are cut off against a holder privileged under the law
of his own acquisition. 26 This very remarkable result is
justified in the Continental literature by the necessity to
protect the holder in the interest of undisturbed circulation.
The indiscriminate language of the Geneva Rules, article
4, paragraph 2, in stating the principle of independence
certainly encourages a corresponding solution. 27
That American practice favors the same view may be inferred from one decision holding "that a transfer of personal property which is valid by the law of the place where
such transfer is made is insufficient to pass a valid title to
19
RAISER 91; HUPKA 263 If. i QuASSOWSKI ALBRECHT 94i ULMER, Wertpapiere 287. The wording of Unif. Com. Code, s. 3-305, seems to confirm
the same view with respect to the numerous differences of American statutes.
20
NIL sec. 56; cf., BEA sec. z.
21
NIL sec. 59; BEA sec. 90.
22
Hurst v. Lee ( 1911) 143 App. Div. 614, 127 N.Y.S. 104o; "Good faith
means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned," Unif. Com.
Code, s. 1-201 Nr. 19.
2
8 Geneva Conv. art. 17.
24
Comptes rend us 133, 291 If.; HuPKA 52 n. 2.
25
Compare BEA sec. 30, par. 2; NIL sec. 59, sent. x, with Geneva Conv.
art. 17 (the debtor must prove the dishonesty of the holder).
26
BEA sec. 30, par. 2; NIL sec. 59·
27
RAISER 104j ARMINJON ET CARRY 478 §422.
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it," so as to protect a holder in due course of a note against
the defense of the maker based on fraud. 28 With greater
clarity the same conclusion seems to follow from the leading American decision on forged indorsements, to be discussed presently.
A doubt, however, is revealed precisely by a case discussed in the United States. Payee A, taking with notice
of fraud committed against the maker, negotiates the note
to B who is immune against the defense of fraud, but afterwards A reacquires the instrument. American courts and
now the Draft of a Commercial Code hold A subject to
the defense. 29 If A takes in the United States without
knowledge but without due inquiry into a suspicious situation and negotiates the note in Germany, where negligence
is no bar to the protection of the holder, no American court,
evidently, will admit his claim. It might be argued even
under the Geneva Convention that if A has acted "sciemment au detriment du debiteur," his claim should be dismissed, whatever his credentials may be. The case recalls
the model case of collusion used in Geneva.
Results, hence, seem identical all around. American
courts would not need resort to public policy to obviate
undesirable situations.
A special instance of such effort to promote smooth circulation has developed in the case of forged signatures.
2.

Spurious Signatures

Under the Anglo-American acts, signatures forged or
attached in the name of a person without his authorization
28
Brook v. Vannest (1895) 58 N.J.L. 162, 33 At!. 382; LORENZEN 140;
RAISER adds Fogarty v. Neal ( 1923) 201 Ky. 85, 255 S.W. 1049 in referring
to the special case of spouses between themselves.
29
Berenson v. Conant (1913) 214 Mass. 127, 101 N.E. 6o; CHAFEE, "The
Reacquisition of a Negotiable Instrument by a Prior Party," 21 Col. L. Rev.
(1921) 538, 542; Uniform Com. Code, 3-201(1).
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are inoperative. No right can be acquired "through or
under that signature." 30 The law recognizes exceptions
in the case of estoppel and ratification by the person whose
signature is not genuine or unauthorized. Other rules
mitigate the result, such as the English statute allowing
bankers to pay in good faith drafts without verifying the
indorsements, 31 and the judicial practice shifting the damage from a paying bank upon the true owner. 32
In the civil-law countries, on the contrary, a bona fide
holder may base his claim on any genuine signature, for
using part of a merely formally uninterrupted chain of
indorsements. According to article I 6, paragraph 2, of
the Geneva Convention:
"Where a person has been dispossessed of a bill of exchange by any event whatever, the holder, justifying his
claim (by an uninterrupted sequence of endorsements), is
not liable to surrender the bill, unless he has acquired it
in bad faith or has committed a gross fault in acquiring it."
This contrast of legislation much debated in the fruitless
efforts for a universal bills of exchange law and, in fact,
of doubtful solution, 33 could also have disturbed conflicts
law. It is gratifying to see how the courts, though reasoning on various formal principles, yet have bridged the gap,
distinctly favoring easy circulation and protection of discounting banks.
30

England: BEA s. 24; Canada: BEA s. 49; U.S.: NIL s. 23.
BEA s. 6o.
32 NIL s. 15; Uniform Comm. C., s. 3-us and 3-406; to obviate City
Nat. Bank of Galveston v. American Express Co. (Tex. 1929) r6 S.W.
(2d) 278, cf., Palmer, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 266. On the thoughtful American
practice concerning the question who should bear the damages, the bank or
the owner, see BRITTON §§ 142, 146. In a recent decision, in Strickland Transportation Co. v. First State Bank of Memphis (Tex. Sup. 1948) 214 S.W.
(2d) 934, ann. 27 Tex. L. Rev. (1949) 713, the court by majority vote
assumed that the damage caused by the faithlessness of the forging agent
should fall on the person who employed him.
33
Cf., HuDSON AND FELLER, 44 Harv. L. Rev. (1931) at 354·
31
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The English Court of Appeal, in Embiricos v. AngloAustrian Bank 34 argued on the basis of the principle of
independence, although this also could have been used for
an opposite decision. However, it recognized the civillaw rule with respect to a check payable in England.
The clerk of the payee A stole a check on a London
bank, already indorsed to B, forged B's indorsement, and
discounted the check with a Viennese bank. The bank,
again, indorsed the check to London and received payment.
When the payee sued the London bank for a second payment his action was dismissed. The bank in Vienna was
authorized by the Austrian law to discount the apparently
regular instrument in good faith.
To this extent, in the relationship between a holder and
the drawee, it is universally settled that the law of the place
where an indorsement is made-as in the Embiricos case, the
Austrian law-determines the justification of the indorsee's
title and, hence, 35 of the drawee's right to pay to him.
There arose grave doubt, however, about the recourse
against precedent indorsers and the drawer. Could the
Viennese bank, or its indorsee who cashed the check, in
the absence of payment, recover from the payee or the
drawer? In his opinion, Vaughan Williams, L.J ., by an
obiter dictum, held it "convenient, as well from a legal as
from a commercial point of view, that it should be established that the title by such an indorsement is good as
against the original parties to a negotiable instrument."
He considered that otherwise, even though the indorsement
abroad was valid to legalize the possession by the indorsee
claiming under the foreign law, yet he would be guilty of a
conversion if he obtained payment from an original party
to the negotiable instrument from which he could not have
34 [1905] I K.B. 677.
35 That is, under the law of the place of payment (infra, Ch.
referring to the law of the indorsement.

62

n. 30),
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recovered by process of law. 36 ' An analogous decision has
been rendered in New York. 87
A corresponding general rule to bind American parties
issuing, accepting; or indorsing a bill has been proposed by
Lorenzen. 38 The Supreme Court of the United States
took a broad view, but on technically different grounds.
This time, the lex situs was invoked as the chief basis of
the decision.
The Supreme Court held, indeed, that the right of a
holder against the drawer as well as the drawee is governed
by the law of the place where the indorsed bill is delivered
to the holder.
A check was drawn by the United States Veterans Bureau
to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the Treasury
of the U.S. The check was payable to L. Makanja in
Yugoslavia and mailed to him, but failed to reach him.
Somebody forged his signature and an attestation by the
city and sold it to the Merkur Bank in Zagreb (Croatia),
whence it came to the Guaranty Trust Company to which
it was paid by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as
fiscal agent of the U.S. 39
The decision is squarely built on the conflicts rule for
transfer of chattels. The bank in Yugoslavia acquired the
title under its last situs, by the effect of good faith. The
court, in this view, was influenced by the consideration that
the owner of the paper, the Government, by mailing the
check consented to negotiation in Yugoslavia. From these
antecedents, the trust company acquired the check and the
right to enforce the obligation it represents, as an incident
of the transfer of a chattel.
86

Ibid. at 684.
Casper v. Kiihne ( 1913) 159 App. Div. 389, 144 N.Y.S. soz; payment
in good faith by the drawee bank in Vienna.
37

38

LORENZEN 139·

89

United States v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York (1934) 293 U.S.

340, 95 A.L.R. 651; STEFFEN, Cases 390.
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It is very difficult to follow this sequence of ideas, since
a check to order is not an ordinary chattel. The result in
the instant case was right, but the reasoning expressed a
not quite satisfactory theory.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the court and intent
on combating the theory of the defendant government, explained that the holder in the case had, indeed, more than
a title in a valueless paper, derived from the local lex situs;
the situation was likened to that of a transferee without
indorsement or an indorsee after maturity, that is, the
holder was not owner of "the debt," but he had the right
to collect the proceeds such as the payee would have. This
construction unnecessarily separates title and debt. Why
was the holder not also the owner of the debt as well
as of the paper? If the Yugoslavian law was seriously
applied, the discount bank did acquire "the debt," not meaning of course the underlying relationship between the payee
and the drawer, or that between the drawer and the drawee,
but "the debt" flowing from the instrument, the scriptural
rights. It is illogical and unsound to convert this effect
into a conception that neither corresponds to Yugoslavian
nor to American law. For assuming that the foreign bank
became a regular holder in good faith, so as to cut off the
objection of previous forged signatures, his successors in
due course enjoyed his privileges and were not in a hybrid
and possibly precarious position.
It is an important requirement that title and cambial
debt both be considered in full, and at the same time kept
together as often as possible.
In France the principle of independence was understood
to require that English parties should not be made liable
contrary to their own law (of contracting), except on the
ground that the latter contravenes public policy. 40 Yet the
40 ARMIN JON ET CARRY

507 § 448.
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only English and American opinions rendered so far approve such liability even in their own courts. The same
view has been taken by the German writers, because the
recourse must be continued to reach the original parties.
They contend that the drawer has no interest in the person
who a vails himself of the recourse. 41 In any case, the
courts do feel the necessity of bridging the gaps threatening
the value of international bills of exchange.
Liability of Agent. According to the English and American Acts/ 2 an agent "signing for or on behalf of a principal or in representative capacity" is not liable on the instrument "if he was duly authorized." Otherwise, he is
personally liable. The same is stated in the Geneva Convention, article 8. Are these incidents of the signature?
Arminjon proposed first to consult the lex fori on the
"preliminary question" whether the relationship is to be
characterized as ucambiaire" or not; 43 in the affirmative,
the agent would have to use the forms of the lex loci contractus, and his own obligation would be determined by the
bill of exchange law. The detour seems unnecessary. The
laws of bills of exchange expressly incorporate the liability of unauthorized agents, correctly so, since his relationship to third parties is governed by the law of the contract
that he concludes (Vol. III, p. 141). Indeed, by reimbursing the holder he enters into the cambial rights quite as
the principal would. 44
41 8TAUB-8TRANZ
42

Supra n.

744 n. 24; KESSLER 152 n. 36; RAISER 105.

28.

43 ARMIN JON ET CARRY 491 § 433 with some distinctions; ARMIN JON, DIP.
Com. 320 § 16 5·
44 Whether there should be an analogy in the case where an authorized
agent signed with the name of his principal without his own name and
finally pays the bill, is questioned by ULMER, Wertpapiere 179.
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III. "Lex Loci Contractus"

OF THE SINGLE OBLIGATION

OR LAw oF THE ORIGINAL CoNTRACT?

I.

Negotiability

The ability of a paper to be transferred by indorsement or delivery depends on compliance with formal requirements. It might simply be regarded as an incident of
form. But American courts distinguish negotiability from
form, and various considerations have been introduced into
the problem.
(a) In English and Continental laws/ 5 it is plainly
recognized that the law of the place of issue governs the
original contract also with regard to the questions whether
the payee may transfer the instrument to order, in blank,
or to bearer. A bill of exchange drawn and delivered in
England and payable in Paris was negotiable and indorsable anywhere without the clause "or order" as former
French law required, and is endorsable now although not
named "bill of exchange," as the Geneva law adopted in
France requires. Conversely, a bill issued in a country of
the Geneva Convention is negotiable everywhere, if designated as bill of exchange (article 1), though clauses required elsewhere are lacking.
It is furthermore settled that accessory contracts, such as
indorsements or avals, enjoy the negotiability of the original
bill. An indorser therefore cannot restrict his signature by
prohibiting subsequent indorsements (Gen. Conv., art. IS,
par. 2).
But where the drawer himself uses the clause "not to
order," 46 or for that matter when the law of the first is45

z

DIENA, Principi 312; 3 Trattato 95 §zzz; 0TrOLENGHI zu §84;
99; HUPKA 265.
Generally allowed, see DIENA, 3 Tratt. 94 n. I; Geneva Conv. art. u,
par. z.

RAISER
46
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sue excludes negotiability in the absence of a clause "to
order," 47 the municipal enactments and doctrines are divided. Among them, the view that non-negotiability extends
to all further contracts 48 has been adopted in the British
Act, section 8 (I) and the Geneva Convention, article I I,
paragraph 2:

If the drawer has inserted in the bill the words 'not
to order' or an equivalent clause, the bill can only be
transferred in the form and with the effects of an ordinary assignment.
Other laws, however, pursuing the principle of independence as conceived in municipal law, restrict the effect of
the clause to its signer, even though he is the drawer; the
bill, hence, reacquires its full force in the hands of any
holder. 49
The conflicts problem appears where, under the first
group of laws, now under the Geneva Convention, the
drawer, according to his law, excludes subsequent negotiations, which nevertheless occur in a country denying the absolute effect of the clause. The municipal doctrines have
influenced the decisions. Leading writers belonging to
the jurisdictions of the second group extending their municipal conception to the conflicts rule have invoked the independence of subsequent indorsements as governed by their
own laws of contracting. 50 Against this view, a scholarly
47 Egypt, Code Com. mixte art. uo; Code C. Com. indigene art. 105
(following a former provision of the French (Com.).
48 France: Cass. (Dec. u, 1849) S. r8so.r.ur, D. r8so.1.47;
Germany: former Wechselordnung art. 9, 15;
Scandinavia: Bills of Exchange Act (188o) art. 9, rs; Swiss C. Obi. art.
727, 733;
Hungary: Bills of Exchange Law ( 1876) art. 8, 13.
49 Italy: former law: VIVANTE, 4 Trattato Dir. Com. § r6I7j actual Bills of
Exchange Law, 1933, art. 15, 19.
50 Italy: DIENA, 3 Trattato 97 §222; BONELLI 230; 0TIOLENGHI §84 (but
see §57) ; G. ARANGIO-RUIZ 254 § 98;
France: ARMIN JON ET CARRY 507 § 449·
Germany: STAUB-STRANZ 739-740 n. 16.
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opinion considers the drawer's declaration to be an integral
or at least prominent part of the original contract, binding
on all participant parties, throughout the circulation of the
bill. 51
But the defenders of the independence principle 52 again
may point to its adoption, without an exception for the
clause "not to order," in the Geneva Rules (article 4, paragraph 2). Also certain of the draftsmen have denied that
a bill could be made non-negotiable from birth forever. 53
On the other hand, it is clear that accessory parties may
end initial negotiability by appropriately restricting their
signatures. 54
(b) United States. Also in the United States it ts
controversial what law governs negotiability. Lorenzen 55
and the Restatement (§ 336) have well perceived that in
principle negotiability is an incident of the basic contract,
governed by the law of the place of the first issue. Only
a small minority of the decisions, however, follow this
course. 56 Beale says that most decisions contain "as usual
no square holding." 57 Wharton thought that the courts
decided according to individual incidents rather than principles.58 Favor for one party has certainly influenced some
51 2 BAR 166 n. 143; RAISER 99; HIRSCH, JW. 1932, 709; HUPKA 265;
KESSLER 138.
France: VALERY§ 923; ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 336 § 177.
52 STAUB-STRANZ, art. 93, n. 16; HUPKA 26 ( 5).
53 RAISER III.
54 RAISER 101 consistently denies this possibility as excluded by the original
contract.
55 LoRENZEN IZ9 If.; Popp v. Exchange Bank, noted n
Calif. L. Rev.
II4 (1923).
56 Carnegie v. Morrison (Mass. 1841) 2 Metcalf 381; Swift & Co. v.
Bankers Trust Co. ( 1939) 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E. (2d) 992.
57 2 BEALE n86 § 336.1; cf., Notes, 61 L.R.A. 193, 205; 19 L.R.A. (N.S.)
665; See also BEUTEL-BRENNAN 971 § 66 with comment on Mackintosh v.
Gibbs ( 1909) 79 N.J.L. 40, 74 At!. 708; add ( 19II) 81 N.J.L. 577, So At!.
554·
58 2 WHARTON 966, cf., LORENZEN 130.
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holdings. 59 According to Stumberg's analysis, in the case
of a maker or an acceptor, the weight of authority favors
the law of the place of payment, although for secondary
obligations the decided tendency goes toward the separate
laws of the places of drawing or indorsing. But authority
exists for the proposition that if a check is drawn in Mexico
and payable in New York, its negotiability depends on the
law of Mexico, because the check is a bill of exchange. 60
Application of the independent laws is often advocated
by the usual formalistic arguments. The law of the place
of payment is not explained at all. But, as the next topic
will show, it is regarded as the alternative to plurality of
laws which is not attractive in itself with respect to the primary obligation.
(c) Conclusion. If we want a simple and coherent law
we cannot disregard the initial role of a bill if issued as a
negotiable instrument. Any indorser may eliminate its
effect for himself by an express clause. But he should not
be able to restrict the characteristic quality of the paper
with respect to subsequent parties who sign without restriction. This quality is an immediate effect of compliance
with the formal requirements of the original contract. 61
Where, however, an instrument is non-negotiable under
its original law, it accords with the modern compromises
respecting form and capacity to allow subsequent additions
altering the nature of the instrument as respects the parties
involved thereafter. 62
2. Indorsement after Maturity
Indorsement after maturity has "a most diversified effect
in the different countries." 63 This is also true of indorseSee, e.g., Nicholas v. Porter ( 1867) 2 W.Va. 13, 94 Am. Dec. sor.
Henne Iotter v. De Orvananos ( 1921) 114 Misc. 333, r86 N.Y.S. 488 and
supra n. so.
61 Everything on this point has been said by LoRENZEN roo.
6 2 LoRENZEN 132 seemed to be of the same opinion.
59
60

63 LoRENZEN

32.
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ments after protest or after the time for protest has
elapsed. However, the great tendency has been in all these
cases to treat the indorsee as an ordinary assignee. 64 Conflicts do arise where duly protested bills give rise to this
situation, as formerly in Germany, 65 or conversely these
events do not impair the indorsement, as formerly in
France. 66
The reason for the infirmity of the indorsee's position
is not a defect of title, but the end of the normal life of
the instrument. This gives no reason to exclude the individual laws in just this case. 67
IV. SINGLE LAW OF INDORSEMENT OR LAW OF THE
PLACE OF PAYMENT?

Amount of Damages in Recourse

I.

In this matter there has been no doubt respecting the
substantive nature of the extent of recovery due in case of
recourse on a dishonored bill. 68 In England formerly, the
"several laws" doctrine applied to the rate of interest, 69
and related questions, 70 but the Bills of Exchange Act,
section 57 ( 2), states that in the case of a bill dishonored
abroad, the last holder or a warrantor may choose between the English measure of damages and the amount of
re-exchange with interest. A decision has given the same
right to a foreign drawer against an English acceptor. 71
Otherwise, foreign parties seem to be restricted to the Eng64 BEA sec. 10 (2); NIL sec. 7, par. 3·

Geneva Conv., art. 20.
Former Germon W.O. art. 16.
66
Former French doctrine, 4 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT§ I3S·
67
See RAISER 107.
68
In re Gillespie, ex p. Robarts ( 1886) 18 Q.B. 286; Re Commercial
Bank of S. Australia (1887) 36 Ch. D. 522; DICEY (ed. 6) 702 n. 84.
69
Gibbs v. Freemont (1853) 9 Exch. 25.
7
Cooper v. Earl of Waldegrave ( 1840) 2 Beav. 282; CHALMERS 238.
71
In re Gillespie, supra n. 62.
65

°
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I ish provisions in an English court. 72 Hence, apart from
re-exchange, which has little importance at present, the
acknowledgment of the substantive character of damages
does not help much.
American courts, speaking of lex loci contractus 73 or of
lex loci of "performance," 74 have applied the law of each
single contract; the maker of a note and the acceptor, of
course, remaining subject to the law of the place of the payment of the instrument. 75 The German law and discussions
preceding the uniform Geneva Convention were dominated
by the idea that in the event of recourse the amount of the
bill and the original addition of interest and costs ought
to be successively increased by new interest and costs. 76
This system of "plural return costs" is mitigated by a right
of every party liable to offer payment and require that the
bill shall be given up to him. 77 With this system of substantive law, accentuating by itself the independence of
the single laws with international effect, it is only a step to
the similar conflicts system, accounting for the additional
costs according to the single laws.
It would seem, indeed, that, once the single law doctrine
obtains at all, it has the relatively best case in this very
question which is really such as would be contemplated by
a bank discounting a payee's check. 78
Defenses of Acceptor or Maker

2.

The analogous rivalry of conflicts rules involving the
position of the primary obligors belongs to the next chapter.
72

DICEY (ed. 6) 703; LoRENZEN 168.
Slacum v. Pomery (U.S. 1810) 6 Cranch 221, 3 L. Ed. 2os; Bank of
Illinois v. Brady ( 1843) 3 McLean 268, Fed. Cas. no. 888.
74
Peck v. Mayo ( 1842) 14 Vt. 33, 39 Am. Dec. 2os, and cases cited by
LoRENZEN 169 n. 401-403. But see Mullen v. Morris ( 184s) 2 Pa. St. Ss:
place of payment of the bill, i.e., New York, for indorser of Pennsylvania
(semble).
75
Scofield v. Day (N.Y. 1822) 20 Johns. 102: English law for a note
payable in England.
76
Geneva Conv., art. 48, 49; cf., former German W.O. art. so, Sl·
77 Geneva Conv., art. so; W.O. art. 48.
78 See LORENZEN's conclusion 173; RAISER 65 ff.
73
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Payment and Recourse
I.

PAYMENT

AYMENT here means the fulfillment of the primary
cambial debt, by the drawee or maker. The law applicable to this relationship is primarily concerned
with the obligation of a maker or an acceptor to a holder,
but also includes such incidents as the offer of partial payment and certain other questions, the scope of which is
sometimes much enlarged.

P

1.

The Applicable Law

Matters respecting payment are commonly controlled by
the law of the place where the bill is payable. Thus, the
Geneva Rules (article 41 paragraph 1) state that
"The effects of the obligations of the acceptor of a bill
of exchange or maker of a promissory note are determined
by the law of the place where the instrument is payable."
This rule contrasts with the effect given in the Geneva Rules
to the law of the place of signature in the case of other
parties. 1
Story and the weight of American judicial authority 2
agree with this rule.
The former German doctrine, true to the principle of
the law of the place of performance, tended rather to the
1
This contrast, notwithstanding some variance as to the exact point of
reference (infra n. 3) was stated early in Germany: I ROHG. E. 289; 14 id.
258; 1 RGZ. 125; 6 id. 24; 7 id. 22; 107 id. 46; STAUB-STRANZ, art. 93 n. 6;
see also Swiss BG. (Jan. 24, 1878) 5 BGE. 19.
2
STORY 478 § 333; Heller v. Goslin ( 1900) 65 N.Y.S. 232; Midland
Steel Co. v. Citizens Nat!. Bank ( 1904) 72 N.E. 290; Egley v. Bennett
(Ind. 1923) 139 N.E. 385; Montana v. Worthington ( 1912) 162 Mo. 508,
142 s.w. 1082.
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place which, as a subsidiary rule, was identified with the
domicil of the debtor. 3 The same contact or the place
where the acceptance is made, have also been urged on
the ground of general theories. 4 Also, the English Bills
of Exchange Act, section 72 ( 2), submits "interpretation"
of acceptance, like that of other acts, to the law of the
place "where such contract is made." This embarrasses
the modern commentators, 5 and has been expressly rejected
in the United States ;6 the place of payment may be or
may not be that where acceptance occurs. 7
Place of payment named (u domiciled draft"). Where
a place of payment, different from the domicil of the
drawee, is named in the bill, this has always been regarded
as the surest expression of the intention that the law of
this place should govern the obligation of the acceptor. 8
The place for performing the duties as a guarantor, of
course, is not affected by this consideration.
Absence of Place of Payment. Where there is no ascertainable place of payment, as in the case of a bill payable to bearer or in blank, a substitute is needed. The
place of issue may serve for the obligation of the maker
and that of the drawee's domicil for his duty. 9 But cer3

2 RGZ. 13; 6 id. 24; 7 id. 21; etc. 107 id. 44, 46.
E.g., STORY 478 § 333·
CHALMI!RS, Bills of Exchange, thought that the mistake could be corrected;
Wl!STLAKI! § 229 ignored the provision; DICI!Y (ed. 6) 690 doubts whether
the law can be helped.
The Act of India, s. 134, a year older, has a different rule, likewise unsatisfactory in the opinion of an Indian comment, see DICI!Y, /.c.
6
By an ancient decision, Grimshaw v. Bender (1809) 6 Mass. 157. The
place of acceptance was used, e.g., in Briggs v. Latham ( 1887) 36 Kansas
255, 13 Pac. 393·
7
Rouquette v. Overman ( 1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 525: place of acceptance
or place named for payment; Hall v. Cordell (1891) 142 U.S. u6; etc.
8
United States: Brown v. Gates (1903) 97 N.W. 221, 98 N.W. 205: a
very persuasive evidence of the intention of the parties.
9
Geneva Convention on Bills, art. 2 (3) (4), on Checks art. 2 (2)-(4)
and reservation 3 (allowing the place of creation, used in Italy and Greece).
4
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tainty is achieved by the laws prescribing that the place of
payment be indicated in the bil1. 10
The Scope of the Law of Payment
(a) Modalities of payment. The normal application of the
law of the place of performance is natural also here. The law
of the place of payment, in such capacity, determines the
means of payment :11 local or foreign currency; meaning
of "pounds" or "francs," 12 or of money in the old
days of markets and fairs; holidays and hours to be observed ;13 the days of grace ;14 and anticipation or deferment
of the payment. 15
(b) Time of maturity. The periphery of "modalities"
has been gradually stretched, which in this field corresponds to the special needs. The Geneva Convention,
article 37, to end much controversy, expressly prefers
the calendar at the place of payment to that of the place
of issue. The English Act covers this solution broadly
with respect to the "due date," 16 and other statutes agree. 11
The lex loci solutionis is commonly preferred to the lex
loci contractus. 18
2.

10

Hague Uniform Law, art.

1

no. 5; Geneva Conv., art

I

no. 5·

11 Caras v. Thalmann (1910) 138 App. Div. 297, 123 N.Y.S. 97; Geneva
Conv., art. 4I par. 2 (usages of the place of payment) ; Montevideo Treaty
Com. Terr. ( I940) art. 30 par. 3·
12
2 BAR 164; 1 FIORE 223; 2 ROLIN 543; LoRENZEN 163 n. 371; Adelaide
Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd, [1934] A.C. 122,
I5I, per Lord Wright, supra Vol. II, p. 464; but see Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia [1950] 66 T.L.R., Pt. 2, 969, 978.
13 LoRENZEN 144, n. 29I, citing the international literature.
H United States: Cockburn v. Kinsley (1913) 25 Colo. App. 89, 135 Pac.
II IZ; Second Nat!. Bank of Richmond v. Smith ( I903) n8 Wis. I8, 94
N.W. 664; other cases: STUMBERG 264. LoRENZEN 144 n. 292, with many

citations of Continental authors.
15 England: Rouquette v. Overmann (I875) L.R. IO Q.B. 525 (moratory).
16
Sec. 72 (5).
11 Switzerland: C.Obl. art. I092.
18
France: ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 348 n. I citing opponents, cited 347 n. I;
cf. ARMINJON ET CARRY 517 § 548 on the French controversy.
Germany: STAUB-STRANZ art. 93 n. 8.
Italy: FIORE§ 328; DIENA, 3 Trattato § 233·
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Illustration. Are "three months after date" calendar
months or ninety days? The Portuguese law of the place
of payment decides. 19 "Thirty days after date" in a seller's
draft, drawn in the United States and accepted in England,
the steamer with the goods arriving earlier than foreseen:
English law applies. 20
(c) Part payment. Although the Anglo-American acts
allow the holder an option to receive or refuse partial
acceptance by the drawee or partial payment, 21 the Geneva
Convention states that the holder must receive it. 22 The
Geneva Rules, article 7, apply the law of the place of
payment to this question. 23
The same must be true of a conditional acceptance. 24
If the laws of the place of indorsement were applied, an
American could be made liable by a holder having refused
part payment but would not be able to sue his Italian
indorser.
(d) Amortization. In conformity with the universal
view, 25 the Geneva Rules add to the scope of the lex loci
solutionis the "measures to be taken in case of loss or
theft of a bill of exchange or promissory note." "Loss"
includes destruction 26 and the "measures" include restitution following such measures. 27
(e) Excuses and discharge. Finally, the same law determines the excuses for delaying or not performing pay19
OLG. Hamburg (May 28, 1895) 5 Z. int. R. 570, Clunet 1897, 386,
aff'd. RG. (Dec. n, 1895) 36 RGZ. xz6, 6 Z. int. R. x66, 429, Clunet
1897. 827.
20
Hammond, Snyder & Co. v. American Express (1908) 107 Md. 295, 68
Atl. 496.
21 BEA s. 44 (I) ; NIL s. 142 ;-a bad rule, HUDSON AND FELLER, 44 Harv.
L.Rev. (1931) at357.
22
Geneva Conv., art. 39·
23
Likewise LoRENZEN 163 f.
24
ARMIN JON ET CARRY 498 § 438.
Treaty of Montevideo, Com. Terr., art. 30 par. 4·
25
VEITH 526.
26
Comptes rendus, 157 § 203 i.f.
27
ld. 366.
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ment. 28 And as the law of the place of payment predicates
what amount is due on the bill, it also decides whether the
entire bill is discharged by payment, release, setoff, or other
event, 29 and therefore also whether an acceptor is discharged by payment on a forged instrument or has to
pay again to satisfy the bill (not his underlying relationship to the drawer) ,80
3· Enlargements of Scope
(a) The British Act, Section 72 ( 2), subjecting all "interpretation" of any cambial act to the law of the place
of payment, however this vague provision may be construed, by far exceeds the reasonable scope of this law.
(b) In the United States, many decisions sound as if
the law of the place of payment governed the total obligation of the maker of a promissory note. It is said to
govern "execution, construction, and validity." However,
there is no reason why the validity of issue should be
judged from the viewpoint of the place of performance. 81
More thoughtful courts have restricted the scope of this
law to the incidents of performance itsel£. 82 Also the
obligation created by the issue of a check must not be
determined by that law, 33 as the Geneva Rules on Checks
correctly state. 34 In the present system, it is unavoidable
that validity of drawing and making be subject to the law
of the place where signature and delivery to the payee
occur.
28

For U.S. see STUMBERG 263.
BEA sees. 59, 6o. DICEY (ed. 6) 694 f.
30
E.g., Casper v. Kiihne ( 1913) 159 App. Div. 389, 144 N.Y.S. 501,
Austrian Jaw of the drawee bank.
31
This criticism seems to be shared in 11 Am. Jur. ( 1938) 437· Most
decisions allege "intention," in a purely fictitious manner.
32
Brabston v. Gibson (1850) 9 How. (U.S.) 263; Bank of U.S. v. Daniel
( 1838) 12 Pet. (U.S.) 32.
38
Contra: Moulis v. Owen [1907] I K.B. 746- C.A.
34 Geneva Rules concerning checks, art. 2 par. 2.
29
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Acceptance, it is true, is "independent" of issue. Its
place has been identified either with the locality of the
declaration of acceptance, or, as in the United States, simply
with the place where payment is due. 35
II. THE STEPS TO PRESERVE RECOURSE
I.

Survey of Theories

(a) Controversy. Are presentment of the bill, protest,
and notice of default to be governed by the law of the
first issue as the basic law of the bill? Or by the law of
every single indorsement, in virtue of the principle of
independence? Or by the law of the place of payment as
a unitary law in matters not directly connected with issue?
There have been controversies on these questions for a
long time in various countries. 36 The European discussion originated in connection with the French moratory
law of I 870, which under the pressure of war postponed
the maturity of bills and the time for presentment and
protest. Brilliant expert opinions brought no agreement
on the international effect of the French law. 37 Very comprehensive debates in the preparation of the Hague and
the Geneva conflicts rules were no more fortunate. Neither
are the rules reasonably settled, nor even the problems
completely envisaged.
The ideas underlying the substantive rules requiring the
holder to take certain measures are approximately uniform,
with just one exception. In the Anglo-American laws, the
holder is expected to exercise diligence; negligence in per35

Supra Ch. 59·
We owe an excellent report to LORENZEN 158 ff. An almost forgotten
but historically important and profound contribution was made by voN
SALPIUS, "Anwendung ausliindischen Rechtes auf den Wechselregress," 19
Z. Handels R. ( 1874) 1.
37
See infra 219.
36
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forming this duty deprives him of his recourse. Continental laws agree in the main but usually add the consideration that the holder loses his right by force of law.
Thus, it seems that Anglo-American lawyers base the duty
on the contract between the holder and his indorser, whereas Continental doctrines, though also emphasizing contractual aspects, at the same time have in mind a legal
effect of inaction equivalent to estoppel, 38 operating without any fault of the holder. This contract is now mitigated
by the fact that the Geneva Convention concedes the excuse
of vis major. Nevertheless, the principles are sufficiently
different to have inspired different points of view in the
conflicts field.
In the United States, the principle of independence,
fostered by isolated contractual privity, dominates in surprising strength. 39 In the Continental doctrine, the same
powerful current 40 encounters opposite tendencies with such
uncertain results that the comments on the Geneva rules
still hesitate where to draw the line between the principle
of independence sanctioned in article 4 and the law of the
place of payment invoked in article 8. 41
In general, the law of the place of payment has an unchallenged role in certain parts of the matter and a controversial one respecting other incidents.
(b) Statutes. The only statutes apparently attempting
a comprehensive conflicts rule have given enigmatic directives.
The British Bills of Exchange Act, section 7 2 ( 3), following some leading precedents, 42 subjects all duties of the
38

Very instructive: HUPKA I49 j ULMER I87.
See the cases in 2 WHARTON § 452b i I DANIEL ( ed. 6} § 909; LoRENZEN
I48 n. 3 I7 j RAISER 40 n. 3·
40
2 MEYER 373 for documentation.
41 Infra.
42
Rothschild v. Currie (184I) I Q.B. 43; Hirschfield v. Smith (I866)
L.R. I C.P. 340, quoted by LoRENZEN IS2-IS4·
39
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holder to "the law of the place where the act is done or
the bill is dishonoured." Since the text only mentions the
place where the act is done, without adding "or to be done,"
the courts have refused to apply the provision to the question whether, e.g., an act of presentment is required at all. 48
Among many other doubts, it is even queried whether the
law includes other indorsees than the last holder. 44
In the Geneva Rules, article 8 speaks of the form of
protest and other necessary acts, submitting it to the law
of the place of acting (infra 3), but the text fails to say
what law decides whether an act is necessary for the conservation of rights. No help is afforded by the preparatory
materials.
We shall first discuss a problem that is quite commonly
treated as an incident of the independent laws, viz. the
necessity of the various measures in question; thereafter
the problems generally considered subject to the law of
the place of performance-time and manner of these
measures; and finally the problems of doubtful classification.
2.

Necessity of Preserving Steps
Not only the vastly dominating American practice, 45

48
Bank Polski v. Mulder & Co. [1941] 2 K.B. 266, [1941] 2 All E.R. 647,
per Tucker J.; Cornelius v. Banque Franco-Serbe [ 1941] 2 All E.R. 728,
732 per Stable J.; on the reasoning see the critical comment by MANN, 5
Mod. L. Rev. (1941/42) 251, and CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 254·
44
WESTLAKE§ 232: no; contra: DICEY (ed. 6) 698.
45
II Am. Jur. 444 n. 2; Aymar v. Sheldon (N.Y. 1834) 12 Wend. 439,
27 Am. Dec. 137; Musson v. Lake (1845) 4 How. (U.S.) 262. Among more
recent decisions, see, e.g.:
Liability of drawer: Casper v. Kuhne (1913) 79 Misc. 411, 140 N.Y.S. 86,
aff'd. 144 N.Y.S. 502; Ellenbogen v. State Bank ( 1922) 119 Misc. 711, 197
N.Y.S. 278; Mazukiewicz v. Hanover Nat. Bank of City of New York (1925)
240 N.Y. 317, 148 N.E. 535; Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel (C.C.A. 1st
1952) 106 F. (2d) 950.
Liability of indorser: Briggs v. Latham (1887) 36 Kan. 255, 13 Pac. 393;
Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Canada (C.C.A. 8th 1911) 188 Fed. 300.

210

BILLS AND NOTES

but also the majority of Continental courts 46 and the
writers 47 profess that "necessity" and "sufficiency" of presentment, protest, and notice are subject to the several
independent laws. The justification of this rule is sought
in "logic"; where the obligation of the indorsers is made
dependent on a protest, this is a condition precedent of the
guaranty to be governed by the law controlling this obligagation.
A contrary opinion, however, objects that no valid
reason exists for compelling the holder to observe the Ia ws
under which the previous engagements occurred. 48 The
result is application of the law of the place of payment,
quite as the British Bills of Exchange Act, section 72 (3)
predicates.
A related rule has been introduced into the Uniform Commercial Code, section 4-102, but only for actions
taken by a bank in the course of collection. The place of
the bank, however, though a better contact than the place
of the indorser, is not of such practicability as that of the
place of payment.
The commentators on the Geneva Rules split into the
46

France: Trib. Com. Seine (April 6, 1875) Clunet 1876, 103.
Germany: 9 ROHGE. 203; RG. (May 27, 1913) Leipz. Z. 1913, 674·
Italy: Cass. Firenze (Apr. 8, 1895) S. 1896·4·7·
47
2 MEYER 373 j RAISER 20 n. 21 3 j 72 n. 3 j VEITH 517 f.
England: WESTLAKE § 232.
U.S.: STORY§ 360; 2 WHARTON 986 § 452 b, d.; LORENZEN 148-150j DANIEL
( ed. 6) §9o9.
Austria: BETTELHEIM 157 f., 162 f.; 2 GRUNHUT 581; CANSTEIN 182.
France: DESPAGNET 994 § 345 j VALfiRY 1288 j SURVILLE § 497 j WEISS, 2
Traite 444; AUDINET 6r8, 620.
Germany: 2 BAR § 306; 2 GRUNHUT 58Ij 19 ROHG. 203j 9 RGZ. 430j
STAUB-STRANZ (ed. 10) art. 86, n. 9; KGJW. 1932, 754·
Italy: DIENA, 3 Tratt. 169, 2 Principii 327; 0TTOLENGHI 366; Bosco,
Rivista 1928, 97, ro6.
Switzerland: 2 MElLI 347 § 192.
48
England: FOOTE (ed. 5) 460; DICEY (ed. 6) 698; CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 253·
Germany: 2 FRANKENSTEIN 434i NUSSBAUM 324 f.
Italy: SRAFFA, Riv. Dir. Com. 1927, r. 255; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Corn.
392 f.; App. Napoli (May 2, 1924) Rivista 1925, 101 (promissory note).

PAYMENT AND RECOURSE

2II

same two views. Either they trust the broad language of
article 4, stating the principle of independence, 49 or they
construe article 8, establishing the law of the place of payment, extensively. 50
A third view looking to the place of issue 51 has no attraction. The consequences may be illustrated:
( i) A bill issued and payable in the United States (or
England) to P is indorsed in the United States {or England) to A and by A in Germany to B. Since under
German law protest is a condition of recourse, B omitting
the levy of protest loses his right against A. This is still
true under the Geneva Convention, article 44, paragraph 3,
for bills payable on a fixed day or in a fixed period after date
or sight and otherwise, where the protest is not made within
a year (article 34). However, under American (or English or Mexican) law concerning an inland bill which does
not need to be protested, 52 A has, without protest, recourse
against P and P against the drawer. 5 3
( ii) A commercial order was drawn in New York on
a firm in Vienna, Austria, to the order of plaintiff. Protest in Vienna was omitted as unnecessary because the instrument was not a true check. Under New York law,
however, it was a foreign bill and protest was required.
The liability of the drawer is denied,-correctly under the
law of the drawer, wrongly under that of the place of
payment.

If it may be allowed to doubt whether the issue warrants
an exception to the several laws principle-as Lorenzen
did-the presence of both conflicts rules in the same world
is one disadvantage too many.
The decision in favor of the lex loci contractus is ordinarily believed easier with respect to notification. The duty
49 HUPKA 256
50 ARMINJON,

f.
DIP. Com. 359 § 193.
Institute of International Law, 8 Annuaire 122, resolution IV.
52
BEA sec. 51 (z); NIL sec. 152; Mexico: Ley de Titulos, art. I45·
53
RABEL, 6 Z. ausl. PR. r"~5 1 332 j KESSLER 151, 157 j HUPKA 257 n. 1.

51
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of the holder is now regulated with less difference but
not quite similarly by the Anglo-American Acts which prescribe notices to the drawer and every indorser, and the
Hague and Geneva Conventions requiring notice to the
drawer and the precedent indorser who has to communicate
with his own indorser. 54 The writers think that with good
reason an American indorser may expect notice from the
last holder. 55
Illustration. A indorsed in England a bill payable in
Spain, and B indorsed in Spain to C where no notice was
required. C gave notice to B twelve days after dishonor,
B at once to A. The English court allowed recourse by B
against A; 56 indeed, B could not act earlier. 5 7
It is difficult to see why even in such questions a world
law could not provide unity.
3. Form and Time
(a) Form. The Geneva Rules, article 8, expressly state
that
"the form ... of protest as well as the form of the other
measures necessary for the exercise or preservation of
rights concerning bills of exchange or promissory notes,
are regulated by the laws of the country in which the protest must be drawn up or the measures in question taken."
The same rule is established for all "duties" of the holder
in the British Act, section 72(3), 58 for the duty of levying
protest in the laws of the German group before the Geneva
54
BEA sec. 48; NIL sec. 89; Hague Unif. Law art. 44; Geneva Conv.
art. 4S·
55
To this effect recently ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 361.
56
Horne v. Rouquette ( 1878) 3 Q.B.D. 514-C.A.
57
"How could the English indorsee have given what would have been
timely notice from the point of view of English domestic Jaw, if his own
knowledge of the dishonour depended on the compliance with Spanish Jaw?"
DICEY's editors ( ed. 6) 698 ask.
58
DICEY (ed. 6) 698.
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Rules, 59 in the Latin-American codes and treaties, 60 and is
familiar to the literature. 61 A prominent American decision 62 shares this view, speaking of the "days of grace,
the manner of making the protest and the person by whom
protest should be made," as equally subject to the law of
the place of payment. We may take it that the former
contrary opinions respecting time and form of notification
are to be regarded as obsolete. 63 The law or custom of
the place where the bill is payable governs, as it is often
said.
What is "form"? Agreement seems to exist that here,
once more, form is a broad term, really a misleading name,
including external expression of presentment, protest, or
notification or "noting," but also the officers, manner, time
of day, and locality involved. The British Act happily
avoids this term. It appears that even such questions as
follows are included in the "mode of presentment" :64
Whether a mere possessor who is not the owner of the
bill may present it and levy protest in his own name ;65
Whether upon a presentment for acceptance the drawee
59
·

I MEYER 659. Germany: former WO. art. 86; 2 GRiiNHUT 577·
6° Montevideo Treaty Com. art. 26.
Cod. Bustamante, art. 270.
Chile: C. C. art. I7 par. 2, involving "effects" of an instrument, applied

by Sup. Ct in Bco. Germanico de Ia America del Sur v. Lizarralde (Aug.
IS, I928) 26 Rev. Der. Jur. y Ciencias Soc. I929 I, 474, 48I, to the form of
protest in Buenos Aires; it was a bill of exchange, indorsed in Chile upon a
person domiciled in Argentina.
Mexico: Ley de titulos I, ( I932) art. 256, calls this law lex fori.
61
STUMBERG, 253; PILLET, 2 Traite 84I, 848.
62
Amsinck v. Rogers (I907) I89 N.Y. 252, 82 N.E. I34; Wooley v. Lyon
(I886) II7 Ill. 244, 6 N.E. 88s; cf. Gleason v. Thayer (I9I3) 87 Conn.
248, 87 Atl. 790.
63
See LoRENZEN ISI n. 329; add Sec. Natl. Bank of Richmond v. Smith
( I903) n8 Wis. I8, 94 N.W. 664.
64
LoRENZEN I48, par. I.
65
He may, according to Geneva Conv. art. I6 if he shows an uninterrupted series of indorsements.
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may revoke his acceptance written on the bill, as the Geneva
Convention allows him until he returns the bill. 66
uSufficiency of notice" is an ambiguous term occurring in
American decisions, to be located between "necessity" and
"manner." If the holder has given a reasonable notice
to the defendant according to the law of his contract, it
would seem that any other possible requirement regards
either "time" or "mode," both of which belong to the
place of payment.
Renvoi. One American case applying the law of the
place of payment is known as admitting renvoi. 67 A promissory note was made and indorsed in Illinois and payable
in Canada. It was dishonored, and the notice complied
with the Canadian but not with Illinois law. Judge Sanborn, directly adducing the Canadian law of the place of
payment to "time and manner of giving notice," argued
ad abundantiam that even though Illinois law were to apply,
it would refer to Canadian law. This decision has unnecessarily been criticized with the usual arguments against
renvoi. 68
(b) Time. In the United States, the time for presentment and protest is by prevailing authority determined
under the law of the place of payment. 69 For the time
and manner of giving notice some old decisions applied the
independent laws of the several contracts, 70 but more recently the single law of the place of payment obtains. 71
In agreement with the universal view/ 2 article 8 of the
Geneva Rules also follows the law of the place of pay6

6

67

68
69
70
71
72

Geneva Conv. art. 29.
Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Canada (1911) 188 Fed. 300, 301.
LORENZEN 175 f.; cf, RAISER 39·
10 C.J.S. 498 § 66 n. 59·
10 C.J.S. 499 n. 64, 6s. For the old cases on presentment, cf. RAISER
Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Canada (1911) 188 Fed. 300, 305.
LORENZEN 154·

72.

PAYMENT AND RECOURSE

215

ment for protest. The time for presentment and particularly notice continues as a subject of controversy. 73
The several laws doctrine produces a disorderly chain
of recourse in which an indorsee may be liable to his
creditor and unable to recover from his debtor. 74 Under
the Geneva Rules the extensive interpretation of article 8,
to cover presentment and notification, has been urged, not
only as a requirement of harmony 75 but also because the
local law of the place of payment is the only one known
to the persons charged with cashing the bill. 76
At least, respecting the time for presentment, all courts
should follow this argument, especially, but not only, where
the basic bill indicates a certain date for presentment or
maturity. 77 The place of payment is also here preferable
to that where presentment is due. 78
Reasonable time. The Anglo-American Acts prescribe
a reasonable time: for acceptance of a bill payable after
sight (the time running from the issue) (NIL § I 44) ;
for presentment and protest of a bill payable at demand
(from the issue or the last negotiation) (NIL§§ 7I, I 55);
and for the liability of the drawer of a check (from the
issue of the check) (NIL § I 86) .79 Moreover, an old
practice is frequently continued whereby a check must be
sent for presentment the day after receipt. These are
VEITH soo.
Despite a Yugoslavian proposal and a monitum by the Northern states,
see HUPKA 2SS n. 3·
75
RABEL I.e.; RAISER 74. 7S; VEITH SIS; HUPKA 2S6.
76 KESSLER 156; but the dominant opinion takes, with regret, the independence principle as prescribed; see RAISER So; QuASSOWSKI-ALBRECHT art.
97, n. 6; HuPKA 2s6, all following former rules; cf. RENAULT, Actes, Second
Hague Conference on Bills of Exchange, 1912, I ISO.
77
ARMIN JON-CARRY,§§ 436, 462.
78 STAUB-STRANZ art. 97 n. 9 advocates the place of presentment.
But
this is too subtle; presentment may also be considered a modality of payment.
79
BEA sec. 40 (1), 45 (2), 86 (1); 51 (4); 74·
73

H
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contradictory principles which cannot be reconciled. 80 However, they may be corrected; only one decision has taken
section 7 I literally. 81 Commonly in case of a check, the
reasonable time is simply understood to mean that each
holder, to preserve the liability of his immediate indorsers,
must present a check on the next following working day.
Yet a bank issuing a check is deemed to put the instrument
into circulation for a certain time. 82
The interesting point here is, how foreign courts the
laws of which do not know the criterion of "reasonable
time," should apply this measure.
The main principle to be observed by a foreign court
defining the duty of presentment is contained in § 193 NIL
(sec. 40 ( 3 ), 4 5 ( 3 ) , 8 6 ( 2) BEA) :
"In determining what is 'reasonable time' or an 'unreasonable time,' regard is had to the nature of the instrument,
the usage of trade or business (if any) with respect to
such instrument and the facts of the particular case."
Foreign courts, applying American law as that of the
place of payment, sometimes have failed to understand that
this period must be estimated from case to case, and that
drawer and indorser are on a different footing. The date
of receiving a check, sending it to a bank for collection,
dispatch to a correspondent bank and to the drawee must
be ascertained; the holder must prove diligence in a severe
examination.
No matter whether the Anglo-American "reasonable"
time applies abroad as an incident of the indorser-indorsee
80

Insofar (not respecting his own theory) I agree with BIGELOW-LILE,
Bills, Notes and Checks (ed. 3, 1928) §§ 223, 351-355 against the authors
who try vainly to harmonize the rules, with varying results. Cf. 6 Z. ausl.
PR. 327 f.
81
Columbian Banking Co. v. Bowen (1908) 134 Wis. 218, 114 N.W. 451.
82
2 DANIEL (ed. 6) 1789 f.
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relation or as the unitary rule of the place of payment,
this concept must be used in its original meaning. 83
4· Exemptions from the Duties.
It is a difficult question whether excuses for delaying
or omitting protests or other measures fall into the category of the independence principle or of the law of the
place of payment.
The older authors either accorded to each signer discharge as provided by his own laws, 84 or likened temporary
obstacles to the days of grace, subject to the law of the
place of payment. 85 Lorenzen, declaring for the first
principle, nevertheless on grounds of convenience, states
an exception for the "definition of vis major" which should
be that of the place of payment. 86 But this defeats the
alleged principle. Arminjon distinguishes liberation by
vis major and the obligations of the holders, which remain under their several laws. 87 Their duties, however,
are essentially changed. The decisive question is: whether
the law of the place of payment, quite contrary to the
several laws principle, ought to be stretched, 88 so as to
afford equitable relief to the holder, menaced in the preservation of his recourse. This should be affirmed with the
exception of events affecting merely personal relationships. 5 9
The American Negotiable Instruments Act uses a threefold language to define the exceptions to the duties of protest, presentment, and notice; these steps are "not reRABEL, 5 Z. a us!. PR. ( 1932) 326, 330.
E.g., 2 BAR § 310; SURVILLE § 498; 4 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT § 660;
4 WEISS 463 f.
85 2 BROCHER 33 I; DIENA, 3 Tratt. 182, 192; 2 MElLI § 193; CAVAGLIERI,
Dir. Int. Com. 390.
86 LORENZEN 156.
87
ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 371 § 203.
88
Stretched over its normal scope which does not, despite the Restatement,
§ 332, include the causes of nonperformance, supra Vol. II, 466, cf. supra
205 f.
89
RABEL, 6 Z. ausl. PR. 332 ff.; v. CAEMMERER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 265; KESSLER 151; HUPKA 256 f.
83
84
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quired," 90 or "excused," 91 or "dispensed with." 92 Nevertheless, we do not see that these expressions have ever been
neatly differentiated,-they are in fact merged in the Uniform Commercial Code, section 3-5 I 1-or would be able
to furnish adequate categories for conflicts purposes. Yet,
all these cases cannot be treated on the same footing. The
following divisions may be proposed.
(a) Personal defenses. To stay within the American
examples, an indorsee may sue the indorser or a maker
or drawer without presentment, protest, or notice, where
both parties knew that the instrument would not be honored
and both were in fraud or the drawer was dishonest and
the indorser knew it. 93 Likewise, where the indorser has
participated in an application for bankruptcy of the maker,
which made payment impossible at the time of maturity ;94
or the indorsee had to retain the check for a few days in
the interest of the drawer and the indorser. 95
The courts invoke waiver by conduct or construe sections
79, 8o "broadly." In truth, the exemption is based on
circumstances outside the instrument, characterizing the
underlying relationship between just the two parties. The
individual contract and its law, under the principle of independence, govern the incident.
A different situation which, however, equally must produce the application of the several laws doctrine, arises
where really waiver is written in the bill with restriction
to a two-parties-relation.
90
§§ 79, II4 no. 4, 159 (liability of the drawer) ; §§So, II5 no. 3, 159
(liability of indorser).
91 §§ 81, u3, (delay by 'Vis major).
92
§§ 82 (3), 109-1II, 159 (waiver); 82, (1), 112, 159 (impossibility).
93
DANIEL 1236, 1792; going farther: First Nat. Bank v. Currie ( 1907)
147 Mich. 72, 110 N.W. 499; Start v. Tupper ( 1908} 8r Vt. 19, 69 Atl. 151
(semble); NORTON, Bills and Notes (ed. 4) 561.
94
J. W. O'Bannon Co. v. Curran (1908) 129 App. Div. 90, 113 N.Y.S. 359·
95
Churchill v. Yeatman, Gray Grocer Co. (1914) rrr Ark. 529, r64
283·

s.w.
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(b) Incidents of Payment. In contrast to the group
just described, the holder may encounter obstacles "beyond
his control" or "not imputable to his fault." It stands
to reason 96 that the law of the place of payment is competent, e.g., to free the holder unable to levy protest.
Impossibility and frustration will work in this manner as
grounds of exemption under the Anglo-American acts. 97
Although the Geneva Convention introduces the exception of vis major, 98 it does not fully reach the scope of the
Anglo-American exemptions on which recourse may be
based when protest etc. is delayed. It excuses only absolute
and objective, total impossibility, not frustration, excessive
or extraordinary difficulty, partial or relative impossibility,
while on the other hand destruction of the instrument belongs to another category. 99 Where, e.g., death or illness
prevent the holder or his agent from presenting the bill,
he may be excused under American law, but not according
to the uniform law.
Illustration. A check could not be presented at a bank
in Amsterdam during the German occupation. Dutch law
had to control the question whether the recourse survived.
This also agrees with BEA, section 72 (3). Strangely,
an English judge instead applied the substantive rule of
BEA, section 46 ( 2), to dispense with presentment. 100
The much debated question concerning the moratory
laws of the place of payment 101 has finally been answered
96 To the same effect:
England : BEA sec. 72 ( 3) .
Italy: Cass. (July 4, I927) 4-5 Annuario Dir. Comp., Parte III, Io; Cass.
Sez. Unite (July I, I927) Rivista I928, 94·
97 NIL sec. 8I, 82 no. I, n2, BEA 46, so; Uniform Commercial Code
3-SII (I).
8
9 Geneva Conv., art. 54·
99 See in particular HUPKA I48 ff.; ANGELONI, Cambiale ( ed. 3) 448 ff.,
§§ 222 f.
10
° Cornelius v. Banque Franco-Serbe ( I94I) 2 All E.R. 728; cf. DICEY
( ed. 6) 699, illustration 2.
101
LoRENZEN IS8, I6I; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 372 § 204.
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by the Geneva Convention insofar as the wording of article
54 on vis major expressly names prevention by a "legal
prohibition," "prescription lt!gale," by any state. 102 Decrees and ordinances are included, but the co-ordination with
acts of God introduces too short a waiting period of thirty
days for termination of the unsurmountable obstacle to
presentment or protest, and the ample reservations of the
states, allowing deviations from article 54 and defense
against foreign moratoria ( annexe II, article 22), have
marred the uniformity of the regulation. 103
(c) Estoppel. The difference between the two situations
described under (a) and (b) is illustrated by a German
decision applying the American rule of estoppel. This rule
prescribes, according to a frequent quotation, that:
"Where the indorser of a note by words or acts has in
fact misled and put the holder off his guard and reasonably
induced him to omit due presentation for payment and
notice of non-payments, he is deemed in law to have waived
the performance of these ceremonies ... " 104
In a case of the Appeal Court of Berlin, the holder, suing
upon a German executed indorsement in a bill payable in
New Y ark, sought excuse for not having given timely notice
and resorted to the American estoppel rule, under the
theory that the unitary law of the place of payment should
prevail. The bill was indorsed by the signature of the defendant's son as authorized agent, but the father, falsely
denying that the son's signature was genuine, induced the
holder to fetch back the instrument from New York where
it had been sent for presentment, in order to have the defendant examine it. After exact investigation of the facts,
102

Comptes rendus 1930 p. 253, 256-262.

103

HUPKA 162-171.

104 Foster, J. in Kent v. Warner (Mass. 1866) 12 Allen 561, 563; In re
Swift ( 1901) 106 Fed. 65, 68.
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the court held that the plaintiff's conduct satisfied the conditions under which NIL, section 159 dispenses with protest, for the time being, allowing it when the cause of
delay ceases to operate.
The court wandered off from the principle of the several
laws:
"The question is only whether the provisions excusing
failure to protest belong to the provisions involving the
time for protest (law of the place of payment) or to the
provisions involving the necessity of a timely protest (law
of the domicil of the defendant in recourse). The first view
is preferable and highly suggested by convenience. Protest
is an act to be made at one time by the last holder of the
bill, commonly in a very short space of time. The last
holder cannot be supposed to know and observe all laws of
the debtors in recourse. Security of commerce therefore
requires that a protest still permissible and in time under
the law of the place of payment should also be available
against a regressee whose domicil has other rules on the
effect of delay in making protest." 105
This eloquent reasoning unfortunately clashes with the
existing rules. The recourse against the German indorser stood under German law which seemed to afford
merely an action for tortious violation of good morals, but
may have provided a more efficient remedy than that recognized for the case at bar. In any case, also under American law to which the court resorted, estoppel dispenses only
with the recourse against the one indorser who induced the
holder.
1.

III.
Suing for Recourse

TIME FOR SUING

In the common-law jurisdictions, scarcely a doubt has
been expressed that limitation of action, as usual/ 06 is
105

97.

KG; (13th Div.), (April 25, 1932), 6 Z. ausl. PR 334, IPRspr. 1932,

100.

106

Vol. III, p. 475 ff.
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governed by the lex fori. 101 Some of the old leading decisions to this effect dealt with negotiable instruments. The
exceptions, such as contained in the borrowing statutes,
apply of course, and "extinction" of the action or discharge
of the debtor takes the case out of the rule.
In the civil-law doctrine, 108 by which limitation of action
is recognized as a substantive institution, governed by the
law of the contract, it was taken for granted that the principle of independence was to prevail. 109 But the draftsmen
of the Geneva Rules, apprehensive that the drawer might
be freed earlier than his indorsee, chose just this situation
to impose a single applicable law. As such they selected
the law of the place of issue, because the basic law of the
bill would afford the appropriate contractual ground for
the single law. 110
Article 5 of the Geneva Rules expresses this meaning so
badly that it became controversial whether it refers only
to periods of preclusion rather than also to limitation of
action. The broader construction, however, prevails and
is founded upon the fact that the time restrictions almost
everywhere are but genuine limitations of action. No interpretation serves to extend the provision to the causes of
interruption and suspension of the time period, which are
left either to the lex fori 111 or to the several laws, 112 or
reserved to nationallegislation. 113
107 LoRENZEN 164; more recently, e.g., Coral Gables v. Christopher (1937)
108 Vt. 414. 189 At!. 147, 109 A.L.R. 474; Gaffe v. Williams (1942) 194 Ga.
673; Western Coal and Mining Co. v. Jones ( 1946) 27 Cal. (2d) 819.
108 An attempt to collect decisions on the special matter ends in failure
to discover a principle; see ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 374 § 206.
109
2 BAR § 308; DIENA, 3 Tratt. § 247·
110
The writers also refer to an express utterance of a draftsman, Comptes
rend us p. 363, cf. 2 MossA, La cambiale secondo Ia nuova Iegge ( 1937) 841
§8u; KESSLER 153 n. 1; ARMINJON ET CARRY 531 §476.
111 HUPKA 221 invoking a conflicts rule implied by Conv., art. 16 and
Reservation, art. 17.
112
ARMINJON-CARRY 531 § 476; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 376 § 207 refers
suspension for minor age to the national law.
113
Geneva Conv., Annex II art. 17.
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The entire idea of article 5, however, is wrong. This
very problem could have remained in the domain of the
principle of independence, since commonly the time periods
run successively. As the rule now is, a bill issued in England carries a privilege to sue during three years in Continental recourses, which are normally of a few months
or even weeks, and of one year under the Geneva Convention, article 70, for the holder and six months for an indorser, provided that the Geneva Rules have been made the
only conflicts rules of the matter at the forum.
2.

Suing for Payment

There is a problem for the civil law courts, respecting
the obligation of a maker or acceptor, whether they should
use a criterion different from what they would select for
the respective contract as a whole. It would seem that
there is a strong and sound tendency to apply the law of the
place of payment, irrespective of its application to the
obligation of the primary parties. 114
114 See for France the comment by BATIIFOL, Traite sso § 549 on Cass.
civ. (July 7, 1938) Gaz. Pal. Oct. 27, 1938, p. 530 (which establishes even
a unitary rule for recourse against the Geneva Rules. In Germany lex loci
solutionis has been applied in its quality as the general rule of contracts
(2 RGZ. 13; 6 RGZ. 24, etc.).
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Checks
I.

THE SPECIAL LAw ON CHECKS

Differentiation. In the Anglo-American enactments the
check is defined as a bill of exchange drawn on a bank
payable on demand. 1 What particular elements this variety
of a bill of exchange does have, is relegated to the background, but they are not insignificant. 2 The Continental
laws, developing the check more recently, and then rapidly,
instituted an "autonomous" type of commercial paper. It
is now regulated separately in the Geneva Convention of
3
I 93 I, though supplemented by national legal rules of the
member states, and in many special statutes in other countries. The authors of the Convention, however, were
anxious to preserve as much analogy as feasible to the
Convention on Bills and Notes of I930.
Whereas the long preparation of the prior treaty was
largely inspired by the hope for accession of the commonlaw countries, no illusion in this respect remained in I93 1. 4
The effort became a purely European compromise. Even
so, three main systems were to be reconciled, the French,
German, and Italian. Considering the fundamental divergencies then existing, the unification was hailed as a conspic1

BEA s. 73; NILs. 185.
See the enumeration in 10 C.J.S. 412 and Supp. 1953.
3 Convention portant loi uniforme sur Ies cheques, Geneva, March 1931.
5 HUDSON, Intern. Legis!. 889 No. 283 (hereafter called Geneva Check
Convention) ; Convention destinee a regler certains con flits de lois en matiere
de cheques, Geneva, March 19, 1931, 5 HUDSON, id. 915 No. 284. (hereafter
called Geneva Rules.)
4 MossA, Check 86.
2
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uous progress, although the 57 sections are incomplete and
variegated by 3 I reservation clauses, all of which have
been used, some by all or almost all member states. 5 The
law of checks was called at the Hague in 1912 "un enfant
de Boheme" and in Geneva in 1931 "un enfant terrible." 6
Among the differences between checks and bills of exchange, two are outstanding: checks enjoy total or partial
exemption from the tax imposed on bills, and the time for
presentment and for suing is much shorter. Conflicts law,
moreover, is strongly influenced by the importance of the
banking institution and bank collection tying the check to
the individual bank visible on the face of the paper; no
such drastic connection is afforded by similar negotiable
instruments.
Also, the conflicts rules of the Bills of Exchange Act and
those of the American courts on bills and notes pretend to
include checks, although the peculiar nature of these instruments evidently demands some distinction. The Geneva
Check Convention is accompanied by a convention on conflict rules, which shows even more improvisation than its
counterpart concerning bills and notes, and has unhesitatingly adopted the latter's controversial rules on capacity,
form (with one meritorious addition), and "effects," as
well as the time for suing in recourse. A gratifying part
will be found in article 7, which puts a series of incidents
uniformly under the law of the place where the check IS
payable.
5 See the table in HAMEL ET ANCEL, La convention de Geneve sur
!'unification du droit du cheque, ( 1937). HAMEL, 1 Banques 85 § 703 considers as a reservation art. 4 par. 3 of the Check Convention (allowing a
member state to validate obligations between its nationals contracted abroad
in the form of the national law); hence, this paragraph not mentioned in
the reservations used by France has no effect. The contrary opinion of z
PERCEROU ET BOUTERON 177 n. 3 seems Jess well-founded.
6
GIANNINI, Sistema 354·
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In the other countries, the European controversies are
shared.
United States. If the conflicts rules concerning bills of
exchange largely suffer from uncertainty, an additional
grievous complication centers on the question whether there
are modifications of these rules with respect to checks. In
the most important jurisdiction, New York, the views
have changed. In Hibernia National Bank v. Lacombe,
the Court of Appeals declared in a case involving a check
that the nature, validity, interpretation, and effect of the
instrument were governed by the law of the place of payment.7 Amsinck v. Rogers, establishing a scheme of division between the topics pertaining to the inception of negotiable instruments and the incidents of performance (payment), drew a line of distinction between bills and checks.
The Hibernia decision was explained on the general principle of lex loci contractus, because the drawer of a bill of
exchange undertakes to pay at the place of drawing, and
the drawer of a check contracts to pay at the place of payment.8 Finally, in Swift & Co. v. Banker's Trust Co., the
court in I 9 3 9 overruled the distinction, assuming that the
Negotiable Instruments Act establishes a uniform law in
which the obligations of a drawer of a check or a bill of
exchange payable at demand are identical, and hence also
the conflicts rules are common. Thus, the validity and
effect of the drawer's contract should be governed by the
law of the place of contracting. A check drawn in Chicago
to a fictitious person upon a bank in New York through
fraud of an employee of the drawing firm, was held to
be a check payable to the bearer under an Illinois statute
of I 93 I and correctly paid by the New York bank; under
the Negotiable Instruments Act, adopted in New Y ark,
7

8

84 N.Y. 367.
189 N.Y. 252, 257.
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the result would have been contrary. 9 This cannot be the
last word.
Authority in the other American jurisdictions remains
thoroughly divided. 10
Function. The check is contrasted with bills of exchange
as serving payment while bills are instruments of credit
and financing. With the actual low stand of private international credit operations, hoped to be temporary, the
check has made an enormous advance and, at present, may
sometimes replace commercial drafts or promissory notes in
their own field; certainly it is often used as security. Nevertheless, the statutes and the regulations by bank accords
and most standard conditions are intended for instruments
essentially contemplating payment. In the United States,
the banks handle daily an estimated number of 35 millions
of checks mainly in the service of collection for payment. 11
By another functional restriction, checks in some parts
of the world are more or less strictly regarded as local
paper. At one time, it was specially noted in Latin America
that Cuba and San Salvador permitted international circulation.12
Conflicts. The contrasts between the Geneva uniform
check law and the Anglo-American statutes have been repeatedly described in detail, notably by Feller. 13
Conflicts of laws relating to this subject are bound to
9
Swift & Co. v. Banker's Trust Co. ( 1939) z8o N.Y. 135, 144, 19 N.E.
(zd) 993· Whilst usually the local law of a bank is emphasized, here a
bank is discharged for the reason that at the place of issue the check was
payable to bearer, depending on the fraudulent act of an employee of the
drawer, unknown to both parties.
10 See 10 C.J.S., Supp. 1953, Bills and Notes§ 48.
11
MALCOLM, "Article 4, A Battle with Complexity," Wise. L. Rev. (195Z)
z65, z7o and additional information by Mr. Malcolm.
12 ARGANA § 3Z.
13 FELLER, "The International Unification of Laws Concerning Checks," 45
Harv. L. Rev. ( 193Z) 668. On the fundamental differences from English
law, see GUTTERIDGE in Z PERCEROU ET BOUTERON zzz.
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occur in increasing numbers, but for one reason or another,
they very seldom reach the courts. The Conference of
I 93 I diligently tried to obtain progress over the preparatory drafts and succeeded in clarifying at least those questions most troublesome in international circulation. Such
topics were revocation (stop payment), provision (cover),
time for presentment, and prescription (time for suing).
The Rules of Geneva transcend this subject matter, although they leave much open to doubt.
The habitual neglect of the conflicts rules by the lawmakers has produced doubts even with respect to the scope
of application of the Geneva Rules. Although Germany
has adopted them with the Convention in a new domestic
law, and Italy now has clearly two different laws for the
member states and other states, in France it is controversial whether the ratified Geneva Conflicts Rules are
general or intended for the member states. 14
A number of provisions are closely shaped after the
model of the conflicts rules on bills and notes; they involve
capacity (art. 2), form (art. 4), effects of obligations (art.
5), and form of protest (art. 8). Little will have to be
added in these respects to the remarks made in the foregoing chapters.
The Rules have established a list of problems specially
assigned to the law of the place of payment:
"Article 7· The law of the country in which the cheque
is payable shall determine:
( I ) Whether a cheque must necessarily be payable at
sight or whether it can be drawn payable at a fixed period
after sight, and also what the effects are of the post-dating
of a cheque;
( 2) The limit of time for presentment;
14 For general application because France has not restricted the ratification
of the Convention, HAMEL, Banques Suppl. 84 § 700; contra z PERCEROU ET
BOUTERON 171 § 196.
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( 3) Whether a cheque can be accepted, certified, confirmed or visaed, and what the effects are respectively of
such acceptance, certification, confirmation or visa;
( 4) Whether the holder may demand, and whether he
is bound to accept, partial payment;
( 5) Whether a cheque can be crossed or marked either
with the words 'payable in account' or with some equivalent
expression, and what the effects are of such crossing or of
the words 'payable in account' or any equivalent expression;
( 6) Whether the holder has special rights to the cover
and what the nature is of these rights;
( 7) Whether the drawer may countermand payment of
a cheque or take proceedings to stop its payment ( opposition);
( 8) The measures to be taken in case of loss or theft
of a cheque;
( 9) Whether a protest or any equivalent declaration is
necessary in order to preserve the right of recourse against
the endorsers, the drawer and the other parties liable."
The solutions given to the most troublesome questions
will be reviewed presently.
II.

CREATION

r. Form. Article 4 of the Geneva Check Rules reproduces the obnoxious disunity left in the Rules on bills concerning form, but adds a salutary relief (paragraph r,
i.f.) : "Where the form of the place of the signature is
not observed, it shall be sufficient if the forms prescribed
by the law of payment are observed."
2. Capacity of Drawer. Article 2 of the Rules, organized after the model of the analogous rule concerning bills,
results in the principle that the national law of the drawer
at the time of the signature determines his capacity of contracting in general and drawing checks in particular, while
subsequent death or insanity is immaterial (Check Conv.
art. 33). In the American practice, capacity is governed
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by the law of the place of delivery; and if capacity existent
at the time ceases subsequently as the Bill of Exchange Act
states in case of the drawer's death, a respective notice to
the bank ends its authority to pay. 15 In conflict the law
of the place of payment should decide (infra III 2).
3· Capacity of Drawee, "Passive check capacity." The
legal definition of a check in the Anglo-American Acts requires drawing on a banker. This is also the law of
Austria, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries and the
declared aim of article 3 of the Check Convention; but
subjected to a strong restriction:
"A cheque must be drawn on a banker holding funds at
the disposal of the drawer and in conformity with an
agreement, express or implied, whereby the drawer is entitled to dispose of those funds by cheque. Nevertheless,
if these provisions are not complied with, the instrument
is still valid as a cheque."
The statement of the principle was thus deprived of any
sanction, in order to satisfy the countries where either a
check could be drawn on anybody, as was then the law in
France, or on institutions assimilated to bankers, as the
French law is now. 16 A reservation, No. 4, allows striking out the "nevertheless" sentence or extending the category of capable drawees. Both these privileges have been
utilized, and in some statutes it now seems doubtful whether
a check on a nonbanker is considered a bill of exchange, as
in the United States, or radically void.
The article proceeds to uphold in any case the obligations arising out of the signatures affixed in countries whose
laws permit drawing on persons such as the drawee.
15

16

1942•

BEA sec. 75, and see FELLER, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 686.
France: Decree Law, October 30, 1935, art. 3 amended by Law, Feb. 14,
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In view of these differences, article 3 of the Check Rules
states:
"The law of the country in which the cheque is payable
determines the persons on whom a cheque may be drawn."
The Convention would certainly have done better either
to adopt the entire common-law rule or to exclude any
reservation for nullity as check or nullity altogether. 17
Fiscal interests have played an excessive role in the question.
The Italian statutes recognize as checks instruments
issued and payable in a foreign country only where the
drawee has passive check capacity in that country ;18 but
these are valid anyway under the Geneva Rules, article 3·
The principal conflicts rule with its choice of the law
of the place of payment is clearly adequate; the check being concentrated upon the right of the drawer to draw
upon the specific drawee, his quality has to be determined
by his own law. When, before the Convention, a check
drawn in Austria on a nonbanker in Paris was a check in
France, it was no check in Austria. 19

Illustrations. (i) A check is drawn in New York on
the Credit Municipal de Bordeaux recognized in France
as assimilated to banks. Under Geneva Rule 3, the check
is valid in France and under Geneva Convention, article
3, likewise in Germany. In an American court the law
of the place of issue would result in invalidity as check,
that of the place of payment in validity, and the latter
should be preferred, despite the New York Court of
Appeals.
( ii) Vice versa, where a check is drawn in Paris on an
American stock exchange broker, American indorsers would
be liable under the law of bills of exchange in most Con17

For the latter method MossA, Check 140.
Italy: RD., Dec. 21, 1933, art. 3, par. 1, criticized as immaterial by MossA
I.e. 141. The German Check Law § 25 contained an exception for checks
payable abroad which made sense in face of a lex loci contractus.
18

19

STROBELE 91,
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tinental and American courts. But what would be the
French solution? It would seem that article 3 of the French
Check Law means only French, not foreign agents de
change and courtiers en valeurs mobilieres, and the instrument would not be considered a check. Yet according to
an official Instruction concerning the stamp duty, 20 the reasoning of which goes beyond the stamp question, it is fatal
that the instrument does not bear the name "lettre de
change," wherefore it would not be treated as a negotiable
instrument at all.
III.

CovER AND SToP PAYMENT

I. Cover. The most dreaded of all obstacles to unification of the law of negotiable instruments has a particular
aspect in the law of checks; the existence of cover is the
avowed requirement even in those countries that do not believe in the tacit transfer of cover by the creation of cambial
rights. The requirement, it is true, is subject in the Check
Convention of Geneva to degrees of seriousness depending
upon the quality of the drawee as banker. The Check
Rules, article 7 (b), call for the law of the country in
which the check is payable, to determine:

"Whether the holder has special rights to the cover and
what the nature is of these rights."
This rule, quite contrary to the Rules concerning bills
and notes, which declare for the law of the issue, was generally recommended. 21 As justification, it was alleged that
a check is drawn on the basis of a credit the amount of
which is not identical with the sum of the check; that the
banks must pay it immediately in the course of large business and there is no time to study various foreign laws;
20
Instruction No. 4228 de Ia Direction generale de !'Enregistrement, etc.,
Dec. z, 1935, Z PERCEROU ET BOUTERON z68.
21
HIRSCH, Provision 154; STROBELE 95; the commissions of experts, the
Institute of Int. Law, 33 III Annuaire z68, Z77· The French writers are
inclined to this solution against Cass. (Feb. 6, 1900) S. I900.I.I6I.
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and, above all, that subsequent insolvency of a drawer or
his order of stop payment, subject to a foreign law, ought
not to disturb a banker, at a place where the underlying
claim of the drawer is deemed to have been transferred to
the payee and the holder. 22
Illustration. A check drawn in New York on a bank in
Paris is presented by the holder at a time when the drawer
had become a bankrupt. While an American bank knowing
this would refuse payment, the Paris bank must pay the
holder in his quality as assignee of the cover to the extent
of the sum payable on the check. The Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal between Belgium and Germany decided by the
same test of lex loci solutionis that a Belgian plaintiff had
no claim in the clearing against a German bank according to
the German law, ignoring the doctrine of cover. 23

Specific party agreements for the assignment of cover
are to be distinguished in principle. They are frequent in
Germany as well as in the United States when banks discount a negotiable instrument in security transactions. On
the other hand, certification of a check by a bank is considered assignment of the funds to the amount of the
check. 24 It would seem that despite the theoretical difference from the French type, the applicable law should always be that of the bank.
2. Stop Payment. Common law and civil law are in sharp
disagreement not only concerning the effect of death and
bankruptcy of the drawer of a check on the right of the
holder, but also on revocability. At common law the order
22 PERCEROU and MARKS VON WURTTEMBERG in the Conference, see
BOUTERON, Statut 705 ff.
23 TAM Germano-Belge (Jan. I, 1929) 8 Receuil Trib. Arb. M. 791.
The point was separate from the added fact that there cover was never
provided.
24
Comm. Credit Corp. v. Orange County (1950) 34 Cal. (2d) 766, 214
Pac. (zd) 319; cf. New York L. 1944 c. 537 § 325; 37 McKinney's Cons. L.
Ann., § 325a, forbidding stop order; Natl. City Bank of Cleveland v.
Erskine (N.Y. 1953) IIO N.E. (zd) soS.
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to pay may be countermanded at pleasure, 25 though there
may be liability in the internal relations. Evidently the
revocation also ends the authority of the holder to receive,
which traditionally, though no longer correctly, is regarded
as an authority of agency. For the draftsmen of the
Geneva Convention it was a matter of course that a check
creates irrevocable relations.
The Convention left additional differences among its own
members. The principle is that revocation of a check is
not effective until the time of presentment has expired
(article 3 2, paragraph I). But by exercising Reservation
No. I6, a majority of the states have prohibited revocation even after the time for presentment ends. Conflicts
Rule, article 7, no. 7, conveniently makes this question depend on the law of the place of payment. Partly it has
been perceived that the three problems of cover, subsequent incapacity of the drawer, and stop payment, are
closely connected 26 and ought to be subject to the law of
the place of payment.
If the authorization of the bank to pay is emphasized
over that of the payee or holder to receive, the same test
will be applied in England and, we hope, also in an American court.

Illustrations. (i) A check drawn in Chicago on a bank
in Hamburg, Germany, is countermanded before payment;
under German law the stopping is immaterial, even after
the time of presentment expires; under American law it
25
BEA sec. 75 and for the United States, BRADY, Bank Checks § 206. It
is interesting that the New York surrogate decision, In re Mason's Estate
(I948) I94 Misc. 308, 86 N.Y.S. (2d) 232, likewise does not hesitate to
apply lex loci solutionis in the case of an Italian check upon a New York
bank. The drawer died before the bank paid the check, but the bank did
not know it. The court resorted to the customary New York rule as laid
down in Glenn an v. Rochester Trust and Safe Deposit Co. ( I 9 I 3) 209
N.Y. 12.
26
MossA, Check 3I8.
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would be effective. The German law should be applied.
In the case of a German check on an American bank, revocation should be allowed.
(ii) A check drawn in Paris upon a bank in New York
is revoked. This has consequences not only in the United
States but also in France. In France, the drawer is exempt from the heavy penalties of French criminal law, as
stop payment may be considered outright crooked. 27 In
the United States, New York law has been applied without
hesitation, where an Italian drawer died before the check
upon a New York bank was cashed, although in the same
breath the Surrogate referred to the applicability of the
law of the place of contracting to checks. 28 In fact, the
lex loci solutionis was competent.
3· Restriction to Specific H alders. The Geneva Convention made a compromise between the English "general"
and "special" crossing of checks which was adopted in
France, Italy, and other countries, and the German and
Austrian clause "payable in account" ( nur zur J7 errechnung,
a porter en compte). The Convention finished a considerable debate by permitting and regulating both types itself
and opening a large choice to the state laws (articles 3739). Where a country allows only crossing, a check carrying the other clause is construed as a crossed check, and
vice versa (Reservation No. 18). The Conflict Rules
(article 7, No. 5) add that the law of the place of payment decides which clause is admissible and what its effect is.
Illustration. The drawer in London crosses a check on
a bank in Vienna with two lines not inserting any name
between them (general crossing). The check figures in
Austria, and by the Geneva Rules in all member states,
as a check payable in account. It cannot be paid in cash
to a third banker or a customer of the drawee (as under
27
HAMEL, I Banques Supp. § 714, p. 88, d; 2 PERCEROU ET BOUTERON
185 n. 2.
28
In re Mason's Estate (1948) 194 Misc. 308, 86 N.Y.S. (2d) 232.
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article 3 8 of the Convention) or to a banker (as under the
Bills of Exchange Act § 70 ( 2)).
In England the question falls under the law of the place
where the check is first delivered; but can the transformation of the drawee's duty by his own law be ignored? There
was a long debate in the Geneva Conference on whether
during the circulation in the country of origin itself the
law of issue should determine the nature of the payment
clause. The majority rejected this exception, to give the
place of payment more importance. 29
In the United States neither type is used, since in contrast to the Geneva Convention, article 35, and the Bills
of Exchange Act, 6o, the drawee is responsible for examining the genuineness of indorsements. 30
4· Time for Action. The time for suing has been fixed at
a much shorter period in the Continental laws than for bills
of exchange. 81 The Geneva uniform check law, article 52,
allows six months after the end of the time for presentment
against the drawee and six months from reimbursement by
him or the day when he himself was sued for each endorsee.
However, under Reservation No. 25, after the expiration
of these periods actions may be based on enrichment and
against a drawer who has failed to provide cover; these
provisions have been commonly instituted. 32
The Check Rules, article 6, assign these problems to the
law of the place where the check has been created. But
interruption and suspension of the period of limitation is
left to "each state," and other states may react as they
wish. 83 In the common-law countries, the lex fori actually
29

GIANNINI, Sistema 354·
690 n. 143.
31
Geneva Conv. on Bills of Exchange, art. 70.
32
France: art. 25 par. 3; Germany: art. 58; Italy: art. 59·
33
Reservation No. 26.
8

°FELLER (supra n. 13)
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controls these incidents, though with certain references to
other laws, but whether under the Convention lex fori or
lex loci contractus, or lex loci solutionis governs, no one
knows.
That the law of the place of issue does not furnish an
adequate unitary solution, is as true as in the case of bills
of exchange. This test was simply adopted as a matter
of school tradition. 34
34
E.g., Italy: Cass. (March 3, 1933) Foro Italiano, 1933 I 730: check
issued by an Argentinean to the order of an Italian and payable at a branch
of the same bank in Italy: prescription according to Argentine law; Cf.
CAVAGLIERI 397·
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Conclusions to Part Twelve
Why the Geneva conflicts rules have failed to produce
uniformity with the Anglo-American countries, providing
such a poor example of unification, has often been explained but never justified. It was previously known that
the differences in the national laws are numerous and of
many kinds. These have proved too numerous and difficult,
because the governments were not prepared to abandon
particular rules and even mere banking habits. 1 Despite
assertions to the contrary, the conflicts rules of the British
Act have not been commended in authoritative opinions
and those developed by the courts in the United States are
considered confused. 2 The divergencies cherished throughout the world are largely superficial.
A considerable improvement in the present situation
might be reached by following a suggestion of Hessel E.
Yntema, which he allows me to mention. After investigations of many years, he proposes an international collaboration of the relatively few leading banks in each country
which are most active in the field of foreign bills and notes.
Each bank may issue forms complying with its own law
and rely on the validity of the instruments approved by a
partner to the agreement. This experiment should be tried.
In the long run, of course, uniform legal rules cannot be
avoided. When the problems are scanned, certain observations impose themselves.
No reference should be made to the national law; its
mingling with form and capacity in the Geneva rules is
1 ARGANA

215

blames unjustified negative tradition and exaggerated

nationalism.
2 LoRONZEN

5;

GuTTERIDGE 16

ser. 3·

J.

Comp. L. 54·
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deplorable. 3 The law of the domicil is adequate only for
emergency purposes.
Nor can any effort serve to discover a single local contact to provide a single law for all obligations arising on
a bill of exchange. Whenever a bill is submitted for discount or acceptance, it is a primordial postulate that no
foreign law should have to be consulted to determine the
main effects of the intended transaction. 4 The same is true
for checks, despite their closer connection with the place
where payment is due. Since they are handled in millions
through bank collections, the now frequent proposals to
determine all check obligations by the law of the place of
payment 5 are unrealistic. This is an irremovable block on
the road to simplicity.
On the other hand, form, capacity, and other initial requirements of "cambial" obligations and their construction
and effects must be subject to unitary legal treatment, for
which the lex loci actus has an inveterate claim, although
its definition needs elaboration and unification.
To delineate the scope of such acts, various in nature,
the "extracambial" contracts and obligations must be excluded and assigned to their own connections ;6 if this is
done, the "cambial" acts proper group themselves easily in
three categories.
I. The law of issue, that is, of the place of negotiation
through signature and delivery by the drawer or maker to
the payee, creates the basic instrument, including its nature
as negotiable 7 and the class of commodity papers to which
3
4

5

Supra Ch. 59 III z; 6o I
Supra Ch. 61.

I

E.g., HJALMAR EGNALL,

Le cheque et Ia loi du lieu du payment (Paris,

1935) 103 ff.
6
7

Supra 142 ff.
Supra Ch, 61, III.

(b).
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it belongs, construction, 8 and general rules. 9
2. Under the principle of independence, opposed to the
law of issue, each law of the successive places of contracting controls the respective obligations of drawer, maker,
indorser, giver of aval, accommodating party, and acceptor
for honor, with the exception of obligations determined by
the law of the place of payment. 10 The law of the place of
contracting especially governs validity and effects of warranty,11 including liability after maturity 12 and damages
in recourse. 13 Whether it ought to determine also the
necessity and time for notification of default is doubtfui.I 4
Worldwide unification of these questions at least and of the
time for suing should be earnestly sought at the Hague.
3· The law of the place of payment of the principal
obligation governs conditions and effects of acceptance,
time of maturity, modalities of payment, such as currency,
time and locality, permissibility of part payment and conditional acceptance, amortization, discharge and excuses of
any acceptor, and the necessity, time, and form of protest. 15
In the case of checks, the scope of the law of payment is
enlarged, as the Geneva rules have recognized. 16 It should
also be observed that the American courts show unequivocal
preference for the law of the place of payment in locating
the liability of the maker of a promissory note. 17 Promissory notes in the United States, quite as billets a ordre,
eigene W echsel abroad, are prevailingly used in bank loans
and therefore usually are payable at the lending bank. With
8

Supra 148 ff.
Supra 149 ff., 196.
10 Supra Ch. 61.
11 Supra 188 ff.
12
Supra 198-199.
13 Supra 200-201.
14
Supra 215.
15
Supra Ch. 62, I.
16
Supra 225.
17 Supra 206.
9
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such facts in mind, a middle road might be found for conflicts rules between the civil law separating bills and checks
and the common law merging them; promissory notes and
checks may well be subjected to the larger domain of the
law of the place of payment which, if it can be as·certained,
is preferable to the domicil of the payee as such. 18
A holder in due course for value or in good faith acquires
the protection granted him by the law governing the indorsement made to him, when it affords larger rights than
the law under which a precedent indorser obligated himself.19
As we have seen, the courts seek practical solutions,
sometimes without any intention to do so but with the
apparent effect of moderating fundamental contrasts, such
as the opposition of signature and delivery 20 or the diverse
treatment of bills carrying forged signatures. 21
18

Supra.

19 Supra.
20

21

Supra.
Supra.

PART THIRTEEN
INHERITANCE

CHAPTER

65

Present Conflicts Rules
I.
1.

TERMINOLOGY AND SOURCES

Terminology

I

N the United States, the common terms employed concerning succession on death are "descent and distribution" (for intestacy), "wills," and "administration."
But it is gratifying that the Restatement uses "succession on
death" to cover the first two topices. In the civil law, the
"law of inheritance" or "law of succession" is a general
term which will be used here to include all incidents depending on the law governing a decedent's estate, with the
exception of administration in the common law countries.
Another linguistic difficulty is caused by the lack in English of a word for the main beneficiaries of an estate.
"Heir" stricto sensu is merely a successor to land ab intestato, as the htfritier once was in French; it is desirable
in conflicts law to stretch this term as has occurred in
France, to comprehend all intestate and testate successors
to ownership of all assets in the civil laws, not only those
named heres ( Erbe) in the Roman or German systems,
but also the French Iegataire universel and the beneficiary
titre universe/.
Moreover, devise of real estate and bequest of personal
property are analogous gifts that fall short of easy correspondence in other systems. Since the residuary legatee who
would not be heir ab intestato in the same state does not
incur personal liability in Anglo-American law, the term
"legatee" may be used to denote all beneficiaries directly

a
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taking by will and not regarded as "universal successors."
Finally, readers may be reminded that in the civil law
the estate in principle forms an entity without regard to
geographical frontiers, although the consequence that only
one law of inheritance should govern is not drawn in all
civil law jurisdictions. The principle, nevertheless, applies,
at least in the best theories, when the claims of creditors
of the estate are regulated.
On the other hand, foreign readers have to bear in mind
the system of state control of estates prevailing in common law jurisdictions and a few others such as Austria and
Denmark, producing many complicated problems in connection with the sovereignty of 48 states in the United
States.
Although in England the law reform of 1925 has unified this system by transferring the title to real as well as
personal estate at death to the administration of "executors"
or "administrators," most American states retain the prin·
ciple that real estate goes directly to the heirs, but the
powers of administration are more and more extended to
all assets.
2.

Sources 1

Assets left by a foreigner at death in foreign territory
are a frequent topic of treaties, statutes, court decisions,
and consular activity. On the interstate and international
1
A second edition of the excellent collection of sources of private international law by PROF. MAKAROV, while under press, has most kindly been
made available to me during my writing. A remarkable discussion of the
treaties on inheritance is to be found in PLAISANT, Les regles de conftit de
lois dans les Traites ( 1946) 231-261.
Comparative conflicts law: FRANCESCO P. CoNTUZZI, II Diritto ereditario internazionale ( 1908); LEWALD, Questions de droit international des successions, Recueil 1925 IV 5 ff.; id., Internationales Erbrecht, 4 Rechtsvergl.
Handworterb. 448; P. ANLIKER, Die erbrechtl. Verhiiltnisse der Schweizer
in Ausland und der Auslander in der Schweiz ( 1933).
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level, many efforts to foster harmony have been undertaken, but with small success.
Treaties. A century ago, a series of bilateral agreements were concluded containing provisions on inheritance.
Commortly, they stabilized court jurisdiction over inheritance claims and competency of consulates to take care of
property owned by their nationals. Some outstanding
treaties of this group remain in force, such as, among
others, those concluded by the United States with France of
February 23, I853, 2 and with Switzerland of November 25,
8
I 8 5o,
between F ranee and Switzerland of June I 5,
4
I869, Baden and Switzerland of December 6, I856. 5
These and other treaties, drafted with more good will
than legal ability, seldom spoke of the applicable law; but
when they laid down jurisdictional rules, they usually contemplated that every tribunal would apply its own domestic
law, although this has often been forgotten. The AmericanSwiss treaty of I 8 so, Article VI, says succinctly though
quite ineptly:
"Any controversy that may arise among the claimants to
the same succession, as to whom the property shall belong,
shall be decided according to the laws and by the judges of
the country in which the property is situated."
2
Consular Convention, 10 Stat. 992, U.S. Treaty Ser. No. 92; materials in
6 MILLER, Treaties 169 If.; also in DELAUME, American-French Priv. Int.
L. ( 1953) 68-72 with comment.
3 II Stat. 587 No. 353; MALLOY, 2 Treaties 1763; NussBAUM, AmericanSwiss Priv. Int. L. (1950), cf. 47 Col. L. Rev. (1947) 186; ANLIKER II5 If.
4
Convention on Jurisdiction, Swiss. Off. Coil. IX 1002; NIBOYET ET
GouL1!, I Recueil 735; ANLIKER 49 If. with large literature; PILLET, Les
Conventions 147 If.; BATIFFOL, Traite 724 If.
5
Swiss Off. Coil. V 661; the continued validity of the treaty, not formally
assumed by Germany, has been challenged by SCHNORR VON CAROLSFELD, 12
Z. ausl. PR. (1939) 285 and 2 SCHNITZER 503.
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But American decisions overlooked the provision on "the
laws," and the recent decision In re Schneider has, without
any reason, 6 denied its effect.
The Franco-Swiss Treaty of June IS, I869, Article 5,
has no such express provision on the applicable law; it
states merely that:

"Any action relating to the liquidation or partition of
a succession, testamentary or intestate, and to accounting
among heirs and legatees will be brought before the tribunal
where the succession opens, that is, in the case of a Frenchman dying in Switzerland, the tribunal of his last domicil
in France, and in the case of a Swiss dying in France, the
tribunal of his place of origin in Switzerland. N evertheless, the partition, auction, or sale of immovables must
comply with the laws of the country of their situation."
This text, however, naturally for that time, was understood as meaning that the movable property of a Swiss
national situated in France should be litigated by claimants
to the inheritance before the French courts according to
the French Code Civil, and vice versa. This construction
has been preserved by the Swiss courts and recently has
been reaffirmed. 7 The French Court of Cassation, however, held in I939 that the treaty in the main restricts
itself to the jurisdictional problem. 8
A divergent interpretation by an Alsatian decision 9 has
been called amazing. 10
6
/n re Schneider (1950) 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 652; Clunet 1950, 976; I6 Z.
ausl. PR. (I9SI) 620 with note ZwEIGERTj 3 Rev. Hell. (I9SO) 3IO. Notes
in many American Law Reviews.
1
BG. (June 29, I928) 54 BGE. I 216. BG. (May 21, I942) 68 BGE.
II ISS, I Schweiz. Jahrb. l.R. (I944) 222.
KG. Waadt (March 3I, I943) 4I SJZ. (I945) Io6, I Schweiz. Jahrb.
I.R. 22I.
8
Cass. Civ. (June I9, I939) S. I940.I.49; to the same effect Clunet I902 1
567.
9
App. Colmar (June IS, I949) Rev. crit. I9SO, 62.
10
BATIFFOL, note Rev. crit. I9501 64.
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Even apart from such failure, these treaties raise controversies of many kinds. Where does the property "lie"
for the purpose of the American-Swiss treaty? The Swiss
Federal Tribunal assumes that movables are situated in the
country of the last domicil, 11 whereas American courts for
the most part have applied American law to assets belonging to decedents domiciled in Switzerland. 12
On the other hand, in Switzerland two different theories
arose concerning the law applicable to immovables under
the Swiss-French treaty; it is either said to be the lex situs
or the lex domicilii. 13 The Federal Tribunal applies the
latter opinion in favor of a single court and a single law ;14
the French courts, with one recent exception/ 5 have not
followed this.
A second comprehensive group of bilateral treaties was
due to the hopeful international wave after the first world
war. Their scope is more clearly defined; they rule on the
functions of consuls, preliminary measures, and sometimes
measures of liquidation; but they are commonly meager
regarding conflicts rules. So far as they go, the European
treaties, with the exception of the Austro-German and the
German-Polish, differentiate between movables and immovables, and with the exception of the West-Scandinavian
countries, are devoted to the nationality law.
The treaties relating to property and inheritance, 16 con11
BG. (Nov. 24, 1883) in re Wohlwend, 9 BGE. 507, 513 If.; in re
Gem. Feldis (May s, 1898) 24 BGE. I 312, 319; 43 I 87; cf. App. Bern
(March s, 1885) 21 ZBJV. ( 1885) 361.
12 ANLIKER ns; NuSSBAUM, Amer.-Swiss Jaw 27.
13
See ANLIKER so If.; WEiss, 4 Traite I75·
14
BG. (June 29, 1928) 54 BGE. I 216, 219.
15 Seine (Jan. s, 1951) Rev. crit. 1951, 316, criticized by FLATI'ET in the
note and in J.d. Trib. 1951, 604, refers to the Swiss courts for French
immovables.
16 U.S. Department of State, Div. of Research and Publication, Treaty
Section: Treaty Provisions relating to the Rights of Inheritance, Acquisition
and Ownership, etc. Compiled March 31, 1943, revised September 4, 1944·
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eluded by the United States from I850 with a great number
of countries, contain the usual clauses of equality with the
nationals of the other power, and free disposal, ordinarily
with the right of selling real estate if the acquirer is disqualified to possess, 17 but with no conflicts provisions at all.
Only the treaty with Thailand of I937 declares that for
the acquisition, possession, and disposition of immovable
property the law of the situs exclusively shall be applicable.18
A different class consists of the conventions constituting
uniform conflicts law, the Treaty of Montevideo, the
C6digo Bustamante} the Northern Convention, and the
drafts of the Hague Conference on the Law of Succession
on Death. 19 These enter into many particular questions
and will be used here on par with the statutes.
The statutes are short. The most recent codifications
are disappointing in their reiteration of principles of yesterday or the past century. Some are even difficult to
understand. While the Hague drafts stimulated a certain
progress, contemporary legislation seems not too much disposed to observe international courtesy.
The Hague Drafts aroused the greatest hopes. In I 903
Franz Kahn in his comment on the draft of I 902 expected
"with fair certainty" that the convention on succession
would be accomplished. 20 The draftsmen and the other
delegates were highly interested and laborious and were
believed to be largely conscious of the necessary "sacrifices." They were unable, however, to agree on a number
of fundamental principles. The majority simply adopted
17 VIRGINIA M. MEEKISON, Treaty Provisions for the Inheritance of Personal
Property, 44 Am. J. Int. L. (1950) 313 ff.
18 Treaty with Siam of Nov. 13, 1937, Art. z, par. 7, 53 Stat. Part 3,
1731 ff., U.S. Treaty Ser. 940, 192 L. of Nat. Tr. S. p. 247 ff.
19
Supra Vol. I, pp. 29, 32, 33, 36.
2
KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 35·

°
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the principle of unity of succession and control by the
last national law of the decedent, against the opposition of
France and Switzerland, leaving the Anglo-American system entirely out of consideration. Comparative efforts
have been made in the literature, but civilian and common
lawyers regarded each other so much as complete strangers
that, in the learned approach, mutual respect was expressed
from a far distance and without a real resolution to unite.
II.

SuRVEY OF THE CoNFLICTS SYSTEMS

The systems will be categorized by principles; there exist
many exceptions to be mentioned subsequently.
A.
I.

Plurality of Successions

Immovables under lex situs

(a) Movables under lex domicilii. The law of the
decedent's domicil as of the time of his death governs succession to movable property in the older system:
England and almost all common law jurisdictions of
the British Commonwealth, 21 United States, 22 including
Louisiana, 23 but only mistakenly extended to Puerto Rico/ 4
and excluding Mississippi.
'
Argentina, court practice. 25
21
Re O'Keefe (1940) Ch. 124.
Canada: Stuart v. Prentiss (r86r) 20 U.C.Q.B. 513 (C.A.); ro Can.
Abridgement 758 ff.
Australia: 17 Australian Digest 404 ff.
22
Mr. Justice Holmes in Bullen v. Wisconsin ( 1916) 240 U.S. 625, 632.
23
Louisiana: Immovables: Sevier v. Douglass ( 1892) 44 La. Ann. 6os,
ro So. 804. Movables: Succession of Wells ( 1849) 4 La. Ann. 522; In re
Lewis' Estate ( r88o) 32 La. Ann. 385.
24
De los Angeles Melon v. Entidad Provincia Religiosa (1951) 189 F.
(2d) 163. See the penetrating criticism by EDER, r Am. J. Comp. L. 123.
25
Argentina: C.C. Art. ro, 3283; see Cam. civ. 2 Cap. (July 13, 1931) 95
Gac. For. 90 Nr. sro6; (March 30, 1932) 98 id. roo Nr. 5292; Cam. civ.
r Cap. (May 28, 1934) 121 id. ros Nr. 6693. And others see 2 RoMERO,
Manual, 203; Cam. civ. r Cap., Jur. Arg. 1942 I 715; Cam. civ. 2 Cap.,
Jur. Arg. 1943 III 723; (Dec. 22, 1948) Case Grimaldi; Jur. Arg. 1949 I 578;
Contra the writers infra n. 57·
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Belgium. 26
Chile. 27
Costa Rica. 28
France. 29
San Salvador. 30
Siam. 31
Treaty: Switzerland-Baden (I 869), if the estate is in
both countries.
The system of France, for a period, was in doubt with
respect to the question whether the domicil was not superseded by the nationallaw, 32 but is now resettled.
(b) Movables under lex patriae. Movables follow the
law of the decedent's national law as of the time of his
death:
Austria. 33
Bolivia. 34
Iran. 35
Liechtenstein. 36
Luxemburg. 37
26
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June 16, 1926) Revue Pratique du Notariat
Beige 1928 46, cf. GILON, Clunet, 1928, 1103; Trib. Verviers (Jan. 14, 1936)
Pasicrisie 1936 III 133; Bruges (May 10, 1939) Rechtsk. WB. 1939-40, 105;
Rb. Antwerp (June 16, 1950) id. 1950-51, 509.
21
Chile: C.C. Art. 16, 997, 955·
28 Costa Rica: C.C. Arts. 4, 5, 7 par. 2.
29 France: Cass. civ. (June 19, 1939) affaire Labedan, Rev. crit. 1939, 480.
Cass. Crim. (June 4, 1941) D. 1942.1.4, S. 1944·1.133; Trib. Seine (Feb. 6,
1952) Rev. crit. 1952, 494, have now also settled the exact point of contact, the place of "opening" the succession, which, of course, regularly in
France is the last domicil.
3o El Salvador: C.C. art. 994·
31
Siam: Int. Priv. L. (1939) arts. 37, 38.
32 Infra, 1 (b). On Peru C.C. (1936) art. V, see infra n. 56.
33 Austria: Verlassenschaftspatent ( Gesetz iiber Verfahren ausser Streitsachen) of August 9, 1854, as amended, § 22 (immovables), § 23 (movables).
34 Bolivia: C. C. art. 463, 464.
35 Iran: C. C. arts. 7 and 8.
36
Liechtenstein: Law on the estate of foreigners of Dec. 4, 1911, arts.
1 and 2.
37
Luxemburg: Immovables: App. Luxemburg (Nov. 13, 1931) 12 Pas.
Lux. 467. Movables: Trib. Diekirch (Feb. 22, 1900) 7 Pas. Lux. 41, Pas.
Beige 1908 IV 119; Trib. Luxemburg (June n, 1913) 9 Pas. Lux. 478.
Contra: Trib. Luxemburg (June 20, 1932) 13 Pas. Lux. 466.
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Turkey. 38
Treaties: Germany with Soviet Russia, 39 Estonia/ 0 and
Turkey. 41
French courts temporarily. 42
Before their Sovietization and allegedly still at present:
Bulgaria. 43
Hungary. 44
Rumania. 45
2. Other Functions of Lex Situs
(a) As principle for all assets. That the lex situs should
govern the totality of a succession including movables, was
a widespread system before the movables were artificially
deemed concentrated at the deceased's domicil. 46 More recently, it was adopted in ·a code of Latvia. 47 Recently
abandoned in Illinois, 48 this system is represented by the
law of Mississippi 49 and by the Treaty of Montevideo. 50
The inheritance is thus entirely dismembered, and the
local position of each asset or debt is of decisive importance.
The Mississippi court thinks along rigorous territorial
38
Turkey: Law on the rights and duties of foreigners in the Ottoman
Empire, I9IS, art. 4; CARABIBER, 6 Repert. 432; BERKI, La succession ab
intestat dans le droit int. prive de Ia Turquie (these Fribourg, Suisse, I94I).
Yugoslavia: Law of July 24, I934, §§ 25, 26.
39
Oct. 12, I925, Annex to art. 22 §§ I3 ff.
40 March I3, I925, Art. XVIII § I4 ff.
41
May 28, I929, Annex to Art. 20 § I4.
42
Decisions from (May s, I875) 2 Clunet 358; (May 8, I894) 21 Clunet

562.
43
Bulgaria: former Constitution, art. 63 ; DANEFF in 2 5 Bulletin de
l'lnstitut Intermediaire International 1; GHENOV, 6 Repert. I94·
44 Hungary: ScHWARTZ, so Z. int. R. 67 f.; SzA.szv, II Z. ausl. PR. (I937)
I89; see also 6 Repert. 469.
45
Rumania: Cass. (Feb. 20, I90I) Clunet I902, 9I6; PLASTARA, 7 Repert.

74·

46

FRBYRIA, infra Ch. 65, n. I, passim.
Latvia: C.C. of Jan. 28, I937, § 16, literally only referring to domestic
estates; cf. II Z. ausl. PR. 484.
48
Illinois: the rule coming from an Ordinance of I787 and reproduced
in Stat. Annot. (Smith-Hurd) I935, c. 39 § I, was replaced by the Probate
Act of July 24, I939, Rev. St. I95I, c. 3 § I62 (§ 11).
49
Mississippi: I C. Ann. I942, § 467, derived from Code I8S7·
50
Texts of I889 and 1940, arts. 44, 45·
47
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lines. 51 Although notes and bonds of a foreign owner
lying on deposit in Illinois were not held to be located in
Illinois, 52 the solution would not be analogous in Mississippi. 53
(b) As exception for all domestic assets. In Mexico,
Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, all movable and
immovable property situated in the country is submitted
to the domestic law. 54 This attitude is sometimes taken as
adopting the general principle of lex situs. 55 Other provisions in Venezuela and discussions in Peru, however,
emphasize the law of the last domicil. 56 The latter seems
to be accepted for foreign situated assets. But here as also
in other Latin-American countries, the facts seem to point
to a system where all domestic assets are subject to the lex
fori, whereas foreign assets are ignored. Legal and factual
exceptions seem to make this awkward scheme tolerable.
(c) As exception for certain movables. As noted above,
the Argentine courts, defying a nearly unanimous learned
51 Heard v. Drennen ( 1908) 93 Miss. 236, 46 So. 243: "All the rights
to be derived through the will must be derived from its terms administered
according to the law of this state, so far as it affects property situated here"
but concerns real property. Yet the decision in Bolton v. Barnett (1923)
131 Miss. 802, 95 So. 721 in all respects overrules the often cited case
Slaughter v. Garland ( 1866) 40 Miss. 172, which restricted the lex situs
to intestate succession.
52 Cooper v. Beers (1892) 143 Ill. 25, 33 N.E. 61, cf. 3 BEALE 148o;
GooDRICH ( ed. I) 401 If.
53 Money deposited within the state is included, Ewing v. Warren ( 1926)
144 Miss. 233, 109 So. 6or. The rule naturally includes a money lending
business of an Italian domiciled in Italy, Jahier v. Rascoe ( 1885) 62 Miss.
699, and a negotiable warehouse receipt lying in Mississippi, Gidden v.
Gidden ( 1936) 176 Miss. 98, 167 So. 785.
54
Mexico: C.C. art. 14.
Panama: C. C. art. 63 x.
Peru: art. VI, 692; GARciA GASTANETA, Derecho Internacional Privado
(ed. 2) 243·
Uruguay: C.C. art. 5·
Venezuela: C.C. art. xo.
55 Thus, CAICEDO CASTILLA, 2 DIP. 34·
56
Venezuela: C.C. arts. 894, 954·
Peru: Juuo DELGADO, Compendio de DIP. citing old theories, is doubtful,
however; and see GARciA GASTANETA, supra n. 54·
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opposition, follow the American principle in construing
article IO of the Code in the broad meaning of Story from
whom it was borrowed. In consequence, it has been argued
that article I I ought likewise to apply; that is, movables in
"permanent location" should also follow the law of the
place where they are. 57 Against former cases, recent
decisions have adopted this opinion 58 which transfers the
contradictory statements of what is a permanent location 59
into the inheritance field. The same argument seems to
apply to the Code of Uruguay, article I5. 60 Is this rule
also meant to be applied by foreign courts? and also to
foreign movables when Argentine inheritance law is referred
to? I hope not. 61
(d) For domestic immovables only. Although the Swiss
statute recognizes foreign domiciliary inheritance law for
movables of a Swiss national, if the foreign state prescribes
it, Swiss immovables of a Swiss national are always
governed by the law of the canton of origin. 62
The same rule seems to be accepted in Bolivia, 63 where a
foreign will, so far as it disposes of domestic immovables,
is subject to domestic law.
In all these cases, it might be argued that the statutes are
inspired by lex fori rather than by lex situs. Nevertheless,
it does not seem doubtful that the rules are applicable in
foreign courts, as if they truly came from lex situs.
(e) Otherwise on the ground of public policy. Where
57

BAQUE 87 ff.; see supra Ch. 54·
Cam. civ. I Cap. (Dec. 30, I94I) Jur. Arg. I942·I.7I7i Cam. civ. 2
Cap. (July 27, I943) Jur. Arg. I943·3·723; contra Cam. civ. I Cap (March I6,
I926) 27 Jur. Arg. 33·
59 Supra Ch. 58.
60
Uruguay: C.C. art. I5·
61 See the hypothetical assumptions by WALDEYER, Sucesiones ArgentinoAleman ab Intestato, Jur. Arg. I951.I Doctrina 53, 55·
2
6 N.A.G. art. 28 par. I.
63
Bolivia: C.C. art. 464.
58
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the interests of domestic creditors, beneficiaries, or forced
heirs are involved, numerous exceptions in favor of the
domestic law are made by the states in whose territories
assets are situated. As illustration, it may here suffice to
mention the California statute, disallowing gifts by a
testator of more than a third of his assets to charity. While
the courts of California reduce legacies correspondingly, the
forum of the domicil tries to correct the result. 64
(f) On the ground of comity. In Germany since the
early nineteenth century, the opinion has been maintained
by some decisions and writers that the personal law adopted
in principle should be barred in the case of foreign land subject to special rules of succession, such as feudal estates
(family fideicommissa) or certain kinds of peasant land
( dnerbenguter 65 ) . The Civil Code of Zurich provides
such an exception for family foundations. 66 The German
Code formulates the general provision repeatedly mentioned in this work 67 whereby the German rules yield to
"special provisions" on objects situated in a foreign state
whose laws claim to govern these objects. After some
controversy, it is settled that these foreign provisions do
not refer only to substantive rules on successions such as
farms, or homesteads, but also to the conflicts rules of the
situs. Hence, the lex situs rule for succession to immovables in the common law countries and France, Argentina,
etc., breaks the unitary German conflicts rules based on
the national law of the decedent. 68
64

E.g., Whalley v. Lawrence's Estate ( 1919) 108 A. C. 387; infra Ch. 66.
Thus, of course, the American legislation on homesteads; Poland, IPR.
art. 30; Liechtenstein: C.C. Pers. L. art. 828, 833, and others.
65

66
67

2 MElLI 139·

EG.BGB. art. 28; Vol. 1, 342, 601; supra Ch. SS·
68
RG. (Oct. 4, 19u) Warn. Rspr. 19u, 484, n. 437; (Oct. 2, 1930) 85
Seuff. Arch. (1931) No. 18; IPRspr. 1930, 175 No. 88; Planck's Kommentar,
EG. art. 28, 2b; MELCHIOR 405; RAAPE 766; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 31I ff.; WOLFF,
D. IPR. ( ed. 3) 232.
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The commentators, however, restrict this large reference
to the lex situs by excepting problems of form and capacity,
which have an independent conflicts rule in the continental
doctrines. This leads to absurdities. 69 The German conciliatory gesture is excellent, provided it defers comprehensively to the foreign laws adopting the lex situs.
A similar provision is contained in the Swedish law and
the treaty between Austria and Poland. 70
B. Unity of Succession
This principle brings the entire succession under the
personal law of the decedent at his death. The C6digo
Bustamante, which itself does not determine the connecting factor of the person, accordingly subjects the succession to the "personal law." 11
1. All assets are subject to the law of the last domicil:
Brazil. 72
Chile. 13
Colombia. 74
Denmark. 75
Ecuador. 76
69 These have been demonstrated by WILFRIED ZEUGE, Das Recht der
belegenen Sache im Deutschen Internationalen Erbrecht (Wiirzburg 1939)
59 ff., although he did not know how to remedy them.
1
° Cf. infra 373·
Sweden: Intestate Estate Law, art. 2.
71
Cod. Bustamante, art. 7·
72
Brazil: Ley Introd. ( 1942) art. 10.
73 Chile: C.C. art. 955 and Cod. Organico de Tribunales, art. 148, with
exceptions, notably C.C. arts. 15, 20 and 998 of controversial scope, see recently ALBONICO, 2 Manual § 501 ff.; MARIO GoNZALEZ ALVARADO, Le sucesi6n
ante el DIP, (Diss., Santiago, Chile, 1944) 95, 99-101.
74 Colombia: C. C. art. 1012, but restricted by art. 1054, see CocK, Tratado
de derecho internacional privado ( ed. 2) 204 ff., and by other controversial
exceptions; see RESTREPO-HERNANDEZ, I D.I.P. §§ 512, 598, CAICEDO CASTILLA,
2 DIP. 75 §§ 241-243 with an attractive solution.
75
Denmark: 2 Z. ausl. PR. 866; Revue 1910, so8.
76
Ecuador: C.C. art. 101:1.
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Federated Malay States. 71
Norway. 78
Quebec. 79
Peru (with exceptions). 80
Former practice in German common law and in Prussia. 81
2.

All assets are subject to the national law of the deceased
at the time of his death:
Belgian Congo. 82
China. 83
Cuba. 84
Czechoslovakia. 85
Egypt.s6
Germany. 87
Greece. 88
Italy. 89
Japan. 90
Mexico. 91
Morocco, French and Spanish. 92
Netherlands. 93

77
Malay States: One Cheng Neo v. Yar Kwan Seng (I897), Digest of
Rep. Cas. 1897-1925 ( 1929) 47·
78
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 580.
79
Quebec: C.C. art. 7 as construed, see 3 JoHNSON 49, 52.
80
Peru: C. C. art. 692, see supra n. 54·
81 Common Law: SAVIGNY 272 ff.
Prussia: Obertribunal, ro Entsch. I43, 146; (May 8, r865) 6o Striathorst
20 No. 6, at 66, 67; I REHBEIN 97; FDRSTER-Eccws, 1 Preuss. Landr. (1892)

6s.82

Belgian Congo: C.C. art. ro (wills).
China: IPL. (of 1918) arts. 20, 21.
84 Cuba: C. C. art. Io, par. 2; BusTAMANTE, I DIP. ( ed. 3, 1943) § 429.
85
Czechoslovakia: IPL. (I948) § 40.
86
Egypt: C.C. 1948, art. 17.
87
Germany: E.G. art. 24, 25, extended to foreign nationals, 91 RGZ. 139
and unanimous doctrine.
88
Greece: C.C. art. 28.
89 Italy: C.C. Disp. Pre!. art. 23; App. Napoli (Sept. 8, I948), Monitore
(1949) II7 emphasizes unity and indivisibility of the succession.
90
Japan: IPL. art. 25.
91 Mexico: argument from C.C. Arg. arts. I2, 14, except domestic assets.
92
Morocco, French: IPL. art. I8; Spanish: Dahir 1913, art. r6.
93
Netherlands: Hof Den Haag (Feb. 23, 1942), W. 1942, 327, aff'd H.R.
(Jan. 8, 1943) W. 1943, no. 202; Hof Den Haag (Apr. 28, 1947) N.J. 1947,
743; cf. MEIJERs, W.P.N.R. 3494, 3555-&; VA~; BJU.KEL § 138; Official Com83

PRESENT CONFLICTS RULES

259

Philippines. 94
Poland. 95
Portugal. 96
Puerto Rico. 97
Spain. 98
Sweden (in relation to the non-Scandinavian countries). 99
Tunis. 100
Treaties: Austria-Poland, 101 Austria-Germany. 102
France-Switzerland. 103
Italy-Switzerland (relating to jurisdiction) .104
Colombia-Ecuador .105
With respect to double nationality, apatrides, national
law divided according to local domicil, religion, race, or
caste, the general principles apply. It is true that succession is not necessarily included, even in civil law countries,
under the personal law. But in the divisions into classes
ment to the Benelux Draft p. 17 n. 32; DE WINTER, W. I948, 405. The
Hooge Raad maintains its own lack of jurisdiction to review non-enacted
law, but certainly does no longer infer from art. 7 Alg. Bep. that immovables are subject to lex situs (H.R. (Apr. s, 1907) W. 8524, Clunet
I910, 285, see the decision of Jan. 8, I943) and is supposed to approve silently
of the nationality principle.
94 Philippines: C.C. art. I6, par. 2; SALONGA, Private International Law
(Manila, I952) 377·
95 Poland: IPL. art. 28, par. 1.
96
Portugal: Clunet I9I3 1 1355.
97 Puerto Rico: C.C. art. u, see EDER, supra n. 24.
98 Spain: C.C. art. IO, par. 2; Trib. Sup. (June 6, I873) Clunet 1874, 40,
S2; TRIAS DEBEs, DIP. (I932) I02 ff., (I939) no. 63ff.; 2 GoLDSCHMIDT I64
(against exceptions to the principle).
99 Sweden: Law of March 5, 1937, (except within the Scandinavian
Union).
100 Tunis: Trib. Tunis (Mar. 3I, IS99) Clunet I9oo, 372; (Apr. 20, I904)
Revue I905, I 57; SLAMA, Conflits des Lois rei. aux successions ab intestat en
Tunisie (th. Paris I935) 6I.
101 March I9, I924, art. 28.
102
February s, I927, § 3 par. I.
103 June IS, IS69, art. s, in contrast to the dual system of French conflicts
law, PERROUD, Clunet 1934, 285.
104
July 22, 1868; App. Ticino (June 21, 1950) 47 SJZ. 334 no. uS, S
Schw. Jahrb. Int. R. (195I) 307.
105
June IS, 1903, art. 23.
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of persons such as in the now expired Egyptian system,
succession pertained to the foreign or mixed jurisdictions. 106
3. Mixed systems
As mentioned earlier in this work, 107 the Swiss law applies
Swiss substantive law to foreigners domiciled in Switzerland and subjects foreign domiciled Swiss citizens to the
"foreign legislation" with two exceptions: their land situated in Switzerland is governed by the law and jurisdiction
of their canton of origin, and "where these Swiss citizens
according to the foreign law are not subject to the foreign
law, they are subject to the law and jurisdiction of their
canton of origin."
I described the latter provision as an admirable effort
to avoid collisions regarding Swiss nationals abroad, as
the statute applies Swiss law to them only if the law of
the domicil so admits. 108 This was in ·conformity with the
Swiss commentators ;109 in the meantime, the Swiss Federal
Tribunal in a dictum formulated the rule expressly to
the effect that "Article 28 NAG in the case of a foreign
domicil of Swiss citizens concedes precedence to the conflicts rules there in force." 110 This interpretation has been
challenged recently on the ground that Swiss law should
always govern when the law of the domicil itself does not
claim to govern. The practical difference is significant when
106
Similarly in the treaty United States-Persia of July u, 1928, with
respect to movables. See Vol. I, 104 ff.; Trib. Consulaire Franc;ais, Cairo
(June 25, 1948) Clunet 1950, 6o8. On the present complicated law in Israel
see MAKAROV no. 25; YADIN, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. (1952) 143.
1o1 NAG. art. 28; Vol. I, 81, us.
108
I said "prescribes," which word was used in a somewhat related
provision in Privatrechtl. Gesetzbuch Zurich, § 4 par. 2.
109
ANLIKER 2; SCHNITZER (ed. 3) 460, 465; VOUMARD 89: "das Recht
welches das Konfiiktsrecht am Domizil anwendet."
110
BG. (Nov. 18, 1949) 75 BGE. II 280, 283 ff.: "Wohl riiumt art. 28
NAG. bei ausliindischem Wohnsitz von Schweizerbiirgern den dort geltenden
Kollisionsnormen den Vorrang ein."
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the conflicts rule of the domiciliary state refers to a third
law. 111 The result would be disastrous:
A Swiss citizen dying domiciled in England leaves immovables in England and France. Does the Swiss statute
mean that the English immovable is governed by English
law but the French immovable is governed by Swiss law?
Such far-fetched arbitrariness would not square with the
comity inspiring the Swiss provision and the analogous
German solution. 112
Scandinavian Treaty. The Northern Union of 1933
calls for the law of the last domicil, if this has been in one
of the states of the Union during five years; the draftsmen presumed that during this period the deceased would
have adjusted himself to his surroundings. Otherwise, the
national law at the time of the death generally governs,
with various exceptions for different incidents of the succession.113

C. Lex Fori
I.

As principle

Soviet Russia applies its own law to all but certain
situations. 114
2.

In Favor of Domestic Beneficiaries

There exist powerful remainders of the most ancient
conception that foreign inheritance laws should be ignored,
and foreigners should not inherit. The Code Napoleon
reserved rights in successions, as a part of "civic rights," to
111 H. LEWALD in Fragen des Verfahrens- und Kollisionsrechts, Festschrift
fiir Hans Fritzsche (Ziirich 1952) 171 If., ignoring the dictum by the
Federal Tribunal of 1949.
112 Supra 255, 256; see also Louis LucAs, cited infra n. 137.
113 Scandinavia: Treaty of Nov. 19, 1934, art. x, cf. UnDGREN, 92. Z.
ausl. PR. 267 If.
114 LUNTZ, Mezdunarodnoe castnoe pravo (Moskow 1949) 320.
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French Citizens; aliens could not inherit. Moreover, it
maintained the droit d' aubaine, jus albinagii, reserving the
sovereign a part in foreigners' assets before they were
allowed to emigrate. 115
(a) Reciprocity. One popular modernization of the old
xenophobia was the requirement of reciprocity for the application of foreign inheritance law. This idea 116 is incorporated in the Austrian law of I854, 117 requiring equal treatment of Austrian movable estates with domestic estates
as a condition of applying the national law to the movables
of a foreigner domiciled in Austria. This exception recurs
with various limits in modern codes 118 and many treaties.
(b) Prelevement. After the French Restoration, paradoxically, the spirit of the Revolution was more felt than
during the Empire, but the Law of July I 4, I 8 I 9, changed
the old principle merely to the effect that domestic persons enjoy all rights derived from the domestic statute.
The French courts are so intensely imbued with the force
of the Law of I 8 I 9 that in the wide application of this
prelevement, heirs and legatees 119 of French nationality 120
may claim so much of the value of assets situated in France
as to provide them with what they would receive under
French inheritance law from all French assets and foreign
movables. The courts regard this rule as a means to
115

France: C.C. arts. 7z6, 912.
Formerly Prussia: A.L.R.I. 12, 40; Baden, Law of June 4, 1864, art. z.
117
Austria: Verlassenschaftspatent ( Gesetz iiber Verfahren ausser Streitsachen) 1854 § 2.3.
118
Germany: EG. BGB. art. zs i.f.s. infra n. 130.
Liechtenstein: Law of Dec. 4, 1911, art. 2 (Austrian rule).
Mexico: C.C. art. 132.8.
119
Not the "legataire universe!," or a surviving spouse claiming under
marital property Jaw; BAUDRY LACANTINERIE ET WAHL, Droit civil, I Successions § zo6; MAURY in PLANIOL ET RIPERT, Successions § 38.
120
They must be citizens at the time of the testator's death, Cass. req.
(May 10, 1937) Rev. crit. 1937, 677; Cour Paris (July 10, 1946) Rev. crit.
1947, I4Z·
116
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protect a French national 121 who would be heir or legatee
according to the French law of succession. 122 On the other
hand, the right is accorded against all co-heirs, be they
foreigners or Frenchmen. 123
Modern French scholars regard this ((eviction de la loi
hrangere" by the French system of devolution and the
consequent split in the law of succession 124 with deep regret 125 as a "legislative mistake," strangely aggravated by
the courts. 126
However, Belgium, 127 the Netherlands, 128 Argentina, 129
and other countries 130 have enacted provisions on this
model. The German Code has adopted a more moderate
but nevertheless cumbersome version, in case the deceased
121

CHARRON in 4 Foreign Law Series 111; 10 Repert. 280 ff.
Cour Paris (Jan. 6, 1862) S. 1862.2.338. A change of nationality does
not extinguish this privilege, which brings the clash with foreign laws and
even treaties to a climax;· DELAUME, "De !'application et de !'interpretation
des Traites . . . dans les relations franco-americaines," Clunet 1953, Nr. 3,
§ 16.
123
Trib. Seine (Dec. 16, 1950) Clunet 1951, 906, Rev. Crit. 1951, 302;
against the text of the Code, see LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE § 365.
124 RENAULT, Clunet 1876, 21;
NIBOYET, Manuel § 740 bis; ROBERT
DENNERY, Le partage en droit international prive fran~ais (Paris 1935) 147.
125 PLAISANT 246 f. discussing the French-Swiss Treaty.
126
NIBOYET, 4 Traite 685 § 1254; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 416;
"institution exorbitante et archaique."
127
Belgium: Law of April 27, 1865, art. 4·
128 Netherlands: Law of April 7, 1869, art. 1; but in KosTERs' (636-642)
interpretation the article serves only the case where a Dutch national suffers
abroad because of his nationality.
129
Argentina: C.C. art. 3470. ROMERO DEL PRADO, 2 Manual 182, observes
that also a foreigner, son of a foreigner domiciled abroad, is privileged.
Even the foreign lex situs of immovables is disregarded, Cam. civ. 2a
(June 22, 1925) 57 Gac. Foro 98 Nr. 133.
13
Chile: C.C. art. 998 for intestate succession.
Colombia: C. C. art. 1054.
Ecuador: C.C. art. 1056.
Honduras: C. C. art. 978.
Nicaragua: C. C. art. 1024.
El Salvador: C.C. art. 995·
Treaty of Lima (1878), arts. 20, 22. (MARTENS, Recueil (2d. ser.) vol.
16 1 293).
122

°
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was domiciled in Germany. 131 Notably, under all these systems, nationals may claim their statutory portions, contrary
to the applicable foreign law. 132
The Chilean Code, article 998, reserves "in the intestate
succession of a foreigner" the rights of Chilean nationals
to inheritance, marital portion, and aliments according to
Chilean law. On the exact scope of this provision, at least
three doctrines exist. 133 In any case, the Code is not content to maintain forced heirship as a territorial prerogative
with respect to domestic assets.
In Brazil, as an exception to the domiciliary law, where
a foreign domiciled person leaves assets in Brazil and a
wife or children of Brazilian nationality, these share in the
inheritance according to Brazilian law, if this law is more
favorable to them than the foreign law. 184 The criticism
directed against the corresponding provision in the older
statute on account of its unprincipled invasion into the unity
of the succession with no hope of foreign recognition, remains valid. 135
These nationalistic relics of old times were sharply
criticized 136 and expressly rejected in the Hague drafts
on succession. 137 The Report of the Commission of the
131
132

EG. BGB. art. 25, sentence 2.
France: Trib. Seine (Apr. 26, I907) Clunet I907, 1132, 1135.
Germany: RG. (May 3I, I9o6) 63 RGZ. 356; (Oct. 23, I9II) JW. I9I2,
22; 24 Z. int. Recht 3 I7; see also OLG. Hamburg (June 15, I906) I8 Z.
int. R. I46, where, however, German law applied also as lex situs.
133 Chile: ALBONICO, 2 Manual 117; GoNZALES ALVARADO, supra n. 73·
134 Brazil: Ley in trod. I942, art. IO § I.
135 BALMACEDA CARDOSO, 0
Direito lnternacional Privado (Sao Paulo
1943) ISI. The law of I9I6 had been criticized also because the exception
could work to the disadvantage of the Brazilian party, see BEVILAQUA, I
Codigo Civil Commentado, Art. I4.
136
LAINE, Clunet I906, 990; MAURY ET VIALLETON in 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT
6I j BATIFFOL, Traite § 662 If. KAHN, 13 Z. int. R. 342, followed by most
German writers.
137
Actes de Ia 3me Conference pour le droit international prive, ( I900)
58 ff., I22, I30i Draft I9o4, art. 7, see Actes de Ia sme Conf., p. 354; Draft
I925 art. 5 ibid, p. 283; Draft I928 art. 5, Actes de Ia 6me Con£., p. 406.

PRESENT CONFLICTS RULES
Sixth Conference, after exhaustive discussion, summarized
three methods of preferring the lex fori to the foreign law,
repudiating all of them with the result that:
( 1 ) A claimant may not invoke a domestic rule more
favorable to him.
( 2) Where the forum considers the foreign national law
of the deceased as violating public policy, the ensuing complications prevail over the equitable considerations favoring
the foreign law.
(3) It is absolutely objectionable that the lex situs
should discard the national law in order to enforce its own
order of distributing assets situated outside the territory.
The recent French draft maintains a right to prelevement
only where a French heir (that is, an heir according to the
applicable law) is discriminated against solely because of
his status as an alien. 138
Sometimes it is not clearly acknowledged where the
obnoxious character of the criticized measure lies. No confusion should be made with similar results reached if the
domestic law of the forum and a foreign law are in conflict,
each considering itself competent to govern the same succession. Also in this situation, a system will try to defend
itself by using the assets available in its territory. 139 This
may be called a legitimate product of an unfortunate international conflict. But the prelevement trespasses on a
foreign law recognized as applicable.
( 4) Special cases: Although the Hague and French
drafts as well as the Restatement ( § 612) expressly re138

Comite pour Ia Reforme du C.C., Travaux 1949-50, Projet, art. 55;
Am. J. Comp. L. 423; this restrictive interpretation, however, is doubted
by LOUIS LucAs, Rev. crit. 1952, 69. A similar restrictive meaning has been
given in Luxemburg to the law of Feb. 29, 1872 by Trib. Diekirch (Feb. 22,
1900) 7 Pas. lux. 41.
139
Benelux Draft convention, art. 16 (English translation in I Int. J.
Comp. L. Q. (1952) 426).
1
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serves public policy, it is gratifying that in the judicial
approach remedial refusal of foreign inheritance law is
exceptional.
It was only natural that old French decisions, when civil
death had been abandoned in France, rejected similar foreign punishments 140 or that courts repudiate immoral dispositions.141
A doubtful problem, however, concerns the admission of
binding agreements concerning inheritance.
Contractual disposal is recognized as an alternative to
wills in a few systems, although, for the most part, it
is prohibited. Even Sweden, conservative of old usages,
forbids agreements to appoint an heir as well as pacts
stipulating the succession of a third party. 142 No doubt, if
subjects of a country allowing the appointment of an heir
by pact use this faculty within their own country, extraterritorial effect will in principle be accorded in other jurisdictions, according to their conflicts rules, provided that
the subsequent succession is governed by the same law. 143 A
pact between German spouses concluded in Germany is
recognized in France with respect to movables, though
not an immovable on French territory. 144 Opposition, in

140 See French law of May 31, 1854, (abolition de Ia mort civile) and
Cass. (Feb. 26, 1873) D. 1873.1.208.
141 Cass. (Jan. 24, 1899) Clunet 1901, 998.
142 Sweden: Law of April 25, 1930 (on inheritance pacts) § 3; PAPPI!NHI!IM, 5 Z. ausl. PR. 306.
143 England and United States: no case is known, but binding contracts
to make a will are valid ; see also BRESLAUI!R 194·
France: BATIFFOL, Traite 657 § 654, against contrary opinions.
Germany: Old practice rejecting the objection of public policy, see LEWALD
319; NussBAUM 364 If.
Italy: Cass. Firenze (Dec. 12, 1895) S.r897·4·17.
Netherlands: Hof den Haag (Nov. 26, 1925) W.u623.
Sweden: Law of March 5, 1937, Ch. r, § 7: "The question of the binding
force of an inheritance pact with the deceased or a gift mortis causa is to
be examined according to the law of the country, whose national the
deceased was, when the transaction was made."
144 App. Colmar (Feb. 19, 1949) Nouv. Rev. 1949, 222; Rev. crit. 1950, 52.
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this case, under the theory of public policy seems to disappear. On the other hand, a prohibiting state seeks to
prevent its subjects from disposing in this way everywhere.
A pact between French spouses made in Germany is void in
France.
Other questions, however, are not settled. In particular,
whether the former-mentioned parties may transact abroad,
is controversial. Certain laws exclude pacts in their territory absolutely. The adequate rule, making recognition
likewise dependent on the law governing the succession of
the deceased person, is formulated in modern laws. 145 The
Czechoslovakian statute, 146 however, requires for capacity
and intrinsic validity compliance merely with the national
law of the first decedent, in other respects with both national
laws at the time of execution.
We shall limit our discussions to wills. Here we shall encounter related problems concerning joint wills, renunciation of future shares, and promises to leave or not to leave
by will.
14 5 See preceding notes and cf. 2 BAR 340; KAHN, 2 Abh. 21 8, n. 140 ; 2
ZITELMANN 965; RAAPE 647.
Germany: KG. (April 10, 1941) Deutsches Recht 1941, 1611, no. 9:
Dutch spouses domiciled in Germany concluded a "marriage and inheritance
contract"; declared void under Dutch C. C. art. 977 If.
146
Czechoslovakia: PIL. ( 1948) art. 42.
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Principles
I.
I.

UNITY AND PLURALITY oF SuccESSION

Historical Notes

1

B

ARTOLUS made the territorial scope of inheritance
statutes dependent on their wording. 2 Later, the
jurists discussed the nature of these statutes, to
ascertain whether they were personal or real or determined
by the place of death. Alberic de Rosate is credited with
the merit of having first treated the problem of a unitary
law of succession in the proper perspective. But lex situs
for immovables was the prevailing teaching of the statutists,
although the German "Mirrors"-the Sachsenspiegel and
Schwabenspiegel-as well as decisions of the Parliament
of Paris, I392 and I429, together with a host of learned
writers 3 were partisans of the law of the deceased's domicil
as a single law.
A decisive new impulse to create a unitary law governing
succession came from Mancini who, as president of the
Institute of International Law in Geneva, on August 3 I,
I 874, urged universal and total acceptance of the national
law. In the following period, the weight of the literature
in all civil-law countries with great energy favored the
1
Most valuable: FREYRIA, La loi applicable aux successions mobilieres
(these, Lille 1944) ; see also CouLON, Principes generaux sur Ia devolution
hereditaire (these, Poitiers 1886, 1889) 35 ff.; for the latest periods see the
book by DELAUME, supra, bibliography.
2
BARTOLUS, De Summa Trinitatis VI § 42.
3
In former centuries among the statutists, FROLAND, BouHIER, and
BOULLENOIS, as cited by WEISS, 4 Traite 535 ff.
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national law as the single law of the decedent. 4 Most
statutes, following the model of the Italian Code of 1865
and the German of I 896, adhered to this system.
However, opponents have been frequent in France, supporting the traditional split between immovables and movables.5 During the Hague Conference of 1928, Professor
Basdevant 6 declared it inacceptable that French land should
be governed by a foreign law, a view traditionally shared
by the French courts, 1 and that the national instead of
the domiciliary law should govern movables. The Swiss
delegate, Sauser-Hall, also advanced objections against the
single national law. It was finally adopted by the majority,
subject to exceptions, but the convention was never ratified,
largely because of this division of opinions.
In the common-law countries, learned writers did and
do acknowledge the theoretical superiority of the single
law. Practically, however, the contrary firm position of
the courts is usually regarded as reasonable-it is true,
without much penetrating analysis of the situations arising
from the coexistence of several laws governing the same
succession. This is due to the prevalent attention given
to probate procedure and the administration of decedent's
estates, which includes the verification and discharge of
debts. The problems produced by this system are different from ordinary choice of law, and the difficulties involved
require remedies on a different basis.
The most acute controversy concerning this problem has
been developing for a long time in Argentina. The case for
4 See 2 BAR 304, and WEISS, 4 Traite 543, who was himself a most eloquent
advocate of the single national law.
5
There is a long list of French authors of the 19th century.
6
Comptes-rendus de Ia 6me Conference 277.
7
Cass. (Dec. 8, 1840) 8.1841.1.56 and many decisions leading to (May 7,
1924) Revue 1924, 406; (May 23, 1948) J.C.P. 1950.2.5241: irrespective of
the testator's intention.
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the single law (of domicil) has been fully pleaded by both
exegetic explanation of the puzzling code provisions and
rational appraisal of the contrasting theories. It is the
prevailing scholarly view that there is a cleft between
catedra and jurisprudencia, through the exclusive "fault of
the courts." 8 Velez Sarsfield, the principal author of the
code, according to his numerous notes, wanted to follow
Savigny strictly. 9 But the code contains so many apparent
contradictions that the courts may well shift a part of the
"fault" upon the draftsmen. 10
2.

Rationale

Any legal conception of a hereditary unit is due to an
advance of legal thought over the primitive separatenes·s of
assets and rights. The comprehensive bringing together
of all chattels under the law of domicil, strongly emphasized in English law, 11 was in itself a lawyerlike achievement.
That in so many jurisdictions the process of forming a
unit out of an aggregate halted without encompassing immovables, was caused, of course, by the high importance
of the land and the political and economic interests of feudal
8 ROMERO DEL PRADO, 2 Manual 187; see his excellent exposition 151-239;
before him: MoLINA, El Derecho Int. Priv. (Buenos Aires, 1882) §§ 92, 103;
WEISS-ZEBALLOS, 1 Manual de Derecho Internacional Privado ( ed. 5, Paris,
1911) 345; 2 id. 367; 2 VICO ( ed. 1927) 273 ff.; and see the impressive brief,
published by DR. SANTIAGO BAau£, Regimen sucesorio internacional segun
Ia ley Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1936). Contra: ALCORTA, 2 Curso de DIP.
( ed. 2, Buenos Aires, 1927) 388; BIBLIONI, 4 Anteproyecto de Reformas a!
C. C. Argentino ( 193 I) 26.
9 Especially art. 3283 is taken as a clear declaration of the law of the
last domicil. It was so understood by Trib. Seine (Apr. 17, 1912) Clunet
1913, 175, a foreign tribunal, but the only one to understand correctly as
DfEZ MIERES, infra n. 10, at p. 20 ironically states.
10 ALBERTO DfEZ MIERES, Las sucesiones en el Der. Int. Priv., Conferencia,
21 March 1927 (Madrid, 1927) repudiating the "preposterous" Montevideo
solution, advocated an accord with Spain with adoption of the unitary law
as in Spain, but with the domiciliary test as in Argentina.
11
Lord Chancellor Westbury, in Enohin v. Wylie [1862] 10 H.L. Cas.
r, I I E.R. 924.
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and modern rulers. This basis of the several laws doctrine
is intensely emphasized and glorified in France, while AngloAmerican practitioners take the twofold system of their
conflicts law in stride as the most natural thing.
There can be no hesitation in conceding the absolute
superiority of the Roman-Byzantine concept and the refined modern doctrine of "universal succession." 12 It is
a succession of heirs in the place of the deceased, continuing
his rights as well as his debts, giving coheirs equal provisions, and including legatees and creditors in a comprehensively considered coherent system. Unwise as it was for
the purpose of a world law to declare at the Hague simply
that there should be unity of succession, the majority vote
for this principle is well understandable.
What we have now is a stalemate with respect not only
to unity and plurality, but also to connecting factors and
accessory incidents. Every system in the checkered table
believes in its own merits. All together have created chaos.
To be realistic, we must discard once more the subtle
arguments, pompous phrasing, and disturbing dialectic of
conflicts philosophy. Must the conflicts rules on inheritance
really be territorial because of the sovereignty of the states
over their territory? 13 Must they on the contrary apply
the personal law of the deceased, because inheritance
allegedly is still in close relation to personal and family
relations? 14 Is it true at all that the continental Roman12 On the concept of succession in the Italian Code, G. STOLFI, Note sui
:oncetto di successione, in Riv. trim. dir. e proc. civ. 1949, 535·
13 Thus NIBOYET, 4 Traite § 1318 j LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 409
§ 361.
14 Thus with special regard to the national law, ANZILOTTI, in Actes de
Ia 5me Conference 203 ; Comment Benelux Draft p. 17; contra BASDEVANT
in Actes de Ia 5me Conference 202; and see App. Napoli (Jan. 23, 1924)
Giur. Ita!. 1924 I 2, 175: Italian citizens may divide foreign assets without
regard to the national law of the testator, as only property, not status,
capacity, or family law, is involved.
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istic laws start from the personal sphere, whereas the com·
mon law of inheritance is allegedly built upon exclusive
economic consideration of the assets? 15 A glance at the
foregoing survey of systems with its shocking variety of
combinations of "real" and "personal" statutes destroys the
easy affirmation of any such pretense. History knew these
ideas and overruled them.
In fact, all these systems are in force irrespective of
reasons. Even though the Romanistic principle is sound in
itself, its application to the divided world is not at all
natural. When in England the land reform of 1925
abolished the dualism of descent and distribution to realty
and personalty, many were expecting an automatic repeal
of the dualism in conflicts law. Nothing of this sort happened, which is the more notable since the Anglo-American
expansion of the lex situs is as extravagant in this field as
in that of marital property. 16 That eight pieces of land
need eight different systems of liberty or restraint in testation is bad enough in all jurisdictions of the split law; but
that even the capacity to make a will and the formalities
and construction of will are independent in principle in
every jurisdiction where an immovable is found transgresses the borders of tolerable tradition.
A slight beginning of consciousness is noticeable. An
enlightened dissenting vote of a strong minority of the
Iowa Supreme Court has reminded us that the ancient
difference between the will of real estate made before a
court of law and the testament of personal property, pertaining to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, has vanished; hence,
a revocation of a will, involving movables and immovables,
15
Theory of Dicey, much noted on the Continent. Another fruitless debate
was conducted on the relation of universal succession to the personal law
between z BAR 306, 6z3, and KAHN, I Abh. 38.
16
Supra Vol. I, p. 337·
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effective by the law of the domicil, ought not to be ignored
at the situs of land, merely because its own domestic law
requires a different mode of cancellation. 17
On the other hand, the Hague, Benelux, and French
drafts have been influenced by a doctrine of recent French
writers, strongly narrowing the scope of national law: by
these it is limited to the designation of the beneficiaries and
their shares, and excludes administration, liquidation, and
liability for debts, if not also partition as submitted to the
lex situs.

To a critical mind and to a new legislator, the practical
effects of the two fundamental systems should be decisive. 18
To this end, the results so far discernible will be collected
here.
II.
I.

PROBLEMS CoNCERNING THE CoNNECTING FACTORS

Party Autonomy

Sometimes emphasis is laid upon the possibility that a
person may select the law applicable to his succession by
choosing his domicil-or for that matter, his nationalityor by buying land in an advantageous jurisdiction for purposes of succession. This we do not call autonomy of
determining the law; it is individual freedom itself. The
dubious French-Italian doctrine of fraus legi facta, fraud
committed by using a foreign connection with the intention
of evading the municipal law of the forum, was invoked
where spouses abroad executed a joint will prohibited at
17
Dissenting vote by Smith J. in re Barries' Estate (Iowa, 1949) 35 N.W.
(2d) 658, 9 A.L.R. (2d) 1399 at 1407, citing in re Goldsticker's Will ( 1908)
192 N.Y. 35, and Ellis v. Davis (1883) 109 U.S. 485 (interesting but not
really a support).
18
In agreement, SAVATIER, Cours de DIP. (Paris, 1947) 304 § 436.
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home; but only two French cases to this effect, both a
century old, are known. 19
A true option granted a testator, however, was once
generally thought permissible. Some present enactments
allow it under circumstances.
The outstanding provision of this sort is embodied in the
Swiss law, directly intended to aid international relations.
An alien domiciled in Switzerland is subject to Swiss inheritance law; nevertheless he may provide by will that his
succession should be governed by his own national law
(called professio juris) .20 It seems settled that by so doing
the testator may exclude forced heirship granted by Swiss
federal or cantonallaw, 21 although other questions of construction are doubtfuV 2 In the prevailing but controversial
opinion, it is assumed that a Swiss national, domiciled abroad
in a state recognizing the national (i.e. his Swiss) law of
inheritance, may choose between the Swiss Civil Code and
his cantonal law, particularly with respect to any differences
in determining the forced heirs. 23
In Peru, where domestic immovables are controlled by
domestic law and movables by the law of the last domicil,
the former code nevertheless allowed a foreigner to dispose
at his choice of a "big business enterprise" in Peru under
his national law 24 and of foreign-situated assets under either
19 ANDRE TIRAN, Les successions testamentaires en DIP. (1932) I4Z ff.
at 154, in addition to the long-condemned decisions operating with fraudulent
though serious change of nationality; cf., supra Vol. I, pp. 507-510.
20 NAG. art. zz.
21 SCHNITZER (ed. 3) 468; PAUL FISCHER, 64 Z. Schweiz. R. (1945) 129,
132. That, as Schnitzer contends, there may be a renvoi from the national
law to the domiciliary Swiss law, sounds inconsistent with the apparent
meaning of the statute.
22 VouMARD, Transmission 51-81 enumerates three theories on the scope of
the rule and numerous controversies.
23
See FISCHER, id. 132 against SCHNITZER ( ed. Z) 428, ( ed. 3, 47Z).
24
Peru: C.C. (185z) art. 694; CARLOS GARcfA GASTANETA, Derecho Int.
Priv. ( 1930) 244 contended that an analogous rule was to be inferred for
intestate succession; this seems to mean that the foreigner may write a
declaration (or only a will?) so disposing.

PRINCIPLES

275

25

his national law or the lex situs.
Conversely, the Decedent's Law of New York, 26 continuing a former provision of the Code of Civil Practice,
is always satisfied when the New York law is chosen to
govern an inheritance:
"Whenever a decedent being a citizen of the United
States or a citizen or a subject of a foreign country,
wherever resident, shall have declared in his will and
testament that he elects that such testamentary dispositions
shall be construed and regulated by the laws of this state,
the validity and effect of such dispositions shall be determined by such laws." 27
The Treaty between Colombia and Ecuador permits the
testator to choose national or domiciliary law. 28
Finally, among the peculiar rules with which American
statutes abound, there is a provision in Maryland that
where the testator "originally" was domiciled in this state,
his succession is governed by Maryland law, unless he
should "expressly declare a contrary intention in his will
or testamentary instrument." 29
Apart from these exceptional legal rules, certainly freedom to dispose by will depends on the leeway left by the
law governing succession. Lists of imperative rules in the
national laws limiting this freedom were collected at the
fifth Hague Conference. 30 Nevertheless, some eminent
courts occasionally still separate on the old lines, resorting
to the presumptive intention of the testator not only in
25
Peru: C.C. (1852) art. 693; 27 Anales Judiciales de Ia Corte Suprema
de Justicia (Peru, 1931) 24.
26 Decedent Estate Law, § 47; cf. Davids N.Y. Law of Wills§ 531.
27
An analogous provision respecting movables was contained in the
former C.C. of Mexico, art. 3286.
28
Art. 18; cf. CocK, Tratado de D.I.P. (ed. 2), 209.
29
Md. Pub!. Gen. L.: art. 93 sec. 344· Nevertheless, this statute applies
only if the will is submitted in Maryland for original probate.
30
Documents 1925 p. 89, 185, 358, 502 If.; for France see LEREBOURSPIGEONNIERE (ed. 5) 501 § 370.
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construing his will, which is natural, 31 but also in determining the applicable law. There are recent examples. 82
2.

Concept of Immovables

The general principle that characterization of things
connected with land as movable or immovable is referred
to the law of the place where the land is, has been discussed
above (Chapter 54).

Illustration: The granddaughter of the famous writer
George Sand, married to an Italian, bequeathed the castle
of N ohant in France with its inventory and an amount of
money to the French Academy to maintain a memorial for
her grandmother. The French court, following the French
law of situs, considered the furniture and the money as immovable and therefore subject to French law. 33
31
Also the recent decision Amerige v. Attorney Gen. ( 1949) 324 Mass.
648, 659, 88 N.E. (2d) u6 (against the rule that a power of appointment
is controlled by the law of the donor, the perpetuity rule of Massachusetts
is applied because of the presumptive intention of the donor) is explained by
the specific nature of the matter, infra p. 352.
32 England: Re Allen's Est. [1945] 2 All E.R., a most objectionable decision,
criticized by MoRRIS, 24 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1946) 528.
France: Cour Paris (Apr. 24, 1913) Clunet 1913, 1276: Mme. NazareAga, wife of a Persian diplomat, was born in France, educated there and
did not leave that country. Until near her death she only knew French
law and usages. Her act was evidently a holographic will according to
the French C.C. The court refrained from attributing her a French domicil,
but nevertheless presumed her intention to apply French law and granted
reserved portions to her children under French law.
Germany: Bay. Ob. LG. (Jan. 3, 1934) IPRspr. 1934 Nr. 24 assumed that
the testator may choose the law and in absence of his choice lex situs governs.
Contra: EcKSTEIN, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 229 Nr. 189.
Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (July II, 1946) N.J. 1947 no. 66, affirmed
H.R. (March 21, 1947) W. 1947, 382, applied the law of the Netherlands
where the testator was formerly a national from birth and had his last
domicil, because of the particular circumstances of the case.
Therefore, recognition to an adopted child was refused, The H.R., however,
expressly stated (Jan. 8, 1943) W. 1943, 202, that autonomy of the testator
is limited by the applicable law.
It is interesting that the Kammergericht in Berlin (April 10, 1941)
Deutsches Recht 1941, 16n, HRR. 1941, 846, had understood the Dutch law
just as the Amsterdam court did, in the case of a Dutchman long domiciled
in Germany.
33
Trib. civ. La Chiitre (July 5, 1910) Clunet 19II, 588.
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Exceptions are made by the provisions in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, assimilating movables in a "permanent"
situation to immovables 34 in foreign countries. The French
draft, submitting a fonds de commerce, an established business, to the lex situs/ 5 applies the same treatment also to
inheritance law. 36 The reporter proposed special contacts
also for patents, trademarks, designs and models, maritime
and fluvial vessels, and aircraft, but the committee declined
to institute so many separate successions. 37
3· Renvoi
The Hague Convention on renvoi, 38 drafted at the Conference of I 9 5 I, is much limited in scope. Nevertheless, it
affirms the renvoi principle in its oldest and most important
application, viz., to the conflict between the principles of
the national law and the law of the domicil. It shows also
the direction in which further development must be sought.
Since the first volume of this work 39 called for a sound
positive stand in construing references to foreign law, world
opinion has made a highly gratifying progress, leaving
behind all the sterile negation of renvoi in the universal
literature. Even the adversaries concede more and more
"exceptions" to their denial of renvoi.
True, while the new approach has been initiated in the
Netherlands, where rejection of renvoi was practically
unanimous, 40 some writers dwell on the old futile arguments, extolling the pretended wisdom of their conflicts
34

Supra Ch. 54·
French Projet, art. 48.
I d. art. 54·
37 Travaux de Ia Commission de Reforme du Code Civil (1949-1950), 635637.
38 Draft Convention to determine Conflicts between the national Jaw
and the law of the domicil, Engl. tr. in 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 275, zSo-282.
39
Vol. I, p. 79 ff.
4
°KosTERS 135; MuLDER (ed. z) 94; MEIJERS W.P.N.R. 3555-3558;
HUMANS 157; VAN BRAKEL 66.
35
36

INHERITANCJ<..

rules allegedly pointing directly to some internal law. More
regrettably, a number of delegates, for one reason or
another, refrained from voting, although it was carefully
explained that, far from adopting the "theory of renvoi,"
the draft merely offered practical uniform rules indicating
a specific law applicable, not the supremacy of foreign conflicts rules defeating those of the forum. This dreaded
"theory of renvoi," especially in the form proclaiming total
renvoi in all situations, may once have been favored by
writers, but it now exists exclusively in the imagination of
the anti-renvoyists. What writers of recent times who
advocate acceptance of renvoi have had in mind has been
exactly what the draft begins to teach, a sensible construction of the forum's own conflicts rules, certain complements
to them, attaining uniformity, and references to foreign law
just where they are sound. 41 The draft could very well
call this by its name. The decisive point is whether a court
insists on the literal or even narrow-minded interpretation
of its conflicts rules at the cost of reasonableness, or looks
to the international purpose of these same rules.
Perhaps it is allowed to hope, despite the remaining
reluctance of some eminent scholars to abandon their old
dogmas, that the field may be considered free for an unbiased discussion of the cases in which renvoi is sound and
in which it is not.
We have to review the topic here, because the law of
succession furnishes the most frequent field for renvoi. Of
the numerous English cases in point, all but two involve
succession.42 Apart from the special rules on formal validity of wills, only two types of conflicts rules are in question,
41
It may specifically be referred to the writings of MELCHIOR, RAAPE,
GRISWOLD, and my own, as well as in this respect to PAGENSTECHER (cf., 1
Am. J. Comp. L. r66).
42
CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 90.
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the personal law, as tested either by nationality or domicil,
and the law of immovables as it is a part of a unitary
governing set of rules or an independent factor. The
Hague draft deals merely with the first problem.

The Personal Law
The draft provides as follows:
Article I. When the State where the person interested
is domiciled prescribes application of the national law, but
the State of which such person is a national, prescribes
application of the law of the domicile, each contracting
State shall apply the provisions of the internal law of the
law of the domicile.
Article 2. When the State where the person interested
is domiciled and the State of which such person is a national, both prescribe application of the law of the domicile,
each contracting State shall apply the provisions of the
internal law of the law of the domicile.
Article 3· When the State where the person interested
is domiciled and the State of which such person is a national
both prescribe application of the national law, each contracting State shall apply the provisions of the internal law
of the national law.
Article 4· No contracting State is obligated to apply
the rules prescribed in the preceding articles, when its rules
of private international law prescribe application in a given
case neither of the law of the domicile nor of the national
law.
Article 5. Domicile, for the purpose of the present Convention, is the place where a person habitually resides, unless it depends on that of another person or on the seat of
an authority. 43
The preference given to the law of the domicil confirms
the practice of the German, French, and Swiss courts, contrary to all opinions still fascinated by the virtues of the
u Translation by

I

Am.

J. Comp. L. z8o.
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nationality principle. E. M. Meijers has rediscovered a
passage of Mancini's work in which the necessary concessions to foreign references to the law of domicil are masterfully stated. 44
"Further references" are absolutely inevitable, if "each
contracting state" has to follow the lead of the two nearest
involved conflicts laws. The draft has not adopted the
often repeated proposal that transmission of reference
should depend on the consent of the two laws to which
the reference would lead. In fact, such coincidence, desirable as it is in the interest of harmony, cannot be required
for the purpose of renvoi, which in my opinion is simply
the carrying out of the first and principal reference, that is,
the reference contained in the conflicts rule of the deciding
judge. What happens, otherwise, is illustrated by the
French draft which states:

"If the foreign law applicable according to the French
conflicts rules does not consider itself applicable, the foreign
law, if any, to which this law refers shall be applicable if
it considers itself applicable, otherwise French law shall
apply." 4s
A French critic 46 refutes this doctrine with this illustration: If an Englishman died domiciled in Greece, and
Greece refuses to accept the English reference, French
courts may nevertheless have to apply Greek law, or (not
very justifiably, in my opinion) English law; that French
law should be substituted is perfectly arbitrary.
The favorite examples of the literature would be decided
with more assurance.
Illustrations: (i) A Danish national lived and died in
Brussels, but made his last will in the Netherlands before
44 MEIJERS, Recueil de lois modernes concernant le DIP. ( 1947) 95·
45
Art. zo, Engl. tr. by I Am. J. Comp. L. 420.
46
Louis-LucAs, Rev. crit. 1951 at 409.
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a Dutch notary. The appeal court of The Hague, m a
recent decision, 47 stated that a Danish court would apply
Belgian inheritance law without accepting renvoi. Although
the Belgian court of the domicil would accept the renvoi,
the Dutch court felt forced by the Dutch legislation to
apply Danish law. The Dutch legislator has defined his
view on the applicable law, and foreign rules could not be
obeyed.
The Convention would-and in the Dutch case, we hope
it will-remedy this abstruse alleged legislative situation.
(ii) An English testator dies domiciled in Italy, leaving
movable property in Italy. At present, the Italian courts
reject the reference from the national state, England, to
the domicil, Italy; hence, they apply the English law of
inheritance. The English courts follow. In the same case,
with France instead of Italy, at present, the French courts
"accept" the English renvoi to the French domicil; the
English again follow.
In the future, Italian courts would share the French
attitude applying their own law of succession; the English
courts would not have to ascertain the foreign view concerning renvoi and would always apply the law of the
domicil. Moreover, where assets of an Italian-domiciled
testator are situated in France, the French courts, thus far
so adverse to transmissive reference, 48 would apply Italian
rather than English law.
{iii) A Danish testator, domiciled in Italy, leaves movables in England and Germany. At present, Danish courts
refer to Italian law, Italian courts to Danish law; both,
allegedly, without admitting renvoi. Third states must
divide according to their principle: England going the
Italian way reaches the Danish inheritance law; 49 Germany
47

Hof Den Haag (Feb. 23, 1942) W. 1942 no. 327.
Vol. 1, p. 78 n. 33; CHARRON, in 4 Cahiers de Droit Etranger (ed. fr.,
1934) 138 claims that App. Alger (Jan. 12, 1931) Gaz. Pal. I931.1.58I
contains no true application of transmissive reference; but see BATIFFOL,
Traite 331 on Cass. (Nov. 7, 1933) S.I934·I·32I, Rev. crit. 1934, 440; Clunet
1935. 88.
49
Cf. Re Achillopoulos [1928] Cb. 433·
48
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after the Danish model applies Italian law-we are in the
paradise of no-renvoi.
In the future, in both jurisdictions, Italian law would
govern the entire succession, wherever the movables may
be and whatever court would decide.
( iv) An Englishman dies domiciled in Boston, Massachusetts. This case has been used as proof that the English
foreign court theory would break down if both jurisdictions
involved attempted to apply it. 50 The case is expressly decided by the draft to the same effect as in my propositions;
Massachusetts law, of course, governs. The English court
theory does not break down but is confirmed if all courts
adhering to the domiciliary principle adopt it in relation to
jurisdictions of the nationality principle. Among themselves no conflict exists, except when an American court
would assume a domicil not recognized in England, a disharmony independent of renvoi and remedied by another
section of The Hague draft.
If renvoi is entirely rejected, the results are indicated by
a recent Swedish decision.
(v) An immigrant to the United States lost his Swedish
nationality without acquiring another and died domiciled in
the state of Washington. The Swedish Supreme Court,
influenced by a review article of Unden, reversed its stand
and rejected renvoi. Hence, it applied the inheritance law
of Washington even to Swedish land, against the conflicts
law of Washington and the inheritance law of Sweden. 51

Reference to Lex Situs
In the Hague Conference of I 9 5 I, it was instinctively
felt what is needed. The Italian delegate Perassi criticized
50
Thus LEWALD, in Festschrift f. Fritzsche (Zurich, 1952) at 170 note,
using a word used by M. Wolff against universal use of this theory. I
take the opportunity to direct the author of that critical note to the list in
Vol. III (1950) p. 593 correcting Illustration (c) in Vol. I, p. 79, where the
typed manuscript was confused by three misplaced words.
51
Sweden: S.Ct. Plenum (Feb. 28, 1939) Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 1939 I p.
96, 13 Z. a us!. PR. ( 1942) 843.
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the result of the draft in Italy: the courts would apply
Italian inheritance law to the movables of a domiciled Englishman, according to the uniform rules, but would continue
to apply English inheritance law to his Italian immovables,
according to their anti-renvoi doctrine. Sauser-Hall replied
that this is the consequence of the restriction of the draft
to the conflict between domicil and nationality. 52 Time and
again, it is the rejection of renvoi that troubles the solution.
On the other hand, it creates bad confusion if a reference
to the situs is treated as if it were an agreement to the
general conflicts law of the situs. This regrettably has been
done by the English courts and is the main basis for the
argument that renvoi leads to a vicious circle.
It may be recalled that the German Code by Article 28
of the EG., and its usual construction, 53 concedes that land
situated in a foreign state is controlled by this state through
special rules of descent and distribution. Between the
United States and Germany, therefore, no conflict exists
where a German testator leaves an immovable in American
territory. Succession is governed by the law of the situs.
Neither does a conflict exist in the inverse case, but this
is due to renvoi; if an American testator leaves an immovable in Germany, American conflicts law refers to the
German law, which renvoi back is accepted in Germany
( EG., article 27). Hence, all third states, whether primarily referring to American or German law, are likewise
directed to the German substantive rules.
Although adopted in the Swedish law on conflicts, this
expressly stated difference is not shared anywhere else.
An Italian court of appeals has rejected its very idea. 54
2
G

Actes de Ia 7me Conference, 234 ff.; SAUSER-HALL, 8 Schweiz. Jb. Int.

R. 121 ff.
53
Supra Vol. I, 342; supra Ch. 65 n. 68.

54 Italy: App. Napoli (Nov. 8, 1948) Mon. Trib. 1949, 117; see DE
NovA, Rev. crit. 1950, 351 (Offprint p. 31).

INHERITANCE
But the question, indeed, has never been examined. Where
a unitary system and a special order of succession conflict,
which should be granted preference? The German solution is based on the commonly accepted justification of lex
situs-the state where the property lies commands respect
-and warns against insoluble conflict. At the same time,
this faculty of the situs, in fact, guarantees a uniform solution for all interested jurisdictions; a vicious circle is
avoided.
It is submitted that the same result ought to be reached
in both jurisdictions, on the one hand, by a reasonable
construction at the forum of the reference and, on the other
hand, by acceptance at the situs of the reference, that is,
renvoi to the situs. We may remember that it is not an
entirely new suggestion that lex situs may not refer to the
whole law of the situs. 55

Illustrations: (vi) An American citizen, domiciled in
England, leaves a house in Norway. At present, Norway
applies English inheritance law to all assets of the decedent. England and the United States primarily refer
to Norway, but the English courts accept the Norwegian
reference back. 56 A French court, if really excluding further reference, would probably have to look to "American"
inheritance law (if they can find one) .
But why should Norway, on the ground of the domiciliary
principle in England, insist on the unitary doctrine in the
teeth of the English system? On the other hand, Norway
converted to renvoi should not be induced to carry this
too far.
55
GRISWOLD, 51 Harv. L. Rev. at 1196. My own suggestion, 4 Int. L. Q.
at 406, "not understood" by LEWALD, supra n. 50 at x68, was moreover
preceded by 4 FRANKENSTEIN 306.
56
Re Trufort (1887) 36 Ch. D. 6oo; Re Duke of Wellington (1947)
Ch. so6; CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 91 sub III accepts just this point among his now
approved cases of renvoi.
United States: Restatement § 8, Re Schneider's Estate ( 1950) 96 N.Y.S.
(zd) 652, much discussed with very questionable positive assumptions.
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(vii) An American domiciled in England leaves a house
in Rapallo (Italian Riviera). At present, England refers
to Italy which refers to the United States which is said
to refer back to Italy and so forth.
Here, Italy, as Norway in illustration (vi), is allowed
to ruin a sensible order of succession by imposing its
unitary system on the succession of an American citizen,
domiciled in England. This result will be corrected, when
Norway and Italy understand that their reference to the
domicil or national law, respectively, means full abandonment of the treatment of succession, and England and the
United States understand that they do not refer to the
unitary systems of succession concerned.
(viii) A naturalized American citizen, having retained
Swiss citizenship, dies at his last domicil in Illinois. He
leaves a bank account in Switzerland and real property in
Switzerland and New York. Two decisions of the Swiss
Federal Tribunal 5 7 and the recent decision of the New
York Surrogate in re Schneider 58 deal with these situations.
They were to be decided on the ground of the AmericanSwiss treaty of I 8 5o, as was recognized by the Bundesgericht, although disapproved by the Surrogate, with the
result that the bank account and the American real estate
were to be governed by the law of Illinois and the Swiss
land by Swiss law. 59 If no treaty existed, the Swiss courts
still would be entitled to treat the decedent as a Swiss
subject 60 and apply the provision of their law of I 89 I that
succession to Swiss real property of Swiss citizens domiciled
abroad is controlled by the law of the H eimatkanton. 61
In either case, the New Y ark court erroneously assumed
that renvoi to the domicil applied; but its decision together
57
BG. (Nov. 24, 1883) in re Wohlwend, 9 BGE. 507, 509, 513, concerning
the bank account; BG. (May 5, 1898) in re Gemeinde Feldis, 24 BGE. I
312, 319 concerning American and Swiss real estate; App. Bern (March 5,
1885) 21 Z. Bern J.V. 360: forum rei sitae for immovables.
58
In re Schneider's Estate ( 1950) 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 652.
59
See ANLIKER at II5; SCHNITZER, 501; NussBAUM, American-Swiss PIL.
1951, 21-23,
60
Supra Vol. I, 81.
61
NAG. art. 28 (1).
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with another, likewise objectionable, holding of the Second
Circuit Court, show nevertheless the changed climate. 62
On the other hand, the reference to lex situs does include
certain further references. In continental literature it is
often forgotten what a healthy function in the American
law is exercised by the references in the statutes of the situs
to lex loci contractus and lex domicilii for validating the
form of wills; an analogous recognition of foreign law is
advisable for capacity to execute a will. These conflicts
rules of the situs and whatever other foreign validating law
may be invoked there, deserve application in any court
applying lex situs. They are part of the "special law" in
the right meaning of the German article 28 EG.
It is not suggested, therefore, that lex situs exclusively
means substantive rules. They are the principal object,
however.
Renvoi, as I understand it, is not a mechanical device.
It serves to carry out the conflicts rule of the forum, and
must not blindly run into any complications conditioned by
the coincidence of foreign conflicts rules. Since our conflicts rules, commonly and fortunately, fail to explain their
content, they permit interpretation in favor of a modicum
of harmony. However, the harmony has to be sought in
the spirit of the referring rule. This is in the first place
the conflicts rule of the forum. If it refers to the national
law in personal matters or in the matter of succession in
toto, the entire conflicts law of the national state is invoked,
and its further reference to the lex situs is susceptible of
adequate application. Exactly the same is true where the
forum is dedicated to the principle of the law of domicil,
except that a reference back on the ground of the nationality principle must be eliminated, as the Hague Convention
has well perceived.
62
Mason v. Rose (C.C.A. 2d, 1949) 176 F. (2d) 486; criticized by Jerome
Frank J. dissenting; see also BRAUNSCHWEIG, 31 Boston U.L. Rev. (1951) 74·
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67

The Form of Wills
I.

1

THE CoNFLICTS SYSTEM

M

ULTIPLICITY of laws establishing forms for
wills engenders conflicts particularly discomforting
because invalidity of a will, discovered after the
testator's death, is irreparable.
The present greatest differences of formal requirements
consist in the varying position of the legislators on public
testaments, as developed in the civil-law countries from
Justinian's Corpus Juris; private wills before witnesses,
peculiar to the common law; self-written (holographic)
wills after a long history adopted and widely popularized
by the French Civil Code; and oral (nuncupative) wills,
derived from various sources. In the United States, many
variants are represented; aside from the English private
testaments, written and witnessed, almost half of the statutes admit holographs, although nuncupative wills are only
allowed in extraordinary emergency situations. 2
Yet the general public resents even more the innumerable
small divergences in which the statutes seem to delight.
How many witnesses for private, or for notarial wills:
two? three? Two or three, two or five according to circumstances? Seven? Have the witnesses only to sign or
also to give "attestation?" Have all solemnizing persons
1 LoRENZEN, "The Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as Regards Form in
the Conflict of Laws," 20 Yale L.J. (1911) 427; CoNTUZZI, Diritto ereditario
internazionale (Milano 1908); RABEL, "The Form of Wills," in Symposium,
6 Vanderbilt L. Rev. (1953) 533·
2
See ScHOULER § 417 n. 3; r PAGE §§ 386, 395 ff. and Supp. 1950.
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to be present all the time? or only at the signature? or
may they come and sign successively? Must the testator
sign in the presence of the witnesses or the official? At a
certain place at the end? Must every step be acknowledged
in the document? Must a holograph bear date and place,
or only the date, or neither? Is it void if the date is
printed? Must a signature carry the name as in the birth
document, or does a given name, a nickname, pen name, or
"your father" suffice?
The "pitfalls" and "hardship" involved in these ruthlessly whimsical legislations have drawn attention for a
century. They have been experienced everywhere, particularly in the case of a change of domicil or nationality after
the execution of a will. Some legal provisions have been
especially devised for this case. But the need for a remedy,
recently felt in the United States, arises also where a testator disposes of assets situated in several jurisdictions, or
movables and immovables subject to different systems,
or assets under general and special rules of inheritance.
Some, but not very much, satisfaction has been obtained
by counselor's practice.
In the civil-law sphere, it is old advice that a will should
be clothed in the most exacting public form available so
as to satisfy any law requiring "authentic" testaments. It
is well-known, however, that formal invalidity is strikingly
often encountered just in notarial instruments.
In the United States and elsewhere, advantage has been
seen in separate wills with respect to every state where immovables are left. These wills have to be altered according
to changes of circumstances or of fancies. They may also
be construed by different methods.
A relatively helpful private form may be suggested,
combining a holographic will with the Anglo-American
attestations of witnesses, both complying with the most
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severe standards. I do not pretend, of course, that this
eliminates all pitfalls.
r. Basic Tests

In the curiously involved history of doctrines from the
twelfth to the eighteenth century, the ancient personality of
law was replaced by the territorial lex situs of the feudal
regimes until the personal law came back in the disguise of
a statutum reale or openly. In this development, the form
of testaments was from the thirteenth century on a subject
of controversies in which domicil and lex loci actus were
often in rivalry. 3 In the nineteenth century, the law of
domicil as of the time of the death of the testator at common law and lex loci actus at civil law dominated the choice
of law for the form of succession to movables.
At common law, the formal requirements of a will are,
like all other requisites and the effects of wills, governed
by the law governing succession. This is the law of the
situation of immovables, and the law of the testator's
domicil at the time of his death for movables. The purest,
unadulterated expression of these rules is to be found in
the Restatement of Conflicts Law. 4 A will affecting immovables must observe the domestic law of the place where
they are situated or else be void. 5 A will complying with
the law of the place of execution, or even with the requirements at the testator's domicil at the time of execution
but not with what is law at the last domicil of the deceased
3

LAINE, De Ia forme du testament prive en droit international (I908).
Restatement, §§ 249, 306; 4 PAGE §§ 1634, 1638; GooDRICH (ed. 3, I949)
5I4; Note, I69 A.L.R. ( I947) 554·
5
Coppin v. Coppin (I725) 2 P. Wms. 29I; Pepin v. Bruyere [I9oo] 2
Ch. 5o4; [I9o2] I Ch. 24; Will valid under lex situs, though not at domicil;
De Fogassieras v. Duport (I88I) II L.R. Ir. I23; Murray v. Champernowne
[1901] 2 Ir. R. 232.
Canada: In re Howard ( 1924) I D.L.R. I062.
United States: In re Irwin's Appeal (1865) 33 Conn. 128; 2 BEALE §249·3·
4
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-such will is void. 6 Vice versa, a will invalid where it
originated may convalesce at the domicil the testator had
when he died. 7 In a famous criticism, Phillimore called
this system of compulsion "unwisely, arbitrarily and unphilosophically" made. 8
The civil-law tradition, here as in the matter of contracts, detaches the formal elements from the whole transaction and treats them in accordance with the maxim, locus
regit actum. Not in the old Italian school, but since the
French statutists, this principle was prevailingly observed in
full rigor, with imperative force. The will had to conform to the formal provisions of the law governing at
the place of execution at the time of execution or be considered void under the law governing succession. Thus,
the Grand' Chambre du Parlement of Paris invalidated
in 1721 a holographic will that the Governor of Douai,
M. de Pommereuil, had made in that town in the holographic form of the Coutume de Paris. 9 This remained
the French approach during the nineteenth century. Hence,
a foreigner could not employ the forms of his home state.
In the numerous cases of wills made in France by Englishmen in the English manner with two witnesses, a manner
unknown to French law, it happened that the will was
invalid in England because France was the last domicil/ 0

6 Bremer v. Freeman ( 1857) 10 Moo. P.C.C. 306; Moultrie v. Hunt ( 1861)
23 N.Y. 394; Nat v. Coons ( 1847) 10 Me. 543·
7
ln re Beaumont (1907) 216 Pa. 350, 65 At!. 799; Blackwell v. Grant
( 1933) 46 Ga. App. 241, 167 S.E. 333·
8
PHILLIMORE, Commentaries upon International Law ( ed. 3) vol. 4, 705.
9
2 LAINE 416. Exactly to the same effect the Parliament of Paris had
decided analogous cases since 1615. See DuBRUJEAUD, Des conllits de lois
relatifs a Ia forme du testament sous seing prive (these, Paris 1908).
10
Bremer v. Freeman, supra n. 6.
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and was equally void in France, because it was executed in
France. 11
A third connecting factor is the oldest of all: lex situs
governing all assets including movable property. As mentioned above, this approach obtains in Mississippi, 12 and
in the Treaty of Montevideo is subject only to the exception
that authentic wills executed in a member state are recognized.13
These three basic tests, if standing unrelated, are a
monument of isolationism. They are inexcusable where the
ultimate penalty of invalidity befalls an instrument as the
effect of one of the mentioned variants in the number of
witnesses, attestation and signing, acknowledgment of presence, officials in public wills, dates and location of signature in holographic wills, etc.
2.

Enlargements

(a) English legislation. Even before the belief of the
lawyers in the necessity of rigorous formality began to
decline, the international intolerance shown in our matter
aroused astonishment. It is well-known how the decision
in Bremer v. Freeman 14 alarmed the British colony in
France and led to Lord Kingsdown's Act, 15 which created
a very large faculty for British subjects to testate abroad.
According to this law, which despite its record for bad
drafting 16 is still in force, the formal validity of the will
may derive from the law of the place of execution or that
11 The line of these decisions, including Cass. req. (March 9, 1853)
D.I8S3·I.2I7, S.I853·I.2I7, reached to the lower courts in the complicated
law suit Gesling v. Viditz, Cour Paris (Dec. 2, 1898) D.1899·2.177 and
Cour Orleans (Feb. 24, 1904) Revue 1909, 900 reversed, see infra n. 23.
12 Miss. C. Ann. 1942, Title I, ch. 1, § 467. See supra 253·
13 Art. 44·
14
Supra n. 5·
15
Wills Act, 1861.
16 See the criticism by MORRIS, 62 Law Q. Rev. ( 1946) 170, I73·
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of the domicil or ongm. (Section I ) . It is well understood that in addition the law of the last domicil remains
in an optional function (section 4) .
This option is granted to British subjects making a will
concerning "personalty" out of the United Kingdom. When
executing a will within the United Kingdom, the list is
strangely narrower (Section 2) . Section 3, declaring a
change of domicil immaterial, has a much disputed scope;
in particular it is an unending controversy whether it adds
anything new for British subjects and whether it applies
also to aliens. 17
(b) Typical civil law. In the civil-law countries of the
later nineteenth century, another enlargement took place.
The lex loci actus lost its mandatory character and permitted the personal law to govern formalities in disposition
either of movables or, in accordance with the principle of
unity of succession, of the entire inheritance. Personal law
to the Continental European mind was in this period the
national law at the time of executing the will. The old
test of lex loci actus, thus, was replaced by the option,
lex loci actus or lex patriae, as early laid down in the Italian
Code of 1865. 18 The German Civil Code of 1896 inverted
the order: lex patriae or lex loci actus. 19
In France, two sections of the Civil Code created diffi17
For the affirmative: WESTLAKE I2I § 85; DICEY (ed. 5) rule I97;
BRESLAUER, "The Scope of Section 3 of the Will's Act I86I," 3 Int. L. Q.
(I950) 343· For denial: FOOTE 30I; CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 527; DICEY (ed. 6)
840. Loss of British nationality after execution of the will is innocuous
according to Re Colville [I932] I D.L.R. 47 (British Columbia S. Ct.) and
"probably'' in the English courts, CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 5I8.
18
Italy: Former C.C. ( I865) Disp. Prel. art. 9, par. I; FEDOZZI (ed. 2) 593·
19
Germany: EG. BGB. art. II, par. I and some treaties of Germany.
Similar: Austria: doctrine, s. EHREN ZWEIG, I System des osterreichischen
aiig. Privatrechts (I95I) uo; China: I.P.L. (I9I8) art. 2I, par. I; Czechoslovakia: Pr. I. L. (I948) 43· Japan: Pr. I. L. (I898) art. 26. Poland:
Pr. I. L. ( I926) art. 5 and 29, controversial. Siam: Pr. I. L. ( I939) art. 40.
Sweden: L. March 5, I937• ch. I, § 4·
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culties. Article 999 permits Frenchmen abroad to testate
by the French form of a holographic will or by local
authentic testament. The courts rejected certain foreign
executed wills of Frenchmen 20 but seemed agreed that
authentic wills did not need intervention of one or two
official solemnizing persons as the French Code demands.
The definition should rather be taken from the foreign
place of execution. Use by Frenchmen in a common-law
jurisdiction of the private and secret Anglo-American forms
was therefore admitted, 21 a nice legal trick to obviate hardships. On the other hand, foreigners in France were finally
allowed, despite the categoric rule locus regit actum of
C. C. article J, to testate in France in their national forms;
the Court of Cassation announced the facultative, optional
function of this maxim in a decision of I 909, dealing with
the will of a foreigner. 22 After this was secured, the
authors went farther in construing article 999 as merely
"enumerative"; Frenchmen should be able to use any forms
of the local law, for instance a holographic will in an easier
form than Article 970 C.C. allows. 23
An analogous development may be noted especially in
Quebec and Chile. When a domiciliary of Quebec executed
a holographic will in New York, the old interpretation of
the Quebec Civil Code, article 7, imperatively required compliance with New York law, which did not know holographic wills. But the Court of Appeals unanimously,
and the Canadian Supreme Court by majority, validated
the will applying Quebec law as the law of the last domicil,
20
Trib. civ. Lyon, Clunet 1877, 149, without date concerned an Austrian
oral will.
21
Cass. civ. (Feb. 6, 1843) D.1843·1.2o8, S.1843.1.209; App. Rouen (July 21,
1840) S.1840.2.515; Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 6, 1919) Revue 1920, 476.
22
Cass. civ. (July 20, 1909) D.1911.I.185, S.1915.1.165, Clunet 1909,
1097, Revue 1909, 900, following the conclusions of the Procureur General,
Clunet 1909, 1098.
23 BATIFFOL, Traite 582 ff. § 581.
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stating renvoi from New York to Quebec, and the Supreme
Court recognizing that the rule locus regit actum is per·
missive. 24 Article I 8 of the Chilean Civil Code declares
it necessary that every will be a public and solemn instrument, and article I027 again recognizes a foreign will
only if it is (written and) "solemn." But the views of the
commentators and a decision of I 864 rejecting foreign
holographic wills were superseded by a decision of the
Supreme Court of I927 recognizing them. 25 The Greek
Code of I830 recognized merely the lex loci actus, but the
Wills Act of I 9 I I added the lex patriae. 26
Among the many laws that followed the French lead, 27
an analogous trend toward lex loci actus or national law is
noticeable, although Portugal insists on the law of the
place of execution even with imperative force 28 and often
the required authentic form is more rigorously insisted
upon. Frequently, the domestic forms must be observed
also by foreigners, and holographic wills may be excluded
altogether. In the Netherlands, holographic wills of foreigners at the forum may be executed according to the
24
Ross v. Ross (1894) 25 S.C.R. 307; 2 Q.B. (1893) 413, cf. FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict (ed. 2) 154 f., 280; 3 JOHNSON 5·
25
App. Santiago (June 27, 1864) Gac. Trib. (1864) 436, no. II95; Corte
Supr. (Jan. 14, 1927) 25 Rev. Der. Jur. y Ciencias Soc., 2nd part, I Io6;
ALBONICO VALENZUELA, EJ DIP ante Ia Jurisprudencia Chilena (I943) I66.
26
Greece: Law of Feb. II, I83o, art. 6I; Law on Wills of May I7/I8,
I9II, art. 53 par. I; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 509; C. C. I940, art. II.
27
Belgium: C.C. art. 999; POULLET (ed. 3) §§ 477 f.
Belgian Congo: C.C. art. II.
Bulgaria: Law of Dec. I7, I889, art. 88.
Cuba: C. C. art. 732.
Dominican Rep.: C. C. art. 999·
Egypt: C.C. I948, art. I7 par. 2.
Haiti: C. C. arts, 8os, 8o6.
Panama: C.C. arts. 76 5, 770.
Puerto Rico: C.C. art. I I.
Spain: C. C. art. 732.
Venezuela: C.C. art. 879.
28
Portugal: C.C. art. I9IO ff., 1961, 1965; infra n. 81. Also the old
bilateral treaties between Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia.
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national requirements, but the Appeal Court of the Hague
insists that a deposit with a Dutch notary is indispensable. 29
Nevertheless, the most familiar formula of the civil-law
countries can be stated as referring alternatively to lex loci
actus or the national law, 30 less often the domiciliary law 31
of the testator. Sometimes, it is true, in the codes the
alternatively to lex loci actus is only the code itself. 32
Nationality has been replaced by domicil as the test of
personal law, for instance, in Brazil. 33 However, in France,
where the law of the last domicil governs succession to
movables, formal validity is yet subject to lex loci actus or
lex patriae as of the time of execution.
(c) Interstate and international unification. Uniform
state statutes. When the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was founded in I 892,
practically their first work was the drafting of an Act relating to the execution of wills. The wording then 34 was
29
Rb. Den Haag (June 3, 1926) W. II545, N.J. 1928, 1020, affirmed
Hof Den Haag (Jan. 9, 1928) W. n813; contra MEIJERS, N.J. 1929,
468; WPNR 3493; BARMAT, De Regel Locus regit actum (Amsterdam,
1936) 314.
30 In addition to the citations supra n. 19 and 26, e.g. Ethiopia: BENTWICH,
4 Int. L. Q. 113; Nicaragua: C. C. art. VI, par. rs.
31
E.g. Denmark: (App. 30, 1940) U.F.R. 1940, 857, 13 Z. a us!. PR. 828:
Dane, domiciled in Denmark, testating in France in French form.
2
3 Colombia: C.C. art. 1084.
Ecuador: C.C. art. roSs.
Guatemala: C.C. ( 1877) art. 789.
Honduras: C. C. arts. ror r, 1012.
Mexico: C.C. art. 1593 (implicite); State of Morelos: C.C. arts. rs, r6or;
State of Puebla: C.C. arts. 12, 3127.
Norway: Law of July 31, 1854, §56.
33
Brazil: The dominant opinion under the law of 1916 claimed the imperative effect of lex loci actus without any distinction; TEN6Rro ( ed. 2)
336 § 443 against BEVILAQUA and RoDRIGO OCTAVIO, 1 Manual do C6digo civil
brasileiro (Lacerda ed.) 2 § 356. According to the Introd. L. of 1942 it
seems that for foreign executed wills the law of the last domicil and lex
loci actus are optional.
34
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Law, 1892, p. 9·
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identical with the text agreed upon in I 896 35 and again
with that promulgated in I9I0, 36 as Uniform Wills Act,
Foreign Executed. Among the many subsequent uniform
bills, this is a rara avis belonging to the "conflictual" kind.
Wills executed in a foreign state in a manner recognized
at the forum or at the testator's domicil should be considered as if they were executed in the mode of the forum.
This rule extends to interests in land.
The draftsmen stated from the beginning in I 892 that
there was no real reason for the differences of formal requirements in disposing by testament of personalty and
real estate, "the effect of which has been in many cases to
defeat the purpose of a testator." Since divergence of the
laws of real and personal property had been abolished
in most states, "there would seem to be every reason why
a similar simplification of the law would be accepted."
However, the success was limited. The Act has been
adopted only by thirteen jurisdictions. 37 In a new draft
of Execution of Wills Act, I940, intended to unify the
municipal formal requirements of wills themselves, the old
text was inserted with certain modifications as section 7. 38
This broadening of the scope was balanced by changing
the "uniform" law into a "model law." Although its influence is certainly notable, in the past twelve years only
Tennessee has joined the ranks of the adopting states.
The draftsmen considered their work useful rather than
necessary. Yet at least the conflicts rule of section 7 concerns one of the numerous points where the local differences
35

I d. 1896, p. 19.
!d. 1910, p. 144.
Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, South Dakota, Wisconsin. Washington repealed its adherence. Kansas and Tennessee acceded to the new draft, see
on Kansas infra n. 49·
38
9 U.L.A. ( 1951) 421, 423, inserted in the Model Probate Code §so,
SIMES, Problems in Probate Law ( 1946) p. 82.
36

37
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are devoid of any territorial, moral, social, or other justification and plainly apt to irritate the people involved.
Legal formalities are indispensable, but to allow their local
shades to disturb otherwise unimpeachable post-mortuary
dispositions compromises the law. This motive was taken
up and made the theme of a masterful exposition by Lorenzen in I9I I.39
Canadian Uniform Law. The British Act of I86I was
amended by the Uniform Wills Act in Canada in I929,
particularly by including alien testators, and increasing the
list of validating foreign laws. 40 But also this Act is in
force only in two provinces, Saskatchewan and Manitoba.
In Canada, Falconbridge is the eminent advocate of a generous recognition of foreign forms of testaments. A further improved text is due to him. 41
Hague Conferences. It demonstrated a need recognized
universally at the time, that the Hague Conferences on
Private International Law beginning in I 893, almost simultaneously with the American Uniform Law Commission,
exactly like the latter started their work with the conflict
of inheritance laws and were concerned in particular with
the form of wills. 42 The formula adopted has become
a model for a few recent laws, although the Draft Convention as a whole has been a failure.
Scandinavian Convention. The Northern Convention of
I 934 considers a will formally valid if it complies with
the law of the place of execution or the law of the domicil
39

LORENZEN, 20 Yale L.J. (1911) 427·
14 Minutes of the Proceedings, Canadian Bar Ass., 1929 ( 1930) 323,
332 If.; also printed by MORRIS, 62 Law Q. Rev. ( 1946) at 185.
41
FALCONBRIDGE, in 62 Law Q. Rev. ( 1946) 328; id., Essays in Conflict of
Laws, Ch. 23; 34 Proceedings Can. Bar. Ass. (1951) 42-45.
42
Actes de Ia Cinquieme Conference de Ia Haye ( 1925) 283 art. 6;
identical Actes de Ia Sixieme Conference de Ia Haye ( 1928) 405 If. Pro jet
art. 6.
40
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or the national law at the time of execution. 43 The last
personal law is omitted as in the Continental Codes.
The Swiss law of I 89 I can be mentioned here since it
was enacted at a time when legislative power over private
law was with the Cantons. It allowed the forms of the
place of execution, of the Canton of domicil at the time
of execution or of the death, and of the home Canton. At
present applied only to international relations, this means
an option among the place of execution, the domicil at
either time, and the nationality. 44
(d) J7 arious rules. The existing variety in all other
jurisdictions is perplexing. Within the United States, five
or more groups of conflicts rules are distinguishable. 45 It
is highly significant that in most jurisdictions foreign executed wills on movables agreeing with the formalities of
the place of execution, are recognized, either as a privilege
restricted to formal requirements or as including intrinsic
validity. The variants include, in addition, the law of the
enacting state or the domicil at the time of execution or
both. On the other hand, six states name only their own
law and the lex loci actus, and eleven states retain exclusively the common-law criterion of lex domicilii as of the
time of death.
In the Latin-American countries, even where the French
Code is not followed literally, the "authentic" form enjoys
a marked preference, either suppressing holographic wills
altogether or at least for the use of nationals abroad. As
on this point, the Codes also vary in combinations between
43
("Northern") Convention, concerning Inheritance and Succession ( 1934)
art. 8, 6 HunsoN, Int. Legislation 947 no. 397, 164 League of Nations Treaties
Ser. 279.
44
N.A.G. arts. 24 and 28.
45
The best survey has been given in the excellent article by HoPKINS,
"The Extraterritorial Effect of Probate Decrees," 53 Yale L. J. ( 1944) 221,
254 ff.
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lex loci actus, national or domiciliary law, respectively, and
the domestic law.
Another minimum requirement, that a foreign will should
be written, recurs also in American statutes. 46

3· The Most Developed Reference Lists
(a) Texts. The Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed,
1910, stated that "A last will and testament, executed without this state in the mode prescribed by the law, either of
the place where executed or of the testator's domicil, shall
be deemed to be legally executed, and shall be of the same
force and effect as if executed in the mode prescribed by
the laws of this state; provided said last will and testament
is in writing and subscribed by the testator." 47
This text did not specify the domicil of what time was
deemed decisive. A new draft of 1938 therefore supplied
a broader option, referring to the domicil either of the
time of the execution or at the death. 48 This version was
adopted by Kansas. 49 But, without discussion, 50 the Commissioners abbreviated the wording, leaving only the domicil
at the time of the execution:
"A will executed outside this state in a manner prescribed
by this act, or a written will executed outside this state
in a manner prescribed by the law of the place of its execution or by the law of the testator's domicil at the time of
its execution, shall have the same force and effect in this
46
In re Tessini's Est. (1947) 73 N.Y.S. (2d) 904, an Italian testament in
which the testator declares to be unable to write, was denied probate because
an agent should have been asked to write for him.
47
Handbook ( 1910) 144.
48
Id. (1938) 314 with an appropriate note.
49
Kansas L. ( 1939) ch. 180 § 45; Gen. Stat. Ann ( 1949) §§ 59-609.
50
In Handbook ( 1939) 227, the note of 1938 is carried, but the text is
changed, cancelling the mention of the last domicil. Mr. Barton H. Kuhn,
Omaha, obliged me by stating that no discussion of the point is noted in the
files.
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state as if executed in this state in compliance with the
provisions of this act." 51
Probably the old text already meant to refer to the
domicil at the time of execution, and was silent on the last
domicil because this was the old accustomed device of which
no lawyer needed to be reminded. Section I of Lord
Kingsdown's Act may have been too closely followed. The
final text expresses what the old wording omitted to specify.
The formulation this time, it is true, sounds so exhaustive
that it has been understood by competent interpreters as
excluding the last domiciJ.5 2 If so, the common-law rule
would have entirely yielded to the civilian thought. This
is unlikely in itself and seems not to have come to the mind
of the draftsmen. The omission also of lex situs reinforces
the argument that the draftsmen cannot have intended to
exclude the old criteria. This interpretation is approved
by a leading commissioner. 53
Most recently, in an unofficial manner, an extremely
ample (perhaps all too ample) list has been offered by the
Commissioners which at the same time, opportunely leaving the narrow framework of a law for foreign executed
wills, includes nonresident testators:
"A will is legally executed if the manner of its execution
complies with the law in force either at the time of execution or at the time of the testator's death of I) this state,
2) the place of execution, or 3) the domicile of the testator
at the time of execution or at the time of his death." 54
The Hague Draft, article 6, names the law of the place
of execution, the testator's national law at the time of execu9 U.L.A. (1951) 423.
Thus BORDWELL, "The Statute Law of Wills," 14 Iowa
445; HoPKINS, supra n. 45, at 268 regretting this result.
53
On the ground of the facts, supra n. so, Mr. Willard
kindly authorized me to state his personal interpretation of s.
54
9 U.L.A. ( 1951) Supp. 1953 (for 1954) p. 48, in
Uniform Probate of Foreign Wills Act, 1950.
51

52

L. Rev. (1929)
Luther, Boston,
7 to this effect.
commenting on
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tion or at the time of death. 55 The Swiss law, as mentioned before, declares sufficient conformity with the law of
the place of execution, the domicil of either time, and the
national law. 56
Also the Argentine Civil Code admits foreign executed
wills in the form of the testator's residence or nation or
of the Argentine law. 57
(b) Comparison: time of validity. It is highly interesting that while common law looked only to the personal
law as of the time of the death and civil law only to the
time of the execution, on both sides the distinct trend was
to let formal validity of either time suffice. Lord Kingsdown's Act and the American Uniform Law added the time
of execution; the Hague Draft and, before it, the Swiss
Act added the time of death. The two great groups
joined, but most laws are lagging, and expressions are
sometimes defective. In South Africa, for instance (admitting lex loci actus and "domicil"), as recently reported,
the two only decisions held opposite views on the formal
validity of a will conforming only to the law of the last
domicil. 58 In particular, it is surprising 59 that the German
Code, followed by other codes, 60 fails even to make the
55

Actes Sixieme Conf., ( 1928) 405 ff., art. 6.
N.A.G. art. 24.
57
Argentina: C.C. art. 3638.
58
Re McMillan's Estate (1913) T.P.D. 198 (invalidity); ex p. Estate
Abbott (1950) (3) S.A.L.R. 325 (validity); see ELLISON KAHN, "Recent
Cases in South African P.I.L.," 4 Int. L.Q. (1951) 397; the author advocates
validity also according to the common-law test.
59
The older German literature was divided. But in Austria, WALKER
(ed. 3) p. 1805, against THOL and STOBBE, stressed the awkwardness of excluding the law governing the succession, invoking Savigny's dictum, p. 312,
that the testament is legally to be considered as executed at the moment of
death.
60
Germany: E.G. art. 24.
Czechoslovakia: Priv. Int. L. § 3·
Egypt: C.C. art. 17.
Japan: Pr. Int. L. art. 26.
Siam: Pr. Int. L. art. 39·
56
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exception in favor of the last nationality that it states in
the matter of capacity of willing; as has been pointed
out, where an English lady writes a holographic will in
London, and later acquires German nationality by marriage
and dies, her will remains invalid. 61
Law of Place of Execution. The common-law rule has
since Lord Kingsdown's Act been very largely enriched by
considering the lex loci actus. Familiar to the predecessors
of the English scholars, this is justly recognized as the
most appropriate source of formal validity. Most American statutes and the great majority of all other laws are
now united under this old rule.
Law Governing Succession. On the other hand, again
uniformity is in the making, when the American statutes,
unfortunately often silently, retain validity under the law
of the domicil at the time of death and civil-law statutes
add this reference to their lists, as the Hague Draft,
Switzerland, Italy, and Greece.
The Law of the Enacting State. The American Uniform Law, Lord Kingsdown's Act, and a considerable
number of American and foreign statutes include "this
law," i.e., the law of the enacting state, in their lists,
which may be, but need not be, identical with the last
domiciliary or national law. The reference covers the
cases where assets are situated at the forum, while the
other local contacts may be foreign; for instance, it obviates any hard proof of compliance with the law of the
place of execution. 62 In systems tending to a strong territorialism, this is a natural device. Another unsuspected use
may appear in the following situation. An American citizen,
formerly domiciled in Tennessee, takes a new domicil in
61

M.

62

/n re Hart's Estate (1936) 6o Misc. xo8, 289 N.Y.S. 731; (1937) 250

WOLFF,

D.IPR. (ed. 3) 198, following

/\pp. Div. 753, 295 N.Y.S. 765.

LEWALD,

IPR. 316 f. § 381.
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Cuba (or The Netherlands, Japan, etc.), executes there
a will conforming to the law of Tennessee, i.e., the Model
Probate Code, with two witnesses, and dies there. An
American domiciled abroad is no longer a citizen of a
particular state ;63 the United States has no substantive law
of succession for him. The domicil and the place of execution refuse recognition. But the court of Tennessee and
others, if not demanding more exacting formalities, may
admit the will to probate under "this," their own statute.
This, however, would be a probate judgment, not rendered at the last domicil, that would probably have no effect
outside the state except as to the assets of Tennessee. The
only real remedy would be a substantive all-American rule
applicable by any foreign court that looks to the national
law. Americans abroad are a new event in American lawmaking.
Domestic Wills. The American official text and many
others are merely concerned with foreign executed wills.
A considerable number of states, indeed, insist on their
own formalities for domestic executed wills. This occurs
not only with respect to the subjects of the forum and to
domestic immovables but ((locus regit actum" is likely to
be applied to all assets in the imperative meaning when
the will is executed at the forum. French practice and
the German Code have advanced to a general option between
the lex loci actus and the personal law. This development
is followed in many other countries 64 but needs general
acceptance.
The Personal Law of Other States. Comparing the
advanced lists in the Model Law and the Hague Draft, a
striking parallel is revealed with the likewise remarkable
difference that here domicil, there nationality, is the only
63

64

Vol. I, I34·
Spain is doubtful; see z

GoLDSCHMIDT

ZS3·
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criterion for the personal law. Most draftsmen do not
even think of the connecting factor in the other half of the
world. An exception is made by the Scandinavian Convention which had to consider the nationality principle in
Sweden and Finland and the age-old domiciliary law of
West-Scandinavia for their mutual relations, and more
effectively, by the Swiss law in consideration of the split
in the Cantons. It is the solitary merit of Argentina to
have spontaneously remembered the division of the conflicts
rules in the Western hemisphere. Of course, the C6digo
Bustamante considers this contrast in its peculiar way.
There is an interest of harmony involved in this question,
but also a certain practical effect.
Suppose a Frenchman, domiciled in England, executes in
Portugal a holographic will according to the French Civil
Code, Article 970. Valid under French law (C.C. Article
999), the will is invalid in Portugal. 65 In an American
Court such as New York, neither lex loci actus, nor domicil
of any time, nor "this" law justifies recognition. But all
jurisdictions looking to the national law must hold the
will valid by a kind of renvoi neglected in the discussions.
Should not England and the United States join them?
On the other hand, suppose a Cuban, domiciled in
Detroit, on a trip to Louisiana executes there a will with
two witnesses conforming to Michigan law. Michigan and
Louisiana (under the Uniform Law) consider the will
valid, although Louisiana requires three to five witnesses.
Should it not he valid also in Cuba or Germany or Japan?
Change of Personal Law. As it seems, section 1 of Lord
Kingsdown's Act refers also to the case of a change of the
testator's domicil between execution and death, although
section 3 deals with the same case and only with change.
65

Portugal: infra n.

81.
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The American statutes recognizing the domiciliary law at
either time are drafted with a particular view to the testator's change of domicil. But a German provision only by
an irrational exception preserves the validity of the will
of an alien who becomes a naturalized German, if the will
is valid under the former national law and the law of the
place of execution, yet conforms with German law (E.G.
BGB. art. 24 al. 3).
Proposal: A will is legally executed if the form of its
execution complies with the law in force either (I) in the
enacting state at the time of his death, ( 2) at the place of
execution at the time of the execution, or ( 3) at the domicil
or in the national state of the testator at the time of execution, or at the time of his death.
II.
I.

RESTRICTIONS

In Favor of Lex Causae

The theory that the rule locus regit actum depends on
the consent of the alex causae" 66 obtains a particular place
where the form of wills is tested under the law of the place
of execution.
Around I 900, with special regard to wills, an author
asserted that the theory giving superiority to the lex causae,
which in this case is the law governing the succession, was
not only the prevailing but the common view. 67 In the
same vein, the first drafts of the Hague Conference from
I 892 inserted a clause restricting the application of lex loci
actus to the condition that where the national law governing
66

Vol. II, p. 495, to which the reader may be referred.
CONTUZZI, Diritto ereditario internazionale ( 1908) 510 If., citing AssER,
BAR, DESPAGNET, DUGUIT, DURAND, FOELIX, HAGGE, LAURENT, NAPOLITANI,
and FIORE.
67
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a stipulation of a will requires a certain form, the will
cannot be made in another form. 68
Although this view has since shrunk to a small minority
of opinions,S 9 the recent French draft declares its adherence
to the dependence of lex loci actus on the lex causae/ 0 and
the reporter, Niboyet, wanted also the application to testaments ;11 the Benelux International Private Law in fact
carries this application by stating that a legal act is valid
respecting its form if it satisfies the respective conditions
of the country where the act is accomplished, "except where
the nature of the act or the national law of the person
accomplishing it opposes (this effect)." 72 The Netherlands, moved by their famous prohibition of foreign executed private testaments to Dutch nationals (to be discussed presently), also initiated the first Hague Drafts.
This doctrine results in the extraterritorial effect of prohibitions by the national law or whatever else may be
in other legal systems the lex causae.
The problem has occupied the attention of the courts in
connection with the following legal provisions.
(a) French Code Civil, Article 999: A Frenchman in a
foreign country may make his testamentary dispositions by
act under private signature as prescribed by article 970
or by authentic act in the forms used at the place where
this act is executed.
The significant history of interpreting this section has
68 Actes 1893, p. 29, art. 6 par. 2; Pro jet transactionnel, basis for the Conference of 1904, Documents (1904) 166, art. 2 par. 2; see for the first drafts
on this point 2 KAHN, Abh. 225 If.
69
See for the majority view LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE §§ 314, 367; BATIFFOL,
Traite § 579; and the almost uniform German doctrine, infra n. 76; see also
KG. (June 6, 1940) JR. 1940, 1372, HRR. 1940, uo8.
1
°Commission de Reforme du C.C., Travaux 1949-so, 673 If. Projet art.
59· NIBOYET, ibid. at p. 672 claimed that the German law was to the same
effect, strictly contrary to the facts.
11
Art. 69 of the French draft of the subcommittee. Travaux ibid. 673 If.
12
Benelux draft ( 1951) art. 23.
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been mentioned above. The result is that a French testator abroad may use even a holographic will in the local
form not agreeable to article 970 of the French Code Civil,
and oral wills according to Austrian, Swiss, or Scandinavian
laws, or the American statutes permitting nuncupative wills.
The French lawyers deservedly acknowledge the need of
international security of transactions for an unchallenged
operation of local form applied in executing wills.
(b) Netherlands Code, Article 992. The Dutch provision
runs in categoric terms.
In contrast to the Frenchman, the Dutchman abroad
testates invalidly in any local form, except in "authentic"
form which, moreover, requires the intervention of a public
official, irrespective of the foreign local conceptions. It
suffices, however, as the Hoogeraad inferred from history
and reason of the provision, that a foreign holographic
will be deposited with a foreign public authority. 73
The Dutch learned writers are scarcely inclined to characterize this provision as a rule of status, restricting capacity.
They state in an entirely correct appraisal, a formal requirement sanctioned by nullity, and naturally enforced
within the prohibiting state on the grounds of public
policy. 74 They seem divided, however, with respect to the
international effect. Is this effect merely prevented by contrary public policy of the foreign court or by the rule locus
regit actum itself? In other countries, notably eminent
French and Italian writers, on the contrary, for a long time
acknowledged a binding international force of article 992
on two theories: either on the ground of the mysterious
notion of "formes habilitantes," which constitute not a form
73 H.R. (Jan. 6, 1927) W.n623; N.J. 1927, 266; OFFERHAUS 708 ff.; that
the deposit may be made abroad, against what modern writers had to conclude from H.R. (Dec. 18, 188s) W.5252.
H See ultimately VAN BRAKBL § 150,
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nor an incapacity, or by characterizing the prohibition
directly as incapacitating the testator to execute a private
will in a foreign country. Hence, the Dutch national personal law would be applicable in all courts under the nationality principle. 75 The great majority of authorities 76 have
recognized the obvious truth that the formation of wills in
oral, written, or authentic expression pertains to "form,"
and the domestic forms are open to foreigners; prohibitions
such as the Dutch have to yield to the rule locus regit actum
in the other countries. The Dutch rule is felt to imply
repudiation of the reliance put on the local legal system,
75 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Jan. 9, I937) Pas.I937.2.56, Clunet I938,
367, Revue crit. I938, 470; SATTER, 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. I9: holographic
testament made in Belgium declared void; (June 20, I93I) Rev. trim. Inst.
beige de droit compare I932, 56; 2 DE Vos 947 ff.
France: Cour Paris (May 7, I897) Clunet I897, 8I7; Trib. Seine (Aug. I3,
I903); Clunet I904, I66; (Feb. I9, I927) D.I928.2.33, Revue I928, I02;
LAINE, 2 Introduction 329 ff.; id., Revue I907, 833 ff.; WEISS, 4 Traite 635;
VALERY, 1238 § 882; BARTIN, 3I Recueil 576; cf. DESPAGNET § 378 his.
Germany: RG. (Dec. I7, I9I2) J.W. I9I3, 333, Leipz. Z. I9I3, 774 (overruled with respect to marriage Apr. 6, I9I6) 88 RGZ. I9I; OLG. Karlsruhe
(Dec. I3, I9I9) 40 R-OLG. I59·
Italy: App. Genova (Aug. 4, I89I) Clunet I893, 955; Cass. Torino (Apr. 12,
I892) Clunet, I894, 1083 ; FIORE, 2 Delle Disposizioni Generali sulla Puhhlicazione, applicazione ed interpretazione delle leggi (ed. 2) 385 ff.
76
Belgium: Poullet ( ed. 2) 557 ff. §§ 478 f.
France: Cass. civ. (June 29, I922) D.I922.I.127, S.I923.I.249; for the case
of a Dutchman: Orleans (Aug. 4, I859) D.I859.2.I58, S.I86o.2.37; cf. Aix
(July II, I88I) S.I883.2.249, Clunet I882, 426; Trih. Seine (March 23, I944)
S.I944·2·44· ARMINJON, 2 Precis (ed. 2) § 206 his. NIBOYET, Manuel 665
§ 542 and Revue I928, 105; cf. id., 3 Traite 352 § 953; 363 §956; LEREBOURSPIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 272 §256. BATIFFOL 311 ff., 584 § 582; 670 § 667.
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (May 2, I9I7) 72 Seuff. A. 3I3; RG. (Apr. 6,
I9I6) 88 RGZ. I9I (dictum); (June 22, I93I) I33 RGZ. I6I at I63;
KG. (Feb. IS, I934) IPRspr. I934, No. 7I: "the local form suffices always."
KAHN, I Abhandl. 43; 2 id. 226; KIPP in I WINDSCHElD, Pand. 54 I; PLANCK,
Art. 11 n. 4; NussBAUM 89 ff.; NEUNER, Der Sinn 3I; LEWALD 83, 86, 3IS.Contra RAAPE, Komm. I7I, 686 setting E.G. art. 24 over E.G. art. II.
With comparative research: FRAGlSTAS, 4 Z. ausl. P.R. ( I930) 934·
Italy: Cass. (July 6, I926) Foro delle Nuove Provincie ( I927) I 296,
cit. by FEDOZZI (ed. I) 585 n. 4· (Oral will made in the Austrian time,
recognized) ; BUZZATl I 59, 423, 393; DIENA, Sui limiti alia applicazione del
dir. straniero (also in Studi Senesi, vol. IS) 25-30.
Switzerland: SCHNITZER (ed. 3) 479·
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warranted by locus regit actum, "one of the most beneficent rules of private international law." 11
Evidently, this is the only reasonable and systematically
fitting conception. Yet, can it be justified by the popular
idea that just the law of the forum has its own privileged
characterization of form? Such a prerogative is wholly
unfounded in an international give and take. There as
always, the nature of the rule is molded by the common
theoretical conviction, in this case the more easily so, since
even the Dutch dominating opinion coincides so far. A
singular deviation of one statute is irrelevant. Not the
law of the forum but the reasonable and internationally
accepted concept of form grants the result that every state
may permit and in fact, in the absence of any local prohibition, permits the Dutch national the use of its own forms. 78
(c) The Dutch provision applies also in the former and
present Netherlands colonies. 79 In Latin America, restrictions of the French type are numerous. 80 Portugal, where
lex loci actus is the only validating law, does not recognize
private testaments at all, wherever executed; the conse77

LAINE in Actes de Ia Troisieme Conference de Ia Haye ( I904) at 129;

WALKER 809.
78
FEDOZZI (ed. I) 588 ff. starts with the acknowledgment that the Dutch
rule "e indubbiamente relativa alia forma," but he considers the question not
one of characterization but as a conflict of conflicts rules (on form). Hence,
not the Italian characterization but the Italian conflicts rule would be the
decisive element. This is not a valid contrast! It is just the content of
the Italian conflicts rule that is in question; it is found by characterizing a
concept, part of the rule, viz. the "form."
GEMMA, Propedeutica al Dir. Int. Priv. (Bologna I899) III ff. agrees
because he wants to favor holographic wills, the simplest and most suitable
expression of the testator's intentions. But many legislators mistrust these
wills. This kind of policy, in my opinion, is to be left to the individual
municipal laws. Although some writers have approached Gemma's method
to my own, only the results are kindred.
79
Neth. Indies: C.C. art. 945·
Surinam: C. C. art. 972.
Cura~:ao: C. C. art. 97I, dealt with in KG. Berlin (Feb. IS, I934), IPRspr.
( 1934) nr. 7I.
80
See supra 306.
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quences are absurd. 81 The attitude of other states to these
prohibitions and those of oral wills 82 is naturally negative
because of the effect of the independent rule, locus regit
actum.
Wills of Minors. According to the Austrian, Spanish, and German Codes, a minor of a certain age may execute a will but may not use holographic forms, 83 or must
testate orally in court. 84 In these cases the restriction of
available forms clearly serves the protection of minor age.
Therefore, a part of the doctrine resorts to the personal law
and holds a holographic will void, wherever made, 85
whereas in another view form remains form without regard
at whose protection it aims. 86
It would seem, unfortunately, that in the country where
such a provision is in force, it is meant to apply also to
wills executed abroad. 87 However, the undoubted fact that
the voidness attaches to the use of a certain form and not
to incapacity to will, must work for validity in all other
countries recognizing the lex loci actus in this respect.
Only jurisdictions with a similar public policy may be
exempted.
The situation, hence, is identical with the foregoing
81 Portugal: C.C. art. 1910 ff., 1961, 1965. Sup. Ct. Lisbon (May 28, 1912)
Revue 1913, 220: The holographic will of a German executed in Lisbon and
recognized as valid by a German court is declared ineffective; App. Lisbon
(Jan. 23, 1917) Clunet 1920, 278.
82 BUZZATI 401; FEDOZZI (ed. 1) S8483Germany: BGB. § 2247; law of July 31, 1938 (Testamentgesetz) § 21.
Spain: C. C. art. 688 par. 1, cf. 732 par. 3·
84 Austria: A.BGB § 569; former Prussian ALR.I IZ § 17.
85 Austria: EHRENZWEIG, Z SYSTEM (ed. z, 1937) 4II; former Prossian Code: DERNBURG, 3 Pr. Priv. R. § 104 Nr. 7·
Germany: NEUNER, Der Sinn 35-38; RAAPE, Komm. 642 resorts to public
policy.
86 Austria: WALKER 916.
Germany: PLANCK, 5 Komm. § 2247, z; z BAR 30 n. 24; CROME, 5 Biirg.
R.54; KAHN, 2 Abh. Z3Z; LEWALD, Questions 108.
81 Contra KAHN I.e.,· ScHNITZER 48z holds a holographic will made by a
twenty-year-old German in Switzerland valid in both countries.
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cases (a) and (b) and makes us wish in the same manner
that the statutes should not try to rule beyond their territory.
2.

In Favor of Lex Situs

A German national having executed a holographic will
in Germany leaves land in England. Lord Kingsdown's
Act does not validate wills on immovables, even if it should
be taken as including alien testators. According to prevailing German opinion the will is valid in Germany under the
lex loci actus, E.G. article I I, para. I, sent. 2, also with
respect to English land, though it is invalid in this regard
in England under the Wills Acts. Raape, whose dissident
theory is that lex causae overrides the local law in determining formal validity, suggests that, since E.G. article 28
concedes English land to be governed by English law, the
succession to this immovable is to be treated as intestate
also in German Courts. 88 This general favor given the lex
causae is inacceptable, but another specific restriction of
lex loci actus should be inferred from the yielding of
German inheritance law to the English, E.G. article 28.
Assuming that this concession is an exception to all German
law involving this succession and comprehending formal
validity as well as other requirements of a will, locus regit
actum is put out of function.

III.
I.

OPERATION OF THE RULES

The Concept of Form

As shown above, in discussing delimitations between
formal validity and capacity, it is practically settled that
the concept of form is the same as in the matter of marriage and contracts, 89 but independent of any deviations in
88
89

RAAPE, Komm. 173; IPR. 138, followed by ZEUGE 58 ff.
Vol. I, pp. 207, 214-216, 236; Vol. II pp. 496-498.
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particular systems. Greek requirements of an orthodox
marriage and Dutch prohibition of a foreign private will
are analogous deviations. Form in all these matters is
the natural concept of external expressions of a person's
volition.
The requirements for the form of wills refer to a certain time : the time of the execution of the will or the time
of the death or both. Lex loci actus aims exclusively at
the time when the will is made; subsequent events or
changes of law are irrelevant. In no case, formalities prescribed for a time after the death for the purpose of carrying out a will are pertinent to the applicable law, e.g.,
recording of the will requested in New York or in France,
Poland, etc. 90
Language requirements are important. It deserves mention that in many countries foreigners are allowed to use
the local public forms in their own language with adequate
safeguards. 91
Form, of course, must be distinguished from the evidentiary value of a document which, in general, is that accorded
at the place of execution. 92
Renvoi
The faculties granted in greatly increasing number to find
a law under which a will turns out to be formally valid,
2.

90

N.Y. in re Wizelhole's Estate ( 1941) 176 Misc. IOO, 26 N.Y.S. (zd) s86.
France: Cass. (Apr. 13, 1897) D.I897·I·3S7; S.I897·I-40I.
1
9 Argentina: C. C. art. 663.
Cuba: C. C. art. 688 par. 4·
France: Cass. req. (Aug. 12, 1868) S.x868.1.405; (Aug. 3, 1891) S.1892.1.
566; TRASBOT in 5 PLANIOL ET RIPERT § 566; the notary joins a French
translation, the witnesses must know both languages.
Germany: Law of July 31, 1938 (Testamentgesetz) §§ 18, 19.
Spain: C.C. art. 688 par. 4; cf. 2 GOLDSCHMIDT 253·
Uruguay: C.C. art. 799·
Venezuela: C.C. art. 863.
Note, Clunet 1954, 612.
92
SAVATIER 308 § 441 against confusion in Cour Paris (July 3, 1946) Gaz.
Pal. 1946.2.147·
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contain an equal justification of renvoi, 98 as Griswold has
perceived. In most American states, as mentioned above,
a will executed in the form of the place of execution is probated at the domicil as well as at the situs, and this reference entails further references elsewhere.
Illustrations. (i) Where an American, domiciled at death
in the United States, while in Paris executes a will on his
Cuban real property on a typed paper with two witnesses
and the clauses of his home state, the will is good in Cuba,
France, Germany, etc., as agreeable to the national law,
though not by lex loci actus; it is also good in all American
states and England, because it is valid at the last domicil.
( ii) Where a Portuguese devises his land situated in
Massachusetts by a holographic will in France, a court in
Maryland would refer to Massachusetts, which refers to
France.
Obviously Portugal Is wrong in applying domestic
narrowness.
(iii) In the case Ross v. Ross, 94 where a testator
domiciled in Quebec made a will in New York in the holographic form agreeable to Quebec but not New York law,
under the optional principle of locus regit actum the will
was held valid in Quebec, on the ground of Quebec conflicts
law. But it was held at the same time that if Quebec
should imperatively require validity under New York law,
renvoi from New York to the Quebec domicil would be
accepted. This is consonant with the British court practice. 95
3· Defective Formality
As stated in the case of a defective marriage celebration, 96 if the validity of an act depends on its compliance
93
GRISWOLD, 51 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1938) at 1191, 1201. For FALCONBRIDGE,
Conflict of Laws (ed. z) 154, this is only "a special indulgence shown in point
of formalities."
94
Ross v. Ross ( 1893) Que. Q.B. 413; ( 1894) zs S.C.R. 307; 3 JoHNSON
89-94·
95
See also GRISWOLD [.c.,· in re Martin [1900] P. ZII.
96
Vol. I, p. zz9.
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with the formal requirements of a certain law, the effect
of noncompliance is determined by the violated rule.

Illustration. An Italian was naturalized in the United
States. Because he voluntarily acquired the new citizenship, he lost his Italian nationality. His will executed in
New York (where he died domiciled) in holographic form
without witnesses would have sufficed to Italian law which,
however, was no longer competent. Since it was void under
the lex loci actus and patriae, it was void also in Italy; a
previous Italian will which should have been revoked remained in force. 97
Where parties to a contract fail to comply exactly with
the forms of both the lex causae and the lex loci contractus,
a party may invoke the law that gives the act the more
favorable treatment. 98 A corresponding principle must
obtain here.
In Germany three theories were expressed in connection
with a case where in 1928 a German executed a will
in Davos, Switzerland, before a notary who called in the
witnesses later than prescribed. The form sufficed for
German law. A court held according to Swiss law that the
will had been open to attack but in the absence of any attack
was valid. 99 The authors believing in the superiority of
the German lex causae reached the same result on different
grounds. 100 The majority, however, declared for the "milder
form." 101 The last view is justified by the free competition
between lex loci contractus and national law in the German
conflicts law.
97

Trib. Bari (Feb. 4, 1949) 72 Foro Ita!. (1949) I.III4·
Vol. II, p. 513 f.
99
LG. Naumburg (Nov. 28, 1929) IPRspr. (1930) 183 Nr. 90.
100 NIEMEYER 114; RAAPE, Komm 184; LIEBETRAU 41.
101
HABICHT 91; NIEDNER 35; WoLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 2) 107; WALKER 231;
I FRANKENSTEIN s6r, 4 id. 466. Cf. supra Vol. I, p. 229, II p. 513·
98
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]OINT WILLS

In the past, widespread usage permitted the execution
of one testament for two testators. This is still allowed
in some countries for spouses or for a couple engaged to
marry and spouses. 102 Within England validity may be
assumed under equity principles. 103
The probably prevailing American doctrine 104 recognizes
that two wills may be joined in one document and considers
that all wills can be revoked but a connected agreement can
be enforced against the estate and possibly the beneficiaries.
By way of construction it is often argued that, though both
wills are revocable until the first death, they are presumed to
be correspective, so that after one testator dies the other is
bound. 105 Although the California Probate Act of 1931,
§ 23 states: "A conjoint or mutual will is valid but it may
be revoked by any of the testators in like manner as any
other will" and as late as 1948 the revocability was stressed
to some degree, decisions of 1949 and 1950 joined the
common opinion, basing irrevocability upon the agreement
underlying the joint will that would be broken if the survivor revoked his own will, "at least where he accepts the
benefits under the deceased's will in his favor." 106 There
102
Austria: A.BGB. § 1248; Germany: Law of July 31, 1938 Testamentgesetz § 28; Spanish fora) laws of Aragon, art. 17, 2° and 3° Apendice
al C.C.; Navarra: LACARRA, 2 Institutiones de Derecho Civil Navarro (1932)
Vol. 2 105· See CONTUZZI, DIP. 566; 2 GoLDSCHMIDT 254·
108
England: see BRESLAUER 189.
104
r PAGE§§ 102 If.; Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. (1948) 681-684.
105
Thus in Illinois: Curry v. Cotton ( 1934) 356 Ill. 538; Peck v. Drennan
(1952) 4II Ill. 31, 37•
106
Brown v. Sup. Ct. ( 1949) 34 Cal. (2d) 559, 212 Pac. (2d) 878; the
decision overruled Lynch v. Lichtenthaler (1948) 85 Cal. App. (2d) 437, 193
Pac. (2d) 77, which required an express renunciation of revocation in the
agreement, and also emphasizes against Shive v. Barrow ( 1948) 88 Cal.
App. (2d) 838, 199 Pac. (2d) 693 that "the devisee or legatee cannot be
prevented from enforcing the contractual obligation." See also Chase v.
Leiter ( 1950) 96 Cal. App. (2d) 439, 215 Pac. (2d) 756 favoring the transformation of joint tenancy into community property by a joint will.
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is no doubt that probate both times will be granted where
both wills have not been revoked. 107
Most countries prohibit the junction entirely. Within
these jurisdictions, as a rule, 108 such wills cannot be validly
executed, and for this reason are nowhere recognized so
far as locus regit actum presides. Are such testaments,
however, internationally to be recognized, when executed
by nationals of a country allowing them and in a territory
allowing them? Are joint wills which are prohibited where
they are made, nevertheless recognizable elsewhere under
the law of domicil or nationality? These questions are
much debated in Europe.
I. In one opinion, the joining of the wills is a mere
incident of form, subject to locus regit actum. 109 Thus, an
authentic joint will of French spouses, invalid if made in
France, was held valid in a French court when made in
Batavia, and a joint will executed and probated in Tennessee
107
108

In re Johnston's Est. ( I945) 53 N.Y.S. (2d) 2I2.

E.g. France: C.C. arts. 968, I097; Italy: C.C. (old) 76I, (new) 589;
Netherlands: C.C. art. 977 ff.; Portugal: C.C. art. I753; Spain: C.C. art. 669;
Argentina: C. C. arts. 3612, 36I8; Brazil: C. C. art. I63o; Guatemala: C. C.
84I (like Spain); Venezuela:. C.C. art. 835.
109 England: In re Cohn [I945] Ch. 5 without hesitation; respecting a
German will.
France: Cass. Civ. (June 23, I8I3) S.I8I3.I.380 and continued practice;
(Feb. 25, I925) D.I925.1.I85, Trib. Mulhouse (Jan. I9, I9SO) Rev. crit.
I95o, 668; WEISS, 4 Traite 656, note; BATIFFOL, Traite 67I ff.; IO AuBRY
ET RAU 612; TRASBOT in 5 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 546, contra COLIN ET CAPITANT,
3 Cours § I7 58 ff.
Germany: 2 BAR 329; 2 ZITELMANN I 54·
Netherlands: VAN BRAKEL I95 § ISO·
Argentina: Cam. Civ. 2a Cap. Heger, Christensen v. Johannsen, Christensen (Nov. I6, I948) Jur. Arg. I948, IV, 54I; 9 MACHADO, Commentari6 del
c. c. 457 ff.; 9 LLERENA, c. c. Arg. s8 n. I; MoRENO, I Obras Juridicas
(Buenos Aires I883) 254; NIELSEN, Jur. Arg. I948, III, doctrina p. 6o.
Chile: ALB6NICO, DIP. ante Ia Jur. Chi!. I67.
Portugal: S.Ct. Lisbon (July I3, I923) Revue I924, 257: Portuguese spouses
in Brazil before the Brazilian prohibition.
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was recognized in Louisiana. 110 No offense is seen to the
domestic public order despite the prohibition by the law of
the forum.
2. Another view looks to the restriction of personal
freedom that may affect the surviving spouse contrary to
the public policy of the prohibiting state. The Italian
courts have radically rejected all joint wills, mutual or reciprocal or not, and wherever and by whomever made. 111
The Civil Codes of Spain and Cuba declare expressly invalid a joint will of a national executed abroad. 112
3· In a third theory, the court of a nonprohibiting state
should distinguish whether a joint will is only a document
of two independent wills-in which case recognition should
be due either under the law of the place of execution or
according to the national law of the parties-or is intended
to bind the survivor-which ought only be permitted by
the law governing the individual succession. 113
4· Finally, it has been suggested that foreign joint wills
of Frenchmen are valid, because the French doctrine emphasizes their formal character, and Italian joint wills are
always void, since the Italian doctrine is apprehensive of
possible irrevocability.114
The last opinion is inacceptable as it gives preponderance
to the lex causae over the rule locus regit actum. The first,

°

11 France: Caen (May 22, 1850) S.1852.2.566.
Louisiana: Moore v. Exec. Com. ( 1930) 171 La. 191, 129 So. 920.
Chile: ALB6NICO, DIP. ante Ia Jur. Chi!. 167 (despite the prohibition by
C.C. art. 1003).
111
France: 6 LAURENT 535; SURVILLE 307 § 193 and many others.
Germany: RG. (April 24, 1894) 5 Z. int. R. 58.
Italy: Cass. Flor. (Nov. 9, 1896) Clunet 1902, 175; Trib. Benevent
(March 25, 1934) Rivista 1935, 420, deals only with Italian spouses having
willed at a place where this was permitted.
Spain: T.S. (Feb. 13, 1920).
112 Art. 733·
113
Italian writers and decisions cited by CoNTUZZI, 532 If; KAHN, 2 Abh.
23 5; see also ScHNITZER ( ed. 3) 484.
114
Lewald, Questions, 100 If.; M. WOLFF, D. IPR. ( ed. 3) 230.
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the French view, neglects the essential ground of their own
prohibition; Italy, again, neglects the cases of noncorrespective wills, but also of wills that may have developed
such effect but in fact did not because no spouse wanted
revocation, the normal situation faced with joint wills in
the United States.
Accepting the third theory, we may think with Kahn that
formalities are prescribed for many reasons and all covered
by the necessary international force of the law of the
place of execution; but that the effects of irrevocability and
reciprocity are a matter of the substance and depend on
the law governing succession.
This, it would seem, would also suit the American conceptions.

CHAPTER

68

Substantive Requirements of Wills
I.

TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

APACITY of a person to make a will at all is distinguished from the right to dispose of assets free
from restraint, which will be discussed separately.
The importance of this topic has been greatly diminished
by the emancipation of married women. But the great
differences in fixing the age at which juvenile persons may
leave property by will, which varies from full age as in
common law down to I 2 years, according to sex, married
status, and country, produce some conflicts.1 Mental incompetence, prodigality, and undue influence raise wellknown conflicts and questions of evidence.
The doctrine is split into three systems.

C

I.

Law of Succession

At common law, capacity as an incident of the formation
of a will is governed by the same law governing individual
succession. This approach is congruous to the commonlaw treatment of formalities and, in fact, appears in old
English decisions and in Beale's teaching: capacity is controlled by the lex situs respecting immovables 2 and by the
1 E.g., Spain C. C. art. 663, 1°: IS years; Germany Wills Act § I par.
2: r6 years; England: 2I years; United States for bequests r8 years, for
devise 2 I years, or no difference.
2
England: Coppin v. Coppin (I72S) 2 P. Wms. 29I, 24 E.R. 725; Re
Hernando, Hernando v. Sawtell ( r884) 27 Ch. D. 284.
United States: Restatement § 249a; Carpenter et al. v. Bell et al. ( I896) 96
Tenn. 294, 34 S.W. 209.
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law of the domicil at the time of death 8 . respecting
movables.
In the United States, the principle that the law of the
last domicil governs capacity to dispose of personal property, is confirme<I in case ancillary probate is granted upon
the theory that a previous grant of probate by the court
of the last domicil is conclusive. Such recognition is at
times extended by the court of situs of immovables, and
even a probate by a nondomiciliary may be held conclusive. 4
An analogous reference to the national law as of the
time of death is not entirely alien to civil-law authorities. 5
Accordingly, the lex situs as of the time of death applies to
every asset under the Montevideo Treaty. 6
Once, Theobald wondered whether it was not a "ridiculous idea" that the testator's ability should depend on a
domiciliary law unknown to him at the time of executing
his will. 7 It is now generally felt that a change of domicil
or nationality after the execution should not invalidate a
will valid when it was made. 8 Hence, it has been sought
to adopt the common-law rule to the effect that the law of
the last domicil merely determines whether the testator
had capacity at the time of execution. 9 An identical sug3
In the goods of Maraver ( I828) I Hagg. Eccl. 498; DICEY rule I79·
United States: STORY § 468; Shute v. Sargent (March I7, I893) 67 N.H.
305, 36 At!. 282; Woodward v. Woodward, 2 BEALE Cases 794; Restatement
§ 306 b.c.
Quebec: C. C. art. 6.
4
See infra 4 I 9 ff.
5
Austria: for immovables, EHRENZWEIG I I (I95I) I2I.
Germany: EG. BGB., arts. 7 and 24, have been construed to this effect
by 4 FRANKENSTEIN 419; RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. (ed. 3) 266; ARNDT ln ERMAN,
BGB. Komm. (1952) art. 7, n. 3a.
Spain: LASALA LLANAS 252, comment to art. 128.
6
Art. 44·
7
THEOBALD, On Wills (ed. Io) (Morris) 3·
8
BUSTAMANTE, 3 DIP. (ed. 3, I943) I44 against RODRIGUES PEREIRA.
9
4 BURGE (ed. I) 58o; in his example, capacity at the time of execution
was lacking if judged under the law of the last domicil.
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gestion has most recently and surprisingly been made relative to German Iaw. 10
2.

Personal law

Civil law has traditionally classified capacity as a matter
of the personal law, which extends to the making of a will. 11
This, again, implies an exclusive view to one moment, the
time of the execution.12 In this order of ideas, the German
Code provides an exception for a testator who was an alien
when he made a will and had not reached the age prescribed
by his national law, but later acquired German nationality
and was of full age under German law at death/ 3 That
this exception should be enjoyed only by naturalized subjects of the forum, has been criticized as well as advocated. 14
In England, Lord Kingsdown's Act would provide a correction, if it were considered applicable not only to form
but also to capacity, which remains controversial. 15 But
recent writers, despite this possibility, think that a will
10 NEUHAUS, "Die Behandlung der Testierfahigkeit im deutschen IPR.,"
18 Z. ausl. PR. (1953) 651,656.
11
Quebec (domicil): C.C. art. 835, c/. 3 JoHNSON 66, 69 f. (also for
immovables).
Austria: A. BGB. § 575·
Czechoslovakia: IPL. § 41.
France: 10 Repert. 520.
Germany: EG. BGB. art. 7·
Italy: C. C. 1942, Disp. Pre!. art. 17; MoNACo, Manuale 565 against SCERNI

6s.
Poland: IPR. § 29.
Siam: PIL. art. 39·
Spain: C. C. art. 9·
Sweden : PIL. § 2.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7 par. 4 (for Swiss nationals).
Argentina: (domicil) C.C. art. 36, 45, 36n; 3613. C6digo Bustamante:
{personal law) art. 144.
12
WEISS, 4 Traite 671 n. 3; 10 Repert. 522 no. 140. Argentine C.C. art.
3613 expresses this contrast to "intrinsic" requirements art. 3612.
13
EG. BGB. art. 24 par. 3, sent. 1, phrase 2; Testamentsgesetz July 31,
1938, §§ 2, 33 par. 2.
14
Criticism by LEWALD 307; Contra: WoLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 3) I97·
15
See WoRTLEY, Recueil 1947 II at 68, and cited authors. For negation:
CHESHIRE (ed. 5) 68o; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict 464.
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cannot be validly executed by a person lacking capacity
at the time of execution. The applicable law in this view
is necessarily the law of the domicil at the time of execution.16
3· In the variety of solutions, usual in conflicts law, while
some English writers state the common-law rule that the
domiciliary law of the time of death governs 17 and preference goes to the time of execution, there are those who
advocate cumulating both requirements, 18 but it was stated
long ago that modern private laws are loath to invalidate
a will only because of an incapacity subsequent to execution. 19
4· It is submitted that a fourth solution is available: vel instead of et-why not recognize a will made by a testator
considered capable under his personal law either of the time
of execution or at his death, in the latter event on the
ground that he chose to let his will stand?
Assuredly, provisions recognizing foreign inheritance
laws should be construed as including capacity to testate.

Illustration. A mentally insane person executes a will in
a lucid interval. If he is a German national, he has no capacity under BGB. § 7, although he can dispose of his English
immovables according to English law. The German statute
subjecting English land to English inheritance law (EG.
BGB. article 28) ought to be interpreted as derogating from
EG. BGB. article 7. 20
II.

OTHER SuBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS

The above mentioned conclusive force of a foreign probate
judgment, if recognized, includes not only mental incapacity
16 CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 520; MORRIS in DICEY (ed. 6) 819 and new rule 179;
GRAVESON (ed. 2) 240 would prefer this rule.
17 GRAVESON (I.e.) who invokes In the Goods of Maraver (1828) I Hagg.
Eccl. 498.
18 NIBOYET, 4 Traite ( 1947) § 1340.
19 KAHN, 2 Abh. 204 n. 33·
20
Quite as proposed supra 292, n. 19 respecting the rule on form, EG. art.
II.
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but also undue influence, 21 fraud, and presumably all legal
causes of lack of consent. It does not include the testator's
power of disposal. 22 Apart from this exceptional element,
the law of succession governs.
Civil-law statutes, reserving the personal law as the test
of bodily and mental capacity, distinguish invalidity because
of error, fraud, duress, immorality, or illegality. 28
The area, thus differently described, is governed by the
common principle that the law of the succession controls.
In consequence, the technical effects of failure to comply
with the intrinsic requirements of wills-nullity, relative
nullity, voidability by action, collateral attack-are specified
by the same law. This principle also furnishes the natural
basis for all causes of restraints on alienation by will to be
discussed hereafter.
Foreign laws are inclined to deny all effect to laws that
govern succession if an essential requirement, not relating
to form or capacity, of the governing law is missing. 24
Illustrations. (i) A Swiss citizen, domiciled in France,
left a son whose legitimacy was contested. An English court
referring first to French and further to Swiss law, followed
a Swiss decision acknowledging the share of the son; this
was not on the ground of res judicata, but because the force
of the last domicil (in France) was expressly recognized. 25
(ii) A testator, domiciled in Ireland, set up a testamentary trust, disposing that a leasehold on English land should
be converted into money. The English accumulation law,
the lex situs, prohibiting extension of the limitation beyond
21 E.g., Crippen v. Dexter (r859) 79 Mass. (r3 Gray) 330, cf., Hopkins
53 Yale L. J. at 229-23 I; Mass. Ann. L. ( 1933) § 192, ro.
22
The Hawaii decision cited by PAGE 7II n. 4 does not fit.
23
Thus expressly, Argentina C.C. art. 3617 and Czechoslovakia, P.I.L.
§ 41 name both categories but treat them equally.
24
KAHN, 2 Abh. zo8.

s,

25

In re Trufort [1936] Ch. D. 6oo.
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a certain period, made the trust invalid with respect to the
leasehold. 26
The treaty between Austria and Germany of 1927,
however, calls only for the national law of the deceased
at the time of execution.
III.
1.

RESTRAINT oN PowER OF DISPOSAL

Law of Succession Governs

The rule that the law governing a succession decides
whether the testator had the power of disposing in the
manner he did, is well settled. 27 The same law determines
the reasons and form of disinheriting a relative, including
a deprivation bona mente, benevolently protecting his interests. The forum will not raise an objection of public
policy against a system of legitimate portions or forced
heirs different from its own. Usually, not even when the
domestic law gives full liberty to the testator is a foreign
restriction rejected. 28 Neither is a foreign unlimited disposal normally challenged as subject to domestic restraint/ 9
26

Treke v. Carberry (1873) L.R. 16 Eq. 461.
England: In re White [1941] Ch. 200, 1 All E.R. 216,360.
United States: STORY §§ 445, 475; Restatement § 201, 2 BEALE § 249.1; 4
PAGE 713 n. 5 and Suppl. § 1643; Note 91 A.L.R. 491; GooDRICH 512 § 168.
France: Constant practice and modern literature, see BATIFFOL, Traite 655
§ 651.
Germany: BAY OLG. Dresden (June r6, 1914) 37 Siichs. Ann. 92; Bay.
Ob. LG. (Oct. 12, 1917) 27 Z. int R. 377·
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 21, 1943) 69 BGE. II 362; (June 27, 1946) 72
BGE. III 104. The legal sources are contradictory respecting the application
of the cantonal statutes on forced heirship of brothers and sisters and of their
issue. See discussion in Trib. Cant. Vaud (May 5, 1939) 36 SJZ. (1939/40)
193 No. 35 and cf., citations supra Ch. 66, n. 20-22.
28
England: In re Trufort (1887) 57 L.J. 36 Ch. D. 6oo (Ch.) 1135;
Enohin v. Wylie ( 1862) xo H.L. Cas. x, 138 R.R. 1, and others; 6 HALSBURY
(1907) 226; Dicey (ed. 6) 829.
United States: Ennis v. Smith (1853) 14 How. 400.
29
Denmark: Copenhague (Aug. 6, 1903) Clunet 1905, 1099: Father
domiciled in London disinherits his son respecting Danish assets.
Germany: RG. (Feb. 26, 1911) JW. 1912, 22, 24 Z. int. R. 317, Revue 1914,
262 rejects expressly application of public order (EG. art. 30); RG. (March 4,
27
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although contrary views have sometimes been expressed in
Europe under the theory of public policy. 30
Illustrations. (i) A New York testator excludes his son
from land he leaves in France. Since French law applies
(according to both laws involved), the devise is reduced. 31
Italy, on the contrary, would apply New York law, and
New York would accept the renvoi back.
(ii) Thornton, a British subject, domiciled in France,
made a will in England in English form, disregarding the
reserve portions of French law. The English court in 1824
directed the property to be distributed according to the
French law of intestacy. 32
(iii) A Frenchman domiciled in the United States may
dispose of his personalty in France free from French restrictions. 33
The numerous statutory exceptions by prelevement in
favor of the domestic law, in some codes with extreme disregard of foreign control of assets (mentioned in chapter
64), are particularly undesirable in this matter.
In the United States, a line must be drawn between distributive shares and family allowances, which should not
be confused as they sometimes are. In an increasing number
of statutes, both categories appear side by side. A surviving widow, or as the statutes may state instead, a sur1915) 8 Warn. 1915, p. 455 applies American law without mentioning
art. 30; RAAPE, Komm. 736; cf., PETER KLEIN, 13 Z. int. R. 87; NIEMEYER,
IPR. 16,
Spain: 2 GoLDSCHMIDT 256 refers to the freedom of testation in Navarra,
Cortes de Pamplona of 1688, for excluding a public policy objection.
3
France: App. Poitiers (July 4, 1887) S. 1888.2.194; Trib. Grasse
(May 3, 1926) Clunet 1928, 1022.
Germany: KEIDEL, Clunet 1910, 265; HABICHT 195; RAAPE Komm.
31
Trib. Seine (July 13, 1910) Clunet 1911, 912; Cass. civ. (Apr. 4, 1881)
s. 1883.1.6 5·
32
Thornton v. Curling (1824) 6 Sim. 360. Not affected by Lord Kingsdown's Act, according to Cheshire ( ed. 2) 530. Identical solution in France:
Trib. Seine (July 13, 1910) Revue 1912, 414, Clunet 1911, 912 (American
domiciled in France).
33
App. Lyon (Feb. 3, 1932) Clunet 1932, 930.
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vtvmg spouse, may have a statutory intestate portion of a
third, a half, or all the estate, which is frequently not
barrable, but subject to election as against benefits under
a will; at the same time, the spouse and minor children
may have an emergency allowance for the time of the
administration or a period following the death, with priority
to the legatees or even creditors. Also, homestead exemptions combine with these two types of provisions.
As the Restatement seems to suggest, only the first kind
of provision, if mandatory, falls strictly under the restraint
depending on the law of succession; 34 this characterization,
however, is certain and justified.35
Change of the personal law is treated accordingly. Where
a Dutch woman at home appointed her husband as sole
heir, except for the legitimate rights of her children which
amounted to three fourths of her estate, and subsequently
acquired domicil in England, the husband was awarded the
whole inheritance. 36
Conversely, an English mother acquires a statutory heirship by the fact that her daughter dies domiciled in France, 37
and an Englishman, acquiring a domicil in the English sense
in Switzerland, becomes subject to the forced heirship of
relatives who may or may not include, according to the
canton of the last domicil, brothers and sisters or their issue.
United States. In the United States, the principle is
34

Restatement § 301 compared with§ 461.
MARSH, Marital Property in Conflict of Laws (1952) 137-141 shows the
quasi unanimity of the courts to this effect. His own reason for approaching
the nonbarrable share to marital property because of related policies ( p.
136) would lead to a theory similar to that of NEUNER, Der Sinn 66; and
5 La. L. Rev. (1943) 190; but in fact the reasoning is not convincing, the
share is as much an inheritance right as any other.
36
In re Groos [1915] 1 Ch. 572, Clunet 1915, 686, Revue 1919, 595·
Accord: Germany: RAAPI!, IPR. 269; Netherlands: H.R. (June 27, 1918)
Clunet 1919, 426.
37
Trib. Seine (June 14, 1901) Clunet 1901, 8oS.
35
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said to be the same. 38 Lex situs, of course, governs at the
time of the death without regard to any previous domicil. 89
2.

Family Provision Acts

In the type of British statutes, first adopted in New
Zealand, tempering the sheer freedom of disposition of
the common law, the next relatives of the testator are entitled to a share not fixed by law but left to the discretion
of the court, comparable to the portio debita as developed
in the practice of the Roman tribunal of the centumviri.
In Great Britain 40 and some Canadian provinces/ 1 as
also in one recent Australian decision, 42 this right is connected with the succession and is granted only at the
last domicil of the testator 43 without regard to the situation of the assets and the beneficiaries. 44 The conflicts rule,
hence, is almost the same as above described, although it
is regretted that the English court has no jurisdiction to
grant maintenance, if the testator died domiciled abroad.
In other British jurisdictions, however, the emphasis
lies on the territory rather than on the domicil; the court
may vary the will only with regard to domestic land and
38

4 PAGE§ 1640.
Atkinson v. Staigg (188z) 13 R.I. 725; Staigg v. Atkinson (1887) 144
Mass. 564, IZ N.E. 354·
40
Great Britain: Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, amended by
Intestate's Estates Act, 1952, sec. 7·
41
Ontario: Dependents' Relief Act, R.S.O. 1937, c. 214.
Alberta: Widow's Relief Act, R.S.A. 19ZZ c. 145; Re Corlet (Alta.) [1942]
3 D.L.R. 72, z W.W.R. 93·
Quebec: Pouliot v. Cloutier (1944) 3 D.L.R. 737, 740, [1944] S.C.R. ZS<J.
Manitoba: The Wives and Children's Maintenance Act R.S.M. 1940 c. Z3S
(at the husband's lifetime) does not apply to persons resident in another
province, Smith v. Smith (Man. 1953) 3 D.L.R. 68z.
42
Australia: Scholl J. in Re Paulin [1950] Viet. L. Rep. 46z; FLEMING,
4 Int. L. Q.·Z39·
43
FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict (ed. z) 656 If.
44
DICEY (ed. 6) 556, 889.
39
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all movables, and this can be done also by a court not at
the last domicil. 45
Also in the United States, the statutory allowances for
support of the widow and children are not susceptible of
a uniform characterization. In a number of instances, territorial limits are expressed or implied in the statutes, as
when the domicil of the husband or even that of the widow
must be in the state administering the statute or the benefit
is due only out of property left in the state. 46 However,
in some cases, the domiciliary statute or at least a judgment
of allowance has been given extraterritorial effect in other
states by enforcement on personal property! 7
The Restatement has made a courageous attempt to
regulate on these advanced lines the conflict of these
statutes! 8 It would seem that this maintenance of the
surviving spouse, as in France the pension alimentaire of
the surviving spouse, 49 and many provisions of support
imposed on decedent's estates in other countries, rests on a
legal obligation not itself of the nature of inheritance.
3. Restraint on Liberalities to Certain Persons
(a) Mortmain statutes prohibiting or subjecting to
special authorization benevolence to charitable and other
corporations, are here set aside; they concern the capacity
of beneficiaries only. 50 Those restrictions that contain a
45
New Zealand: In re Roper [1927] N.Z.L. Rev. 731· See BROWN, 18
Can. B. Rev. 456.
Saskatchewan: Re Ostrander [1915] 8 W.W.R. 367; Re Elliot [1941]
2 D.L.R. 71; Re Herron Est. [1941] 4 D.L.R. 203.
46
DAINOW, "Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada,"
36 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1938) 1107. Some American material is collected by
ATKINSON, 3 Am. L. Prop. 749 n. 8, the survey by BORDWELL, "Statute Law
of Wills," 14 Iowa L. Rev. ( 1929) 194 ought to be renewed.
47
Note, 13 A.L.R. (2d) 973-980.
48
Restatement§§ 302, 461.
49
MrLHAUD, Clunet 1896, 495, 501; WErss, 4 Traite 584, note, differs only
in selecting the law of the creditor instead of that of the debtor.
50
See BRESLAUER, 27 Iowa L. Rev. 432-435, and supra Vol. I, p. 164 f.
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protection of the testator's family, however, apply only
as a part of the law governing the succession. As it was
said in the New York leading case : "The prohibition operates upon the testator's capacity to give rather than upon
the power of the legatee to take." 51 Of course, the charter
and general law of the corporation have to be consulted
at the same time.
It deserves mention that also these prohibitions may be
restricted to the assets found in the territory. Thus, a
well-known California statute provides that no devise or
bequest to any charitable or benevolent society shall exceed
one third of the estate left by the testator to his legal
heirs, and that foreign wills are subject to this restriction. 52
Thereby, a gift is limited so far as property is located in
California, and not limited elsewhere; a court of another
state dealing with assets situated in its territory on a different ground ignores 53 and a court of the domicil corrects
the distribution reached in California. 54 Thus, another case
of several masses to be separately distributed is formed. 55
(b) ((Special Incapacity," it has been said, is constituted
by the much debated prohibitions, contained in the French
51
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain ( 1871) 43 N.Y. 421, 433· To the same
effect Healy v. Reed (1891) 153 Mass. 197; Trustees of Amherst College v.
Ritch (1896) 151 N.Y. 282, 45 N.E. 876. The statute was not applied in
Crum v. Blits ( 188o) 47 Conn. 592, the testator having been domiciled in
Connecticut. Cf., supra Vol. I, p. 165 and n. 195; BRESLAUER id. 434 f.;
STUMBERG (ed. 2) 415.
Accord: Germany: OLG. Frankfurt and RG. (March 9, 1891) 46 Seuff.
A. 418 j LEWALD 308 § 374·
On France see Vol. I, 165 and n. 193.
52
California: Probate Code 1931, § 40. Foreign situated property bequeathed to charity must be considered, In re Dwyer's Est. (19II) 159 Cal.
68o; followed by Decker v. Vreeland (1917) 220 N.Y. 326, us N.E. 989.
53
Johns Hopkins University v. Uhrig ( 1924) 145 Md. u4, 125 Atl. 6o6,
upon the statute mentioned supra 256.
54
Whalley v. Lawrence's Est. ( 1919) 108 Atl. 387.
55
On the position of third states, Schultz v. Chicago City Bank & Trust
Co. (1943) 384 Ill. 148, 51 N.E. (2d) 140, Comment, 21 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 268,
states that a restriction by the domicil is recognized, one made by another
state is not.
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Code and others following it, on gifts to witnesses to the
will, the guardian, the physician and minister taking care
of the decedent in his last illness. 56 In the constitutional
Declaration of Rights of Maryland, the list of persons to
whom gifts cannot be made without sanction of the legislature, in addition to religious orders and denominations,
includes a minister, public teacher, or preacher of the
gospel. 57 Recent French doctrine acknowledges that such
prohibitions are not really concerned with incapacity of the
testator to give or of the donee to take, but are simply a
part of the law of succession, protecting the family. 58

4· Gifts Impairing Legitimate Shares

In many jurisdictions, a statutory portion gives rise to
a claim against persons who received gifts inter vivos from
the testator depleting the assets available at his death. 59
Such claims are considered based on obligations ex lege
and therefore have been classified outside the conflicts rules
on succession. 60 A contrary opinion, however, prevails. 61
The attacks against gifts preceding death are a necessary
complement to the protection awarded under the statutory
rule of succession.

56 France: C.C. art. 907 ff. and similar provisions of other codes, see 2
KAHN Abhandl. 208 ff., recently, e.g., Venezuela, C.C. art. 814.
57 Maryland: Const. § 38.
58
Trib. Nice (Dec. 28, 1903) Clunet 1904, 713; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIBRE
(ed. 6) 419 § 369 j TRASBOT in S PLANIOL ET RIPERT 265 j this replaces the
older reference to the personal law of the beneficiary, 2 BARTIN, 2 Principes
§ 241, 10 Repert. 521, no. 136 ff.
59
On the generally scant protection of the surviving spouse in the United
States, see Note, 40 Georgetown L.J. (1952) 109.
60
2 ZITELMANN 998; see also DEMANGEAT, note in I FOELIX 218 note (a).
61
Germany: 2 BAR 335i HEDEMANN, 23 Z. int. R. 229j RAAPE, Komm. 652.
France: BATIFFOL 656 § 654.
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5. Future Interests
A difficult question arises from the various provtswns
directed against the creation of future interests by will.
At common law and by the statutes against suspension of
the power of testation and those against grants in perpetuity
in the narrower sense, the testator is limited in the freedom of disposing of the future of his estate. The radical
principle of the French Revolution, adopted in the Code
N apolion (article 896) and many Latin codes, did away
with all feudal, rural, or fiduciary ties that would fetter
the inheritance beyond the immediate successors. The
German Code, on the contrary, brought the universal
fideicommissary substitution to perfection; the pandectistic
doctrine permitted charging of a beneficiary with delivery
of his grant to future or conditional donees, whereas the
Code made the first grantee and the subsequent takers all
full heirs with temporary ownership. But at the same time,
the period within which remaindermen may inherit is
restricted in a manner comparable to the rules against
perpetuity.
The starting point for forming conflicts rules on this
matter is naturally the law governing succession. If this
law rejects the limitation of a devise or bequest, the result
ought to be accepted everywhere, for this is the purpose
of establishing a governing law. The gift is either void
in toto or the restriction is cancelled. Where, however,
the law of the succession allows the testator's disposition, two
obstacles to its extraterritorial effect may be encountered,
although by no means generally occurring. 62
The French and Italian courts usually operate with a
62

Z PONTES DE MIRANDA 338 states that, despite Brazilian C.C. art. 1734,
which applies of course to Brazilian-governed successions, the provisions of
a foreign inheritance law relating to substitutions are fully applicable; he
enumerates twenty-four problems so involved.
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wide concept of public policy. The principle of "equality"
among the beneficiaries from which the prohibition of
fideicommissary substitutions derived, has been opposed
to any discrimination among successors. 63 Another approach, more emphasized in recent times, counteracts the
law of succession by supporting the lex situs. 64 As a consequence, the ban on tying up assets is not applied to movables situated abroad. 65

Illustrations. (i) A Belgian national, domiciled in Switzerland, executed a valid Swiss will, leaving his daughter as
universal legatee for life and his brothers or their issue as
remaindermen. The daughter died domiciled in France,
leaving a will appointing the Salvation Army as heir. The
heirs of a brother of the testator sued for his share according to the original will. Their claim was dismissed on the
ground of public policy. 66 Lex situs would have worked
more satisfactorily.
(ii) Where under German law an heir is charged with
an executory estate, passing title at his death to a reversionary heir, assets situated in Italy would be considered in an
Italian court not as bound by the substitution but as a part
of his free estate. 67
Should such exceptions based either on an extreme public
policy or a preference for the domestic situs be followed in
jurisdictions recognizing larger testamentary freedom? The
German Reichsgericht once answered in the negative. 68 A
fideicommissary substitution, valid under Roman law at the
63
France: see citations in KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 271 f.
Italy: FEDOZZI (ed. 2) 6oo; PACCHIONI 321.
64
France: Cass. civ. (June 24, 1839) D. 1839-1.257, S. 1839·1·57; req.
(March 27, 1870) S. I87I.1.91.
Italy: FIORE, Sull'articolo 8 delle Disp. Prel., in Giur. ItaL 1901. IV. 193,
202, 208.
65
Cour Paris (Aug. 7, 1883) Clunet 1884, 192.
66
Trib. Seine (July I, 1949) Nouv. Rev. 1949, 219.
67
See authors supra n. 6o.
68
RG. (April 14, 1893) 4 BOLZE 4 No.8.
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testator's domicil, was extended to movables in Alsace notwithstanding the French law there in force. It is true that
public policy had minor influence in this case, as Alsace was
within the country. Nevertheless, neither the state controlling the entire succession nor another state following
the same policy of freedom of testation has a compelling
reason to bow before a diverse policy of lex situs if the
treatment of the assets by the latter can be somehow
corrected.
In the United States, the exclusive law of succession has
been subjected to concessions to local interests, although
on the other hand local prohibitions have been sacrificed
in favor of charitable and other purposes. The most remarkable deviation, dispensing with the New York rules
against remoteness of vesting interests in order to save a
trust from invalidity, will be discussed below. 69
69

Chapter 75·

CHAPTER

69

Effect of Wills
l.
1.

CoNSTRUCTION

Concept of Construction

N common law the terms construction and interpretation
of ambiguous texts are often interchangeable, the first
term including the latter. 1 More specifically, it has
been thoughtfully suggested that interpretation should mean
the ascertainment of the real intention of a declarant and
construction the use of canons, maxims, or rules, established
by law or judicial decisions, in order to clarify the effect
of a declaration or to protect an act from invalidity. 2
This differentiation corresponds to a German distinction: The rules of interpretation concern factual ascertainment of intention, including presumptions where an intention is deemed to exist and only its expression is ambiguous.
The rules stating what should be the legal effect in the
absence of a presumptive intention are called suppletive (in
a narrow sense), complementary to the declaration. Much
theoretical thought has been devoted to this undeniable
difference. 3
Nevertheless, earlier in this work it has been submitted
that only one reliable conclusion can be drawn in conflicts

I

1

Matter of Costello (1933) 147 Misc. 629, 265 N.Y.S. 905.
HEILMANN, "Interpretation and Construction of Wills of Immovables in
Conflict of Laws, involving Election," 25 Ill. L. Rev. (1931) 778; RHEINSTI!IN,
Cases and Other Materials on Succession ( 1947) 482 f.
3
See DANZ, Die Auslegung der Rechtsgeschiifte, (ed. 3, 1911) and the
commentaries to BGB. §§ 133, 157; ENNI!CCARUS-NIPPERDEY, 1 Biirg. R.
§§ 192, 193·
2
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law from any such distinction, namely the contrast between,
on the one hand, the true, veritable, expressly or tacitly
declared intention of the declarer, and, on the other, intention implied either in fact or in law. 4 The same approach
is suitable to the construction of wills. This favorite subject of lengthy discussions forms an oversized body of rules
in English law and an extremely intricate network of subtle
considerations in American courts, and produces plain confusion in conflicts law.
The core of the matter involves the frequent legal rules
created by judicial practice or enactments, which state presumptions for the content of ambiguous words in a will,
such as "my children," "my issue," "heirs"; the codes prescribe whether this expression includes illegitimate or
adopted offspring, and stepchildren. There are innumerable rules of this category. If a coheir or a legatee dies
before the testator, the statutes either attribute this portion to the same class of beneficiaries or cancel it. Or a
devise by a husband to his wife is deemed to be in lieu of
dower, et cetera. Many so-called rules of construction
had the important function of correcting antiquated law. For
instance, the English Statute of Wills 1837 (s.24), often
copied in American statutes, extended the effect of wills
to after-acquired property by providing that the will is
"to be construed as if it had been executed immediately
before the death of the testator unless a contrary intention
appears in the will."
These rules are called interpretative, because they yield
to any sign of a contrary intention of the testator; or at
least to rebuttal; but when nothing indicates the true intention, the same rule is suppletive. Treatment in conflicts
law must be always the same. We may state that all legal
4

Vol,

II, p. 530.
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rules subsidiary to an intention ascertained by facts are
to be deemed complementary rather than merely "interpretative." Among other consequences of this proposition,
we ought not to differentiate between presumed (as opposed
to tacitly declared) intention and legal effects, 5 or expect a
court of the situs to look to a stereotyped meaning of certain words of the legal language of the situs as long as the
inquiry still turns upon the actual intention of the testator, 6
-and this, I dare say, even though the lawyer writing the
will has chosen terms that he presumed to reproduce the
testator's wish. And if we look to a foreign legal definition
of a term used by will, we should not believe that we apply
the foreign law. 7
The purpose and nature of construction of wills have
changed in history. The bulky English canons are partly
due of course to the old endeavor to facilitate the task of
juries. In recent times, their effect was often unhealthy,
introducing an element of judicial discomfort, until finally
some courageous decisions opened the gate to free interpretation. An English writer says of this body of law:
"Much of it has become unreasonably technical, but
it is still applied, presumably in the interest of uniformity and certainty, though its effect is not infrequently
to defeat what seems to the lay mind to have been the
actual intention of the particular testator." 8
How often was it held that "my money" in a testamentary gift always meant currency and never securities-this
writer once experienced one of these decisions of the Court
of Appeal which finally in 1 948 Lord Atkin in the House
5
STUMBERG, 419, 4zz, distinguishes intention, stated by operative facts and
rules, from legal effects.
6
Thus, apparently, ATKINSON in 3 Am. L. Prop. 749·
7
Vol. II, p. 534·
8
PARRY, Succession (ed. 3) 103 citing Lord Romer in Perrin v. Morgan
[1943] A.C. 399· 4ZO ff.
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of Lords called "absurd"; "the ghosts of dissatisfied testators" would from now on be considerably diminished. So,
"money" has now "no fixed meaning"; 9 it is a "cardinal
rule" that the court "has to sit in the testator's armchair." 10
The same current, fortunately, breaks through the overlapping lines of American decisions. What is now tantamount to an almost universal view was expressed by the
Illinois Supreme Court in 19 52, urging that the intention of
the testator is to be ascertained from the entire will and
a strict technical construction of certain language is not
warranted. 11 The New York courts are indefatigable in
asking for such free interpretation. 12
Conflicts law should finally take note of this development
and further it. There are many fixed interpretations that
are not even meant to transcend the domestic sphere.
2.

Universal Principle

(a) In the first place it would seem, in spite of all
traditional canons and presumptions, that respect is paid
everywhere to the intentions of the testator, as they appear
in the light of the entire document and of all "external"
circumstances. It is very important not to resort to any
petrified presumption at this stage of judicial investigation.
Where tlie true intention is ascertained, there remains
merely one question. In the Romanistic tradition leading
9
Perrin v. Morgan [1943] A.C. 399-H.L., 408 per Viscount Simon, Lord
Chancellor, 414 f. per Lord Atkin.
10
Ibid. 420 per Lord Russell of Killowen.
11
Kiesling v. White ( 1952) 411 Ill. 493, 499·
12
See the New York Digest index. The same careful search of the testator's
intention appeared in an older case, New York Life Ins. and Trust Co. v.
Viele (1899) 161 N.Y. u, affirming 22 App. Div. So, 47 N.Y.S. 841. The
courts discuss what 4 FRANKENSTEIN 470 missed on the ground of an incomplete private report in I I Z. int. R. 105; they used free individual interpretation of the words "lawful issue" in the will of an American lady
living in Germany.
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to this free interpretation as well as in the English courts/ 3
interpretation is limited by the condition that the result is
not inconsistent with the expression used: the court may not
substitute a stipulation not expressed by the testator. 14
Only most recently has it been sometimes suggested that
the court should exercise a bolder discretion: the power to
correct the will by an equitable decision/ 5 American courts
very firmly put presumptions and precedents behind the
interpretation of the will in the instant case; thus, in the
primary objective of investigation, all courts concur. 16 Conflicts arise only where the search for the intention in fact
ends without result.
An obvious application is made when common-law courts
look to a foreign law for explanation of technical terms
peculiar to this law. 17 This is done everywhere, and no true
application of the foreign law is implied.
(b) From this it is a close step to a consideration of
foreign law without applying it in any sense. The testator
may expressly or tacitly have contemplated such consideration, which the forum observes for the limited purpose of
13 See Mr. Justice Holmes in Eaton v. Brown ( I904) I93 U.S. 411; "The
English courts are especially and wisely careful not to substitute a lively
imagination of what a testatrix would have said if her attention had been
directed to a particular point for what she has said in fact."
Germany: A.G. Miinchen (Dec. 29, I927) IPRspr. I928 Nr. 58.
Switzerland: 64 BGE. II I86.
14
Matter of Watson ( I933) 262 N.Y. 284, I86 N.E. 787: the court has
no power to change a clause.
15
To this effect the tentative draft of a law on inheritance for Israel.
16
United States: Purl v. Purl (I921) Io8 Kansas 673, I97 Pac. 185;
4 PAGE 70I.
E.g., Germany: RG. (March I3, I924) Leipz. Z. I924, 74; RAAPE 643;
4 FRANKENSTEIN 471.
17
England: In re Price [I900] Ch. 442, 452; Studd v. Cook ( I883) 8 App.
Cas. 577. 590; Re Miller [I9I4] I Ch. 516; Re Manners [I923] I Ch. 220;
Dicey (ed. 6) I83 at 833; Chia Khwee Eng v. Chia Poh Choon [1923]
A.C. 424; Re Allen's Est. [I945] 2 All E.R. 264.
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construing his actual intention. 18 As if considering contracts,
English courts speak outright of the "proper law" of a
will, 19 and an intention expressly declared 20 or presumed. 21
The presumption refers to the law of the testator's domicil
at the time of the execution. 22
These are exaggerated formulas, usual when judicial presumptions are stiffening into legal rules. We have to replace
the "presumptive" by a "tacitly expressed" intention and
instead of inventing a "proper law" of the will give due
regard to the law to which the testator seems to have looked,
amid all circumstances of the case. In this manner, a
sound and universally acceptable rule is in the making.
When a Swedish woman died domiciled in Massachusetts,
the Swedish Supreme Court assumed "without an express
provision by the testatrix" that she left certain assets to
her husband, which would have been his separate property by force of the Massachusetts law. As the Court said,
not only the text but also all other circumstances, particularly
the law of the country involved, are to be considered.23
From the form of a will, a reference to the content of a
law may be drawn 24 or not drawn. 25
Exception. In American practice, as the Restatement
18
STORY § 479 j DICEY (ed. 5) comment on rule I96 j WESTLAKE (ed. 7)
§ IZ3 i.f. j SCHMITTHOFF ( ed. I) 234·
France: NIBOYET, 4 Traite § I34Ii LERERBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 37Ii
BATTIFOL, Traite 672 § 668; but there is no judicial authority.
Germany: OLG. Karlsruhe (Nov. I7, I898) 9 Z. int. R. 3IO.
19
Bradfort v. Young (I88s) 29 Ch. D. 6I7i Trotter v. Trotter (I828)
4 Bli. (N.S.) 502, 505.
20
Solicitor General dictum in Anstruther v. Chalmers ( I826) 2 Sinn. I, 4-·
21
Eve J. in re Cunnington [I924] I Ch. 68, 72; Briton, domiciled in
France, will made in England in English form: "the will ought prima facie
to be construed according to French law."
22
SCHMITTHOFF 234: particularly if it is identical with the last domicil.
23
H.D. (Feb. 25, I939) N.J.A. p. IOI, I3 z. ausl. PR. 844; on another
point of the decision, MICHAEL! 245·
24
France: App. Paris (April 24, I9I3) Clunet I9I3, I276.
25
Germany: OLG. Karlsruhe (Nov. I7, I898) 9 Z. int. R. 3IO.
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§ 25 I (I) clarifies the law, interpretation is not free where
an interest in land is devised and certain words are used,
having an "operative effect irrespective of the intent of
the testator." This exception may be, apart from tradition, justified by the need for certainty in real property
transactions. However, a doubt in the usefulness of such
formalism is confirmed by its application. In the very
example adduced by the Restatement, a devise of land
in Y to "the children of A" is frustrated in the person
of A's adopted son because "children" in Y means legitimate
children by birth, although the adoption was made in X
with full effect. The court thus would consider neither the
intention of the testator nor the extraterritorial effect of
the adoption nor the status of the child according to the
law of its domicil. Certainty here conflicts with justice.

3· Conflict of Rules
Where the testator's factual intention is not discoverable
and a set of legal rules must be applied in a subsidiary
manner, no agreement has been reached on the choice of
this law.
(a) An old and widespread opinion resorts to the law
governing the succession. 26 The lex situs 27 for immovables,
the law of the last domicil 28 or nationality 29 for movables,
26
CHESHIRE ( ed. 2) 533 (but see infra n. 32) ; DICEY ( ed. 5) rule 196;
STUMBERG (ed. 2) 423 n. 34; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 421 § 377; but
see STORY §§ 473, 479 a-f. 484.
27 England: HALSBURY, Laws of England (ed. 2) 242.
United States: Jennings v. Jennings (r871) 21 Ohio St. 56; Staigg v.
Atkinson ( 1887) 144 Mass. 564, 12 N.E. 354·
28
England: Trotter v. Trotter ( 1828) 4 Bligh (N.S.) 502; but the exceptions for the law intended by the will are much emphasized, see Re
Allen's Est., supra n. 17.
United States: see cases in 4 PAGE 707 § r 6 39·
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Apr. 2, 1925) Revue 1926, 405 (currency of
legacy); Cour Paris (May 29, 1948) J. C. P. 1950 II 5241, Rev. crit. 1950, 197,
affirmed by Cass. civ. (Nov. 13, 1951) S. 1952.r.r89, Rev. crit. 1952, 323.
29
Germany: R.G., Leipz. Z. (1924) 741.
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respectively, furnish the rule of interpretation or invalidate the clause or the will.
This approach is favored by eminent authors, some of
whom would have this the exclusive method. 30 The reason
most advanced is that it is the law "with which the ordinary
person is most familiar." 31
(b) Another part of the authorities, continuing the direction toward the proper law of succession, presume that the
testator in an ambiguous clause may have had in mind the
law of his domicil at the time of the execution. 32 This, of
course, is a rebuttable presumption. 33
This view, primarily intended only for personalty, easily
extends to immovables, provided that lex situs "has the last
word" for allowing the creation of rights.u Indeed, the
Restatement calls for the law of the domicil at the time
when the will was made, with respect to movables ( § 308)
as well as to immovables except in the case of legally fixed
words ( § 25 r). This is a considerable progress in approaching several successions, especially when a single will disposes of both real and personal property. However, such
30

HENNING, 41 N.S. Am. L. Reg. 6z3, 7IS, approved by GooDRICH (ed. 3)

376.

31

32

4)

CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 563.
Eng)and: WESTLAKE ISS §u3; DICEY (ed. 6) rule IS3; CHESHIRE (ed.

s6z, s6s.

Canada: Ontario H. Ct.: Re Bassette [I94z] O.W.N. Z7S, [194z] 3 D.L.R.
207, FALCONBRIDGE 464.
Quebec: 3 JoHNSON 64.
United States: Staigg v. Atkinson (I8Sz) 13 R.I. 72s; in re Chappel's
Estate (I923) I24 Wash. uS, 2I3 Pac. 6S4, with rationale, citing Story in
Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. (32 U.S.) 4S3; Palmer et al. v. Crews (194S)
203 Miss. So6, 35 So. (2d) 430, 4 A.L.R. (zd) 4S3; "royalties" of oilwells in
Louisiana and Mississippi did not include other oil interests, according to the
law of the domicil in Texas.
France: Trib. Seine (March 9, 1S9s) Clunet 1S9s, 62S; cf., the authors
cited supra n. IS; DELAUME, Rev. crit. I9SO, I99·
33
In re Cunnington [I924] I Ch. 6S.
34
England: Nelson v. Bridport ( 1S46) S Beav. S47, S70 per Langdale,
M.R.; Lord Nelson was not allowed by Sicilian law to acquire land devised
to him under English law.
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a role of the domiciliary law purely as a device of mindreading is quite arbitrary.
(c) More isolated opinions point to the law giving validity to the will, 35 the domicil of the beneficiary, 36 or look for
combinations. 37
Illustration. A mortgaged land is devised to a legatee.
Where there is no clue to the intention of the testator, is
the legatee entitled to demand that the secured debt be
paid out of the general personal property? This question
has been much discussed in England because the law was
changed; the claim formerly granted is now denied; the
cases are therefore antiquated. 38 It has been concluded
that the legatee has only the rights given him by the lex
situs. 39 However, in another view, this question of construction must be answered according to the law of the domicil
as of the time of execution, following the presumed intention of the testator. 40
This example shows that no certain solution of the choice
of law problem is feasible, if we work with so elusive a
criterion as "presumptive" intention. Where no actual
intention can be verified, the applicable law must be the
law governing the succession, not because the testator is
supposed to have had it in mind, but simply because it is
in charge of the situation!
The advantage of a common criterion for a plurality of
successions could be maintained, if the situs were to recognize, by renvoi, the prerogative of the domicil, in the line
Cf., DICEY (ed. 6) 833.
4 PAGE 708 n. S·
E.g., WESTLAKE ISS j CHESHIRE (ed. 4) S6S j BRESLAUER, 27 Iowa L.
Rev. at 429 ff.
38
See in particular FALCONBRIDGE 4SI, 480; Locke King's Act 1854,
amended I867, I877; Adm. of Est. Act 192s, sec. 3Si Ontario: Wills Act
R.S.O. 1937 c. 164, Rev. Stat. I950, c. 426, sec. 37 (I).
39
WESTLAKE § II8.
U.S.: Restatement§ 490; STUMBERG (ed. 2) 42S ff.
40
Maxwell v. Hyslop, L.R. 4 Eq. 407; Higinbotham v. Manchester (I93I)
II3 Conn. 62, 1S4 Atl. 242, 79 A.L.R. 8s; 4 PAGE 732 § 16s2.
35
36

37
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of the improved doctrines of formal requirements and conclusive probate judgments.
However, the conclusive effect of judicial construction
of a will is doubtful in this country. 41
4· Transposition
A will may be executed in the technique of one system
and finally governed by a law of another system. The
testator may have preferred his former habits to the usage
of his domicil, he may after execution change his domicil
or nationality determining the applicable law, or he may
dispose of his several successions by one will. Here, more
than an ordinary construction is needed: something like
the transposition of a piece of music to a different key.
Through renvoi to the law of domicil and that of the
situs, continental courts have had not seldom to adapt
American wills with their particular technique into the
structure of a civilian legislation. 42 A sole residuary legatee
in American terminology is understood as universal legatee
in France, and both are sole heirs in the German parlance.
An executor may not be allowed all the powers attributed
by the will. Future interests, if vested, must be assimilated
to a German N acherbschaft or N achvermachtnis and if
::ontingent, conceived as conditional legacies. Creation of
:1. trust fund or a foundation-possible in some countries,
while not in others-has to be converted into a type of the
forum or considered void.
A good operation of this kind will save a maximum of
the testator's intention. But regard to the exigencies of
41

See Note, 63 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1950) 504 and infra Ch. 71.
In the Institute of Berlin during my directorship, this was a frequent
subject of advice to courts and tax authorities. See the article by RuDOLF
MOLLER, 7 Z. ausl. PR. (1933) 8o8, 816. See also on the subject LEWALD,
Questions 115-118j M. WOLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 3) 87; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 471-474·
42
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the governing system cannot always obviate the results that
must be reached when the forum applies the foreign law.
II.

REVOCATION

A testator may, by his intentional act, rescind a will.
The formal requisites vary: physical destruction of the
document or of parts, repeal by a new will, tacit revocation
by contrary dispositions, etc. Anglo-American law developed
in addition an annulment ipso facto, by certain events/3
also called revocation, although originally the will simply
expired when the testator married and had a child, or a
testatrix married, or had a child after the execution
of the will. While the statutes formed variations of these
causes and added divorce, in more recent times many provisions directly granting hereditary shares to posthumous
and pretermitted issue have superseded the destruction of
the will. Marriage of women has no effect any more, since
they may have separate property and capacity to testate;
and marriage of a bachelor usually breaks his will only
under certain conditions; the legal presumption is rebuttable
by such facts as express declaration to the contrary, settlement in favor of the widow, or other provisions for her
benefit. Actually, the statutes making divorce a ground for
"revocation by implication" are still the most practical of
this decaying institution and in American courts the most
rigorously applied in spite of counterevidence. 44
Divorce and separation of spouses are causes of presump43

England: GRAVESON (ed. 2) 250 ff.
United States: ELIZABETH DuRFEE, "Revocation of Wills by Subsequent
Change in the Condition or Circumstances of the Testator," 40 Mich. L.
Rev. (1940) 406; SIMES, Model Probate Code 83-84.
44
ELIZABETH DURFEE I.e. at 412, 415 ff.
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tive revocation in a part of the civil-law countries by rules
of subsidiary function, 45 in others not.
Formal validity of a voluntary declaration of revocation
is assimilated to execution of wills by a few of the American
statutes that give liberal options of foreign forms or liberal
statutory interpretation. 46 Usually, 47 however, and even in
the Execution of Wills Act of 1940, revocation is forgotten.
Hence, the law of succession, especially the law of the situs
of land, applies rigorously. 48 When a domiciliary of Illinois
made a will and revoked it by writing "void" over the dispositions, the Illinois court recognized the revocation, but
the court of Iowa as situs of land, by five against four votes,
refused probate, although Iowa does probate the wills
executed at the domicil. 49 This decision, as the dissenting
judges said, perpetuates "an anomalous and confusing legal
situation."
In civil law, the references to foreign law-of the place
of execution or the domicil as of the same time, or also the
domicil at death-are usually broad enough to embrace
revocation by a new will or other declaration. 50
45
Revocation by force of law is distinguished, e.g., in the case of
pretermitted children, from revocation by act, e.g., in Venezuela, C.C. art.
9SI, 990.
46
Supra, Ch. 67 I; Okla. St. Ann. 1938 tit. 84 §§ 71-73; Utah C. Ann.
I943, § IOI.I-I4i Re Traversi ( 1945) 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 453·
47
ATKINSON, 3 Am. L. Prop. 750.
48
Restatement §§ 250, 307; In re Kimberly's Estate ( I913) 32 S.D. I, I4I
N.W. I08I.
49
In re Will of Barrie (1946) 393 Ill. III, 65 N.E. (2d) 433; First
Presbyterian Church of Sterling, Illinois v. Hodge ( 1949) 240 Iowa 43 I, 35
N.W. (2d) 658, 9 A.L.R. (2d) 1399, annot. I4I2. In Matter of the Estate of
Nora Gardner Lufkin (1933) 32 Haw. 826, where a Californian holographic
will was revoked in Hawaii by another holographic will, invalid under the
Hawaii statutes, the court recognizes the first and rejects the second, leaving
uncertain whether the law of the place of execution or the new domicil
decides.
Canada: Re Busslinger (Alta. I952) 6 W.W.R. (N.S.) 408 and cited
precedents.
50
Expressly e.g., China: P.I.L. art. 26 par. 2; Czechoslovakia: PIL. § 43·
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For cancellation by force of law, and for all substantive
requirements, in any case, the views are divided.
(a) Law of Succession: Whatever happens to a will
after its execution may be considered under the law ultimately controlling the succession. American courts incline
to this view; they submit revocation in any sense to the lex
situs 5 1 or lex domicilii as of the time of death, 52 respectively.
Events that have not effect mortis causa are unimportant.
The same approach is taken in Continental courts, where
the last national law of the decedent governs. 53
(b) Effect Inter Vivos. The English courts are of a
contrary opinion, connected with their wrong characterization of a revocation of a will (at least of a British subject)
by subsequent marriage as an incident of marriage. 54 Any
revocation of a testamentary disposition of movables is held
to be governed by the law of the domicil at the time of the
revocation. 55 If it is valid at such time, there is no will
left. 56
The Court of Appeals in New York makes use of a
statute allowing revocation by holographic will made in a
state where it is effective; if the revocation is made by can51
Restatement § 250; In re Patterson's Est. ( 1923) 64 Cal. App. 643; and
see cases in Note 9 A.L.R. ( 2d) 1414.
Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (Mo. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 16;
Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Comp. ( 1946) 394 III. 452, 68 N.E. (2d)
892, I69 A.L.R. (1947) 545·
52
Restatement § 307, GOODRICH (ed. 3) 519; WOLFF, P.I.L. § 569; In re
White's Will (1920) 112 Misc. 433, 183 N.Y.S. 129; In re Smith's Est. (1940)
55 Wyo. x8x, 47 Pac. (2d) 677; cases in 9 A.L.R. (2d) 1412, 1430.
53
France: App. Bordeaux (Aug. 5, 1872) S.x872.2.269; App. Alger
(Apr. 14, 1908) Clunet 1909, 489, Revue 1909, 232, (marriage of a German
wife with an Italian, revocation) ; VALERY 1246; BATIFFOL, Traite 673 § 669.
Germany: 2 BAR 239 tr. 832; 2 ZITELMANN 967; LEWALD 318 § 386.
Italy: FEDOZZI (ed. 2) 615.
54
In re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan [1900] P. 2II, Vol. x p. 375 and
n. 181-183•
55
CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 540, 542.
56
DICEY (ed. 6) 835.
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cellation valid under the law of the testator's domicil at the
time, it is considered effective also in New York. 57
Illustrations. (i) Revocation effective in state X where
made, ineffective in state Y where the testator dies.
A testator domiciled in Washington, D. C., was divorced,
which would cancel his will under the District law, but later
moved to California and died there. The will was considered not revoked, following the view supra (a). 58 According to the English theory, the will would have remained
revoked. 59

( ii) Revocation ineffective in state X, effective in the
last domicil Y.
A Dutch married woman married in the Netherlands
where the will remained intact and died domiciled in England. The will was held effective in England; 60 in an analogous American case, the will was held revoked. 61
(iii) A German woman, who became Italian by marriage,
bequeathed her assets to her Italian husband. After annulment of the marriage, restoring her German nationality,
the will was held void by a French court, under German
inheritance law, BGB. § 2077. 62
( iv) A case involving an implied revocation by executing a new will came recently for the first time to the French
Court of Cassation. The court denied the intention of the
testatrix, domiciled in France, to revoke her French will
by executing a second Argentine testament, rejecting the
application of the Roman and Argentine presumption that
57
Re Traversi's Est. ( 1946) 189 Misc. 251, 64 N.Y.S. (zd) 453: dissenting
opinion in re Barrie's Est. (I950) supra n. 49, 9 A.L.R. (2d) at I414.
58
Re Patterson's Est. (1924) 64 Cal. App. 643, 222 Pac. 374, 266 U.S. 594·
59
DICEY, rule 185 Ill. I.
60
In the goods of Groos [1904] P. 269; see In the goods of Reid ( 1866)
L.R. I P.&D. 74·
61
Matter of Coburn's Will ( 1894) 9 Misc. 437, 30 N.Y.S. 383.
62
App. Alger (Apr. 14, 1908) Clunet I909 1 489.
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testament posterius rumpit prius. 63 The decision agrees
with the principles. 64
It might be asked at what time a will is deemed revoked
if both laws annul it. Logically, in the American view the
effect occurs at death and in the English at the time of the
destructive event. The first approach makes it possible for
the testator to confirm the will or at least re-execute it, 65
which is much more consonant with the modern transformation of revocation by law. Another connected problem
arises when the law between the event and the death
changes; the American decisions have taken a special attitude in such cases, more favorable to the time when the will
was executed. 66 Still another phase of this question is illustrated by the following Canadian case. 67
( v) A man domiciled in Quebec made a testament and
afterward married a woman at whose desire they established their home from the start in Ottawa, Ontario, where
he died. Under Quebec law his will in favor of his mother
and sister was valid, although the widow received half of
the community property. In Ontario the will was revoked
by the marriage, and the widow and child inherited the
entire assets. The Ontario Court, following the English
approach, considered the will as definitively revoked at the
time of the marriage. The Quebec court evidently would
recognize the result, but only because the law of the last
domicil governed.
There is no doubt that the law of the succession ought
to determine these effects.
63

Cass. civ. (Nov. 13, 1951) supra n. 28; cf., Argentina C.C. art. 3827.
Contra the annotation ibid., with a criticism that may rather be addressed
to the imperfection of present conflicts law. For a similar case, see In re
Estate of Wayland (Prob. Div. 1951) [1951] 2 All E.R. 1041: testator executed
an English and a Belgian will, the court searches for the intention, separates
the wills, and concludes against revocation.
65
WARREN, Cases on Wills, 315 n.
66
Note, 34 Harv. L. Rev. (1921) 768.
67
Seifert v. Seifert (Ont. 1914) 23 D.L.R. 4401 32 O.L.R. 433·
64
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ELECTION

A much developed doctrine of "election" in AngloAmerican law deals with the cases where the beneficiary
of a devise or bequest enjoys, as an effect of the same death,
a benefit by the will or ab intestato or against the will or
by marital property law. According to the facts and the
legal situation, he may be entitled to both rights or have to
choose between them.
The traditional cases of the doctrine are those where the
testator gives property not belonging to himself but other
property to the owner, and where his will fails but his
intention is protected. If in the latter case the will is valid
under one law and invalid by another, the purpose of the
testator is carried out by putting the enriched beneficiary
or intestate successor to election: he has to choose between
his interests granted by the will and the benefit obtained
against the will, releasing his right to the surplus to the
disappointed person. The courts involved, according to the
Restatement, have to co-operate. 68
The present conflicts doctrine tends to state that election
depends on the law governing the succession, 69 with respect
to immovables 10 as well as to movables. However, American decisions are vastly divided. 11
Occasionally, the erroneous idea of applying party autonomy has misled courts to invoke a law presumptively intended
by the testator. 72 Doubts. arose sometimes about the rights
of a widow to dower, granted her in many jurisdictions (by
68

Restatement§ 252, apparently a uniform substantive rule.
WESTLAKE 125; CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 566-570; DICEY (ed. 6) 834; BEALE
§253.1; GooDRICH (ed. 3) 121 § 170; STUMBERG (ed. 2) 424·
70
England: De Nicols v. Curlier [1898] I Ch. 403, 413; [ 1900] A. C. 21H.L.
United States: Restatement§ 253, Notes, 22 A.L.R. 437; 79 A.L.R. 103, 105.
71
Note, 105 A.L.R. 271, lists "seven views."
12
Thus Re Allen's Est. ( 1945) supra n. 17; contra MoRRIS, 34 Can. Bar
Rev. 528; id. in DICEY ( ed. 6) 834.
69
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the old rule or by presumption) only when she did not take
under the will of the husband; but in the general opinion,
any question still of practical interest, about dower or the
more recent legal shares substituted for dower, depends
on the character of the right granted by the situs. 73
The "singular tenderness" shown by English courts toward English heirs in adjudging benefits 74 has not been
imitated in the United States. 75
The interesting aspect of this situation is the relationship
between the state laws confronting the beneficiary.
(a) In state X, a surviving spouse has an intestate portion if he does not take under the will. But there is land
in Y and the testator was domiciled in Z, where no conditions attach to the taking of testamentary gifts, even
though no respective in.tention of the testator is perceivable.
The Canadian Supreme Court held that the surviving
spouse may claim his testamentary rights in states Y and Z,
under the legal requirements prevailing there, so as not to
be bound by the provision in X. 76 The restriction on the
will by a statute of election, thus, presupposes that the
enacting state is that controlling the succession.
(b) If the testator owns land in several states·, it would
follow logically that election could be exercised in each state
73
United States: In Staigg v. Atkinson ( 1887) 144 Mass. 564. Holmes,
then judge of the Massachusetts court, did not specify whether he applied
Minnesota law, not imposing election between dower and a legacy of personalty, qua lex situs or lex domicilii as of the time of the execution of the
will. But see 8TUMBERG (ed. 2) 424 ff.; HEILMAN (supra n. 2) 797·
Canada: Re Elder [1936] 3 D.L.R. 422, 2 W.W.R. 70: the right to dower
and election in lieu of will in Manitoba land was subject to election according to Manitoba Dower Act, C.A.M. 1924, c. so, although the husband was
domiciled in British Columbia.
74
DICEY (ed. s) 975; Brown v. Gregson [1920] A.C. 86o- H.L. against
ln re Ogilvie [1918] 1 Ch. 482, 502, see MoRRIS in DICEY (ed. 6) 558; cf.,
CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 568; }ARMAN, Wills 552.
75
GoODRICH 521 § 170.
76
Pouliot v. Cloutier [1944] 3 D.L.R. 737, S.C.R. 284.
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without regard to the others. 77 This awkward result is
usually corrected by the courts; they consider the choice
first made in one state as binding under the theory of
waiver or estoppel. 78 Where the estate contains· movables
and immovables, the same rule obtains. 79
(c) A special case, however, exists if taking against the
will at tfie domicil depends on election. It is controversial
whether such taking has universal effect and operates even
at the situs of immovables. 80 The affirmative answer means
another slight progress towards unity of succession.
Courts of civil-law countries will recognize these rules of
the common-law courts, if, according to their own choice of
law, a common-law statute governs the succession. The
construction of a will executed under American or English
conceptions may be influenced thereby.
IV.

POWERS OF APPOINTMENT

Another Anglo-American institution has some analogy to
the Romanistic substitutio pupillaris and quasi-pupillaris
with the difference that a Byzantine father wills in advance
for his son, but the English son wills for his late father.
In civil law this is a singular exception to the basic requirement for a will that it must be declared by the testator in
person. At common law, the testator may empower a
beneficiary to dispose of assets of the inheritance by deed
or will. 81
77

Van Steenwyck v. Washburn ( 1883) 59 Wis. 483, 17 N.W. 289.
England: Douglas-Menzies v. Umphalby [1908] A.C. 224.
United States: 4 PAGE 730.
79 Van Steenwyck v. Washburn, supra n. 77; Lindsley v. Patterson (Md.
Sup. Ct. 1915) 177 S.W. 826; see GooDRICH 521 § 170.
80
Pro: Coble v. Coble (1947) 227 N.C. 547, 42 S.E. (2d) 892; Note, 105
A.L.R. (1936) 271; contra: Bish v. Bish (1943) 181 Md. 621, 31 Atl. (2d)
348; Seaton v. Seaton ( 1945) 184 Va. 180, 34 S.E. (2d) 236.
81
}OHN MuLFORT, "The Conflict of Laws and Powers of Appointment,"
87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. ( 1939) 403; 4 PAGE § 1649; 2 BEALE §§ 284.1, 236.1;
150 A.L.R. 521; FALCONBRIDGE 455 ff.
78
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With respect to immovables, lex situs, of course, decides
the entire issue. 82 The optional contacts affording formal
validity are specially determined in English law.88
Where immovables are in the inheritance, the dominating
idea of this institution asserts itself. The assets come
from the donor and are further transferred by his will
and left by him, though through the medium of the donee.
Hence, the law of the donor's last domicil governs not
only the validity and construction of the original provision,
but also the exercise of the power. American courts, hence,
generally require that the power be exercised-where the
donor has not specified the form of exercise-by a will
complying with the formalities of the donor's domicil: so
many witnesses as required there, 84 but not so many as
obligatory at the donee's domicil, 85 etc. Yet a contrary
intention of the donor, inferred from circumstances, has
been given effect. 86 The capacity of the donee must only
satisfy the law of the donor's domicil; 87 undue influence is
determined likewise, 88 as also revocation. 89
Next to the tax problems 90 that are in the foreground,
the question whether the donee's forced heirs may claim
rights is outstanding. Again, merely the persons entitled
to a share in the donor's estate have rights. 91
82

2 BEALE §§ 234.1, 236.1.
See DICEY (ed. 6} 845 ff.
84
As in England: In re Scholefield [1905] 2 Ch. 408.
85
Adger v. Kirk (1921) 116 S. Car. 298, 108 S.E. 97·
86
Amerige v. Att. Gen. (1949) 324 Mass. 648, 659 1 88 N.E. (2d) 126,
supra Ch. 66; but see Survey 1950 at 53 on other decisions of the same
court.
87
Matter of the Will of Stewart (N.Y. 1845) 11 Paige 398.
88
In re Harriman's Est. (N.Y. 1926) 217 App. Div. 733, 216 N.Y.S. 842.
89
Velasco v. Coney [ 1934] P. 143; Note, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1202, 1291;
MULFORT, supra n. 81, at 421 n. 101 against the criticism 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
(1934) 279·
90
GRISWOLD, "Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax," 52
Harv. L. Rev. ( 1939) 929, 967.
91
Restatement § 234.
83
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In England, however, the distinction between general
and special powers, familiar to this country in other respects, enters. If the original testator does not indicate
the specific persons in favor of whom the power should be
exercised ("special powers") but has left their designation
to the donee, the donee is deemed to act on his own property so that his own domicil controls the exercise. 92 A will
conforming to the Will's Act, 1837, is always in proper
form to exercise a power given by an English testator if
exercisable by will. 93
These delicate rules, roughly sketched above, are decisive
also in Continental courts, if they belong to the law governing the donee's succession. 94
92
As to capacity: Puey v. Hard ern [1900] 2 Ch. 339; Re Walker [1908]
r Ch. s6o.
93 DICEY (ed. 6) 851.
94
4 FRANKENSTEIN 493-496, SCHNITZER (ed, 3) 471.
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Scope of the Law of Succession
I.

IN GENERAL

T

HE variety of conflicts rules has influenced the domain
controlled by the law of succession. An essential
characteristic and outstanding advantage of the unitary system is provided by its wide radius extending not
only to all assets but also to all debts of the decedent and of
the estate. 1 But at common law, the sphere of the law
governing succession is limited to the problems of "descent
and distribution" in contrast to "administration" of the
estate. 2 Another exclusion of problems from the law of
succession under the theory of territorial law is contemplated
by a most recent French doctrine. 3
The common ground of these groups, the scope of "distribution," is comprehensive enough. It includes the source
of succession: will, contract, or intestacy, with all incidents
such as validity and revocation of wills and the acts leading
from the death of the deceased to the acquisition, though
not the delivery, of the benefits. To quote the Hague draft
of I 9 2 8, the national law of the deceased governs:
(Sec. I) The designation of the beneficiaries, the order in
which they are called, the shares attributed to them, their
obligation to bring in advancements, partition, legitimate
parts, (sec. 2) the intrinsic validity and the effects of testamentary disposition.
1

E.g., NUSSBAUM 351; WOLFF, D.I.P.R. (ed. 3) 228.
E.g., DICEY (ed. 6) 535; GOODRICH (ed. 3) 507.
3
E.g., LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIE:RE (ed. 6) § 362; devolution is subordinated
to the law of property (ed. 5) 320, § 256.
2
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In this enumeration partition is a controversial point.
In any case, beyond this the law of succession may or may
not govern marshalling of assets, liquidation, ascertainment
and payment of debts, and actual satisfaction of the heirs,
legatees, and other beneficiaries.
We shall analyze the first, narrower, group of problems·
in this and the following chapters, principally as a task of
classification of subjects in conflicts law. In the meaning of
the traditional Romanistic system, of course, this exposition
has an equal bearing on most of the matters pertaining to
what is called administration of decedents' estates at common law.
II.
I.

DELIMITATION OF THE ScoPE

Status of Beneficiaries

In the inchoate "general rules" that modern authors
seek to establish in conflicts law, we find two separate topics
which seem to this writer to form only one: the so-called
incidental 4 or preliminary question and the requirement
that a beneficiary must be able to share in the inheritance
(capacity to enjoy rights) and not only that he be able to
accept or renounce a part (capacity to act or dispose).
The opinions are divided on both subjects, which they
should not be.
(a) The incidental question. If a "spouse," a "husband"
or "wife" is called to succeed, by intestate or testate devolution, no court should be in doubt that the law applicable to
determine whether a marriage exists, is defined in the conflicts rules of the forum on marriage and divorce. It would
be too absurd to have two or more yardsticks in the same
court for stating whether an identical marriage ceremony,
4 This term, instead of "preliminary," was proposed by M.
accepted in England.

WOLFF

and
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an annulment, or a divorce is recognized. 5 Even though
a marriage celebrated at the forum is considered invalid at
the domicil or by the national law of a party, the court is
bound to consistency by the law of the forum. 6
More doubt seems, at first blush, justified where testate
or intestate succession is offered to the "children" or "issue,"
or also to the legitimate, recognized, or adopted children.
Although the dominant opinion is that the normal conflicts
rule of the forum defines the appropriate status of an individual claimant, an opposite doctrine stresses the circumstance that the law of succession predicates the status in
question and therefore designates the persons benefited.
The first opinion has been almost a matter of course in
Anglo-American conflicts law. 7 It is true that the English
decisions on questions of legitimate birth and legitimation
relevant to ascertaining benefits in English governed successions have caused much doubt; but the doubts refer to
the structure of the English conflicts rules on legitimacy
and illegitimacy and do not warrant a conclusion that English rules apply because the succession is governed by English law. 8 In the United States it is said that whether a
child is legitimate "relates not to descent or distribution but
to his status." 9 Likewise, the French courts use their
regular tests to decide not only whether a person is a

so Recueil

5

RAAPE,

6

Supra Vol. I, p. 235.

1934 IV at 493·

7
CHESHIRE ( ed. 4) 91; MORRIS, 54 L.Q.R. 6II; 62 id, 89; in DICEY ( ed.
6) 676; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict 166. M. WoLFF, P.I.L. §§ 196-200, however,
expounds arguments pro and contra.
8
This subject has been thoroughly investigated by LIPSTEIN, Legitimacy
and Legitimation in English Private International Law, in Festschrift fiir
Ernst Rabel ( 1954) 6u-630. On complications in Australia, see FLEMING,
1 Int. Comp. L. Q. ( 1952) 67.
9
Note, 73 A.L.R. 941, 943·
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"spouse," 10 but also a legitimate or natural child, 11 a child
of a putative marriage, 12 or an adopted child. 13 In the same
manner, courts decide likewise when full age is attained.u
This is the prevailing view/ 5 although the contrary argument has been presented in impressive reasoning 16 and has
also been adopted by two Anglo-American authors/ 7
A different approach may be taken with respect to a
declaration of death, as the following case 18 illustrates.
A father died early in 1905; his son was three times declared
dead: ( 1) in Vienna, the day of death being fixed on January 8, 1898; (2) in Leipzig as of December 31, 1905;
and (3) in Dresden, dating the death on January 8, 1895.
It appeared that the father was a millionaire, and the son's
minor child had repudiated the son's succession with the
assent of the orphan's court. The court in Dresden, apparently as probate court, could rely on its own statement of
10
Trib. Seine (Jan. 17, 1924) Clunet 1925, 401; Revue 1925, 226: French
lex situs, but common law marriage and marital property system of New York.
11
Cour Paris (March 22, 1924) Revue 1924, ss8; (Feb. ro, 1943) Nouv.
Rev. 1944, 140, J.C.P. 1943 II 2438; (July ro, 1946} J.C.P. 1947 II 3392.
12
Cass. (Jan. 6, 1910) Clunet 19II, 214; Cour Paris (Dec. 31, 1925) Gaz.
Trib. 1926.2.306.
13
Contra: for the law of succession, Cass. req. (Apr. 21, 1931) D.
193r.r.s2, S.I931.1.377, Revue 1932, 526, much criticized, see BARTIN, Clunet
1932, s; BATIFFOL, Revue 1934, 634, Traite 66r par. 658; disavowed by
Cour Paris (July 10, 1946) G. Pal. 1946, II 141 on the report of FI!CHI!, Av.
gen., p. 142, J.C.P. 1947 II 3391.
Cf., RAAPI!, so Recueil I934 IV 493. so6.
14
Woodward v. Woodward (1889) 87 Tenn. 644, BEALl!, 2 Cases 794·
15
France: MAURY, 57 Recueil 1936 III at s6o; SAVATIER, J.C.P. 1947·2.3392,
Cours 309 § 441. Contra DESPAGNET 1046.
Germany: KAHN, I Abh. 22 ff.; LEwALD 300 and in Questions 74 ff.; and
especially RAAPE, Komm. 653, IPR. 68; see Recueil 1934 IV 485 ff.
Italy: DIENA, rs8 Arch. giur. 374, 420 ff., commonly followed. MoNAco,
Efficacia r 90.
16
MELCHIOR 246 ff.; WENGLER, 8 Z. ausl. PR. 206 ff.; OLG. Karlsruhe,
IPRspr. 1931 no. 96.
17
LoRI!NZI!N, Cases (ed. 2) 794 n. 62; WELSH, Legitimacy in the Conflict
of Laws, L.Q.R. 1947, 6s.
18
BARING, "Dreimal fiir tot erklart," ro Zentralblatt fiir Freiwillige
Gerichtsbarkeit und Notariat ( 1909/ro) 630. See on the doubts regarding
the international treatment of absentees, Vol. I, p. 162, r64·167,
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facts, irrespective of the son's personal law in former
proceedings.
(b) Capacity of beneficiaries. With as little doubt as
the independency of the conflicts rule on family status is
observed in the common law courts, the contrary view is
held in the same courts with respect to the capacity of persons to be designated or appointed as heir, devisee, or
other beneficiary. The law governing the succession has a
very firm position, just because it determines the devolution. Not only is devise of land in the exclusive province of
lex situs also in this repect, 19 but the decedent's domicil
rather than the domicil of the legatee defines the latter's
capacity to receive movable property. In England, this
view has been laid down in the case of two persons dying
in a common disaster, an air raid on London. 20 Under the
ancient rule, however, that minors not only lack capacity
personally to accept but even capacity to acquire legal
estate in land, the English courts use an optional test; full
capacity of the minor according to the law of his own
domicil at the time when he reaches full age, suffices. 21
In civil law, the situations where a beneficiary's existence
at the decisive time is in doubt have been constantly debated.
An heir must be "in being" at the death of the decedent,
or, the law of succession allowing substitutions or future
interests, during the period of the rule of perpetuities, or
19 United States: Restatement § 249 comment a; Starkweather v. American
Bib!. Soc. (1874) 72 Ill. so; 2 BEALE§ 249-4i 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 415.
20 England: Re Cohn [ 1945] Ch. 5; it is true that mother and daughter
killed in London in an air raid were not only domiciled in but also nationals
of Germany; hence their personal law was German under both systems.
On the principle see WOLFF, P.I.L. (ed. 2) 577 § 550.
United States: Restatement § 306 comment b.
21
Re Hellmann's Will ( 1866) L.R. 2 Eq. 363. An English will contained
legacies to each of the two children of a German, who were of full age by
German law, but minors under English law; In re Schnapper ( 1928) Ch. 420
announced the rule definitively. On the reformed functioning of the other
disabilities of a minor see JARMAN, Wills (ed. 8) 114.
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within an analogous period, as e.g. established in the German Civil Code. Is a child en ventre sa mere "in being"?
Originally the answer was negative everywhere, and there
are remainders of this view in actual rules. The Roman corrected it: nasciturus pro jam nato habetur quomodo de commodo eius agitur. This rule is textually maintained in most
jurisdictions of the United States: the child en ventre "will
be treated as living or born or surviving where such a construction will be to his benefit." 22 Modern codes even consider the embryo simply as a person under the (( condicio
juris" that it be born subsequently. 23
The older doctrine applied the personal law of the future
person. 24 But more recent writers emphasize that the existence of the beneficiary is a condition of the devolution, and,
therefore, depends upon the law of succession. 25
Most discussed and striking are the cases of commorientes, that is, of two persons dying in a common disaster
or otherwise, so that it cannot be ascertained who died
first. For these cases, different presumptions have been
developed in the various laws, but in some jurisdictions
there is no presumption and therefore no evidentiary substitute favoring one or the other group of claimants. 26
England formerly had no presumption, but from 1926 it
22
Note, 48 Harv. L.R. ( 1935) at IZ35, with just criticism of the "startling"
House of Lords decision, Elliot v. Joicey [1935] W.N. 43 [1935] 79 Scot. J.
144·
23
E.g., Swiss C.C. art. 16, par. 2, cf., RABEL, 4 Rhein. Z. (1912) 167 ff.
24
SAvrGNY 283 §§ 377, 385; LAURENT, 6 Dr. Civ. § 203 ff.; WEiss, 4 Traite
553, 574·
Spain: C.C. art. 9, 745 cf., 30; 2 GoLDSCHMIDT 2 58.
25
2 BAR 314 (tr. 807); DrENA, 58 Arch. giur. 376, 401; FIORE, 4 D.I.P.
(French tr.) §§ 1417, 1420 in case of a single law of succession; PILLET, 2
Traite 382; BATIFFOL 662 § 66o; NrBOYET, Manuel 728; ARMIN JON, 3
Precis § rz8; LEWALD 297 § 362; Paris (Apr. 8, 1938) Clunet 1938, 1038.
26
Vol. I, p. 167 f. and the German controversy, p. 167 n. 24. The start
to establish a uniform law, Convention on declaration of death of Missing
Persons, Lake Success, April 6, 1950. U.N. Pub!. 1950, V r, 3 Rev. Hell. (1950)
391, was not felicitous.
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has been presumed that the younger person survived, and
in 1952 the law of 1925 in application to husband and wife
was repealed. 27
Supposing that a father and his son are killed in an
airplane crash, in one system the son, in another the father
is deemed to have survived temporarily and to have transmitted his share in his own succession, while in modern
statutes considering all presumptions arbitrary, neither inherits from the other. Bar suggested that the law of each
succession should apply its own method. 28 Weiss concluded
that no presumption should apply, 29 and Pillet pointed to
the law of the place of the misfortune. 30 In this unresolved
state, the question still remains in Quebec. 31
Corresponding to the division of writers, some statutes
respectively determine "capacity" to inherit by will or ab
intestato according either to the personal law 32 or to the
law of succession. 33 Also cumulation of both laws has been
tried. 34
(c) Rationale. It may be assumed that many writers
who have taken sides for one or the other contact in all
these questions are nevertheless not adverse to a distinction, which cuts through and corrects the usual antithesis. 35
27
Intestate's Est. Act 1952, Part I and First Sched., amending Adm. of
Est. Act 192 s, sec. 46 ( 3).
28
2 BAR II3 (tr. 805); II3 LEWALD, Questions 63.
29
WEISS, 4 Traite 578; followed by BERKI 74; Cod. Bustamante, art. 29.
30
PILLET, 2 Traite 362, § 577 in order to have a law common to both.
31
3 JOHNSON 72. On various recent attempts see Note, Rev. crit. 1954, 235.
32 Brazil: L. Introd. art. IO § 2.
Sweden : Int. Est. L. § 9·
C6digo Bustamante: art. 152.
33
Treaty of Montevideo art. 45 (b).
34
Poland: P.I.L. art. 28 par. 2.
Austro-German Treaty § I.
2 PONTES DE MIRANDA § IO.
35
Most clearly, FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws sS:z, criticizing the Australian decision In re Williams [1936] V.L.R. 223 (cf., DICEY (ed. 6) 509
n. 65) separates the question of succession and the question of status. 4
FRANKENSTEIN 359 ff., 38I ff., dissatisfied with the alternative dividing the
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Where an inheritance law eliminates the appointment of an
uincerta persona" it eclipses the personal law. Likewise,
how could the personal law of a child decide alone whether
it is an heir in a foreign succession? How can the law of
the succession determine alone whether A is a legitimate
child of B, both subjects of a different jurisdiction? If
it is correctly stated that the existence of an heir is a
requirement for his acquisition, established by the law
governing succession, does it follow that his personal law
is totally excluded?
No cumulation of the two laws, of course, is desirable.
They have rather to divide their domains.
The law governing the individual succession-not the
lex fori or the law applicable to family matters-defines
the category of intended beneficiaries. This is usually not
done by express exact description and only exceptionally by
implicit exclusion of certain classes, as when English land
law understands by "lawful issue" only children born in
wedlock. 36 Thus, commonly what is meant by such terms
must be explained from other sources. It is quite true that
no state need have an adopted child forced upon it as heir. 87
But this is no answer to our question.
Sound construction of the rule of inheritance needs complementation by a relevant set of other rules, and certainly
not by the domestic law of the forum. The question, thus,
is whether the conflicts rule of the state whose law governs
the succession or the conflicts rule of the forum ought to
apply. As seen above, the answer supported by the great
weight of authority is in favor of the view that the forum
literature, suggests a distinction between the calling by the law of succession
and ability to receive the offered gift, which would be governed by the
personal law.
36
Supra Vol. I, p. 654.
37
Hood v. McGehee ( 1915) 237 U.S. 611; Restatement §§ 142, 143; 2
BEALE 427 § 142 j § 305.1.
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apply its own conflicts rule. Unity of the personal law at
the forum prevails over unity of the succession.

Illustration. Suppose two orthodox Greeks domiciled in
Greece were married in Belgium before an orthodox priest,
validly under Greek, invalidly under Belgian law. One,
dying, left land in England, Belgium, France, and Germany.
The status of marriage is determined 38 according to Greek
law in all courts in which the rule locus regit actum is optional, except the Belgian, and in the latter according to
Belgian law. This is done, although France and Belgium,
by normal conflicts rule, and Germany, because of EG. art.
28, recognize that the lex situs governs succession in Belgium,
France, and England. Likewise, irrespective of the lex
situs, English and American courts consider the marriage
invalid according to the imperative principle, locus regit
actum.
As furthermore submitted in the first volume of this
work with special regard to adoption, 39 there may be a considerable variance in defining the class of persons called to
share in the inheritance. "Adoption" may mean anything
between full status of legitimacy and mere educational
rights. If "adopted" children are admitted without qualification by the inheritance law, the effect of adoption on
succession for either party of the adoption is indicated by
the whole law of the state that according to the conflicts
rule of the forum governs the adoption.
The problem of capacity, as represented by the requirement of personal existence, is not different.
Notwithstanding the evident trend toward the law of
succession, the simple contention that it governs capacity
to take is theoretically untenable and practically inadequate. It has been said that the problem does not concern
capacity in the true meaning at all, but a requirement of
38
39

Vol. I, pp. 233-236.
Vol. I, pp. 653-658.
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the succession. But being a requirement, capacity is nevertheless what it is. Why should the personal law not serve
as usual to determine status once and for all? And whether
there is a person certainly concerns status. A person should
not be deemed living for one succession and dead or having
never existed for another, possibly at the same court and
in a split succession to the same decedent. He should not
be considered continuing his marriage and being a decedent
simultaneously. The Restatement and a part of the modern
writers are clearly wrong in extending the law governing
succession to such points. Practically, how can the law of
the last domicil of a testator decide whether a remainderman twenty-one years after the death or twenty-one years
after another measuring period of life, is validly declared
dead?
Whether a certain beneficiary or the member of a certain class of beneficiaries fulfills the required condition,
should be decided by his own personal law.
Devolution to future persons, such as children not yet
conceived, if permitted by the inheritance law, is best construed so that their right, vested or contingent or whatever its nature, is acquired at once but materializes only
under the condicio juris of their future conception and
birth. 40 This corresponds exactly to the laws to be applied.
The origin of the right is in the death of the decedent,
its realization in the birth of the beneficiary.
Of course, especially in this case, not much may be left
to the personal law. Some codes, such as the German and
the Argentine, declare in the course of their specific dealing with inheritance that a conceived child has capacity to
40

Italy: Cass. (Dec. 14, 1945) Foro Ital. 1944-46 I 289; (Aug. ro, 1949) id.
r 949 I 90 5 ; accord by the literature cited in the notes.
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inherit but one not yet conceived has not, 41 while other codes
regulate the matter as one of general capacity of persons. 42
This insertion of a provision into a subdivision of a code
does not mean much. But the German Code makes it a
principle that a nasciturus, after being born, is retroactively
immediate successor of the decedent, and that nonconceived
children can merely be substitute heirs from birth on
( N acherben). Where the structure of the system of succession thus necessitates an extension of its rules to foreign
beneficiaries, a question of legal technique is involved. In
the mentioned case, the Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch, § 2 I o I,
provides that an appointment of a person not yet conceived
at the testator's death is to be understood presumptively
as an appointment as substitute heir after the legal heirs;
if this does not agree with the testator's intention, the
appointment is void. These are clearly rules of succession.48
Insofar as the conflicts rules of the forum obtain, of
course, one more difference in the treatment of the same
succession appears in consequence of the variety of tests
for the personal and family law. Additional differences of
classification from forum to forum-e.g., whether legitimacy
involves the status of the father or that of the childhowever might be avoided.
(d) Public policy of the forum has been urged in countries excluding adulterine and incestuous children admitted
by the law of succession. 44 Natural or not recognized children without such stigma have been allowed foreign-derived
41

Germany: BGB. § 1923 par. 2.
Argentina: C. C. art. 3290.
42
E.g., Switzerland: C.C. art. 31 par. z.
43
Both personal and inheritance laws support the New York decision
assuming civil death of a man convicted for murder, Matter of Lindewall
(1942) 287 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E. (zd) 907, annotated 17 St. John's L. Rev. 46;
only the place of the conviction was discarded.
44
France: Trib. Seine (Aug. 13, 1894) Clunet 1895, 95·
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benefits superior to the French equivalent. 45 On the other
hand, where the foreign law denies natural children any
share, a domestic substitute has been allocated. 46
(e) Unworthiness. Loss of benefits from an inheritance
by tort is naturally in the domain of the law governing
succession. 41 But public policy has been urged. 48 On the
other hand, a Federal Circuit Court admitted an heir who
killed the decedent and was convicted for manslaughter in
Kansas, because the court found that the Oklahoma statute
presupposed a killing in Oklahoma; 49 this, of course, is a
singular method of applying the statute governing succession. Nor is there necessity to favor delinquents by cumulating both laws in principle. 50
(f) Corporations. It should be even more certain than
for individuals that the existence of corporations is determined by their personal law and the law of successions as
such has nothing to do with it. 61 Lex fori, of course,
may deny recognition to a foreign-created corporation.
For acquisition by will, however, the common trend to
require the consent of both the personal law and the law of
succession has been noted in Vol. I, pp. 164 £. 52
2.

Marital Property

The relationship between the marital property system
applicable to the estate and the law of succession has been
45

France: Trib. Seine (Dec. 23, 1924) D. 1927.2.21.
France: Paris (March 22, 1924) Gaz. Pal. 1924.2.148 with the correction
by BATIFFOL, Traite 66o par. 658.
Germany: cf., Vol. I, p. 622 n. 63.
47
2 BAR 316; KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 2II; 2 ZITELMANN 941; PILLET, 2 Traite
383; NUSSBAUM 351 n. 3; BATIFFOL, Traite § 665; SCHNITZER 495·
48
In re Hall [1914] P. at 5·; WEISS, 4 Traite 579; DESPAGNET par. 365;
and others.
9
4
Harrison v. Moncravie ( 1920) 264 Fed. 776.
50
Thus BATIFFOL 663 n. 1 and cited authors.
51
"This is entirely undisputed today," 4 FRANKENSTEIN 386 and n. 136.
See recently Swiss BG. (May 16, 1950) 76 BGE. III 6o, 65.
52
Add Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Catholic Charities (1948)
141 N.J. Eq. 170, 56 Atl. (2d) 483, 489.
46
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explained earlier. 53 The discussion included the difficulties
and hardships arising because the municipal statutes provide for the surviving spouse or the widow either by marital
or by inheritance law and the conflicts rules combine the
systems so that the survivor may happen to take both or
none of the benefits. Recently a valuable study added a
very comprehensive analysis of the American statutes. 54
But so long as the draftsmen of marriage settlements and
wills and the legislators of statutes on matrimonial property
or inheritance persist in ignoring the conflicts problems,
little help is in sight.

3· Donatio mortis causa.
A gift by the decedent in his lifetime, made conditionally
in case the donee survives him, has a hybrid nature. Accordingly, opinions are sharply divided on the characterization of this transaction: does it belong by its origin to
contracts inter vivos or by its effect to acts mortis causa?
(a) Act inter vivos. The Anglo-American approach is
in favor of construing the entire transaction as a contract
inter vivos. In the English case of Korvine's Trust, the
question was squarely asked whether a gift upon death
by a donor domiciled in Russia of movables situated in
England was a gift, subject to lex situs, or concerned succession, subject to the law of the last domicil. The court
applied the English law of the situation, 55 in accord with
the common opinion, 56 also in the United States, where the
53

Vol. I, pp. 374-382.
Marital Property in Conflict of Laws ( 1952) with discussion of the conflicts difficulties, at 130 If., 225 If.
55
In re Korvine's Trust [1921] I Ch. 343·
56 FALCONBRIDGE 565; see also GRAVESON (ed. 2) 214.
54

HAROLD MARSH,
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place of actual delivery is accentuated. 5 7
However, a deeper analysis of the contract of donation
and its performance by delivery, in view of the condition
inherent in both acts, may show this classification oversimplified. A more recent decision applied the law governing administration:
In re Craven's Estate 58 a lady domiciled in England had
shares and money in a bank in Monte Carlo, Monaco. On
July IS, I9JS, facing a dangerous operation, she told her
son he should have the shares and bank balance transferred
to his name, to keep them in case of misfortune happening
to her. The son wrote on her behalf, and the bank acted
accordingly. She died on the 2oth. An expert witness stated
in the law suit that under the French Code (article 93 I),
in force in Monaco, a gift must be made in a public instrument, or by certain so-called "indirect" methods allowed by
the practice, which were missing in the case. But the judge,
approaching the question as an incident of collecting the
assets in the course of the administration, resorted to English law. Hereunder the peculiar elements of a donation
mortis causa-a special institution of common law-were
assembled, 59 since the requirement that the donor must
57
Emery v. Clough (1885) 63 N.H. 552; and the cases cited 4 PAGE 734
par. 1655. The case cited as contrary, Gidden v. Gidden ( 1936) 176 Miss.
98, 167 So. 785, in reality holds the gift ineffective because delivery of the
negotiable warehouse receipt was omitted.
58
Lloyds Bank v. Cockburn [1937] Ch. 423, [1937] 3 All E.R. 312, "better
report" (FALCONBRIDGE 564) in 53 T.L.R. 694 ( 1937).
~ 9 See ATKINSON, Wills 156, and the older English cases in RANKING (ed.
18) 145 If. It is a special institution distinguished from gifts inter q,iq,os and
still considered revocable, not only conditional on the precedent death of the
donor. In France, art. 893 C.C. permitting only gifts inter q,iq,os and testamentary disposition is referred by the courts just to the old law of revocable
donationes mortis causa so that irrevocable gifts under the condition of
survival of the donee are recognized. Cass. req. (May 14, 1900) D. 1900.1.358,
S. 1905.1.438; COLIN ET CAPITANT, (ed. 3) (1929) 796. There is no hint
in the report that the mother reserved revocation.
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part with the dominion of the right was evidently fulfilled
at the situs, Monte Carlo.
Falconbridge criticizes the application of the English
characterization as gift inter vivos; Monaco law should
have controlled the entire transaction. 60 In fact, the question was not one of administration but one preliminary to
administration. 61 But what law governs a gift inter vivos
is highly controversial. Mother and son were domiciled in
England and British subjects; they met in Paris, because
the mother had fallen ill there. English law applied properly to the contract. The transfer of the bank account and
the securities in Monte Carlo was subject to the local law.
Yet, although no valid cause for a transfer existed under
that law, the cause did exist under the English law, sufficient
for any court, also in Monaco.
In an analogous New York case, a resident of France
gave a friend a check on a bank in New York, asking him
to deliver the check to the drawer's sister in New York.
The drawer died "before the check was presented for payment," though presumably after delivery to the payee. The
surrogate considered that "the original transaction" was
in France and the gift was void under French law. 62
Indeed, the operative facts of the gift are determined
by the local law. This is the law governing the obligatory
contract of donating, if it can stand alone-as, e.g., a
promise in notarial form, 63 made and accepted. The law of

°

6
FALCONBRIDGE, ibid. HELLENDALL, 15 TuJ. L. Rev., uses the case for confused ideas on characterization.
61
HELLENDALL, 16 Can. Bar. Rev. ( 1938) 143 objects to FALCONBRIDGE
that the question whether the assets were a part of the inheritance, regarded
the English administration rather than the lex situs. This begs the question;
see infra Ch. 70.
62
In re Bloch's Est. ( 1945) 186 Misc. 105, 54 N.Y.S. (2d) 57· Facts and
decision seem doubtful. See on the check phase supra Ch. 63 pp. 229, 233·
63
Sloan Adm. v. Gertrude Jones (1951) 192 Tenn. 400, 241 S.W. (2d)
506. A third law, that governing marital property, has been held superior in
King v. Bruce (Texas 1947) 201 S.W. (2d) 803; Texas spouses could not
change community property into severalty by transferring to and disposing
of it in New York.
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the situs controls the type of the right granted and the
transfer of possession and title and accordingly the performance that may be necessary to make the promise actionable. However, what is needed to exclude the asset from the
inheritance is naturally an incident of the law of succession.
(b) Act affecting succession. The modern civil law
doctrine 64 enumerates donatio mortis causa, or all transactions 65 conditioned on death, among the incidents of the
law of succession. The Italian courts followed this development; although the Codes of I 93 8 and I 942 merely prescribed that the "national law" of the donor governed, 66
the Italian highest court in 1947 made it clear that the
institution belongs to inheritance law 67 and therefore the
national law as of the time of the donor's death is meant. 68
In favor of this classification, it has been argued that
the law of succession must control for the safeguard of the
legitimate portion. 69 But in the modern systems special
attack is provided against gifts damaging the funds available for forced shares, and these remedies belong to the law
of succession irrespective of the characterization of gifts.
In fact, total enrolment of this type of benefaction into
• inheritance law goes too far. That not only the form, 70
64
France: PILLET, Traite § 945; AumNET 5 Rep. 64I no. 25.
Germany: RAAPE 653; M. WoLFF D. IPR (ed. 3) 229; Bundesfinanzhof
(Sept. 20, I951) IPRspr. I95o-5I, 245 No. III (confused reasoning).
Colombia: I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ § 84I.
Egypt: C.C. I948, art. I7 par. I for the content and effect, art. I7 par. 2
for the optional form.
Hague Draft: art. 6, 7·
C6digo Bustamante: arts. I46 ff.
Scandinavian Convention: arts. 9·I2.
German-Austrian Treaty, art. II §§ 5, 6.
65
For the treaties see PLAISANT 263.
66
Italy: C.C. Disp. Pre!. art. 24; Cass. (June 9, I941) Giur. Ita!. 1941 I
I, 78o; Trib. Torino (July 28, I948) id., I949 l2, 273·
67
Cass. (Feb. Io, 1947) Foro. Ita!. I948.I.636.
68
BARTOLOMEI, note ibid. Disp. Pre!. art. 23.
69
BATIFFOL 656 par. 654.
7
France: Cass. (June 29, I922) S. 1923.1.249.
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but also the other requirements, are those of contracts, is
certain; the gift may exist at least until the death. We
conclude that it is in the province of the law of succession
to decide whether the donated assets are parts of the
estate. This law may prohibit a condition of survival in
order to protect the form of wills more effectively, but if
it recognizes perfected gifts, it is in the province of the
law of property to state whether the gift is perfected.
Where land is the object and the law of succession establishes a separate system for immovables, the problem is
simple.

Illustration. Garda de la Palmira, of Spanish nationality,
a long-time resident of Paris, died, leaving French immovables and movables and immovables in Spain. His daughter
claimed a quarter share, under a gift by the father in her
marriage settlement made at a notary in Rome. The tribunal
of first instance held the gift void under old Spanish law.
The French Court of Cassation applied French C.C.,
article 1082, authorizing parents to dispose of their free
portions in favor of children. "Succession as well as gift
fall under the French lex situs ( C.C. art. 3. par. 2) ." 71
4· Life Insurance

It depends on the contract with the insurer and, if this
allows beneficiaries to be designated, on the use of such
clause, whether the debt is a part of the estate or not. In
case the debt is not created for the benefit of the heirs as
such (not individually to them) or the personal representatives, the proceeds remain outside the succession. 72 From
this rule, the New Zealand statute deviates, in barring the
creditors of the estate from any life insurance. 78 On the
71

Cass. Civ. (Apr. 2, 1884) Clement 1885, 77·
E.g., OLG. Kolmar (Dec. 10, 1912) Els. LZ. 1931, 576.
78
On the conflicts aspects, FALCONBRIDGE 573·
72
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other hand, some fiscal laws extend estate taxes to all life
insurance benefits, which is a deterrent but otherwise does
not affect the normal rule.
A testator permitted to change the beneficiary may validly
exercise this right at a time when he is a subject of a jurisdiction not offering this choice ;74 his right to change had
"crystallized at the time of the issue of the policy." 75
III. THE RIGHT

OF

THE STATE To TAKE EsTATES

In the municipal systems, usually the state-crown or
fisc-or a body designated by the state may claim an estate
that lacks any testate or intestate successor. But this right
is based on two different theories. Either the state exercises
the old jus regale of occupying ownerless property-bona
vacantia, escheat; this is the doctrine of the common law,
most American statutes, Austria, France, Belgium, and the
majority of Latin-American countries. Or the last class in
the order of intestate descent calls the state as heir, jure
hereditario, as in Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland. 76
The conflicts rules tend to follow the domestic characterization. Thus, in the first group it has often been taken for
granted that every state should act according to its own
principle. Notably in France, almost all courts 77 and
74 1n re Baeder and Canadian Order of Chosen Friends (Ontario 1916) 36
OLR 30 [1916] 28 D.L.R. 424.
75
FALCONBRIDGE 573·
76 In Brazil the former lntrod. Law art. 14 left a doubt on the nature of
the state's right, cf., BEVILAQUA (ed. 3) 398 f.; 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 307.
The law of 1942 is silent but the common opinion is for the right to bona
vacantia. This view has spread and finds some adherence even in respect to
French and English law; see E. J. COHN, 17 Mod. L. Rev. ( 1954) 38I.
71 C. Paris (Nov. 15, 1833) S. 1833·2.593, D. 1884.2.2; Cass. civ. (June 28,
1852) D. 1852.1.283, S. 1852.1.537: C. Paris (Jan. 20, 1923) Gaz. Pal.
1923.1.228; 10 Repert. 540 n. 72.
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writers 78 have constantly permitted the French fisc to
occupy heirless inheritances irrespective of the domicil or
nationality of the deceased. This was suggested either by
a formerly unconscious and later conscious characterization
of the state's right according to the lex fori, or by an imperative application of the lex situs. Accordingly, assets
situated abroad are not claimed at all. 79 But if "every court
proceeds according to its own lex fori," 80 another state
may well occupy the assets of a foreigner, such as a Frenchman, and simultaneously appear as heir for foreign-situated
assets of his own subjects when the situs agrees.
Even in view of this doctrine, it is certain that the estate
must be without a successor according to the law governing
succession and that the inheritance law of the forum as such
is of no importance; 81 the domestic law determining the
nature of the state right would be that of the situs of the
assets.
With more effort to conciliate the two kinds of state
rights, a widespread method makes the outcome dependent
on the law applicable to the succession. If assets are in
state X and the conflicts rule of X calls for the inheritance
law of state Y, the law of Y appointing the state of Y
(or any third state Z) as heir is obeyed in X. Only where
the rule of Y is found to follow the doctrine of bona
vacantia, would the forum in X prefer its domestic fisc.
78
WEISS, 4 Traite 580; NIBOYET, Acquisition 2 56-28 I; MANUEL § 83 9;
4 Traite 29I § 1173; 777 § I325; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, by MAURY AND
VAILLETON I93 par. I58 (still speaking of qualification by lex fori but also
of the political and regalia nature of the territorial right) ; IO Repert. 540, n.
73· Noteworthy the contrary opinion of C. Paris (Dec. I3, I90I) D. I902.2.I77
and CoLIN, note ibid.
79
App. Tananariva (Madagascar, June 30, I909) Revue I9IO, 88I.
80
PLANIOL ET RIPERT, 4 Traite (former ed.) §I 58.
81
See the exposition of LIPARTITI, L'acquisto delle eredita vacanti, I29
Arch. giur. ( I943) I and § 9, against other Italian authors who contend that
foreign public law is not included in the reference to foreign law of succession;
on this point see also supra Vol. II, pp. 565 f.
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In this manner, the English courts found that the Austrian
code 82 and the Turkish law as of I 9 r 5 83 shared the theory
of the British law, and the Crown could take assets situated
in Great Britain as ownerless. Again, by the same method,
it was found that the Spanish state on the contrary is considered to be ultimus heres. 84
This view has been followed in courts of both groups 85
and by Wharton. 86 True, the German theory implies that
there is no privilegium occupandi as respects American
assets left in Germany, which remain ownerless to anybody's
occupation. But this would not be followed. 87 Nevertheless,
extension of state power, however qualified, over the borders
of another state encounters rejection in many cases. Such
opposition may not only come from the state of the situs.
A decision of the Reichsgericht dealt with the estate of a
82

In re Barnett Trust [I902] I Ch. 847, Clunet I9Q4, 4I5.
In re Musurus [I936] 2 All E.R. 1666, criticized 61 L.Q.R. (I945) 440.
Canada: In re Hole Est. (I948) 56 Man. L.R. 295; 27 Can. Bar Rev.
( I949) 225·
84
In re Maldonado [I953] 2 All E.R. 300; the method has been criticized
by LIPSTEIN, Cambridge L.J. ( I954) 22, because there is no difference other
than in the name between the claims of the state.
85
Austria: WALKER 923 n. 59·
Austria-Poland, Treaty of March I9, I924; SATTER, Note to OGH.
(June 8, I932) I Giur. Comp. DIP. 30I.
Austro-German Treaty of I927, § 4·
Belgium, Cass. (March 28, I952), Rechtsk. W. 195I-52, I599• Rev. crit.
I953, 132, concerning Swedish law, states that the Belgian ordre public is
not affected.
Germany: NIEMEYER, I3 Z. int. R. 38; NussBAUM 356; WOLFF, D. IPR.
(ed. 3) 227 n. 4·
Italy: Min. Relazione to R.D. Oct. 26, I939, n. 1586; Cass. Roma (Aug. 20,
I900) Annali giur. it. I900, I SIS; Cass. Torino (March u, 1922) Giur.
Ita!. 1922 I 407.
Poland: IPL. art. 3 I.
Spain: 2 GoLDSCHMIDT 260.
Switzerland: N.A.G. art. 28; SCHNITZER 463.
Spanish-Greek Treaty of Sept. 22, 1903, art. 16: lex situs for immovables,
national law of the decedent for movables.
C6digo Bustamante, art. I 57·
86
WHARTON§ 603; see WoERNER§§ 134 ff.
81
See M. WOLFF, D.IPR. (ed. 3) 57 § 13-4(a); cf., RG. (May 16, 1940)
166 RGZ. 395·
83

374

INHERITANCE

Russian emigree who was stateless under the former German rule that stateless persons were subject to their former
national law. The court discarded the Soviet inheritance
law, terming it a noninheritance law, because this law restricted private succession so radically just to make place
for succession by the state, closely resembling a right of
escheat. A right of the situs was therefore denied, and the
estate turned over to the normal order of distribution. 88
Under these circumstances, a third thesis has appeared,
to the effect that even in the jurisdictions construing their
own privilege at home as a hereditary position, for the
purpose of conflicts law the taking should be restricted to
assets found in the territory. Following this lead, the Hague
drafts recognize the national law of the deceased merely
in favor of private beneficiaries, excluding the state and the
corporations designated by it. 89 This approach saves examination of the nature of a foreign claim and eliminates
claims practically defeated by an opposed lex situs. A recent
American suggestion is in virtual agreement. 90
In the relationship among common law jurisdictions, of
course, only the question which state may exercise the right
of escheat arises, and its decision depends on the situation
of the assets. 91
88

RG. (May 16, 1940) 166 RGZ. 395·
Hague draft convention on succession 1904, art. 2; 1928, art. 4· This
model has been followed in some recent drafts, among them the Rumanian
Civil Code art. 38 (the Code never entered into force). However, here the
case is included where the relatives sharing under the national Jaw of the
deceased are not endowed with intestate rights by the Rumanian law. This
seems a curious anticipation of Soviet mentality.
90
jOSEPH MORSE, "Characterization, Shadow and Substance," 49 Col. L.
Rev. 1027, 1038.
91
Connecticut Mutual Life v. Moore ( 1948} 333 U.S. 541.
89
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Acquisition of Inheritance Rights
I.

DEVOLUTION

r. Principle
UNICIPAL Systems. The doctrine of common law
contains two different systems of transmitting the
decedent's assets. As the principle has remained
in most jurisdictions of the United States, real estate is
vested in the "heirs" from the decedent's death, whereas
personal property first goes to the probate court, which in
turn confirms or appoints the personal representative; only
after administration is finished is the net surplus distributed
to the beneficiaries.
In England since the Transfer Acts started in r897 1 real
property shares the treatment of the rest of the estate.
Some American statutes have adopted the same regulation;
most statutes provide the personal representative with important powers of sale, possession, income, or distribution
of land, without disturbing the direct passing of the title
to the heirs.
However, the variety of the statutes is so great and the
desire for more uniformity so strong that the Model Probate Code could state the principle, a person's real and
personal property passes to the persons to whom it is devised by his last will or it devolves by intestate succession,
though subject to the possession of the personal representative.1

M

1 SIMES,

Model Probate Code § 84.
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In the ancient family organization, by the death of the
father and the leader, the descendents who were thereby
freed from his power-sui heredes, yvqULot 1 etc.-became
actual instead of latent co-owners. When the property
system hardened, this heirship was transformed into automatic-uipso iure"-succession to the decedent's ownership. The pure spirit of feudal law would have insisted on
the exclusive effect of new enfeoffment.
This principle, known in medieval and dynastic applications under the slogans: le mort saisit levi/, or le roi est mort,
vive le roi, survives in the French group of legal systems
principally with respect to the oldest group of "heirs," those
ab intestato, and in the German Code and its group as the
general rule, because it is the simplest method of transfer.
In Rome successors outside the "house," whether intestate
or appointed by will, the heredes extranei, including collateral relations, did not acquire ipso iure. The beneficiaries
were "called" ( delatio), and had to acquire the legally
offered position by acceptance, viz. formal ( cretio) or informal express declaration (aditio) or conduct (pro herede
gestio). This is in substance the general system in many
countries.
Conflicts rule. What system governs the transfer of an
estate, according to a view commonly taken for granted,
depends on the law governing the succession. This is so
universally settled that attention is required only by an incisive exception, that French decisions endeavor to consolidate. They dwell on the necessity of exempting a series of
incidents from the law of succession and submit them to
the law of the situs. 2 This discussion involves mainly the
2
Most informative on the division of opinions in France in recent times,
has been to me the subtle (though by no means convincing) monograph:
ROBERT DENNERY, Le partage en DIP (Paris 1935). NIBOYET, who had much
in common with the emphasis on territoriality, seems to have gained a critical
and constructive view in his Treatise, vol. 4·
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transfer of title and possession, undivided ownership of
coheirs and partition, but affects fundamentals. This theory,
indeed, exercised through the French delegates to the Hague
Conference of 1928, influenced the fate of the Hague convention draft. Although the scope of the draft, article 1,
does contain "partition," to the regret of some pres·ent
French authors, everything concerning the practical handling
of the inheritance or exceeding the ascertainment of the
beneficiaries and their participation, especially all relations
with the creditors or even all "third persons," was excluded
and left to the extremely varied national systems. This
would have been understandable in part, if Anglo-American doctrines had been taken into decisive consideration;
as it was, an inter-European codification decapitated itself
for the sake of a questionable theory.
Let us recall here merely the elementary phase of the
problem.
It is no exception to the principle of the law governing
succession at all that lex situs is itself the lex successionis
in the United States, France, etc. Most decisions applying
lex situs fall into this category.
In the case of movables, almost all systems agree in
gathering them into one succession, whether determined
by domicil or nationality of the decedent. What sense would
this make, if the unity were to yield wholly to the lex situs
for such important questions as title and possession? Is
it not enough that the lex situs has final determination of
the permissible kind of rights in re and the publicity required
for their acquisition?
This important question will have to be faced in the
following discussions.

INHERITANCE
2.

Transmission

(a) Title. Apart from the case of coheirs, there is complete universal agreement that the title of heir as successor
depends upon the law governing succession, be it lex situs
or lex domicilii or lex patriae. It is likewise certain that his
ownership in the individual tangible and intangible assets is
conditioned by the law of situs in the two respects that the
local law defines what rights the deceased owned and
whether they are susceptible of being transferred to the
heir. Of course, also publicity measures, such as registration, may be needed in relation to third parties.
But if under the law of succession the title vests in the
court, should the situs ignore this and impose its own rule
that the heir is owner; or vice versa? This question is
fortunately quite generally answered in the negative. In
many, not even published, cases it has been held, as a matter
of course, on the Continent that during an English or
American administration the beneficiaries were not owners,
and, hence, not entitled to sue or apply for registration as
proprietor of Italian land or a German automobile. 8 When
at the end of the first World War an Italian national, heir
to an Austrian inheritance, had not yet accepted and received
judicial authorization according to the Austrian law, he
was not admitted to sue the Austrian state at the Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal. 4
On the other hand, an heir in a French, German, or
Italian succession has often, though perhaps not always,
3
This does not mean that a European universal legatee in an American
succession is considered in all respects as nonowner. The question of the
time when he owes death duties in France has been discussed in Cass. req.
(Nov. 19, 1941) S. 1942.1.129 and learned note by BATIFFOL (from which
I dissent, however) ; German courts grant him a certificate of heirship, infra
Ch. 71.
4
TAM. Italo-Austriaco, Norlenghi v. Austria, 7 Recueil dec. Trib. Arb.
Mixt. 266. On a dissident theory that common law refers to the lex situs,
infra Ch. 71.
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been recognized by American or English courts as "having
title to and right of possession of the assets vested immediately" in him, as well as entitled to sue "on his own
behalf and not in a representative capacity." 5 Or he has
been appointed as ancillary administrator. 6 Even though a
beneficiary does not obtain full property, he may acquire a
"fixed and vested" 7 hereditary right; it is elementary that
this depends on the law governing succession. For this and
other reasons it has been justly urged that American banks
and corporation registrars ought not always to insist on
the appointment of an ancillary administration for allowing them to deliver deposits or transfer stock, respectively. 8
(b) Possession (seisin). 9 According to the French and
other civil codes, certain heirs, 10 and under the German and
other codes all heirs, 11 by force of law succeed by the death
of the decedent to the possession he had.
On this point, French and Italian opinions are clearly
divided into two groups, one applying the law of the sue5

England: Re Achillopoulos [1928] Ch. 483.
United States: New York: The Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian ( 1915) 213
N.Y. 420, 108 N.E. 72 (Turkish law); Ullmann v. Ullmann (1928) 223 App.
Div. 636, 229 N.Y.S. 176 (German law); Roques v. Grosjean (1946) 66
N.Y.S. (2d) 348 (French law). California: Anglo-California Nat!. Bank of
San Francisco v. Lazard (CCA 9, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 693, 698, involving
Californian land, with precedents.
6 ln/ra, Ch. 71.
7
Rowe v. Cullen (1939) 177 Md. 357, 9 Atl. (2d) 585.
8
OPToN, "Recognition of Foreign Heirship and Succession Rights to Personal Property in America," 19 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. ( 1950) 156, 163. In
Roques v. Grosjean, supra n. 5, the demand for ancillary letters is called
untenable.
9
GIAMBATTISTA MAZZOLINI, L'apprensione dell'eredita nel DIP., (Pavia
1930).
10
E.g., France and Belgium: C.C. art. 724; Italy C.C. art. 458; Netherlands: C.C. art. 88o.
11
E.g., Germany: BGB § 857; Switzerland: C.C. art. s6o; Venezuela:
C.C. art. 99 5: very clearly in par. 2: If someone, not an heir takes possession
of the hereditary assets, the heirs are considered ejected in fact, and may
exercise all respective actions.
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cession 12 and the other the lex situs. 13 The latter and more
recent view is based on the power of the territorial law to
regulate the legal situation of property. Although a French
decision of I 939, speaking of the indivisibility of seisin,
recognized the last domicil as governing, 14 the highest court
invoked in I94I the principle of territoriality. 15 If this
is true, a foreign succession can never create seisin in France,
nor a French succession possession in any foreign country.
French immovables, of course, are out of the question. 16
For the other cases, reconciliation of views has been sought
by the requisite that the consent of the lex situs is needed
in addition to the law of the succession 17 or, more specifically, the foreign inheritance law should be recognized in
the cases where the French Civil Code grants seisin. 18 Thus,
a German testate heir could not claim seisin, while a German
heir ab intestato could.
The entire discussion suffers from a confusion. In the
German doctrine, it is understood that § 857 BGB. states
a "succession" of the heir or heirs to the possession in a
strictly limited sense. 19 It is the legal position of the de12
France: WEISS, 4 Traite 594, 605; 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT by VIALLETON
ET MAURY 290 § 222; Trib. s~ine (Dec. 8, 1924)' Clunet 1925, 711, Revue
192 5, 76; and NIBOYET, 4 Traite 864 f. against his former opinion.
Italy: Cass. Firenze (Nov. 17, 1874) Annali Jan. 8, 483, La Legge 1875
I 3; PACIFICI-MAZZONI, Instituzioni (ed. s, 1925) 509; STOLFI, r Dir. Civ.
( 1919) 727 and n. 4·
13
France: CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Successions 381, 384; PILLET, 2 Traite 386,
586, 449 § 618: everything concerning possession is territorial; LEREBOURSPIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 409 § 362, § 363, § 370.
Italy: FIORE, Elementi DIP. 526 and in Giur. Ital. 1901 IV 193 ff.; PACIFICIMAZZONI ib. (supra n. 9) ; FEDOZZI, 4 Digesto Italiano 836; DIENA 218;
GIAMBATTISTA, supra n. 5, 10 calls it the majority opinion; CAVAGLIERI,
Lezioni (ed. 2) 258.
14
Trib. Seine (Jan. 4, 1939) D.1939·2.17.
15
Cass. req. (Nov. 19, 1941) S.1942.1.129, cf., LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE
(ed. 6) 411, 2°.
16
Cour Paris (Oct. 25, 1952) Gaz. Pal. 1953·1.190.
17
BATIFFOL, Traite 674 § 671.
18
ARMINJON, 3 Precis (ed. 2) 149 § 135.
19
STROHAL, Erbrecht 63 ff., 96 ff.; M. WOLFF, Sachenrecht 121; STAUDINGER, Komm. § 857 II,
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ceased at his death, based on his physical or constructive
possession of the assets, that passes, not the possession of
the particular assets as such. The heir has the actions for
recovery acquired by the deceased in his lifetime; he may
take possession and sue any one who takes possession of
the assets without his consent; the tangible assets so taken
are in the category of things "taken away" which cannot
be purchased by third persons in good faith; that is, the
purchaser does not acquire a good title, although he does
acquire good possession. The heir also enjoys the easier
role as defendant in law suits affecting property. But
between seisin and possession in the meaning of property
law is a neat difference.
Some modern French civilists have admirably perceived
a quite analogous distinction between saisine of a "natural
hCritier" and physical possession of the assets, "although
the contrary is often said." 20 The heir may take possession
and may sue others who do so; he may especially bring
possessory actions. His position rules the estate rather than
the components, the particular assets. 21
From these facts it follows that the law of succession
alone determines whether an heir has seisin. True, theoretically, consent by the lex situs is necessary to his protection; but why should it not be given?
That French courts should require a German widow,
though not children, to request envoi en possession 22 would
be scarcely worthwhile; with better reason it has been proposed to enlarge the scope of C.C. art. 724 to include all
universal successors. Again, the law of the situs determines
alone the cases of actual possession (ude fait").
It would seem that the above submitted distinction IS
20 MAURY ET VIALLETON in 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 262 § 196.
21 BALLADORE PALLIERI, DIP. 176 f.
22
Thus 4 FRANKENSTEIN 324, following the French doctrine.
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suitable also to Anglo-American law, inasmuch as the personal representative (and in most American jurisdictions·
the heir to land) acquires ipso jure-in the words of the
British Administration Act-"the same right of action as
the deceased would have had alive ... for any ... right in
respect of his personal estate," 23 (or of his land) .
(c) Specific Legacy
Assuming that a Frenchman domiciled in New York is
bequeathed by specific legacy a violin stored in a German
safe, what law determines the nature of his interest? According to American law, a legatee has no right until the
court order of distribution, and before this time his action
at law needs the assent of the administrator; 24 under French
law he is owner by the death (leg a tum vindicationis) ; 25
German law grants him merely an obligatory claim against
the heir. 26 The prevailing opinion is that the effect of
French law of succession is reduced in German territory
to an obligation until some act of delivery intervenes. 21

3· Acceptance and Repudiation
The law of succession determines whether acceptance is
required to complete the acquisition, or renunciation is
needed to annul it. An heir or a next of kin in the narrow
meaning of the common law cannot even disclaim his inheritance, although he may lose or part with his share by
other events. Devisees and legatees may renounce, except
in certain jurisdictions when their creditors would be defeated.28 Why the rule is different for descent by will
Administration of Estates Act, I 92 s, sec. 26 ( I) •
WOERNER § S6I, I9IO.
France: C. C. art. I014.
26
BGB. § 1974; on the interpretation of legacies so as to satisfy the lex
situs, see NussBAUM 301 n. 3· Lex situs determines the content of the devised
right, RG. (Oct. 2, 1931) IPRspr. 193I, 175 No. 88.
21
BGB. § 2I74·
28
ATKINSON, 3 Am. Property 629 ; § 14.1 s; 26 C.J.S. 1073 § 64 and Supp.
23

24
25
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is explained by historical arguments, but is maintained only
because it exists. 29 Also in China and Japan, as in ancient
Rome, for religious reasons the "necessary" heirs cannot
disclaim.
The inheritance law determines the time limits 30 and
the address for express declarations 31 of acceptance or
renunciation, as well as their form. 32
However, this application not infrequently encounters
rather unsatisfactory local laws with presumptions for
acceptance, short time periods, heavy sanctions for silence,
which may burden beneficiaries in foreign jurisdictions even
without their knowledge. American statutes ordinarily have
no time limits or allow a reasonable time; but an evident
hardship occurs for instance when a five-year period of
escheat runs against foreign heirs without their knowledge. 33 The case where a person became an heir by omitting
renunciation and thereby incurred unlimited liability for
debts has been noted in Germany.
Illustration. A laborer domiciled in Hamburg died without an estate; under the law of Hamburg the father in
Holstein was ipso jure heir and could renounce only within
six weeks, which elapsed. The father was sued by the
guardian for alimony which his son promised to pay to an
29

Bostian v. Milens ( 1946) 239 Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W. (2d) 797, 170

AL.R. 424. As the annotation on p. 439 observes, the rule against renunciation is not adopted in Louisiana, Quebec, and Puerto Rico.
30
In civil law, PILLET, 2 Traite applies the law of succession to these
"modalities of the option," as condition of the devolution. In the codes, the
time periods are spelled out; at common law renunciation, where permitted,
may be made in reasonable time, 4 PAGE 1408.
31
Usually the court at the last domicil of the deceased.
32
C/., 4 PAGE 1406. If it is sometimes said that the formalities are determined by the law of the place where the acts are done, e.g., SAVATII!R 308, 441,
the meaning must be the same.
33
In re Apostolopoulos' Est. (1926) 68 Utah 344, 250 Pac. 469, 253 Pac.
III7, 48 A.L.R. 1322. Only where a treaty prescribes actual notice to consular authorities, is there prevention. The Supreme Court declares public
notice to be adequate. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey ( 1950) 341 U.S. 428,
434·
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illegitimate child. The court in Kiel held it "unthinkable
that so long as the defendant, a subject of the forum, had
not interfered with the inheritance or otherwise submitted
to the foreign jurisdiction, he could be held liable for the
debts." 34
This decision followed precedents and a note by Bar. 35
It has been suggested that the law of succession in such
matters should be entirely excluded in favor of the personal
law of the beneficiary, 36 but this would unduly disturb the
system. Protection by public policy seems to be the only
remedy so long as many inheritance laws are unmindful
of the international complications.
The Hague Draft following a different suggestion omitted
acceptance and renunciation from the incidents controlled
by the law of succession (art. 1) for the reason that these
acts "may exercise influence on third persons." 37 This confused idea, again, stems from the destructive belief in the
lex situs as the great instrument of territorialism.
Another example of the present discord is caused by the
reasonable rule that renunciation should be sent to the
authority at the last domicil of the deceased. In the case
of a Dutch testator, domiciled in Germany, the difficulty
arose that Dutch law, governing the succession, prescribed
that the declaration be directed to the court of the last
domicil, whereas the German courts, under another wellmeant principle, declined any jurisdiction in foreign-governed
successions. 38
Some discussion has turned around the French provision
34
OLG. Kiel (Oct. 23, r884) 40 Seulf. Arch. (1885) 257, accord OLG.
Hamburg (Dec. 17, 1889) I Z. int. R. 55, Clunet 1893, 197.
35
2 BAR 343 n. 9: the decision of the Prussian Obertribunal erroneously
cited by BAR and the courts probably is that of the Plenary, of Jan. 6, 185r,
20 Entsch. OT ro, insisting on the knowledge of the beneficiary of the
devolution.
36
4 FRANKENSTEIN 535·
37
Actes de la Sixieme Conference, 1928, p. So.
38
RABEL, Fachgebiete 178 If.
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that a minor heir may accept a share only under the benefit
of inventory, i.e., limiting his liability for debts to the value
of the estate inventory. It seems now agreed that the personal law fixes the time of full age, but that the French rule
involves only French-governed successions. 39
A future Conference would do well to search for implementation of the conflicts rules by international co-operation instead of cutting out an essential part of the subject.
II. AGREEMENTS ON INHERITANCE RIGHTS
I.

Release to Ancestor

Distribution 1of the paternal estate among the sons
( divisio paterna) 40 was a frequent event in ancient times
when the father had reached the age of retirement. Entirely
normal was the dismissal of a daughter from the house on
marriage, a dowry replacing her share in the family property. A subsequent usage was the analogous emancipation
of male descendants. There exists still a special institution
in some Latin systems allowing pacts between an ancestor
and a descendant releasing the latter's expectancy; 41 such
agreements are similarly recognized in most states of the
United States, 42 although in some jurisdictions the expec39
For particulars see 10 Repertoire 514 no. 99; CHARRON 168; see also
FISCHER, 64 Z. Schweiz. R. at 139-141. It has been concluded that a French
minor cannot accept any foreign succession where the law governing it does
not permit just this means of limiting liability; MAURY ET VIALLETON in 4
PLANIOL ET RIPERT 324 n. 3 § 240j contra ("absurd") 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA
256.
4
For antiquity see RABEL, Elterliche Teilung, in Festschrift 49· Versammlung deutscher Philologen (Basel 1907) ; for Italian history, VITTORIO PoLAcco,
Divisione operata da Ascendenti fra Discendenti (Padova 1884).
41 E.g., Venezuela: C. C. art. u26 ff.
Spain: C.C. art. 833 in case of Mejora.
The provisions of French C.C. arts. 1078-1o8o, "Pacte d'ascendant," are
distinguishable.
42
ATKINSON, 3 Am. Property 594 § 14.12 who notes that no cases are
known relating to release by a collateral heir.
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tancy cannot be released and the gift is treated as advancement on account of the hereditary share. 43
These are exceptions either to the prohibition of agreements of future inheritance or to the requirement of consideration. In the German group, however, waiver of
expectancy is allowed by transaction with any testator.u
In the case of marriage settlements in England, a release
declared to the ancestor seems to be regarded simply as
part of the contract inter vivos and valid as such. 45 Elsewhere, however, permission or prohibition belongs to the
law finally controlling the estate, 46 which certainly is the
correct characterization. An old Italian decision conformed
to this conception in the face of the Italian prohibition, but
emphasized that the daughter's release occurred in a marriage contract made in Zara, Austria, between Austrian
parties, and the will declared Austrian law applicable; 47
perhaps for a daughter of Italian nationality the issue would
have been different on grounds of public policy.
2.

Release of Expectancy in General

In the late Roman law, pacta de hereditate futura were
void in view of the exploitation of spendthrift heirs by
speculators. This tradition was followed by Pothier. In
the French revolution, renunciation of a future inheritance
was prohibited as offending public honesty, and in the
43

26 C.J.S. 1085 § 62.
See infra n. 52.
45
BRESLAUER So cites old cases.
46 Cf., infra sub 2.
47
Italy: C. C. ( 1865) art. 954; Cass. Firenze (Dec. 5, 1896) Lanza v.
Purkardhofer, Sirey 1897-4-17, Clunet 1897, 503 (Fedozzi). Cf., (Senator)
AuG. PIERANTONI, "La rinuncia alia successione nel DIP.," Rivista universale
di Giurisprudenza e Dottrina, vol. 10, fasc. VII (Roma 1896) ; FEDOZZI, 22
Digesto Ita!. IV 837 j CONTUZZI, Dir. ereditario 486.
44
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Code 48 as a means to prevent renunciations by daughters
or younger sons under moral duress and to maintain equality
among the relatives. 49 Any contracts of third persons between themselves without 50 the assent of the testator are
commonly disapproved. In Louisiana, a most radical variant prohibits all releases and agreements on future inheritance even with the assent of the testator. 51 Other statutes
recognize the validity of releases and other anticipated dispositions of future shares, 52 contrary to the French group,
provided that there is no usury or lesion evident.
In the latter group, no obstacle exists to the application
of the law of succession. 53 In the courts that consider an
agreement of such sort not necessarily immoral, the decision
should be the same. There seems not to be even a question
on this point in the United States, as will appear presently.
3· Promise of Testamentary Disposal
In the larger part of the civil law, the Roman principle
persists that ambulatoria enim est voluntas testatoris; the
testator must be free, until the last moment of his capacity
to make a will, to dispose of his property; the testament
48
France: C.C. arts. 791, 1130 par. 2, 1600.
Italy: C.C. (1865) art. 954; (1942) art. 458.
Sweden: Law of April 25, 1930, with qualifications.
Spain: C.C. art. 816, 655.
49
LAURENT, 9 Droit civil 418 ff.
50
Thus Switzerland, C.C. art. 636.
51
La. C.C. arts. 978, 1887, 1017; Alexander v. Gray (La. App. I938) I8I
So. 639.
52
Austria: A BGB. 551 cf., §538; Germany: BGB. 2346, 2352; Switzerland: ZGB. art. 195.
53
Czechoslovakia: IPL. 48 par. 2.
Denmark: S.C. Copenhague (June 25, I902) Clunet I904, 436, IS Z. int.
R. 6os, Revue I91o, so8.
Germany: RG. (Jan. 29, I883) 8 RGZ. I4S; OLG. Stuttgart (May I9, I893)
4 Z. int. R. 567; 2 ZITELMANN 966, 17I; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 370; M. WOLFF,
DIP. R. (ed. 3) 228 n. I.
Switzerland: SCHNITZER 473·
Transvaal: Berman v. Winrow ( I943) T.P.D. 2I3·
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therefore is his "last will." In sharp contrast to this conception, common law has opened a vast domain to contracts
whereby a person undertakes to make or not to make certain
testamentary provisions. 54 The action for breach of such a
contract arising at the death of the promissor directly
affects the distributary shares. The modern state statutes,
however, eliminate at least oral promises of this kind, which
raise doubt and litigation, if opposition to the old custom
does not go further. These laws are now really in conflict.
A recent case that went through all New York courts 55
dealt with an oral promise of the testator not to change
his will involving certain stock. The agreement was valid
at the place of the alleged contracting in Florida, but was
held invalid under c. 3 1, § 7, of the Personal Property Act
of New York. With a former decision, the fundamental
public policy of this statute to prohibit oral bindings that
"threatened the security of estates" was stressed. However,
New York was the state presiding over the estate. What
was explicitly, but only secondarily stated by the Court
of Appeals that the domicil was and had been for a long
time in New York, should have been the decisive ground.
With the present division of statutory rules in this country,
there is not much room for intransigent policy. In addition, the Court used as a different approach the proposition
that New York was the place "of performance" for the
agreement not to change the will. Those mechanical connecting factors generate curious ideas I The contract may
well be considered centered in New York for the reason
that the testator had merely temporarily sojourned for
recovery in Florida and both parties lived in New York.
54

55

68 C.J. s6s ff. §§ 187 ff.; 17 C.J.S. 646 § 263.
In re Rubin's Will, Rubin v. Irving Trust Co. (1953) 305 N.Y. 288,

113 N.E. (2d) 424, affirming App. Div. 113 N.Y.S. (2d) 70; the decision provokes once more the question of the scope of the law of administration, see
infra Ch. 73-
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In civil-law countries distinctions are made, as in a French
case:
Frederic Meyer, of Hamburg, lived in Bordeaux from
I 8os to his death in I 878, but supposedly remained a nondomiciled German, as also his son. When the latter married, the father promised in the marriage settlement before
a notary that he would not give any advantage to his other
children to the detriment of his son. The Court of Cassation held the promise valid, because it conformed to the
French principle of equality, even though it might be considered immoral in Germany. Hence the agreement prevailed over the subsequent will that was governed by German law. 56
This is exactly how an American court evaluates the
breach of a joint reciprocal will in terms of damages. 57
As a result, it would seem that a valid contract binding
the testator under its "proper law" should be respected even
in courts taking a strict view of freedom of testation insofar as a reasonable construction of their statutes permits.
III. AnvAN CEMENTS (collatio bonorum)

Again, it is settled in principle that the law of the succession determines whether and by which method a gift made
by the deceased in his lifetime to a beneficiary must be
brought to account by him. 58
In fact, the problem concerns the collection of the distributable estate and the access of the heirs to it.
56

Cass. req. (Jan. 9, r88z) D. r88z.I.II9·

57

Supra.

58

France: Cass. req. (June z8, r88z) Clunet r88z, 415; WEISS, 4 Traite
688; PILLET, 2 Traite 400 § 596; ARMINJON, 3 Precis (ed. 2) 160 § 144 and
the great majority.
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 24, r88z) Hans. GZ. r88z BBl. 33 Nr. 27.
Italy: 4 FIORI! 457; CoNTUZZI, Dir. ered. 543·
Hague Draft, art. 1.
Montevideo Treaty, art. so par. r.
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Of course, the law governing the gift-e.g., the law of
the parent-child relation or of an obligatory contractimposes its own conditions for validity and effects; these
may constitute a duty or a dispensation from a duty to
account for the gift at the death of the donor. Therefore,
the Hague drafts (I 929, art. 2) insist that where the gift
was originally exempted from collation under its own law,
it should not be considered an advance on the hereditary
share, even though the law of the last domicil were to the
contrary; but this unratified rule is not beyond doubt. 59
The very elaborate but much divided statutory doctrine
of advancement in the United States, 60 apparently unknown
outside this country, has taken no position in conflicts
matters. It is evident only that, in the absence of statutes
defining expressly what is to be considered an advancement,
courts are inclined to look to the intention of the transferor
at the time of making the transfer. 61
Correspondingly, it certainly may be said with the civilian
doctrine that where a rule of the law governing a gift or
an acknowledgeable intention of the donor implies a duty
of adjustment, this is binding so long as the donor by his
will, or the law of the succession in his place, does not
change the situation. The law governing the succession has·
the nearest claim to dominate 62 and the law of the transaction
59 The case of French Cass. civ.
(March 16, 188o) D. I88o.1.201,
S. 188o.1.174, Clunet 188o, 195 contributing to this rule, involves the special
case of the annexion of Savoy, an intertemporal problem independent of the
donor's intention, and does not warrant broad generalizations.
60
WoERNER (ed. 3) 1879; ATKINSON, 3 Am. Prop. 14.10j 26 C.J.S. u64

93-IIS.
61

28 C.J.S. § 98 n. 94·
France: Cass. (Aug. 8, 1921) Clunet 1923, 108: An Alsatian wife having
made gifts to her husband under the French Code died under the German
Code; the latter, not imposing a duty of accounting, governed.
Italy: Cass. Roma (Jan. 4, 1902) Foro Ital. 1902 I 558. A Turk made a
gift to his son, but died as an Italian. The Italian law imposed accounting,
despite the Turkish law.
62
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inter 'Vi'Vos applies only in virtue of a renvoi to it. 63 The
same law determines how far the intention of the donor and
testa tor is decisive. 64
Courts do have some difficulty in reconciling the two
laws, but the clue should lie in a reasonable interpretation
of the law of succession.
Illustration. In an old case, a Swiss widow, remarrying
a Frenchman, obeyed a statute of the canton of Bern, and
transferred a part of her property to her children. French
law governed her estate, but because article 843 C. C. speaks
only of "donations" to be brought to urapport," the Paris
court denied the advancement, 65 a literal construction instead of possibly better reasons.

If, against the present usual method, the contribution to
the estate must be made in nature, e.g., because of a stipulation by the donor, the rights of third persons will be protected by the lex situs.
Trouble starts when there is more than one law of succession, as in the United States in the case of land, when
the land is made subject to adjustment at all. 66
IV.
I.

PARTITION

Coheirship

By the various systems, the several successors to a decedent are made either co-owners of the assets pro di'Viso
(pro rata parte) as for instance in Roman and French
law with respect to debts due to the decedent (nomina sunt
63
Such renvoi is assumed by PILLET, z Traite 381 under the theory of
vested rights.
64
This, of course, does not exclude the dictum of WEISS, Traite 688: only
the giver's personal law at the time of the gift can control the interpretation
of his intention, irrespective of the situs.
65
Cour Paris (Jan. 7, 1870) S. 1870.2.97·
66
Infra Ch. 72.
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ipso jure divisa) ,67 or joint tenants as under German law 68
and in certain cases in the United States, entitled or not
to dispose each of his part in the estate as a whole or only
by majority or unanimity.
This structure of the shares is commonly considered a
succession problem.
The new French territoriality theory, however, subordinates the question to the lex situs and a Report of the Sixth
Hague Conference states that partition pertains to the law
of succession covered by the draft only so far as it concerns
the coheirs inter se. As an illustration, Basdevant invoked
in the Hague Conference the much discussed agreement
of coheirs respecting movables in France and Italy, that
they should remain undivided through ten years; the then
Italian Code (art. 984) permitted this period, the French
( C.C. art. 815) only one of five years. 69 Why this case
should prove the necessity of the lex situs for the relationship among coheirs or for partition has never been demonstrated.70
Clearly, the law governing succession is indispensable for
determining not only the distributive parts· but also the
persons replacing the deceased in the ownership of the
tangible and intangible assets and who can dispose of them
between the decedent's departure and partition. Thus, with6 7 C.C. art. 1220; formerly it was thought that this article applies before
partition and art. 883 (infra) afterward; now art. 1220 is referred to third
persons and art. 883 to the internal relationship. 3 CoLIN ET CAPITANT (ed.
9) 300 § 535; MAURY ET VIALLETON in 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 754 § 655.
68 BGB. §§ 2032 ff.
69
Actes de Ia Sixieme Conference ( 1928) 88f. and Rapport de Ia Troisieme
Commission p. 297; also Actes de Ia Cinquieme Conference, Rapport p. 271,
no. r.
7
Cf., 2 BAR 348. Trib. Seine (May 25, 1935) Clunet 1936, 875 and the
older authors (WEISS, 4 Traite 683 and others) invoke public policy; in 10
Repert. 101 No. I I both lex situs and lex successionis are considered applied.
BATIFFOL 683 contends that the French conception of undivided co-ownership
(indivision) requires the limitation on its duration (just to five years?).
BIBLIONI, Anteproyecto 252: "La divisione forzata es el disastro."
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out hesitation, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals followed this
law in order to ascertain the nationality of the persons
entitled by it. 71 It is difficult to see why the old condition
for a real right, namely, that it needs recognition, though
not creation, by the lex situs, should not suffice again.
Is this not also true of real subrogation? In France itself,
the Court of Cassation in plenary session has held that
where land or an estate is sold, the debt of the price replaces
the land in the mass of the estate as an "effect of succession," for the purposes of jurisdiction and advancement. 72
Real subrogation in fact is a phenomenon of a law governing an estate, 73 whereas the lex situs claimed here 74 governs
merely the individual objects.
2.

Partition

(a) 17 oluntary partttton. The civil law systems distinguish three kinds of dissolution of a coheirship : by agreement, by a nonlitigious judicial act, or by judgment in
contentious proceedings. Division by contract is more usual
in Central Europe than in the Latin countries.
In a widely noted decision of 1932, the French Court of
Cassation recognized freedom of party disposal for a
voluntary partition among the heirs of the Duke of Bourbon
concluded before the Grand Marshal of the Vienna Imperial Court with discrimination against the female sex and
71

TAM. Franco-Austrian (Dec. 9, 1927) 7 Recueil dec. Trib. Arb. Mixt.

659; Germano-Rumanian and Franco-German decisions, see infra n. 82,

though with the former construction of French C.C. art. 1220. Thus far
also the Italian writers, such as CAVAGLIERI, Lezioni ( ed. 2) 249; FEDOZZI
(ed. 2) 632 seem to agree with the text against FUSINATO, Della Iegge
regulatrice della divisione de beni ereditari situati in territorio straniero
(Torino 1898). But see supra n. 10.
72
Cass., Chambres Reunies (Dec. s, 1907) D. 1908.1.II3, S. 1908.1.1.
'la Cf., 3 COLIN ET CAPITANT (1945) § II27 (d). It is integrated in a particular legal institution, LAURIOL, Subrogation reelle ( 1954) § 698, §§ 720 ff.
74
PICARD in 3 PLANIOL ET RlPERT 50 j DENNER¥, Partage 54 j BATIFFOL 663.
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including succession to the castle of Chambord in France. 75
Despite much criticism respecting the various aspects of the
case, it certainly has authority wherever a voluntary partition agrees with the law governing succession. This point
was questionable in the case; but if no asset subject to the
separate lex situs is included, the local situation as such has
no claim for an exception.
It has been noted that in this and another case the French
courts characterized proceedings occurring in Vienna according to the French distinction of judicial and voluntary
partition. 76
Private partition: Waiver of partition. Where administration is not compulsory, private agreements are naturally
allowed if all participants are adults or represent a minor
with authorization. 77 Nothing in principle prevents· them
from disregarding the distribution provided by the will or
the statute of distribution. 78 The same rules obtain even
despite the difference of organization in the United States,
provided the creditors are paid or not endangered. The
beneficiaries may agree among themselves on a division
without any probate. Most courts consider this method
75

Cass. civ. (April 13, 1932) S. 1932.1.361; Clunet 1932, 997; AUDINET,
Revue 1932, 549 j DENNERY, Partage 135·
76
Trib. Seine (July 13, 1909) S. 1910.2.263, Cass. (Oct. 22, 1913)
S. 1918.1.61, D. 1921.1.219, Rev. 1914, 139; TRONCHON, Le partage successoral
en DIP. (1938) 40: here a voluntary partition approved by a tribunal was
assimilated to a judgment.
77
France: 3 COLIN ET CAPITANT (1945) 606 § 1173.
Germany: 4 FRANKENSTEIN 562.
Italy: App. Napoli (Jan. 23, 1924) Giur. Ital. 1924 I 2: 175 C.C. (1942)
art. 713.
Spain: S. T. (Feb. 10, 1826) 87 Coli. Leg. 466 at 509.
78
Trib. Rabat (April 24, 1918) Revue Algerienne, 1922/23 II 142 held
valid a division concluded in Algiers by parties subject to French law,
whereby they adopted Jewish law. AuDINET, Note ibid. criticizes the decision
only because the women did not understand to what impairment they consented.
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which saves the costs and loss of time of an official intervention valid and the agreement enforceable/ 9
While the lex fori governs a court's proceeding, what law
governs such voluntary act? The Hague Draft, article I,
enumerates upartage" among the incidents of the law of
succession, and this presents certainly the prevailing civil
law view. The French delegate, Basdevant, protested against
adoption of a law different from that governing the relationship of the heirs until division, which in his opinion is the
lex situs. But although the latter opinion is shared by other
French scholars, we have just insisted on its fragility.
(b) Effect. Another much discussed difference concerns
the effect of partition. In France and other states, the as·sets
finally assigned to a coheir are deemed retroactively to
have been his property from the decedent's death. 80 This
"declaratory" effect, originally intended to avoid double
enfeoffment, is favored as a protection against detrimental
dispositions by other coheirs during indivision. In the
German system, no such danger exists and partition is
traditionally construed as mutual transfer of the shares
pro indiviso so as to complete full ownership in the specific
assets assigned; a coheir who inherited one third, receives
the two thirds missing in his asset from his two coheirs. 81
An instructive contribution to the required criticism of
the "declaratory effect" in the international field was once
79 ATKINSON, Wills (ed. 2) 565 § 103 j 3 BBALB 144 § 4654.
Contrarily, a few courts declare that the testator's wishes ought not to be
frustrated. Taylor v. Hoyt ( 1932) 207 Wis. uo, 242 N.W. 141; Cochran
v. Zachery (1908) 137 Iowa 584, ns N.W. 486 (an heir and trustee may not
give up his duties as trustee even though before probate they are merely
moral).
80
E.g., France: C.C. art. 883; Italy: C.C. (1865) art. 1034, (1942) art.
757i Chile: C.A. (May 20, 1931) 29 Rev. Der. (1932) II 70: Where a coheir sold his share in the estate, and another coheir in the partition receives
the asset in litigation, the seller never had any title to it.
81
BGB, § 2048 ; partition must be followed by conveyance.

INHERITANCE

delivered in the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals of the 1920's.
The Tribunals repeatedly encountered cases where the
coheirs were of different nationality and attempted to profit
by the declaratory effect of partition under the French, or
Belgian, or Rumanian law governing the succession; they
assigned shares, bank deposits, etc., to the participant protected against the seizure of enemy property.
The tribunals, 82 as well as a Belgian decision, 83 used
various shades of embarrassed arguments in their effort
to eliminate such declaratory effect on the right of liquidation under the Treaties. In simpler form, it was stated that
a private partition could not affect the official clearing procedure between states. 84
However, if the "declaratory effect" is set aside where it
is disagreeable to a state, what role should it have in international relations in general? In fact, it is recognized that
it has no extraterritorial effect, 85 nor effect in relation to
third persons. The difficulty of its application is noticeable
in a long discussion of French writers. Opinions have been
divided between the law of succession 86 and the law of the
situation; 87 middle solutions have also been sought. 88 But
the need in this case to distinguish the cause for acquiring
title in tangible objects and its acquisition is evident; the
first must be governed by the law of succession.
82
TAM. Franco-German (Aprilz6, 1927) De Lyrot v. Mendelssohn & Cie.,
7 Recueil dec. TAM., 587; TAM. Franco-Austrian (Dec. 9, 1927) Goldwasser v. Merkurbank, id. 656; Goldwasser v. Banque des Pays de !'Europe
Centrale, id. 659; Germano-Belgian (Oct. 22, 1929) De Molinari v. Deutsche
Bank, 9 id. 661; Germano-Rumanian (April 8, 1930) s Z. ausl. PR. (1931)
202; cf., RABEL ibid. DENNERY 84 thinks that some of these decisions have
not "seen the problem of qualification;" this is beside my point.
83
67 Trib. Liege (March 12, 1921), Clunet 1922, 1033.
84
TAM. Germano-Belge, 9 Rec. 661, supra n. I.
85
PLAISANT 266.
86
PILLET, 2 Traite 404 § 597; NIBoYET, Manuel 733·
87
BROCHER 439 § 136; 7 LAURENT 52; 2 ROLIN § 769; DESPAGNET § 370;
CHAMPCOMMUNAL 412; MAURY ET VIALLETON, 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT § 640;
IO Repert. 197 No. 73; FEDOZZI (ed. 2) 633 f.
88
ARMINJON, 3 Precis (ed. 2) 155 § 141 bases the effect of the partition
on the law of succession but restricts it to the assets situated in territories
recognizing the same effect.
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Plurality of Succession
I.

THE PROBLEM

(a) Occurrence. As appeared from the survey of conflicts systems relating to inheritance, immovables are separately treated and submitted to the law of the situation
in the Anglo-American and at least thirteen more jurisdictions. In other states, lex situs extends to movables,
or to domestic immovables, alongside another law controlling the rest of the estate. In addition to these primary
rules, public policy, or renvoi, or deference to foreign
conflict rules may produce a scission into segregated estates.
Another source of a split arises in the positive conflict
of conflicts rules, such as at the death of an Italian domiciled
in Massachusetts, a Frenchman domiciled in Brazil, or a
German domiciled in Switzerland. The laws of both states
involved claim his inheritance, and what happens usually
is that each state distributes the assets it can get hold of
according to its own law, with no small confusion, especially
in the liability for debts. Suppose that a testator was
formerly domiciled in Maryland and at his death in New
Jersey, and that he leaves his widow domiciled in California, and movables in California, Mississippi, and Maryland, as well as land in Illinois. There are five laws of succession-not only of administration-within the one country
of the United States.
The United States, of course, is the largest provingground for trying these problems. The only (meager)
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legislative attempt to cope with them has been made in
the Treaty of Montevideo, in which consequences had to
be drawn from its complete dismemberment of estates by
unlimited application of lex situs to all assets. Again, some
scientific exploration solely occurs in France, and there
mainly in the case of French immovables in an otherwise
foreign-governed inheritance. The Parliament of Paris
had urged the unitary application of the last domicil to liability for debts. 1 Under the influence of the Romanistic universal
succession of the heirs to the deceased's position, this view
was popular around the turn of the century, often in favor
of the national law of the deceased. 2 More recently, a
veering toward territorialism has reanimated the customary
principle of tot hereditates quot territoria, enforcing the
plurality in most respects. 3
(b) Scope. The cleavage operated in an estate by the
two-fold conflicts rule of a state or the opposite conflicts
rules of two states goes to the very bottom of all incidents.
It affects the limits and order of intestate succession, especially of the extremely varied benefits of a surviving spouse
or collateral relatives; the form and intrinsic validity of
wills; their construction; the forced shares; adjustment of
shares by election and advancements; acquisition; partition;
and liability for claims.
Accordingly, the Montevideo Treaty enumerates as pertaining to the laws of the situation of each asset: capacity
to inherit, validity and effect of the will, rights in the inheritance, existence and shares of intestate heirs, existence
and amount of the "assets available," and everything relating to forced portions and testamentary inheritance.
1 LAINil, 2 Introduction 307.
2 2 RoLIN § 766; LAURENT, 7 Dr. civ. int. § 42 p. 71 ff.
3
BouHIER, Obs. Bourgogne Ch. 2r n. 212-:215; 2 DE VAREILLES-SOMMIERES
passim j LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE ( ed. 6) § 363 j cf., ARMIN JON, 3 Precis 122
§ II4•
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From the beginning, it is unfortunately evident that
enormous incongruities and hardships are involved and the
present legal situation in the world offers but scanty
remedies. There is some help when federal principles
step in; creditors of a divided estate enjoy equality in the
United States, provided they are American citizens. But
the generally avowed principle that all, domestic and foreign creditors, should enjoy equality, is riddled with exceptions.
Uniformity either of the substantive or of the conflicts
rules or of their effect on a plurality of succession is a goal
of the future. The following pages shall merely describe
the status controversiae. In this sorry corner, clearly no
theory helps when action is missing.
The position of the creditors of the decedent is deferred
(chapter 72) until some account of the Anglo-American
system of administration can be furnished (chapter 71).
II.
1.

DISTRIBUTION

Intestate Rules

Each law governing a part of the estate designates the
order of intestate succession with all its conditions and
effects. 4 Thus Spanish law governing movables allowed
heirs only up to the sixth degree, while French law for the
immovables went to the twelfth degree ..5 A widow has
dower rights 6 or usufruct 7 in one succession but not in the
other.
4
E.g., England: Brown v. Gregson [19zo] A.C. 86o.
Turkey: BERKI 49: the return of paterna paternis (ila fente) applies to
movables left by a Frenchman domiciled in Turkey, but not to his Turkish
land.
5
Trib. Bayonne (March 31, 1904) Revue 1905, 745: C.C. art. 705 (old).
6 FALCONBRIDGE
45 8.
7
Trib. civ. Seine (April z6, 1907) Clunet 1907, II3Z; Trib. Nice (July 9,
1917) Clunet 1917, 179z.
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Requirements of Wills

The formal 8 and substantive 9 requirements of wills,
agreements on expectancies or containing last disposals, and
their construction 10 are governed by each law separately.
The options left for the formal validity of wills have a
moderating influence, as also references to the law of the
last domicil in matters of construction 11 and election 12 act
against the rigor of total consequences.
Another remarkable correction has been attained where
a gift was valid under the law of the domicil and invalid
at the situs of land; the domiciliary court adjusts the portions, increasing the impaired shares at the cost of the
enriched ones. 13 In conformity, the Restatement states a
compensation in the inverse case where land and movables
in X and land in Y are left to B, C, D, each a third, but
the will is invalid in Y and the land in Y falls entirely to
B : C and D should receive in X as much as their shares
in Y were worth, before the rest is distribut~d in three
equal parts. 14 This amounts to a noteworthy though unusual construction of a unitary will. No such helpful idea
was discussed when in a French court a residuary legatee
was charged with gifts of money to uncertainly described
beneficiaries and the clause was considered valid as to
movables in Italy but invalid as to immovables in France.15
Forced shares are due from each fragment of the succes8
Germany: KG. (May 15, 1912) JKG. 42A: 141, 145; OLG. Karlsruhe
(Dec. 12, 1919) 40 ROLG. 159 (German land of a New Yorker).
9 France: Trib. civ. Seine (July 7, 1899) Clunet 1900, 148; LEWALD,
Questions II7 speaks of a special kind of nullity.
10
OLG. Karlsruhe (Jan. 31, 1930) Recht 1930 No. 587: appointment of
heir for the German immovable part of a foreign succession is not an appointment to a pars pro indiviso of the total estate.
11
Supra 334 ff.
12
Supra 349 ff.
13
In re Lawrence's will ( 1919) 93 Vt. 424, 108 At!. 387.
14
Restatement§ 252, illustration; GooDRICH 513 n. 52.
15
Trib. Seine (July 7, 1899) Clunet 1906, 148.
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sion according to its own law. 16 Hence, under the law of
the domicil governing only succession to movables, foreign
immovables are not included in the estate. 17 The testator,
hence, may avoid leaving assets in the state where his disposing power is restricted; on the other hand, he may have
amply provided for the legitime portions in one country
and legacies in another must be sharply reduced for their
sake.

III.
I.

ACQUISITION

Option

Choice between acceptance and repudiation is separate
in the several successions. In the· United States, this leads
to a considerable extension of the doctrine of election. 18
A release of expectancy may operate partially. 19
In France, a problem concerns the provision that a minor
heir may only accept under the benefice of the inventory,
i.e., with restriction of his liability for debts. With two
different calls his age may be differently considered, and
there may be no restriction in the foreign succession. 20
16
Johns Hopkins University v. Uhrig ( 1924) 145 Md. 114, us Atl.
6r6: Maryland law applies to assets in the forum, California restrictions on
charitable bequests are left "to determination by the California courts."
The principle was ignored by Trib. civ. Nice (May 3, 1905) Clunet
I9II, 278.
17
England: Wills Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Viet., c. 114.
France: Cass. (April 4, 1857) D. 1857.I.102i {Jan. r, 1892) D. 1892.1.497•
S. 1892.1.76; Trib. Seine (May 21, 1879) Clunet 1879, 549 (not to violate
the statute real) ; SAvATIER, Cours 304 § 436.
Switzerland: BG. {June 29, 1928) 54 BGE.I.216. American domiciled in
Switzerland. American real property is left out of accounting for forced
shares. The nonbarrable share of children in Switzerland of ~. in Germany
of ~ of their intestate portion is counted separately.
18
4 PAGE 729 If., § 1651.
19
4 FRANKENSTEIN 380 n. IIO.
20
Supra Ch. 71 n. 36. The inventory must include ali foreign assets, Cass.
(July II, 1865) S. 1865.1.406.
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2.

Advancement

As seen before, it is primarily though not exclusively a
matter of the inheritance law to decide whether premortuary
gifts made by the testator to a beneficiary of his inheritance
ought to be accounted in his share. In the concurrence of
two laws of succession, notably the French courts have confirmed the total scission.
Lady Fairbairn, claiming the legal usufruct of half in
French land, under French C.C., article 767, paragraph
2, was not held to deduct the value of the gift she had
received in England. 21 The rule was definitely announced
in one of the law suits involving the succession of the
Spanish Queen Marie-Christine, which comprised land in
France and a Spanish estate. The Tribunal Civil de la
Seine stated that the inventory of the French inheritance
consisted in the proceeds from the sale of French landa subrogation preserving French jurisdiction 22 and inheritance law-but had to exclude immovables and movables received by the French beneficiary in Spain. 23
The European authors almost unanimously endorse this
solution as the inevitable product of the scission adopted
by the courts. 24 Any gift considered an advancement is
referred to the aggregate from which it was taken, independent of the assets of another succession. Sometimes
such tracing is impossible. 25 Generally, fortuitous chance
rules this "unjust and absurd" procedure. 26 Two persons
21

Trib. Bayonne (Aug. 11, 1902), Fairbairn v. Wailes, Clunet 1903, 179.
Cour Paris (Dec. 31, 1889), S. 1891.2.186, Clunet 1890, 121.
Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 27, 1906) Del Drago v. S. M. Alphonse XIII of
Bourbon, Clunet 1907, 770, Rev. 1907, 398.
24 France: CHAMPCOMMUNAL 418; MAURY ET VIALLETON in PLANIOL ET
RIPERT §§ 623 f.; DENNERY 127; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE ( ed. 6) 411;
ARMIN JON ( ed. 2) 3 Precis 160 § 145; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 873 § 1352.
Germany: RAAPE 687; LEWALD, Questions 83.
25
4 FRANKENSTEIN 566; against his proposals in this case ZEUGE 71.
2 6 ARMIN JON, I.e.,· NIBOYET, I.e.
22

23
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having received at the same time equal gifts, one may have
to account for it, the other not. Yet the timid attempts to
avoid these hardships 27 were necessarily rejected.
The Montevideo Treaty, article so, affirms this sourcetheory but makes an exception for gifts of money; the
amount should be distributed among the territories in the
proportion of the benefits drawn from each of them. Any
such solution is possible in a multilateral treaty. But how
can it work?
A similar situation was apt to arise even within one state
in the United States when the probate court restricted to
personalty could not reach land given by advancement.
Despite some remaining difficulties, this case is largely
cleared away, as most though not all probate courts have the
power to include the land in the adjustment, or an action
in equity is available. 28 If, however, land is under foreign
administration, the ordinary jurisdictional conflicts occur
which are the subject of the next chapter.
3· Prerogatives of Domestic Beneficiaries
The various provisions upholding the domestic inheritance
law against a recognized foreign inheritance law reach a
climax where a domestic succession opens at the same time.
But it may be conceded that not much can be added to the
crude results of the French or Argentine court practice
even though only one, foreign, succession is in the picture.
A French national is entitled to what French inheritance
law would give him, if that law were to govern, not only in
the meaning of what he would receive out of the assets
situated in France, but to the effect that he be awarded
27
NAST, Revue 1907, 406, expounding two theories, but consenting to the
prevailing doctrine.
28 ATKINSON, 3 Am. Prop. 499 f.
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everything he would obtain if the foreign movables of
the foreign succession were located in France. Of course,
29
the French assets are the maximum fund of enforcement.
An Argentine decision is in the same vein. The decedent,
a Spanish national domiciled in Spain, in addition to leaving movables and immovables in Spain, was creditor of a
deposit with an Argentine bank. A domiciliary of Argentina
received indemnification out of this asset for loss of the
share he would have had under Argentine inheritance law,
although the law of succession was Spanish under both
conflicts laws. 30
4· Partition
It seems safe to state that courts are restricted by the
territorial limits of their jurisdiction in a noncontentious
judicial division of inheritance. This is a matter of course
in the Anglo-American organization, distinguishing personal remedies in equity. It is also settled in France that
a judicial partition cannot include foreign immovables, 31
and this may be presumed where the procedural statutes
are silent on the question. 32
On the other hand, freedom of agreement between the
beneficiaries helps to eliminate the disturbances caused by
plurality of governing laws. 33
29 DENNERY 146 explains that the equality emphasized by the law of 1819
did not refer to distribution but to devolution, in the old language called
partage de droit, but concedes, p. 149, with MAURY ET VIALLETON, 4 PLANIOLRIPERT § 36 f., that the so-called equality is nothing but the French law of
descent.
3 Cam. civ. 2a Cap. (June 22, 1925) 57 Gac. del Foro 98.
81 Trib. Seine (Jan. 21, 1950) Nouv. Rev. 1949-1950, 214; Cass. (July 5,
1933) Nouv. Rev. 1934, 75; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 561, n. 82. Controversial in
Italy, see CAVAGLIERI, Lezioni (ed. 2) 358; MoNAco, Efficacia 89 n. 1.
3 2 E.g., in Chile, see BALMACEDO CARDOSO 167.
33 Supra Ch. 69; even the narrowest definition of party autonomy in
France allows submission to one of the several laws of succession "provided
that lex situs permits it," LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIRRI! (ed. 6) 415 § 363.
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IV.

ADMINISTRATION

Privity of administration, despite large exceptions, is a
principle in the United States even in the case of a unitary
succession of movables. In the civil-law countries, the same
conception is connected with plurality of successions. Accordingly, where a testamentary executor was appointed
by a French testator, his powers were construed by the
German court under German law with respect to the immovables left in Germany, although the same person had
different powers regarding the movables. 34
34

KG. (May 13, 1912) 4Z ]KG. 141 No. 29.
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Administrators and Courts
I.

MuNICIPAL ORGANIZATION oF DEcEDENT's EsTATE

ALTHOUGH conflicts law is a rather minor part of
.r1_ the law of administration, it cannot be avoided in
this survey; to understand its role, at least some
account must be devoted to a legal situation that would
frustrate even a research of several extensive volumes.
Indeed, no true comparative study exists of the international
relations in treating inheritances. Useful introductions to
the several national laws and books advising practitioners
about steps they may take, abound. But not one author has
ever dared to probe the core of the international disorder.
Nor can it be done here, for reasons that will become
obvious to the reader. Within the United States, gratifyingly, some fruitful or at least promising attempts have
been made to bring coherence into the interstate chaos.
I.

Common Law

At common law, compulsory administration of decedents'
estates was restricted to the personal estate, and the executor or administrator is therefore called a personal representative. In England and a few American states, administration now extends to real property. In most American
jurisdictions, the independence of the heir's title to land
has been preserved, but the personal representative exercises
certain powers over the land, such as taking possession and
sale, if necessary.
406
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In modern Great Britain with its unitary court structure,
and, excepting Scotch land, the full inclusion of immovables,
there are still minor differences, but the system, though
costly and potentially cumbersome, works out smoothly, at
least within the present United Kingdom; the system of
"resealing" probate judgments sets its courts in close
reciprocity with dominions and colonies. 1 In the United
States, the state statutes not only differ on many fundamental or formal points; they are often ambiguous and the
local peculiarities are sometimes strongly stressed. Only
a long and painful development, far from total achievement, offers a homogeneous scheme conquering the old selfconfinement.
This survey is exclusively interested in the interstate and
international effects of probate judgments and of the appointment of fiduciaries. These effects, however, depend
basically on those which probate and letters of administration possess within the forum of the probate court itself.
(a) Jurisdiction. The main principle of the common
law treatment of estates is territorialism. It is still much
in view in the United States. Any court in whose territory
assets of the inheritance are situated has exclusive jurisdiction to administer them; and the jurisdiction of each
court is strictly limited to these assets. A few statutes have
literally claimed authority over foreign executors or administrators as if they were appointed locally. The courts,
not to assume that these statutes undertook to violate the
Constitution, construed them as referring only to property
located in the state. 2 Despite the law of the succession
which includes all movables and chattels real irrespective of
1
Administration of Estates Act, 1925, s. 168; Judiciary Act, 1925, s. 165;
Colonial Probate Act, 1892, and Orders in Council.
2 Thornton v. Curling (1824) 8 Sim. 310; Re Grassi [1905] I Ch. 584;
DICEY ( ed. 6) 828.
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their situs, they are separated by their situs in matters of
administration. Thus, the axiom retains its force that the
law of the domicil governs distribution but the law of the
state appointing the fiduciary governs administration. Accordingly, there is no privity between the fiduciaries of
different states. Even if the same individual is appointed
in these states, he acts in a separate capacity in each state. 3
Usually most of a decedent's movables are situated at his
domicil, and since its law governs distribution, the first"original"-and "principal" probate is sought there. Even
though no assets are found at the forum of the domicil,
it is now settled by a British statute as well as in the United
States that the domiciliary court has jurisdiction for probate
and letters of administration. 4 Nevertheless, it is still one
of the few certain rules in the majority of the American
statutes that a will may be brought to original probate
wherever there are assets. 5 A conforming statute has been
adopted in New Jersey, where, to the contrary, no ancillary
administration was granted if the domicil rejected probate. 6
In some other states, no ancillary probate at all is given,
the parties being referred to the court of the last domicil. 7
It has also been said that the will of a person resident
where he was domiciled should be probated originally only
at that place. 8
For succession to land, the original probate, accords England: Cook v. Gregson ( 1854) 2 Drew 286.
United States: Restatement§ 466, comment a.
4
England: Administration of Justice Act, 1932, sec. 2.
United States: Restatement § 467; see comment c for the purposes of such
grant.
5 United States: Restatement § 469; this is the "better view," 3 BEALE 1464,
§ 469.2.
6 "Rule of Chadwick's Case," So N.J. Eq. 471; see In re Dodge ( 1918)
89 N.J. Eq. 525, 104 At!. 646; superseded by L. 1942, c. 335, p. u86, § 1,
N.J. Stat. Ann. Supp. 3:2-45.
7 CAREY, in CARNAHAN, Cases 979 ff.
8 WOERNER § 226.
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ing to the old rule, must be at the situs. Statutes, however.
derogate from this rule.
(b) Effect of probate within the forum. In Great
Britain, a probate in "common form" is granted in uncontested cases by the court of the domicil if the court is convinced of the formal validity, the mental capacity of the
testator, and absence of error and fraud. This judgment
has force until attack. Then a litigated probate "in solemn
form" has full effect, as it is "in rem," i.e., erga omnes,
and only open to revocation on one of several grounds
stated by successive decisions. 9 Thus, probate of a will is
said to prove the nature of an instrument as a will, its
formal validity, the mental capacity of the testator, the
appointment of an executor, the contents ("what the will
is"), so as to replace the original instrument until correction by the Probate Division and the vesting of title in
land, though not a disposition of property. 10 But the
effect is limited to the territory, except between the parties
to the suit.
Where the deceased was domiciled abroad, an English
probate indicates that the will of a British subject has
been duly executed under Lord Kingsdown's Act but does
not validate the will if incapacity, material invalidity, or
illegality appear under the law of the domicil. 11
In the United States, a probate decree, whether in
common form or solemn form, with or without notice to
all beneficiaries (depending on the various statutes), provided it is not "directly" attacked, is not challengeable by
"collateral" attack with respect to those matters, as cautious
language runs, which it purports to decide. What matters
are these? This turns out to be a delicate question.
II

See

10
11

RANKING

sz ff.

WILLIAMS, I Executors u8 § r8o; PARRY, Wills no.
DICEY ( ed. 6) 828 j WILLIAMS ib.
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Statutes, 12 courts, and writers use varying language. They
all seem to agree that collateral attack is excluded on the
ground that the will is formally insufficient, or that the
instrument is not genuine. But the formulations extend
this effect to one or more of the following matters: incapacity, undue influence, fraud and duress/ 3 outright
illegality, 14 invalidity/ 5 construction/ 6 and effect. 11 Atkinson states that probate is conclusive as to genuineness, due
execution, testamentary capacity, and absence of revocation.18 I think that this formulation is really supported by
the cases in general, although the language of the statutes
md courts is often broader. 19
Within the state, of course, also a decree refusing probate
on one of these grounds is conclusive. 20
Letters of administration, except those with the will
annexed, are conclusive in the same manner for the absence
of a will and the legal shares of the beneficiaries.
2.

Civil Law

Ordinarily the court at the place of the deceased's last
domicil has jurisdiction over his estate, excepting foreign
assets under the control of foreign law. 21 Compulsory ad12 They were collected in Proceedings of the 24th Annual Conference of
the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, I9I4, I72, but never again
completely to my knowledge, and grouped by SIMES, Model Probate Code
306 f.
13 BANCROFT § I63.
14
3 BEALE I463 § 469. I and n. 4·
15
3 BEALl! I466; BANCROFT 355; GoODRICH § I72•
16
CAREY (supra n. 7) §§ IOOI-I005, but see HENRY§ 596; ATKINSON, Wills
(ed. 2) 499 f.
11 I69 A.L.R. ss6 cites four state statutes.
18 ATKINSON, Wills (ed. 2) 499 § 96, somewhat different from (ed. 1)
445 § I84. Similar, Model Probate Code § So (a), § 8 I.
19 By far the majority of the cases cited by the authors involve nothing
but formal validity and very few undue influence or mental capacity. But
I am unable to check all the cases referred to in sometimes wild lists.
20
Matter of Goldsticker (I9o8) 192 N.Y. 35·
21
See, for instance, supra Ch. 70 n. 31.
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ministration, comparable to that in common law countries,
has been preserved in Austria where a regulation of 1854
has been only somewhat amended 22 and in the Scandinavian
countries. 23 The purpose of these organizations is frankly
patriarchal as well as fiscal, the latter aspect being now
prominent also in the United States.
In the great majority of civil law countries a testator
may appoint one or more testamentary executors, defining
their powers up to a certain limit, or request the court to
appoint one, but apart from this, the heir or heirs take
custody of the assets, satisfy the creditors, carry out the
last will, and distribute the residue. To some extent,
officials such as public notaries, are frequently employed,
and in some countries necessary. The jurisdiction of the
court concerns protective measures, receipt of acceptance
and renunciation from beneficiaries, care for the interests
of minors, and noncontentious intervention on request. Some
codes go farther than others in attributing functions to
judicial assistance. Nothing, however, approaches the complete substitution at common law of officials for the heirs.
It is noteworthy that the German courts, against a
strong current in the literature, constantly refuse to take
jurisdiction for more than protective measures whenever
the succession is governed by a foreign law. The measures
they allow themselves involve affixing of seals, taking of
inventory, delivery of a will from official deposit, and
appointment of a trustee for a presumptive heir or a claim
against the estate. They refrain, for instance, from discharging the testamentary executor of a foreign testator.
Their reasoning is partly based on the ground that the
scope of their activity is defined by international private
22
Austria: Kais. Patent of August 9, 1854, amended by Fed. Law of
Dec. 21, 1923, BG. 1923 No. 636, §§ 22-25, 137-140.
2 3 SIEBECK, 6 Rechtsvergl. Hdw. 563.
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law 24 and partly by the inconvenience of meddling with
interests of foreign heirs and a foreign law and the probable absence of recognition in the foreign country. 25
Equally, in Austria, the official administration there prescribed does not in principle take place where a foreign
national leaves movables in the forum. When administration occurs, it follows Austrian inheritance law. This happens also, by exception, if by unanimous consent all appearing parties concerned submit the estate to the Austrian
law. 26
Similar provisions that the parties may choose the inheritance law of the forum occur in some Latin-American
codes.
Bilateral treaties regulating consular intervention need
only be mentioned.
3· Situs
In the Anglo-American system and all others that assign
primary importance to the territory in which the assets of
the estate are located, the question of the method of localization obtains particular relevance. But it is also pertinent
everywhere in matters of procedure, taxation, escheat, and
granting of certificates. Different approaches to this subject
lead to. the conflict of concurrent jurisdictions and sometimes to negative conflicts. Particulars transcend the framework of the present investigation. However, two observations may be added.
First, it is to be borne in mind that the situs for the
purpose of administration is not necessarily identical with
24

KG. (Feb. 4, 1937) Jur. Woch. 1937, 1728; IPRspr. 1937 Nr. 72, Clunet

1937, 832,
25
KG. (July n, 1911) 41 Jahrb. KG. 6z; in accord RAAPE D.IPR 276;
ScHLEGELBERGER, Komm. Freiw. Gerichtsbarkeit § 73, n. z; § 74 n. 4; contra
NIEMEYER, 13 Z. int. R. Zl; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 627; LEWALD 329.
26
Law of 1854 (supra n. zz) §§ 23, 24, 140.

ADMINISTRATORS AND COURTS

413

that for such purposes as civil procedure, seizure, garnishment, or taxation.
Second, in the United States there has been a development with respect to negotiable instruments. The American
cases present, in Beale's words, a "blurred picture." 27 In a
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, 28
administration was founded on the view that any debt is
located at the domicil of the debtor, but the old doctrine of
the ecclesiastical courts on mercantile specialty debts was
adopted by the same Court in I9I8. 29 Accordingly, the
possession of an instrument by an administrator, though not
its mere presence, 30 entitles him to administer the claim
embodied in the instrument. Despite the insecure cases, the
Restatement suggests that possession of a negotiable bill
of lading or ·warehouse receipt determines jurisdiction. 31
Bills, notes, and bonds payable to order are practically
subject to the same treatment; the Restatement says that
they are exclusively administered by the administrator in
possession. 32
Shares of a corporation issued in states following the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 33 are represented by certificates, although shares subject to the traditional method of
transfer through the company books are localized at the
place of the corporation. 34 Bills, notes, and bonds payable
to bearer are treated like tangibles. 35
21

3 BEALE 1480 § 471.8.
In re Wyman ( 1884) 109 U.S. 654.
29
Iowa v. Slimmer ( 1918) 248 U.S. ns.
30 HOPKINS, "Conflict of Laws in Administration of Decedent's Intangibles,"
28 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) 613, correcting 2 BEALE 1481.
31
Restatement §§ 471, 476, 509.
32
Restatement § 479·
33
/d. § 477, cf., supra Vol. II, p. 75 and especially p. 76.
34
/d. § 478; Vol. II, p. 75·
35
STUMBERG (ed. 2) 448 n. 36, denying that the desirable proposition of
the Restatement that the administrator at the situs is treated as the owner,
is borne out by the cases.
28
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4· Law Governing Administration
Whatever is substantive law in the operation of executors and courts at civil law is determined by the law of
succession. Proceedings, of course, whether in litigious or
in noncontentious matters, follow the lex fori, save for
contrary positive rules.
Common law does not so distinguish. Lex fori controls
everything, and since every court administers the assets
situated in its territory, lex fori is identical with lex situs.
But considering certain exceptions, the ordinary formula
says that it is the law of the court appointing the administrator that controls administration. 36
This rule was attacked recently, probably for the first
time, with special regard to the case where administration
of a decedent's estate is followed by trust operation. 37
Courts submitting the administration of a testamentary
trust to the law intended by the testator feel the inconvenience of having all orders during the estate administration issued by the domicilary court, and often by several
other courts competent solely because of the physical presence of assets. 38 Similar awkwardness may be experienced
when ancillary courts give directions without contact with
the principal court. As we shall see, dealing with the outstanding problem of this topic, the claims of creditors,
difficulties are increased by the protection of local interests
and alleged public policy.
What role, however, has the law of the place where an
asset is claimed as part of the estate, irrespective of such
special rules of territorial administration? It has been
Restatement § 468.
A. MOORE, "Estate Administration and the Conflict of Laws," 35
Va. L. Rev. (1949) 316.
38
Will of Risher (1938) 227 Wis. 104, 277 N.W. 160, 115 A.L.R. 790;
In re Keeler's Estate (Surr. 1944) 49 N.Y.S. (2d) 592.
86

87 ]AMES
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contended by the neo-territorialistic writers in France that
the lex situs is of primary importance for the legal situation
of all property, prevailing over the law of succession, 39 or
at least that the movables are subject to the lex situs in
the first place because of the "public credit," which is safeguarded by the lex situs. 40 In the rightly dominating
opinion, it is only true that a beneficiary, executor, or
creditor demanding an asset must comply with the respective local rules of procedure and property law on acquisition
of title, but the content of his cause of action is primarily
determined by the law governing succession.
Nevertheless, in the common law doctrine an analogous
problem can be discovered, if only in a few sporadic applications. Thus, Dicey and Beale have been understood as
including the transfer of title in "administration"; it was
concluded that movables left in Germany by an Englishman domiciled in England pass to the English universal
legatee directly because German law would govern the
transmission of the title as heir. 41 However, the Restatement § 300 declares that the title to chattels passes at the
death of the owner "to the executor or administrator appointed by the court of the state in which the chattels are
habitually kept." This is of no consequence for civil law
countries, and the general assumption is still good that the
English legatee or the English administrator may be treated
in Germany as entitled to recognition not on the basis of
German law but by reasonable adjustment on the basis of
English law.
The validity of a gift inter vivos, conditional on survival
of the 'donee, was classified as an incident of administration
39

BARTIN, 3 Principes § 450 f.; see contra NIBOYET, 4 Traite 911 § 1366.
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIE:RE (ed. 6) §§ 361-363 who corrects his result by
introducing the French system of a liability proportional to the values received (413), infra 433·
41
BRESLAUER 245, 247 n. 2.
40
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in In re Craven's Estate/ 2 and likewise a promise not to
change a will was conceived as pertaining to administration in
In re Rubin's Estate. 43 The Restatement, however, in accord
with many writers, characterizes rules pertaining to administration as "primarily designed to facilitate the quick,
effective and inexpensive settlement of the estate of the
deceased" ( § 300, comment b), and it enumerates specifically such questions as the following: "accounting,
post a bond, invest money, sell chattels, pay debts, ascertain
priorities and similar questions" ( § 468, comment a) . 44
Administration, thus, concerns short range matters, whereas
transfer of title, validity of gifts, and the permissibility of
agreements on testamentary dispositions involve devolution
of rights by death. It would be very strange and unsound
simply to leave the rules affecting persons and assets participating in the succession to the pleasure of foreign laws
and a host of courts of administration.
II.

ExTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT oF PROBATE

r. Common Law Countries
(a) Assets in the forum. A probate decree primarily
involves only the assets situated in the forum, and whether
it is recognized as conclusive outside the state even with
respect to these assets, is a question not universally answered
in the same sense.
However, since a British probate in common form does
not and a probate in solemn form does have force erga
omnes, it may be treated everywhere under the principles
relating to foreign judgments.
Supra Ch. 68 n. x.
Supra Ch. 69 n. x.
44
Compare the relatively innocuous cases described by
as lying on the borderline of succession and administration,
42
43

DICEY

(ed. 6) 813
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Within the United States, a probate has the same effect
as it has within the forum in the sister states with respect
to the assets found in its own territory. To this extent, the
probate is endowed with full faith and credit.45
(b) Assets in other jurisdictions.
England. In connection with the principle that succession
to personalty is governed by the law of the last domicil
of the deceased, an English court of probate, as a rule,
will adopt the decision of the probate court of a foreign
country where the last domicil was and grant probate in
its turn. This is "established practice." 46 Yet in every
case, the court "exercises its own discretion and judgment." 47
United States. Once, in a generous attempt, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that an American probate
judgment, as directed in rem, was effective in any sister
state. "The court here can only inquire as to the sufficiency
of authentication, jurisdiction of the court, existence of
estate upon which the will may act, and perhaps fraud." 48
This tradition is followed by the courts of that state. 49
A similar tradition in Montana stems from a decision
where the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal
Constitution was again expressly invoked. 50
However, the Supreme Court of the United States, long
ago, refrained from such construction of the clause and,
on the contrary, announced the full independence of the
45

Tilt v. Kelsey ( 1907) zo7 U.S. 43, 53·
Per Sir J. Hannan in Miller v. James [187z] L.R. 3 P. & D. 4, s; In the
goods of Malaver (18z8) 1 Hagg. Ecc. 498.
41 In the goods of Kaufman [195Z] P. 3ZS.
48
Mass: C. J. Shaw in Crippen v. Dexter (1859) 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 330.
49
Slocomb v. Slocomb (1866) 95 Mass. 38 (immovables); Mass. Ann. L.
(1933) § 19Z.Io; HoPKINS, 53 Yale L.J. at ZZ9-Z3J.
50
Montana: State ex rei. Ruef v. District Court ( 1906) 34 Mont. 96, 85
Pac. 866 ff.; HOPKINS, ib. Z3S ff.
46
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states respecting their local assets. 51 On the ground of
"power policy," mutual consideration depends upon
local conflicts rules, except where identity of parties
litigated object allows a resort to the doctrine of
judicata. 52

this
the
and
res

"Letters testamentary and of administration have no
legal force or effect beyond the territorial limits within
which the authority of the state or country granting them,
is recognized as law." 53
Every American statute book contains provisions facilitating the extension of foreign probate to personalty, or
even to all assets situated in the enacting state. They allow
either the grant of an ancillary probate or a simple recording of the foreign decree.
Unfortunately, the language of these statutory digressions from the common law is extremely varied and prevailingly uncertain. Moreover, the courts often cling to the
traditional lack of privity between the probate administrations.
With the threefold restriction, to the personal estate,
to the domiciliary probate, and to the decree of a sister
state, courts more or less generally recognize the probate
decrees in the full measure in which they operate at home.
But even in this narrow limitation, cautious investigation
into the practice of the particular court would be opportune.
The broad language of many statutes suggests that also
a probate by a nondomiciliary court suffices, but this does
not seem to agree with widespread practice. 54 That foreign
51
See in the last instance in re Barries' Estate ( 1949) 338 U.S. 815, 881;
Note, DAVENPORT, U. of III. L. Forum (1950) 129, 131.
52
Iowa v. Slimmer (1918) 248 U.S. us, 121; Riley v. New York Trust
Co. (1942) 315 U.S. 343 1 349· HOPKINS, 53 Yale L. J. at 256; ATKINSON,
3 Am. Prop. 752 § 14-45.
53
WoERNER § 157; Restatement § 436.
54
CAREY 988: "Courts do not attach larger and wider constitutional validity
to domiciliary probates."
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countries are included in the recognition is expressly stated
in some statutes, 55 but presumably is not the general construction of the provisions. And although it appears certain
that recognition of a foreign probate includes most matters
for which it is conclusive where it originates, the doubtful
question whether it extends to the construction of the will
makes itself more conspicuous in this application. 56
Finally, the common law principle that foreign probate
is totally inconclusive at the situs of real property has firm
roots to this day. Yet so many exceptions to this principle
by statutes or judicial ruling are existent that an absolutely
negative attitude is to be observed in only a few states. 57
The distinct trend of the development is marked by many
decisions, the efforts of the leading writers, and the uniform drafts. 58 Though different in particulars, they converge in the proposition that a probate obtained at the
last domicil of the deceased should be conclusive to the
full extent, as at its origin, certainly with respect to movables, but since "there is no sacrosanctity about reality," 59
also regarding immovables.
(c) Effect of ancillary probate. When, after the end
of appropriate proceedings-subject to the procedural law
of the court-a foreign probate is "resealed," "confirmed,"
recorded, or adopted by a local probate, it seems to be a
general rule that-apart from nullity of an irregular grant
-only the original probate at its own place may be attacked
55
E.g., Indiana, Burns' Stat. (1933) §57 p. 119; §7 p. 415, 416; HENRY
§ 598.
66
CAREY§§ IOOI-1005; Contra HENRY§ 595·
57
For particulars, see GooDRICH §§ 173, 174; ATKINSON, 3 Am. Prop. 751.
58
The Restatement § 470( r) ; 2 BEALE § 469.1, 3 id. 1466 and some authors
take too much for actual law. But their result is strongly supported by the
postulates of GooDRICH (ed. 3) 525 § 172; HoPKINS, 53 Yale L.J. at 249, 258;
Note 169 A.L.R. 8r, 93, and especially CHEATHAM, 44 Col. L. Rev. at 559;
Uniform Foreign Probate Act, withdrawn 1943, but adopted by Ill., La.,
Nev., Tenn., Wyo.; Uniform Probate of Wills Act, 1950, § r.
59 ATKINSON I.e. with HOPKINS I.e. 253.
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by the means permitted at the same place. 60 An independent
ancillary probate, however, may be treated differently, and
some exceptional statutes establish their own rules on
remedies even though a foreign probate was followed. 61
Indeed, the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws criticized, as early as I 9 I 4, the tendency to diminish the protection of local interests and proposed that remedies should
be allowed against the ancillary grant. 62
Clearly, however, a slow process is in the making to
elevate the domicil to a determinative factor also in these
matters and to subordinate the ancillary to the domiciliary
fiduciary. In the same development, immovables are being
increasingly brought within the powers of the administrator
of personalty. And the fact that every fiduciary is answerable to his own appointing court, acquired a limited appreciation in other courts, leaving him more freedom from
their supervision.
As an illustration of the transition of a jurisdiction,
known for adherence to "power policy" respecting succession to land, to a liberal policy, a I 946 decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court may be singled out which sketches
the whole picture of contesting a domestic probate and then
describes the effect of a foreign domiciliary probate on
land in Illinois: everything involving the land depends on
the Illinois law. The statute modifies the common law (i.e.,
absence of privity) only insofar as foreign wills are admitted, if they are (executed according to the law of the
domicil or the law of the place of execution or) admitted
to probate in a foreign state, Ill. Rev. St. I945, Ch. J,
§ 237. If so admitted, the will is "valid for all purposes,
unless set aside in a suit brought to contest it. It cannot
60
61
62

BANCROFT 394 § 163; Sternberg v. St. Louis, infra n. 63.
See, e.g., BANCROFT § 163.
Proceedings of the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, 1914, 172.
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be collaterally attacked in any other proceeding." But it
can be attacked like a domiciliary will. 63
2.

Recognition in Civil Law Countries

From the European point of view, English and American
probate judgments have not often been given attention,
except with respect to the powers of administrators which
will be discussed later. But a thorough Italian study has
demonstrated that by its nature such probate of a will
includes an official acknowledgment of the validity of the
will-which is true within the limits mentioned aboveand as a judicial instrument enjoys public credit also in
foreign countries. 64 The Italian Supreme Court, already
on the way to this thesis, was entirely convinced by the
study. In consequence, an uncontested probate judgment
is considered to be an act of voluntary jurisdiction, acceptable as a public attestation without the necessity of proceedings for enforcement of foreign judgment ( delibazione). 65 In addition, it was stated that the regular court
in the United States was exclusively competent for a suit
to contest a probate in common form rendered by an
American court.
In other countries the official character of probate decrees is likewise recognized, but proceedings for examining
uncontested foreign probates are usual and, e.g., in France
necessary.
63 Sternberg v. St. Louis ( I946) 394 Ill. 459, 68 N.E. (2d) 892, I69 A.L.R.
545; on other kinds of statutes the not very satisfactory note ibid. at 567.
64 GIUSEPPE P ALLICCIA, "Testamento e probate nei paesi anglosassoni, con
speciale reguardo a! D.I.P. e ai beni italiani," Giur. Ita!. I93S IV II3.
65
Italy: Cass. Civ. (May 12, 1937) Giur. Ita!. 1937 I 667; cf., also
DE MARTINO, 7 Giur. Comp. Dir. Civ. 86 No. Io6; Trib. Bari (Feb. 4, 1949)
Foro Ita!. 1949 I I I I4.
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3· The German Certificate of Heirship
Among the official certificates acknowledging the title
of heir or other beneficiary, issued in the various jurisdictions and frequently required by courts, other state
agencies, and banks, the German "Erbschein" is particularly
elaborate and the nearest analogy to letters testamentary.
If the succession is controlled by a foreign law, the
universal successor-in the case of an American estate, the
heir, or statutory or testamentary residuary beneficiarymay obtain a certificate, limited to the assets situated in
Germany and based on the foreign inheritance law (BGB.
§ 23 69). At least a limited certificate is also given respecting real property under German law in the cases where a
foreign inheritance law governs and refrains from including
German immovables, as Anglo-American law does. 66
The German Erbschein is an instrument endowed with
public faith; its content is presumed to be correct and third
persons dealing in good faith with its holder are protected.
But this effect is, as a rule, limited to transactions effected in
Germany. 67
Analogous rules provide for a limited certificate to be
granted to a testamentary executor ( § 2368). They are
also applied to a foreign intestate administrator.
The presumption attached to these documents is extended to a few other countries by the respective treaties.
III.
I.

ExTRATERRITORIAL PowERS OF FmuciARIES

Extraterritorial Scope of Appointment

(a) Common law countries. To enable an executor
or administrator to act in a foreign territory, his powers
66
ScHWENN, "Die Anwendung der §§ 2369 und 2368 BGB. auf Erbanfall
mit englischen oder amerikanischem Erbstatut," N. Jur. Woch. 1952, III3.
67 NUSSBAUM 369 n. 4·
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must not be rigidly confined by his appointment itself to the
forum in which he was appointed. The English doctrine
satisfies this need. Although the court has only a territorially
limited jurisdiction, the English grant extends to property
no matter where situated. 68 He is charged with collecting
all assets of which he can get hold; the assets in his hands
are accountable to the English court and liable to all debts
whether incurred in England or abroad. 69 This conception
permits the personal representative to receive voluntary
payments by debtors abroad and even to appear in foreign courts, provided this is agreeable to the latter. He
may appropriate all chattels and claims as allowed by the
lex situs/ 0 and transfer them to England. Assets, however,
possessed by a foreign administrator and brought to England, remain accountable to the foreign court. 71
Occasionally, the one relevant difference 72 that continues
between an executor and an administrator in the narrow
sense, despite their large assimilation, may be noticeable:
"Since an executor derives his title from the will and the
property of the testator vests in him on the latter's death,
he is able to do any act of his office with the sole exception of pursuing an action in court. He may even commence proceedings until he has to prove his title which
can only be done by probate." 73
An executor, hence, may sell, assign, or pledge any portion of the personal estate. It has been held that the sale of
land, if executed according to the lex situs, cannot be
attacked by the purchaser on the ground that probate was
68 CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 514.
69DICEY (ed. 6) 811.
70 WESTLAKE 167 ff. j DICEY

(ed. S) rules 85, 87, 131.
(ed. 6) 811 ff.
For another, practically superseded difference, see infra 438.
PARRY 47 ff. j RANKING 140.

71 DICEY
72
73
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not granted to him. 74 By the same consequence of his
position, an executor may be sued by creditors or beneficiaries even before probate. 75
The American position is basically similar, 76 but as the
several states are to be viewed as both the forum and a
foreign jurisdiction, emphasis lies on the powers of a
foreign representative of whom we have to speak presently.
(b) Civil law countries. Testamentary executors are
permitted in all systems, but they are never the owners at
law of the estate. Their powers are limited by the statutes
to a varying maximum, always less extensive than at common law. Within these limits, the testator may define the
authority of the executor. The radius of the executors is
never restricted territorially.
Recognition of Foreign Fiduciaries

2.

(a) Common law countries. In England, to exercise
full powers, a foreign representative must apply for appointment as ancillary administrator. In England, whether
the inheritance law is British or foreign will not make a
difference in normal situations. 77 The foreign fiduciary is
accepted as ancillary administrator ordinarily, though not
necessarily, according to the discretion of the court, 78 and
he is subject to its directions.
In the United States, sometimes a foreign fiduciary is
considered in the older manner as lacking title in the
assets; but prevailingly he can at present, without auxiliary
probate, take possession, remove and administer a chattel
74

National Trust Co. Ltd. v. Mendelson (Ont. H.Ct., 1941) 1942

I

D.L.R.

438.
75

Mohamidu Mohideen Hadjar v. Pitchey [1894] A.C. 437·
Restatement § 474; GooDRICH § 182 (highly informative).
77 In re Kehr, Martin v. Foges [1952] Ch. 26.
78
Court of Probate Act 1857, s. 73; In the goods of Brieseman [1894]
P. z6o; in the goods of Earl [1867] L.R. I P.D. 450.
76
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as well as receive payment of and assign claims, until a local
administrator is appointed or, in another version, until he
knows of such appointment. 79 At the same time he remains
generally unable to sue on behalf of the estate, though some
statutes do allow it, at least where no interested local party
requests an ancillary administration. 80
A variety of other concessions to foreign fiduciaries include the possibility to have an assignee sue 81 or to sue in
his own name rather than on behalf of the estate, 82 which
"artificial" distinction has been used for further liberalization of the principle. 83
Nevertheless, the basic principle remains lack of privity
between the territorial administrations; it shows itself
strikingly when the same person appears in several states
in the name of the estate in the same cause, and the judgments are devoid of effect except where they are rendered. 84
Where the domicil of the testator was in a civil law
country and his testamentary executor possesses sufficient
powers under the law of that domicil, he (or his local attorney) will ordinarily be accepted as ancillary administrator
according to the same rules. If, however, the heirs are
authorized to act and present themselves, a common law
court is correct in considering that such heirs-as I would
put it-unite in their persons the functions of beneficiaries
79

United States: Restatement §§ 474, 481; 2 BEALE 1533 ff.; HOPKINS, /.c.

635 cites three statutes. See the new survey of the topic by OPTON, "Recognition etc." 19 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 156, 165-167.
80 0PTON, ibid. concludes that in the prevailing view the title of the
foreign fiduciary is recognized although he is barred from suing for the
estate. C/., GooDRICH § 182 n. 69.
81 Peterson v. Chemical Bank ( 1865) 32 N.Y. 21.
82 Thus Turner v. Alten Banking & Trust Co. (C.C. 8, 1948) 166 F. (2d)
305.
88 Mr. Justice Cardozo in Wilkins v. Ellett ( 1883) ro8 U.S. 256; Kruskel
v. United States (1949) 178 F. (2d) 738; CHEATHAM, supra, 44 Col. L. Rev.
at 549·
84
Restatement § 468. See the exceptions to the principles infra 437-438.
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and managers of the estate. The court in England, in fact,
will either appoint them as ancillary administrators or order
an ancillary administrator to surrender the surplus to the
heirs. 85
American practice emphasizes rather the discretion of
the court as exercised under statutory directions. 86
The foreign representative appointed in an ancillary
administration has to follow the local law and court
orders and to account to the court that appointed him.
Some courts even require a bond from a nonresident executor relieved from giving security in the will. 87
(b) Civil law countries. Almost unanimous consent
advances the conflicts rule that the law of succession determines the requirements and effects of a testamentary appointment of executor. 88 A divergent opinion of a few
French writers in favor of the lex situs has remained
isola ted. 89
The inheritance law controls in particular capacity and
power of fiduciaries, also when that law entrusts them with
larger activities than the forum. The literature is practically
unanimous on this point, 90 decisive for the recognition of
85 In re Achillopoulos [1928] Ch. 433; Laneuville v. Anderson ( 186o)
2 Sw. & Tr. 24; In the goods of Dost Aly Khan (1887) 6 P.D. 6.
86 BEALE 1417.
87 New York: GRANGE 117.
88 France: Trib. Seine (Dec. 8, 1924) Clunet 1925, 711; Cour Paris
(June 28, 1941) Rev. crit. 1946, 243; Cass. req. (Nov. 19, 1941) S. 1942.1.129;
WEISS, 4 Traite 594; JoussELIN 76 ff.; 10 Repert. Successions no. 90; NIBOYET,
4 Traite 863; DELAUME ET FLATTEL, 90 J. Trib. (1951) 11 6.
Germany: RG. (Jan. 25, 1888) 6 BoLZE 4 no. 11; (April 21, 1890) 26
RGZ. 38o; (Nov. 5, 1928) Jur. Woch. 1928, 3139; KG. (July 16, 1925) Jur.
Woch. 1925, 2142; 2 BAR 338; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 485.
89 CHAMPCOMMUNAL 384.
9
France: Despagnet ( ed. 5) II 16 § 380; LAURENT, 7 Dr. civ. § 109; WEISS,
4 Traite 671; NAST, BATIFFOL AND MAURY in notes to Cass. Crim. (June 4,
1941), see infra n. 96; BATIFFOL, Traite 673 § 668.
Germany: 4 FRANKENSTEIN 488; LEWALD 338; WOLFF, D.IPR. (ed. 3) 229;
NussBAUM, D.I.P.R., 352, n. 4; SCHWENN, N. Jur. Woch. 1952, 1113, 1116 II.
Italy: FEDOZZI in 22 Dig. Ita). at 833; FEDOZZI 593; PALLICCIA, Rivista
1932, 347·
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Anglo-American executors and administrators exercising
powers by far more extensive than any known at civil law.
Accordingly, the German courts, aware of the diversity
of the authority with which administrators of decedents'
estates are endowed in the various laws, recognize without
hesitation the foreign-derived powers and especially the
ample task of Anglo-American fiduciaries. 91 The Reichsgericht, like the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal,
even exaggerated the principle; they concluded that the
British nationality of a personal representative, as distinguished from the beneficiaries, sufficed for admitting a
claim to the clearing-procedure between England and Germany.92 The same basic approach is taken in Italy, Spain,
and Cuba. 93
In France, after older decisions, 94 a decision of the
Seine Tribunal 95 was widely noted which recognized Spanish testamentary executors and liquidators with larger
powers than French executors; they would continue the personalty of the testatrix, receive funds, and create a new
foundation (the validity of which was thus rescued).
91 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Oct. I, I887) Hans. Ger. Z. I887 HBe.
289 no. I24 (English executor); RG. (April 25, I932) 86 Seuff. 27I No. I52,
IPRspr. I932; 6 No. I; KG. (May Ig, I9I2) 42 Jahrb. KG. I4I; supra
Ch. 69 n. go; (July 2, I925) Jur. Woch., I925, 2I4292 RG. (Feb. I8, I926) Jur. Woch. I926, I788, invoking as support AngloGerman TAM. (Feb. 4, I924) 4 Recueil Trib. Arb. Mixt., Klingenstein v.
Maier, see the just criticism by ERNST WoLFF, Jur. Woch. I.e.
93 Italy: Cass. Roma (Feb. 2I, I899) Foro Ita!. I899 I 333, Giur. Ita!.
I899 I I, 2I6 I: powers of a trustee did not offend Italian public policy;
Cass. (July 9, I94I) Foro Ita!. Mass. I94I, 511 No. 2062: Swiss executor.
Spain: Trib. Sup. (Feb. I, I9IO) also in Revue I911, 77I: the testatrix was
a subject of Catalonia; therefore Catalonian law governed the powers of
the executors.
Cuba: Trib. Sup. (Jan. I6, 1908) also in Revue I9II, Igi: the American
personal representative had authority to sue and collect as provided by the
Pennsylvania law of succession, the national law of the testator.
94
Cass. req. (Apr. I9, I859) D. I859.1.277; Trib. Seine (April 20, I898)
J.C. I899, 765; (July I3, I9IO) Clunet I911, 9I2.
95 (Dec. 8, I924) Gaz. Pal. I926.I.293; Revue I925, 76, Affirmed on other
grounds Paris (July I, I926) Revue I926, 540.
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Finally, the criminal section of the Court of Cassation
adopted the proposition that a fiduciary appointed in a
common law court acts in France in his own name though on
account of the estate. 96
From this recognition must be distinguished the permission to undertake certain activities in the territory. Although not in Italy, in Belgium and France a formal judgment of exequatur, enforcing the original appointment 97
and in Germany a certificate of authority 98 are needed for
certain purposes, although merely advisable for others.
Although the usual practice, analogous to the AngloAmerican, requires a foreign executor to follow the local
law, the German courts, in consistency with their conception that they only assist foreign law governing a succession,
apply that law in case they intervene. 99
96
Cass. Crim. Section (June 4 1 1941) D. 1942 C. 4, S. 1944·1.133 1 Juris
Classeur 1942.11 2017: the testator may give the executor saisine under C.C.
art. 1026.
97
Belgium: Rb. Brugge (March 10, 1939) Rechtskund W. 1939 c. 105:
a Michigan administrator in intestate succession is authorized to demand recovery of a debt, but needs an exequatur.
France: Trib. Seine (July 23, 1920) Clunet 1920, 684.
98 Testamentsvollstrecker-Zeugnis, BGB. §§ 2368 f.
99
0LG. Frankfurt (July 11, 1898) 33 Frankfurter Rundschau (1899) 88
(sworn inventory) ; RG. (Nov. s, 1928) Jur. Woch. 1929, 434, IPRspr.
1929, No. 1 (accounting).
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r. The Question of Liability
IRST attention is due to the case where one law
governs the entire inheritance but the assets are
scattered through several territories. Suppose that
an American citizen domiciled in Cuba leaves shares of an
American corporation deposited in a New York bank. His
succession is governed by Cuban law under the conflicts law
of New York and, presumably, also by renvoi in Cuba.
What approach have the American or Cuban creditors to
take when seeking payment out of those shares?
The inherent difficulties of the international problem are
enhanced by the contrast of the conflicts principles. Where
unity of succession is established, irrespective of the situation of the assets, should the foreign part of the assets
simply be included in the account, even though at the place
of the situation local assets are submitted to a separate
administration? Common law lawyers, on the other hand,
often consider "liability" for claims as a matter of administration; does this mean that no regard is taken to the conflicts rule of the situs? Some French writers suggest that
the lex situs, more or less replacing the law of succession,
should be looked to in the relationship between the estate
and the creditors.
To start answering these questions, it should be clear
for all systems whatsoever that the transmission of the
debts of the deceased to a successor in any sense is a neces-
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sary part of the law of succession, 1 quite as the transfer of
the deceased's property is. Only enforcement is a separate
activity at common law, subject to traditional dependence
on territorial principles, and everywhere, of course, procedural incidents follow the lex fori.
The term "liability" should indicate who is the passive
subject of the debt and what can be demanded. Common
law segregates the question what distinction may be made
among the funds out of which the creditor seeks to be paid.
Three main systems of liability for the claim against the
estate, apart from the claims created after death, may be
distinguished.
Universal succession in the Romanistic doctrine commits
the heir to unlimited responsibility with the means of the
estate and all his own means, except where certain measures
are taken for limiting his burden. Such measures are
especially acceptance under the beneficium inventarii, restricting the liability of the accepting heir to the value of
the assets to be listed in the inventory (pro viribus hereditatis 2 ) , and separatio bonorum, segregation of the inheritance from the heir's assets, on the request of an
interested person. This is unlimited or limited personal
liability.
The Germanic, agreeing with the general archaic, conception regards the debts of the deceased as burdening
1 United States: ATKINSON, Am. Property Law 641 § 14.20: "Liability is
independent of Administration."
England: DICEY (ed. 6) 811.
France: CHAMPCOMMUNAL 414; 3 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET WAHL (ed. 3)
463 § 3094 f.; WEISS, 4 Traite 599 f.; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 914 § 1368, 921
§ 1371; BATIFFOL, Traite 676 § 573·
Germany: 2 BAR 350; 2 ZITELMANN 976; LEWALD 389; NUSSBAUM 359;
WoLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 3) 228.
Netherlands: KosTERS 627; MEI]ERS, Weekblaad 349 5, IX.
Switzerland: VoUMARD, Transmission 83 ff.
2
See, e.g., for Argentina: C.C. art. 3363; MOLINA, 12 Rev. Ciencias Jur.
Santa Fe ( 1950) 151.
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the ancestral home and property. Whoever takes the
assets responds for the debts so far as the assets go (liability
cum viribus hereditatis) . This is the foundation of the
Anglo-American liability restriction to the assets of the
inheritance, from which the feudal ties detracted the
land.
A third group has looked for a modern method of limiting responsibility and found them close to common law
methods. The German and Swiss Codes resort to official
administration on request.
2.

Civil Law

The law of succession determines whether liability is
imposed on persons-the heirs, devisees, universal legatees,
universal or residuary legatees, or under certain circumstances, a special legatee or donee-or whether it rests
upon the assets. It determines whether liability is unlimited,
or limited to the assets composing the estate, or to their
value, and what steps are needed for any limitation.
An obvious consequence involves the recourse of a paying beneficiary against those persons charged by the inheritance law with primary liability. 3
Under the nationality principle, this means that the
rights of the creditors are subject to the law of the country
whose national the deceased was. That in this application
the national law is particularly improper, has been sometimes noted! An involuntary avowal of this fact is contained in a provision of the German Civil Code which
calls for the national law of the deceased but permits the
3 Trib. Seine, Clunet 1895, n8; TREBAUT, IO Repert. Succession § 46; on
this point BATIFFOL 677 states an old tradition and unanimity in France.
4 KAHN, 2 Abhandl. z86 perceived that "the interest of the creditors of an
estate demands another contact than the national law," although his own
suggestions were inacceptable.
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heirs of a German who was domiciled abroad to invoke
the limitation granted by the law of the domicil. 5 Indeed,
the Scandinavian Convention on Inheritance and Succession,
deviating from its usual combination of tests, resorts to
the decedent's domiciliary law for determining liability for
debts; only the effect of public summons to the creditors,
issued at the domicil, on creditors in other countries is
qualified by appropriate conditions. 6 The place where the
debtor lived and carried on his business, is rightly supposed
to have influenced the credit extended to him. Its law, of
course, should not operate for the exclusive benefit of the
heir.
Law of the debt. It stands to reason that the debt transferred to new debtors retains the character imprinted on it
during the lifetime of the deceased. The claim may from
its inception be indivisible or joint, and stays so. 7 At civil
law the question who may sue or be sued also is a part of
the substantive order; hence, if English law governs the
succession, not the beneficiary but the administrator has
been allowed in a French court to sue a debtor, 8 and the
analogous solution may be expected in the case of claims
against the estate. However, the complicated rules of the
common law relating to extraterritorial situations, especially when a creditor of the estate sues the administrator
outside the state of his appointment, disturb the problemwhich, in the opinion of this writer, has not yet been
mastered. 9
5 EG. BGB. art. 24 par. 2; OLG. Hamburg (March 8, 1911) 28 R. OLG.
59; KAHN, x Abhandl. 465; RAAPE, Komm. 6ss ff.
6 Scandinavian Convention of Nov. 19, 1934 (supra Vol. I, 33 n. 8s), arts.
17, 18, 25 j cf., PLAISANT 253·
7
MAURY ET YIALLETON in PLANIOL ET RIPERT, 4 Traite 499 § 400j NIBOYET,
4 Traite 913 § 1368.
8 Cour Paris (April 2, 1896} Clunet 1897, 465; otherwise if French law
governs, App. Grenoble (March 31, 1908} Revue 1908, 609.
9 See for the analogous question of the person qualified for receiving an
appointment as ancillary administrator or a certificate of heirship, supra.
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Enforcement. In the traditional Continental doctrine,
the law of succession extends to enforcement by action,
with the sole exception of pure procedural questions. This
law dictates, in particular, the measures giving the beneficiary time for considering his attitude in the face of claims,
the calling up of the creditors for filing their claims, and
the cases in which separation of the inheritance may be
requested, although assistance by foreign authorities may
be needed, and may often be unavailable, to implement
such measures.
According to this prevailing theory, where a French
testator, domiciled in France, leaves movables in Italy,
a French court applies French inheritance law to all movables and makes all heirs liable in proportion to their
shares (Code Civil, article 7 3 2) with all assets remaining
obligated to all creditors as they were in the lifetime of
the deceased (article 2092) .10
Lex situs. Opposition by the neo-territorialistic theoreticians, 11 in France gives the law of the place where the
assets are situated and seized for enforcement the primary
role, either on the strength of a principle valid for all
assets 12 or by submitting enforcement upon movables to
the lex situs because of the "public credit" affected. 13 The
prevailing opinion rejects these obscure reasonings. Discrimination according to territorially divided objects is inconsistent with the leading ideas of the Continental systems.
10
11

WEiss, 4 Traite 6o1.
See the citations in the critical surveys by TREBAUT, 10 Repert. 516 No.
112 ff.; VOUMARD, Transmission u6 ff.; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 904 § 1364 ff.;
also BEVILAQUA (ed. 3), 401 n. 12, citing PILLET, Principes § 179 inclines to
lex situs for claims of creditors, because of the "public credit."
12 BARTIN, 3 Principes § 450 f.; contra NIBOYET, 4 Traite 91I § 1366.
13
PILLET, 2 Traite 414 § 602; NIBOYET, Manuel § 536; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 4II f., who, however, corrects the result by introducing the
French rule of a liability proportional to the value inherited. See the convincing refutation of the "credit public" theory by MAURY ET VIALLETON
in 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 491 f.; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 919 ff. § 1370 f.
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Under the Treaty of Montevideo, the law is different,
but it constitutes always a plurality of successions when
the assets are in different states.
3· Common Law
England. If it is said that the assets in the hands of an
English administrator are liable for all debts whether incurred in England or aBroad/ 4 it is to be understood that
the law of succession determines what debt of the deceased
passes and against whom. On the other hand, proof of the
claim and order of priority are subject to English law as
lex fori with the exception of assets under foreign administration and removed to England. 15
Among the numerous particulars of this doctrine which
cannot be explored here, the old case of Aldrich v. Cooper 16
is interesting. A mortgagee may proceed against freehold
and copyhold, but if he exhausts the personal estate, a
simple creditor may take his place; accordingly, where
claimant A has a real security in two funds, X and Y, and
B only in X, A may satisfy his claim at his option, but when
he chooses the fund X, B is subrogated in A's right in Y.
United States. The law of the place of administration
certainly does not control the existence of a debt or determine who should pay it after distribution of the assets. But
it fixes the time within which a claim must be proved, 11 the
manner in which it may be proved, 18 the modalities of payment, and the preferences of classes of creditors. 19 These
14 DICEY

(ed. 5) Appendix Note 25, p. 971 If.; (ed. 6) 8u.
(ed. 6) 812.
16 Lord Eldon in Aldrich v. Cooper ( 1808) 8 Ves. 382, 32 Eng. R. 402;
WILLIAMS (ed. 12) § 812.
17 Restatement § 498.
18 Restatement § 499·
19 Restatement §§ 500-503; STORY §524 f.; WOERNER§ 166; 3 BEALE§ 497.1;
§ 501.1.
15 DICEY
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questions are independent of the domiciliary law of the
deceased or of the creditors. 20
The principle of equality. A basic idea, similar to that
of the civil law, was once announced by the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts: the assets, wherever situated, should
be available to all creditors of the same class without discrimination.21 But since it was predicated that each state has
independent power over the assets situated in its territory,22 the general doctrine isolates the local property of
each state from all other assets. The right to be satisfied
out of this property belongs to those creditors who bring
and prove their claims before the local court.
The Restatement expresses this rule in an explicit manner:
§ 49 5• ••• "all creditors regardless of where they are
domiciled can prove their claims in any state in which
administration proceedings have been instituted."
§ 497· "All creditors of a decedent who have proved
their claims in a competent court in which there are
administration proceedings of the estate of that decedent
are entitled to share pro rata in any application of the
assets of the local administrator to the payment of
claims, irrespective of the source of such assets or of the
residence, place of business, domicil or citizenship of the
creditors, except
(a) where there are valid claims against specific
funds, or
(b) where there are valid preferences given by local
statute to creditors of a particular class."

Although the Restatement left the question open whether
preferences could constitutionally be given to resident noncitizens, there is certainly a difference to the effect that the
20
Baker v. Baker ( 1917) 242 U.S. 394; Wilson v. Hartford ( 1908) 164
Fed. 817; Duehay v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. ( 1939) 105 F. (2d) 768.
21
Dawes v. Head ( 1825) 3 Pick. (Mass.) 127, per C. J. Parker.
22
STORY § 420; Bostwick v. Carr (1914) 165 App. Div. ss, 151 N.Y.S. 74·
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Privileges and Immunity Clause of the Federal Constitution
assures equality to citizens only; therefore the formulation
of the Restatement exceeds somewhat the actual law in
generosity.
The standard by which preferences may be granted by
statute to local creditors in a solvent estate has recently been
defined. Citizens must have "reasonable and adequate access
to the courts" for filing their claims. They need not necessarily enjoy all technical and precisely similar rights conferred upon the local claimants. 23
Insolvent estates. If an estate is known to be insolvent,
it is settled in theory that equality of all creditors ought
to outweigh convenience of local distribution. The creditors
having proved their claims receive only a pro rata percentage corresponding to the dividend that is likely to result
from all assets and debts of the entire estate. 24 It has
been held, however, that the local creditors may receive this
quota before the others. 25 Nevertheless, it has become
obvious that multiple administration must lead to "conflicts
and confusion." 26 It demands a very difficult interstate
cooperation. Receivership in the case of insolvent corporations has been reformed for analogous reasons by Con23
3 BEALE §§ 466, 510.1, 512.1; Canadian Northern Railway Comp. v.
Eggen ( 1920) 252 U.S. 553, 562; Duehay v. Acacia (supra. n. 19) at 776,
where a statute of the District of Columbia was construed so as to conform
with the Constitution. See also In re Torrington ( 1934) 70 F. (2d) 949·
24
Blake v. McClung (1898) 172 U.S. 239; In re Hanreddy's Estate (1922)
176 Wis. 570, 186 N.W. 744, LoRENZEN, Cases 967; In re Hirsch's Estate
(1946) 146 Ohio St. 393, 66 N.E. (2d) 636, ann. 164 A.L.R. 761, 765. Similar
for receivership, Restatement §§ 559, 560.
25
In re Estate of Brauns ( 1936) 276 Mich. 598, 268 N.W. 893; see in
general Note, 164 A.L.R. 768; 21 Am. Jur. 863 § 878 n. II.
In Owsley v. Bowden (Ga. 1926) 132 S.E. 70, the creditors filed in Georgia
received sufficient payment "to discharge these debts," which seems to be full
payment, because they had not filed in time in Alabama, the domiciliary state,
and were barred there.
26
Report on Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estate Act, Handbook
of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1934, 365. See, as early as
1840, Goodall v. Marshall, I I N.H. 88, 98, 101.
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27

gressional action
and purposeful policy of the United
States Supreme Court. 28 Concentration on the domiciliary
administration as in the case of receivership has been justly
advocated in the whole field of the administration of decedent's estates. 29 Where the estate is insolvent, however,
the most efficient and adequate measure would be the extension of the national Bankruptcy Act to the estate administration, matching the legislation of all other significant
countries. 30
Effect of Judgments. The Supreme Court of the United
States as early as I 841 stabilized the doctrine that in consequence of the territorial limits of his powers an administrator cannot bind the estate outside of the state in which
he is appointed. 31 Even a judgment rendered in the state
of his appointment has no binding effect upon another
administration. 32 The judgment against him as representative is merely regarded as an order to pay out funds
committed to his care just in the same jurisdiction. As the
Supreme Court expressed it: "While a judgment against a
party may be conclusive not merely against him but also
those in privity with him, there is no privity between two
administrators appointed in different states"; hence a judgment obtained against the ancillary administrator with the
will annexed in Massachusetts has no effect against an
executor at the testator's domicil in Michigan. 33 It has
27
28

Bankruptcy Act, chapter X.
CHEATHAM, "The Statutory Successor, The Receiver and the Executor
in the Conflict of Laws," 44 Col. L. Rev. ( I944) 549·
29
HOPKINS, 53 Yale L.J. 221, 634; and especially CHEATHAM, [.c.
30
See NADELMANN, "Insolvent Decedents' Estates," 49 Mich. L. Rev. ( I9S1)
II29, u61 f. and (cited by him) SIMES, "Some Lessons from a Comparative
Study of American Probate Legislation," Proceedings, Section of Real Property and Trust Laws, Am. Bar Ass. ( 1949) 42, 48.
31 Vaughan v. Northrup (1841) IS Pet. I.
32
Stacy v. Thrasher ( 1845) 6 Howard 44, 6o f. See also Low v. Bartlett
( 1864) 8 All (Mass.) 259·
33
Brown v. Fletcher's Estate ( 1907) 210 U.S. 82.
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equally remained constant practice that a judgment against
a domiciliary administrator has no effect on assets in an
ancillary state, 34 or one against a foreign executor outside
the state of his appointment on the entire estate. 35 It does
not even make a difference that the same person is the administrator in both courts or the executor in one and administrator in the other. 36
An exception was once made by the Supreme Court
when the same person was executor in both states, because
his support by the will of the testator unified his position;
the judgment was given full faith and credit. 37 Yet, despite
the alleged privity in such case, such a judgment was subsequently merely considered prima facie evidence of the
debt 38 (which in itself is also an exceptional favor).
It follows that any creditor may present a claim in any
jurisdiction 39 where assets are found 40 and at the domicil. 41
If the claim is rejected, he may prove it elsewhere. If it is
allowed, this is not even an evidence of the existence of
the claim in other jurisdictions. 42 Limitation of action in
one state has no importance in the others; 43 in the kindred
English view, a surplus reached in the ancillary English
administration was surrendered to the local beneficiaries
without regard to American creditors barred by the Eng-

34
Johnson v. Powers ( 1890) 139 U.S. 156; Wilson v. Hartford ( 1908)
164 Fed. 817; Green v. Martin (193z) Z39 N.W. 870.
35
Learned Hand J., in Burrowes v. Goodman (1931) 50 F. (zd) 9Z; see
also Feldman v. Gross ( 195Z) 106 F. Supp. 308.
36 Restatement § so6, comment a. STORY § szza was doubtful.
37
Carpenter v. Strange ( 1891) 141 U.S. 87, 104.
38
Hill v. Tucker ( 1851) 13 Howard 458.
so Restatement § so6 (z).
40
WoERNER § 17z; GooDRICH 570 and citations. Cf., 3 A.L.R. 64.
41
Goodall v. Marshall (1840) II N.H. 88, 98.
42
Green v. Martin ( 193z) Z39 N.W. 870; Restatement § 495 comment b.
In Johnson v. Powers ( 1890) 139 U.S. 156, the same result follows naturally
in the absence of identity of res and persona.
4
3WiJson v. Hartford (1908) 164 Fed. 817.
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lish statute of limitation though not by the statute of the
American domicil. 44
Disposition of Ancillary Funds. The American courts,
like the English, claim discretionary power to dispose of
the assets or the surplus. Where no special reasons demand
attention, the most usual proceedings are the following:
If no locally domiciled creditors exist from the beginning
in an ancillary court, transfer of the funds to the domiciliary
administrator is ordered. 45 Likewise, if all locally appearing creditors are paid, the remaining balance of the personal
estate is transferred to the principal administrator; the
Restatement favors this. 46 An exception has been made,
for instance, where expedience, costs, and other reasons
advised the contrary 41 or there was no assurance that an
administrator "is or will be appointed" at the domicil in
Argentina. 48
Conflict of Systems. In a hundred-years-old English
case, it was held that a foreign personal representative,
having taken heirship according to foreign law without
benefit of inventory, is personally liable in England, not as
an administrator of English movables but as a debtor. 48
Hence, while the administration in England, governed by
English law, is accountable for the assets only, in addition
English proceedings make the successors accountable according to foreign inheritance law. This is one way to
adjust the English system to the recognition that the succession is governed by a foreign law determining also the
scope of liability for debts.
This example may inspire solutions in many other situa44

In re Lorillard (1922) 2 Ch. 638.
Dow v. Lillie ( 1914) 144 N.W. 1082; Restatement § 496.
46 Restatement § 522.
47
Burman v. Lenkin Construction Co. ( 1945) 149 F. (2d) 827.
48
In re Bokkelen (N.Y. 1935) ISS Misc. 289.
48
Beaven v. Lord Hastings (1856) K. & J. 724.
45
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tions where the systems clash. In accordance, it has been
stated in the Netherlands that the creditors of an Englishman who died domiciled in England cannot sue the beneficiaries personally in Holland as they would be entitled to
under Dutch law. 50
II. SEVERAL LAws oF SuccEssiON
1.

Lack of Privity

Realistic understanding on the Continent faces the scission
of inheritance laws, if nothing corrects it, with the same
awe and displeasure as common law lawyers realize the
splitting up of the assets in multiple administration. The
several independent systems, indeed, in the case of their
international segregation, result in the incoherent existence
also of several systems of liability and enforcement. An
heir may, with deliberate planning, accept one succession
and repudiate the other, so as to become liable to the claims
against the first but not to those against the second, which
are higher. The law of state X may hold land liable only
to mortgagees or claims otherwise arising in connection
with land, and the beneficiary leaves the small assets in
Y to the pleasure of all other creditors. On the other hand,
if there happens to be total responsibility of all estates to
all creditors, they may exhaust the funds left to one successor under the law of X to the advantage of the successor
called by the law of Y. Moreover, an absolute lack of
correlation deprives the payor of any recourse for contribution.
When in England movables alone were attachable by
creditors of the estate (and the case is the same where at
present a Scotch heir to an immovable is liable only in a
50

MEIJERS,

( 1948) 134.

Weekblaad No. 3495, IX;

GHEEL GILDEMEESTER,

Vererwing
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subsidiary order), the paying heir was granted recourse in
England. 51 In international relations nothing similar IS
assured.
That mortgages and other security rights can, and in
the case of land charges not supported by an underlying
personal obligation must, be enforced in their totality
against the assets affected, is settled. 52 But an old French
doctrine construed a category of udettes immobilieres,"
including mine royalties, that would be restricted to the
territory of the land, whereas the movables had to support
the great majority of the claims. 5 3
In the prevailing opinion, the principle is certain: all
assets are liable to all creditors, but each asset only according to the law of succession recognized in the country
where it is situated. No privity exists among the several
laws of succession so followed. 54
2.

Equalization

Correction of this sad outlook has been sought in various
ways. An influential doctrine postulates proportional
division of the assets among the creditors of the various
systems, conforming to the value of the assets situated in
the several territories. 55 However, not only is it very
difficult to assemble the facts for such evaluation, but no
pertinent rule can be founded in the absence of federation
or treaty. The Montevideo Treaty in fact provides a liabil51
WESTLAKE§ 118; DICEY (ed. 5) 973j (ed. 6)
52 VOUMARD 86, 144.
53 For extension of this category, JouSSELIN,
PLANIOL ET RIPERT § 906 f. j NIBOYET,
54 France: NIBOYET, Traite 916 §

Germany:
55 France:

NussBAUM 359·
MAURY ET VIALLETON

(ed. 6) 412.
Germany: 2 BAR 3 so.
Switzerland: VouMARD 89.

PIGEONNIERE

813.
(These, 1899) 105; contra

4 Traite 905 § 1364.
1370; SAVATIER, Cours 304 § 436.

in 4

PLANIOL ET RIPERT

489 j

LEREBOURS-
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ity merely proportional to the part obtained by the local
assets in the entire inheritance, but gives the local claims
preference for total satisfaction. 56 The very idea of preventing a creditor from requesting full payment of his claim
is unsound and disastrous to personal credit. Credit is
usually granted in reliance on the entire possessions of the
debtor, which may be true even of a mortgagee. Therefore,
in another view, all assets must be available to every
creditor. 57 At present, this responds of course to the principles of most countries, though not all; but the result of
applying the divergent modalities of limitation and enforcement has never been studied. One difficulty has been overcome in France; an heir claiming benefit of inventory must
extend the inventory to the entire inheritance. 58
In the internal relationship between the beneficiaries of
the separate successions, an obligation of contribution is as
desirable as it is far from recognition. It has been suggested
that joint debtors with recourse proportional to the values
received by them, 59 provided that the construction of a will
does not involve a different regulation. This rule, not of
conflict of laws but a uniform substantive rule, deserves to
be carefully worked out. It is not a part of any present law.
Treaty of Montevideo, arts. 46-48.
M. WoLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 3) 227; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 359; BATIFFOL,
Traite 676 f. § 673 (making no difference whether there is one or several
laws of succession.
58 Cass. req. (April 23, r866) S. 1866.1.290; C. Paris (Dec. u, 1886)
S. 1886.2.42; TREBAUT, 10 Repert., Successions No. 118.
59
WoLFF and NussBAUM, supra n. 55; RAAPE, Kommentar 688; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 580 develops a different proposal which is impractical.
56
57
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Trusts
I. TRUST IN

GENERAL

·F there should be any part of the conflict of laws free
from "confusion," it is not the treatment of trusts.
According to Bates it is "highly uncertain." 1 Griswold
states that in that great maze which we know as conflict
of laws, there are few fields more uncertain in the cases
and difficult in principle than trusts. 2 Cavers describes the
numerous hazards for the creation of trusts which even
may shift in the perhaps long period during which a trust
should run. 3 Beale's attempt to mold the liquid case
material into firm rules 4 had too little support in the decisions and not enough practical appeal. It would seem that
the very territorial principles of the law of property from
which Beale started, appear unsatisfactory to the courts.
Curiously enough, in view of the scarce and not too
reliable authority in England,-"scanty and often misleading"-writers look for enlightenment to the American
cases.5
However, no new examination of the decisions would

I

1

BATES, "Common Law Express Trusts in French Law," 40 Yale L.J.

( 1926) 34·
2

GRISWOLD, Book Review, 55 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1947) 163.
CAVERS, Book Review, 20 North Car. L. Rev. (1947) 231.
4
BEALE, "Living Trusts of Movables in the Conflict of Laws," 45 Harv.
L. Rev. ( 1932) 969; 2 BEALE and Restatement §§ 241-244, 294-299; BEALE,
"Development in the Law of Conflict of Laws ( 1935-1936) ," so Harv. L.
Rev. ( 1937) 1156 f.
5 CROUCHER, "Trust of Movables in Private International Law," Mod. L.
Rev. (1940) III.
3
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help. In the words of Chief Justice Layton of Delaware
speaking of the "vexed question" of trusts inter vivos, the
diversities are "such that no useful purpose will be served
by an attempted analysis of the decisions." 6 The profound
uneasiness these tentative efforts of the judiciary evoke
is caused by a struggle against mechanical rules without
resolute acceptance of the hints given by the prominent
writers on this subject.
1.

Municipal Systems

Trust, the most typical and most advertised institution of
the Anglo-American law, has engendered numerous specialized applications which have grown into autonomous types.
In its general form, apt to serve almost any purpose of
property transactions, the trust survives; but its particularly
brilliant employment in recent periods lies in certain functions among which in the United States long term dispositions of wealth take the foreground.
In the civil law sphere, identical factors have been active
since the very earliest times, to build up new types of transactions by the medium of fiduciary transfers of persons
and property. As a final result, however, the compact
civil codes laid down the specific fruits of this development
but ignored the oldest and central institution. This was
not done by oversight but was felt as a necessity.
The reasons have been thoroughly investigated by recent
scholars. Those who protest against introduction of the
Anglo-American trust believe that this institution violates
6 Wilmington v. Wilmington (1942) 27 Del. 243, 24 At!. (2d) 309. See
also Note, 139 A.L.R. ( 1942) 1129 on the "near impossibility of deducing
a uniform rule."
Every feasible analysis has been made at their times by CAVI!RS, "Trusts
Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws," 44 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1930) 161-202,
and in the special monograph by WALTI!R LAND, Trusts in the Conflict of
Laws ( 1940).
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the principle-itself contested in many jurisdictions-that
the number of property rights is closed, and if not this, at
any rate, that it is incompatible with sure and neat definition
of jura in re, since the right of cestui que trust defies any
clear classification of proprietary and obligatory interests.
Furthermore, the assets constituting the res are inalienable
through normal transfer, although a widespread axiom declares ineffectual in principle, or even without exception,
restraint on alienation by contract or any private transaction. Finally, the group of codes, led by the Code
Napoleon, prohibiting fideicommissary substitutions, is more
or less hostile to fiduciary transfers of rights with obligation to ulterior transmissions under condition or terms of
time. 7
Thoughtful opposition to these arguments has been expounded with equally learned historical, logical, and economical reasons. 8
Whatever the merits of these considerations have been
in the past and present stage of the main European systems,
there is a distinct tendency to lower the defenses against
the trust. Louisiana and Quebec, partly by statute and
greatly by practice, have emulated their common law
surroundings. 9 An increasing and already long series of
Latin-American statutes, since Alfaro's Panamanian statute,
7 See in particular MoTULSKI, "De l'impossibilite juridique de constituer
un 'Trust' anglo saxon sous !'empire de Ia loi fran~aise." Rev. crit. 1948,
451-468; GARRIGUES, "Law of Trusts," 2 Am. ]. Comp. L. ( 1953) 25.
8 Especially LEPAULLE, Traite theorique et pratique des trusts ( 1932)
(extracts by CHAFFEE, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 535); id., "La notion du trust et
ses applications dans les divers systemes juridiques," 2 Actes du Congres Int.
de Droit Prive (Rome 1951) 197; VERA BoLGAR, "Why No Trusts in the Civil
Law?" 2 Am. J. Comp. L. (1953) 204.
9
Louisiana: Trust Estate Act, L. 8r of 1938; cf., F. F. STONE, "Trusts in
Louisiana," I Int. Comp. L. Q. (1952) 368.
Quebec: C.C. r866, arts. 98r-98rn; cf., MIGNAULT, "La Fiducie dans Ia
Province de Quebec," Sem. Int. de Droit (Paris 1937).
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have incorporated either in part 10 or in principle the
trust, 11 as a legal institution, and a very vivid discussion
continues in the Spanish-speaking countries. 12 Continental
Europe offers little prospect for wholesale conquest, but
it is more acutely than ever remembered that the Romanistic system retained, in addition to all the special devices
for acting by an intermediary, (I) the fiduciary disposition
of property rights, from which source German practice,
immediately after the Civil Code came into force, took
inspiration for a vast development of transfer of title for
security purposes, and ( 2) fiduciary agency in the agent's
own name, used in varied fields, often under the very term
of trustee (Treuhander ). Especially have German business
and judicial practice and German science devoted a high
degree of attention to these transactions and institutions,
but a number of similar efforts are noticeable everywhere.
This is not the place to go into the municipal legislative problems. We may, however, for the benefit of understanding the conflicts problems, draw from the recent
animated debates a two-fold inference.
On the one hand, the main argument against the plain
adoption of the trust in civilian systems is neither the
lack of kinship nor the lack of an adequate place in the
statute book. It is rather the fulfillment of most of the
10

ALFARO, Adaptacion del trust del derecho anglo-saj6n al derecho civil,

1 Cursos Monograficos, Acad. Interamer. ( 1948) 67; id., "The Trust in the
Civil Law with Special Reference to Panama," 33, Ser. 3, J. Comp. Leg.
part III/IV, 25·31.
11 Panama: L. Jan. 6, 1925, amend. L. No. 17, Feb. 20, 1941.
Puerto Rico: L. April 23, 1928. SANCHEZ VILLELAS, "The Problem of Trust

Legislation in Civil Law Jurisdictions; The Law of Trusts in Puerto Rico,"
19 Tulane L. Rev. ( 1945) 374·
Mexico: Ley General de lost. de Credito etc. 1926h932h941.
12
See PATION, "Trust Systems in the Western Hemisphere," 19 Tul. L.
Rev. 398; id., "The Nature of the Beneficiary Interest in a Trust," ( 1949)
lnteramer. Bar Ass. S. IV Sixth Conf. with rich documentation; PoMPEYO
CLARET Y MARTI, "De Ia Fiducia y del Trust," Estudio de Der. Comp.
(Barcelona 1946).
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salutary functions of trusts by special devices that make
a revolutionary change of existing sets of rules less imperative.
On the other hand, experience has shown that by a
really skillful new statute, though not without it, trust can
be integrated in a civilian body of legislation. At the same
time, in my opinion, a close analysis of the individual
incidents of Anglo-American law would show a much
greater approximation to the Continental thought than is
commonly supposed by the opponents.
Hence, being well aware of the fundamental differences
of approach, we ought to avoid, once more, the rash impression of an irreconcilable contrast. 13 This observation
should facilitate at least the unreserved recognition of
rights and duties arising from common law trusts in the
countries of civil law.
2.

Categories in Conflicts Law

(a) Testamentary and inter 'Vi'Vos trust. Evidently, a
fundamental distinction between the sources creating a trust
has always been believed natural, on the assumption that
creation by a will is a part of inheritance law and belongs
to the jurisdiction of the probate court, whereas creation
by settlement is subject to the law of contract and jurisdiction is taken by some undefined court in personam, or
on the ground of the situation of the assets. It is worthwhile to recall these assumptions, apparently long forgotten
by some courts and writers. To bring them to recollection
means to reveal their patent inconvenience under present
circumstances, which explains the inconsistency of their
13
A cautious advance of the French to the English idea of administration
is stated by BATIFFOL, "The Trust Problems as Seen by a French Lawyer,"
33, ser. 3, J. Comp. Leg. III/IV x8, 24.
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application. With such basic principles, the courts labor
in vacillating efforts.
(b) Trust of land and trust of movables. The Restatement superimposes on the just-mentioned distinction between
testamentary and living trusts the division of trusts according to their object. The matter, therefore, is· created as a
part of property law. By further subdivisions, the scheme
respecting "creation" of trusts results as follows:
Creation inter vivos: for chattels: lex situs ( § 294 par.

I?)
for chases in action: lex loci ( § 294
par. 2)
for land: lex situs ( § 24 I )
by will: of land: lex situs ( § 24 I )
of movables: lex domicilii ( § 29 5)
The "Corpus Juris" supposes a different system to exist
in fact. In general the law of the domicil of the settlor would
control trusts of tangible movables, which in the case of
wills would be the domicil at the time of death; intangibles
would be governed by the law intended by the settlor and
only in the absence of an intention his domiciliary law.a
The distinctive treatment of intangibles in both systems
seems to be prompted by the awkward primary tests for
tangibles. Narrow territorial and materialistic connections
are utilized to support the lex situs in this application;
only a merely mechanical extension of the adage, mobilia
sequuntur personam, can justify a principle that trusts
are dependent on the settlor's domicil.
That a fiduciary transaction comprehending an entire
estate should be recognized and nevertheless torn asunder
because of the local situation of its components, is the hard
core of the principal difficulties experienced in the matter.
(c) Creation and administration. The prevailing opinion
a IS C.J.S. 936, § 18 g.
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divorces creation and administration of trusts. In the case
of a testamentary trust, the main rule of jurisdiction is
taken from the law of decedents' estates; the law of the
state of the testator's domicil at his death governs administration also of the testamentary trusts. The Restatement,
repeating this rule ( § 29 8), however, grants an exception
if "the will shows an intention that the trust should be
administered in another state" ( § 297). A trust of movables created inter vivos is administered at the place located
by the trust deed. A trust of land is always administered
under "the law of the state where the land is and can be
supervised by the courts of that state only" ( § 243). This,
again, is a system built up by a sense of geometry rather
than wisdom.
In contrast to this formulation, "American Jurisprudence"
states that the courts gradually are subjecting trusts of
movables to the law of the place of administration and
scrutinize every hint of intention in the fixing of this place. 15
(d) Voluntary and legally-implied trusts. Conflicts discussions ordinarily do not include statutory and constructive
trusts which in fact belong in the vicinity of extracontractual
obligations. They seldom refer to resulting trusts/ 6 which
certainly are not typical of the chief problems.
With this negative exception, however, the great variety
of trust purposes has not provoked any attempt to differentiate the conflicts rules. Yet we may take it that the
field of these rules is and must be restricted to the current
main use of trust, that is, dispositions of wealth for long
periods for the benefit of the settlor's family and charitable
corporations. They have no connection, for instance, with
representation of shareholders or bondholders by a trustee
15

u Am. J. 38z § 95; 139 A.L.R. 1129, 1134·
ln re Smith's Will (Surr. 1947) 67 N.Y.S. (zd) 330 contains a very
short mention.
16
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appointed in accordance with the bylaws of a corporation
or by a bond deed, with bankruptcy trustees, Massachusetts
business trusts, and so forth.
Nor are the incidents included in the law of trusts differentiated for conflicts treatment (with the exception of two
marginal questions) .17
3· Judicial Favor
Although no exception to the prohibitory statutes of the
situs of land seems to have been allowed/ 8 a common
phenomenon of American judicial attitude to trusts of
movables is the favor shown by the courts in upholding
their validity. Charitable testamentary trusts have most
often been so privileged, but courts have expressly extended
their benevolence further .19
Thus, a regular conflicts rule is adopted, and prohibitions
contained in the statutes so invoked are the cause for
choosing a different statute. The New York courts, but not
they alone, by recognizing a foreign governing law validate
the creation of trusts that would have been invalid under
the law of the forum. This practice eliminates the adverse
effect of the domestic rules against remoteness of vesting
interests 20 when no such obstacle is raised by the presumable situs of the funds, against accumulation of income when
the law of the place of administration is more favorable, 21
and against indefiniteness of beneficiaries in gifts to charities. 22 As the courts state, the purpose is to uphold the
Infra n. 56.
12.
19
Lanius v. Fletcher ( 1907) 100 Tex. 550, 101 S.W. 1076; Hope v. Brewer
(x8g2) I36 N.Y. 126, 32 N.E. ss8; LAND 57§ 17.
2
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain ( x87x) 43 N.Y. 424.
21
Man ice v. Manice ( 1871) 43 N.Y. 303, 388, erroneously also speaking
of the place of the beneficiary, 4 PAGE 725 n. 5·
22
Hope v. Brewer (1892) supra n. 19.
17

18 LAND§

°
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trust rather than to support the trust corporations of New
Y ark; the New Y ark courts have attempted it was said, 23
"wherever possible to uphold the validity even of charitable
testamentary trusts which were to be administered in another state."
This practice does not think highly either of the traditional restrictions on free disposal or of the traditional
conflicts rules on trust creation. In the first regard, "in
the age of endowment campaigns and trust advertising
the spectre of the dead hand no longer troubles the judge
or legislator." 24 In the second aspect, the usual excuse
is the implied intention of the testator or settlor, which,
however, in these cases is more fictitious than ever, since
it is the court that after the event compares the two or
more statutes possibly in question and does the choosing.
Indeed, the courts are dissatisfied with their own substantive
statutes as well as with their own conflicts rules.
How the courts help themselves, however, is one more
instance in the list of situations where exceptional liberal
conflicts rules are gradually invented to obviate antiquated
difficulties for interstate transactions. 25 The conclusion
must be the same as we submitted earlier, that the exceptions are unfit for international use.
4· Changes of Contact
The law governing creation is naturally invariable, but
also the court supervising the administration under its own
lex fori is ordinarily not deemed to lose jurisdiction because
of supervening events. Even the transfer of the funds to
a diffe.rent location has been held no ground for a change
23

Hutchison v. Ross. (1933) 262 N.Y. 381, 394, 187 N.E. 65.
44 Harv. L. Rev. at 167, 168 n. 24; LAND 74·
25
Usury contracts, Vol. II, pp. 408-412, 427 ff.; Sunday contracts, Vol. I,
p. 564 ff.; liquor sales, Vol. III, p. 177; Statute of frauds, Vol. III, p. 54 (c).
24 CAVERS,
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of law, unless the settlor has reserved the right to change
the place of administration. 26
II.

TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS

Where a trust is set up by a will, it is obvious that the
formal requisites of this will must be observed. The lex
fori is of no importance, but the conflicts rule of the forum
tells whether the inheritance law of the last domicil or
nationality or that of the place of execution or of the situs,
or any one of them, validates the testament. Natural as
this solution is, the effects may not always satisfy, particularly
in the international field, because even with respect to formal
validity a will and a trust are different things.
This is more evident if we think of material validity.
The American doctrine has generally assumed that intrinsic validity is governed by the law of the situs of immovables and by the law of the last domicil of the decedent
respecting movables. 27 In numerous cases, however ,-Land
estimates one-fourth 28-the American decisions have deviated from this principle. Mostly it has been done in favor
of the validity of the trust. But the New York leading case,
Hutchison v. Ross/9 marked in 1933 the formal repudiation of the rule of domicil in the field of living trusts and
affected its application to testamentary trusts from whence
the rule came. Technically the application of a nondomiciliary law was based on statutory construction restricting domestic prohibitions to domestic wills, or on the
intention of the testator, which in the usual manner is
described either as his real, presumed, or assumed intention.
It is assumed where the will determines a place other than
2 6 LAND

§ 26.1.
Restatement §§ 241, 295; FALCON BRIDGE 560;
28 LAND § 17.
29
Supra n. 23; BEALE, so Harv. L. Rev. at us6.
21

LAND

§§ 9, 17.
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his domicil for the administration of the trust, and-for
the sake of upholding a trust-especially where the trust
would be invalid at the domicil but valid at the place of
administration. The Massachusetts court reviewed the
problem with this result in 1949 when a testator domiciled
in New York left personal property in trust in the forum;
in this individual case under Massachusetts law, invalidity
followed for an appointment to a remainder and the funds
reverted, by "capture," to the first appointee for life. 30
Some decisions use the familiar argument that the testator
is supposed to have chosen a law validating his will. 31 The
New York practice described above leads to the domicil
against the place of administration, although the latter is
in New York, 32 or to the place of administration against
New York law. 33
The process of veering away from the last domicil is so
well-advanced that it has been observed that the domicil
is no longer determinative of the applicable law, if it stands
alone in the congeries of elements pointing to other contacts.34 More radically, the very function of the law of the
domicil has been explained by the "theory that such trust
is to be administered at testator's domicil" so that the
intention of the testator now would be the uniform test. 35
But on the other hand, no case seems to recognize even
the express choice of law in a will unless some "substantial
connection" with the selected place is noted. 36
30
Amerige v. Att. Gen. (1949) 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E. (2d) 126. Note,
63 Harv. L. Rev. (1950) 699; so Col. L. Rev. (1950) 239·
81 Lanius v. Fletcher (1871) 100 Tex. 550, 101 S.W. 1076; cf., 4 PAGE
731 § 1647·
82
Cross v. United States Trust Co. (1892) 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125;
Dammert v. Osborn (1893) 140 N.Y. 30, 35 N.E. 407·
83 Supra n. 19-2 z.
34 SWABENLAND, "The Conftict of Laws in Administration of Express Trusts
of Personal Property," 45 Yale L.J. ( 1936) 438.
35 4 PAGE 722 and n. 8.
3 6 SWABENLAND, 45 Yale L.J. at 450.
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Rationale. It is remarkable what progress the American
courts have made without any sure guidance by principles,
merely weighing the traditional contacts such as the testator's domicil at the time of his death, his intention-both
taken from inheritance law-and the doctrine of prevailing elements-taken from the law of contracts; thirteen
such elements have been counted in the decisions. 37 However, only a few scholars have pointed to a role of the
place of administration superior to the rest of the
"elements." 38
J7 alidity and administration. Is it a conception suitable
to a sound treatment of testamentary trusts, that the stipulations producing it are exactly like any other postmortuary
disposition?
A will regulates the order of the beneficiaries; a trust
ties down the assets for satisfying the beneficiaries. The
rules of succession attach to the death of the testator; even
fideicommissary substitutions as such are related in some
manner to the time of death. Trust rules serve the ulterior
fate of the estate and have nothing to do with the personal
relations of the deceased; they are impersonal. Administration of a decedent's estate is a short-range management
to liquidate and distribute assets after payment of the
debts; administration of a trust fund is a matter mostly of
decades under the economic requirements of care during
a life time. The further time advances, the more the onetime domicil of the testator falls back into remote memory.
That its law should be the cornerstone of validity and
effect for this entire period, is no matter of course.
Confirmation of this difference has always been afforded
by the language distinguishing executor and trustee, although the executor is a trustee himself, and substantially
37 LAND 210.
38

Especially

GOODRICH

and

CAVERS,

44 Harv. L. Rev.

190.
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by the scope of trust administration, as it has developed.
Whereas the field of estate administration is occasionally
exaggerated, as observed earlier, 39 it never reaches the
width of the attributes of trust courts and trustees. The
law of the place of administration is said to govern the
questions: to whom the trustee may pay income or capital;
whether the interest of the beneficiary is assignable; and
the power of creditors to reach the trust res or its income. 40
Finally, but not least, the difference in the nature of ordinary and trust dispositions is demonstrated by the fact that
trusts of movables are supervised by one court alone; "no
other court can discharge a trustee and no other courts
will give him instructions." 41
Hence, the mere circumstance that our law permits a
person to establish a trust not only by deed among living
persons but also by will, ought not to cause rational conflicts rules to assimilate just in the latter case the source
of the trust with the will. The German doctrine has developed an instructive terminology. A man may change the
beneficiary of a life insurance in his will without declaration
to the insurer; he may appoint a testamentary executor or
a guardian for his minor children in a pact on his succession.42 However, these acts may be done in the instrument;
they are not done as parts of testamentary disposition, or
binding pact, respectively. The testament provides the
form, nothing else. It seems to me that this is exactly
the situation also of testamentary trusts. Apart from
formal requirements, they should share the law applicable
to living trusts.
39

Supra Ch. 71.
3 BEALE 1024 § 297.2.
Restatement § 299; 2 BEALE § 299.1.
42
BGB. § 332; § 2278 par. 2: only devices and bequests can be made by a
binding successoral pact, but other unilateral dispositions may be inserted in
the document, n6 RGZ. 32.
40
41
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What rule? If the foregoing exposition is correct, the
answer to the questions of what importance the intention
of the testator has and whether the place of administration
is the most adequate localization, must be deferred until
living trusts are discussed. It is of outstanding interest to
ascertain whether the courts which empirically experiment
are right in substituting a kind of party autonomy to the
traditional law of domicil. This question depends on general conceptions. It should be recognized, indeed, that
creating a trust, at least in the Anglo-American orbit, is
permitted as an attribute of personal freedom of transacting. The territorial limits of this freedom, if some exist
and whatever they contain, are certainly not a particular
problem of testamentary trusts.
III.
1.

TRUST INTER VIVOS

England

Although the English decisions are limited to trusts
created in marriage settlements, their criteria are so varied
that the underlying principle could only be found in the
search for the proper law. 43 Thus the intention of the
settlor is sought through the evaluation of all factors.
Also, as in contracts, usually English law is found to have
been in the settlor's mind. No limitations upon free choice
are known. Accordingly, it is held in Canada that a marriage contract made in Quebec may prescribe that the deed
and stipulations as well as administration and disposal of
the funds shall be construed and governed by the law of
England. 44
48
CAVERS, 44 Harv. L. Rev. at 185 f.; CROUCHER, "Trust of Movables in
Private International Law," 4 Mod. L. Rev. (1940) 111.
44
In re Jutra's Est. (Sask. App. 1932) 2 W.W.R. 533, 536; 3 JOHNSON 389.
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United States

Former decisions, in varying choice of law, preferred to
take either the domicil of the settlor or the place where
the deed was delivered, as the decisive criterion. The
domicil, however, has been demoted, especially since 1933,45
to one of many elements for the search of the allegedly
intended law. Lex loci contractus, favored by Beale for
intangibles/ 6 has been sometimes adopted, when the funds
were delivered simultaneously with the execution of the
contract. 47 More important, the "situs" of the trust, that
is, the place where the funds are located at the time of the
delivery of the trust deed, or where they are intended to
be brought, enjoys attention. Factors are also the residence or establishment of the trustee, the domicil of the
beneficiaries, and others. 48 The group of living trusts, thus,
has been more clearly than trusts by will brought under the
dominance of choice of law from case to case, according to
express or assumed intention, the equivalent of the English
proper law, but with better emphasis on the objective evaluation of the closest connection of the case with a statute.
This doctrine is unambiguously adopted in such decisions
as in New York by Shannon v. Irving Trust Co. (1937), 49
in Illinois by Riggs v. Barrett (1941), 50 and in Delaware
by Wilmington v. Wilmington (1942). 51
It is true, neither is this yet a rule recognized throughout
45

Hutchison v. Ross (1933) 262 N.Y. 381, 394, 187 N.E. 65.
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson (1941) 48 Cal. App. (2d) 12, 119 Pac. (2d)
.n4 invokes lex loci contractus (Illinois) for illegality, but all factors of the
transaction were in Illinois.
47
139 A.L.R. ( 1942) 129 ff. no. 4·
48 LAND § 37.1: eight "elements."
49
Shannon v. Irving Trust Co. ( 1937) 275 N.Y. 95·
50
Riggs v. Barrett ( 1941) 308 III. App. 549, 32 N.E. (2d) 382.
51
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Soc. of the Fine Arts ( 1942) supra
n. 6; cf., GooDRICH, 32 Va. L. Rev. 323; ann. 30 Geo. L.J. 788.
46
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the country nor is the scope of this rule clarified. It does
not seem to have been extended to trusts of land.
Creation and Administration. Writers and courts are
still accustomed to distinguish also in living trusts the
questions of the birth of the trust and of its management.
Thus, it is commonly stated that the rules on perpetuity
and accumulation pertain to administration because they
restrict the holding in trust rather than the giving. 52 I
respectfully disagree. The grant in trust is restricted quite
as it is altogether prohibited in other countries; there is
a difference only in degree. So far as a trust fails, there
is nothing to administer by the appointed trustee. Other
incidents, as seen before, attributed regularly to the law
of administration, affect likewise the substance, the object
of the creation.
This difficult tracing of the borderline is eliminated if
both phases are placed under the same law. Such unique
law, of course, can only be the law of the place of administration, already controlling most of the really significant
causes of litigation. 5 3
This place is determined, in the actual opinion of many
courts and writers, by the intention of the settlor. This is
the huh of the entire problem. If the intention of the
settlor inter vivos as well as of the testator is decisive, it
cannot go to two places; and, again, it cannot be supposed
to dwell on a temporary place of domicil rather than on the
locality where he wants the trust to live, at the place of its
management.
IV.

CoNCLUSIONS

This writer continues to recommend the largest latitude
for parties to a contract, to select the law applicable to
5 2 CAVERS,

44 Harv. L. Rev. at n64 and n.
sa Supra, Vol. II p. 14.
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their transaction. Creation of a trust ought to be an
analogous subject. But the situation is not quite the same
as with business contracts.
A trust of the kinds here in question rests on a gift, a
liberality, which may be useful but never is necessary in
the sense business is needed. Indeed, it is alien to a great
number of legal systems, and even repugnant to numerous
civilians. Above all other considerations, there is no other
party to the transaction whose confidence in the contract or
testament would deserve protection. Therefore, the great
principle of freedom of transacting is more likely to suffer
restrictions, if a subject of one state creates a trust in another state, than when he sells merchandise in that other
state. Restrictions may be of two sorts. Although it is a
rather empty requirement in the law of contracts that party
choice of the applicable law should have a "substantial connection" with the chosen law, a similar requirement may
perhaps make sense here in certain cases. And, reaching
deeper, it is possible to argue that in view of the opposed
principles of the systems the subject of one country has not
always unlimited freedom to create a trust in another
country.
If English courts tend to apply simply English law to
trusts on English soil, if New York courts simply acknowledge the validity of a living trust created by a Cuban or
Frenchman, domiciled in his native country, wishing to have
the trust administered in New York and the res is there,
a problem is raised that does acutely exist in the face of the
various but essentially kindred American or common law
rules against restraint of disposal and suspension of ownership. On the international plane, neither indifference to
the foreign brand of prohibitions nor favor of validity can
stand unchallenged without qualification.
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This is a new problem and it can only tentatively be
solved. To be true to the accepted standards of private
international law, a division is probably inevitable. Property law depends on the lex situs, personal law on domicil
or nationality. Under the rules of lex situs, a Frenchman
may, in fact, dispose of assets situated in New York, according to the law of New York. This is energetically questioned in France, as we shall see; in some decisions the
creation of trusts is considered a part of personal law. But
from the internationally prevailing view, there is no doubt,
and the New York courts are correct so far.
Nevertheless, if the French national is domiciled in
France, under the American principles themselves his
marital and family relations and, when he dies, his movable
succession are governed by French law. It is true that a
provision of the New York Decedents' Law allows him
to declare for New York inheritance law, but this is a
very anomalous rule, while we are looking for principles.
In no case can he evade French marital property law nor
the legitimate shares-/a reserve-of his forced heirs. 54
The conflict appearing in Hutchison v. Ross with the
marital property law of Quebec may be recalled. 55
Within the United States, in the stupendous growth of
trust business, the new development of unbarrable shares
has been widely neglected. In the case of succession, this
omission may be repaired to a degree, but trusts inter
54 CAVERS, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 198 assumes the contrary. A different case
was that of the decision in Prince de Bearn v. Winans (1909) 111 Md. 434,
where a resident of Maryland executed a trust in Paris, in contemplation
of the marriage of his daughter to a Frenchman, granting her a power of
appointment. She appointed, by will, her husband in trust of her entire
estate. After her death, against contrary advice received by the widower in
Paris and Baltimore, the court held that the French reseroe for their children
was inapplicable; Maryland rather than French law applied to the execution of the power of appointment under a trust deed made by a resident of
Maryland where also the funds were situated.
55 Supra Vol. I, p. 369.
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vivos make a fait accompli and do not even seem easily
vulnerable to attacks on the ground of violated forced
heirship. Filling this gap needs more than a conflicts rule.
It should not be expected, however, that foreign courts will
agree to the present treatment.
That American trust corporations are rather unwilling
to administer trusts established by foreigners, is well justified under these circumstances.
Party autonomy, finally, has no place where all relevant
facts are united in one jurisdiction. This case forms a
natural exception quite as in the matter of contracts. 56 As
there, only one decision deals with such a situation. All
elements were in New York: the securities and the cash,
their delivery, the bank; nevertheless the deed declared for
Tennessee law in considering the violated perpetuity rules
of New York. 57 No foreign element was in cause.
By standard forms and also judicial opinion, the application of a law other than that of the place of administration is qualified by an exception; the latter law applies
normally to the commission of the trustee and to suits for
termination of the trust. 58
With a license claimed by all writers on this subject, the
American conflicts law on trusts may optimistically be resumed in the following assumptions.
Testamentary trusts are formally valid, if the form of
their documentation complies with one of the laws on the
execution of wills recognized by the law of the forum.
Validity and effect of all trusts and the formal requirements of living trusts are governed by the law of the place
of administration. The administration is conducted at
one place for all movables, which is determined by express
56

57

Supra Vol. II, p. 400 (b), case of 44 RGZ. 300.
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cheek (1935) 93 N.Y.L.J. 2941.
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or tacit statement of the settlor. In the absence of his
ascertainable intention, the trust is administered at the place
that has the most characteristic connection with its management; a bank carrying on trust administration, of course,
presents such connection. 59

v. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN TRUSTS
1.

Common Law Countries

English courts have recognized Italian restrictions on
the creation of future interests, 60 and a Scotch trust against
the English restraint on anticipation. 61 The invalidity of an
English trust in Argentina was taken into account. 62 Jurisdiction in personam is taken in order to fulfill an obligation
to create a trust abroad. 63
American courts show their benevolence also to foreign
trusts under correct reservations for foreign jurisdiction.
Where real and personal property was situated in Canada,
the surrogate judge in New York left the determination
of the validity of the trust to the court in Canada, 6 ~ and
when a trust was to be administered in New South Wales,
as was said: if the trust is valid there, it will be upheld in
New York.65
That objection of public policy contrary to validity has
been singularly reduced in New York and other-though
not all-courts, has been mentioned before. In Louisiana,
59

CAVERS, 44 Harv. L. Rev. at 164 n. 12.
In re Piercy [1895] I Ch. 83, with respect to the part of the land in
Sardinia not yet sold by the trustees, Italian law governs (without any consideration to the question of renvoi), evidently as lex fori.
61
In re Fitzgerald [1904] II Ch. 573·
62 Brown v. Gregson [1920] A.C. 86o H.L.
63
KEETON, Law of Trusts (ed. 5, 1950) 13 j HALSBURY-HAILSHAM, Vol. 13,
p. 79 § 75; Vol. 6, p. 224 § 273.
6
~InreSmith'sWill (1947) 67N.Y.S. (2d) 330.
65
In re Grant's Will (1950) zoo Misc. 35, IOI N.Y.S. (2d) 423.
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long before the trust was introduced into legislation, a trust
valid in another state was approved. 66
2.

Civil Law Countries

(a) In general. A national of a country where trusts are
unknown and which follows the nationality principle, would
perhaps not find agreement in his national courts, if he
established a trust abroad, and certainly not, if he attempts
it within his country. But authority is scarce. There is no
case in Germany deciding the question in general. 67
In France, foreign-created trusts have sometimes been
recognized. The Court of Cassation, Criminal Section, held
in 1941 that the validity of a testamentary trust of the
common law type is governed by the law of the sucession. 68
Prevailing opinion concludes that estates under French
inheritance law are inaccessible to administration as trust
funds. 69 On the other hand, where an English or American
national dies domiciled in a common law jurisdiction, movables left him in France may be possessed by his trustees,
though only on authorization. 70
Two older decisions of French tribunals sanctioned trusts.
In one case, the widow of the sewing machine manufacturer
Singer, about to be remarried and wanting to act in the
spirit of a trust deed of the deceased, gave her shares in
the family concern in trust for the benefit of her children.
The Tribunal de la Seine recognized this living trust on
the ground that she was then an American citizen and
domiciled in England, hence living under English law. 71
66

Heirs of Hullin v. Faure (r86o) IS La. Ann. 622.
Professor Makarov has kindly confirmed his corresponding negative
result.
68
Cass. Crim. (June 4, 1941) D.I942·I·4, S.I944·1.133, J.C.P. 1942 11.2017.
69 MoTULSKI, supra n. 7 at 467 § 19 and citations.
70 BATIFFOL, Traite 673 § 668.
11
Trib. civ. Seine (May r6, 1906), Clunet 1910, 1229.
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In the other case, included in a testamentary trust was a
villa in Beaulieu on the French Riviera. The Tribunal of
Nice construed the will to the effect that the beneficiary
should be absolute owner, avoiding thus unconformity with
French law. 72
From these fragmentary and often criticized pieces, no
comprehensive picture can be drawn. Especially, that a
Frenchman could create a living trust in New York with
French recognition as has been believed in this country, has
been, until now, an unwarranted assertion. The courts have
taken great pains, it is true, to demonstrate that trusts do
not offend the French prohibitions on fideicommissary
substitution : the assets do not go first to the trustee as
owner; he is only a "mandatory," and the beneficiary is
vested at the time of death; nor of agreements on future
inheritance nor of donations mortis causa. 13 Yet, the emphasis on the nationality of the settlor or on his domicil has
sometimes been climaxed by classifying the creation of
trust under the personallaw. 74
Italian and Belgian views seem to coincide with the
French attitude. 75 The climate is certainly more favorable
than it was, but the development has only started.
(b) Powers of trustee. Although the substantive rules
involving the powers of trustees of a bond issue are a special
72

Trib. Nice (May 5, 1905) Clunet 19n, 278.
Trib. Seine (May 16, 1906) Clunet 1910, 1229; (Dec. 19, 1916) Clunet
1917, 1069.
74
Same decisions; see for older cases the digest in Clunet 19n, 134-139.
75
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Nov. 27, 1947) Pas. Beige 1948, 3.51;
Evans v. Evans, although the settlor, an Englishman, was domiciled in Belgium and the immovables situated there: critized by MoTULSKI (supra n. 4)
458.
Italy: see P ALLICCIA, "Trusts testamentari inglesi riferentisi a beni situati
in Italia," Rivista 1932, 347; FEDOZZI, D.I.P. 593 ff. citing old decisions; the
judge in re Piercy ( 1895) supra n. 6o, stated on the basis of the expert
witness reports that the English trust, so far as the Italian land was sold by
the English trustee, was not opposed by Italian law which recognized the
power of the trustees to sell and the use of the proceeds.
73
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matter not here in discussion, the procedural right to appear
in court on behalf of the bondholders is usually assimilated
to the right of trustees in general to represent the beneficial
interests in court: as in the case of bond trustees, 76 now
very widely known to the municipal statutes, it may be taken
as commonly recognized that a trustee of the AngloAmerican type can exercise his powers in civilian territory. 77
It is a useless speculation whether he should be considered
as an owner under restriction or an agent or a composite
of depositary and mandatory (which is the Scotch translation into the domestic system). 78 Scientific interest, aroused
by such debates, has submitted the nature of the rights of
trustee and beneficiary to penetrating analysis. There is
no easy way beyond Maitland's resigned judgment: the
beneficiary's right may appear as obligatory, but for many
practical purposes of great importance it has been treated
as if it were in rem. 79
It is the practical aspect that dominates the question of
exercise of the rights of both the trustee and the beneficiary
in foreign jurisdictions. No real difficulties involving this
exercise have turned up, with one exception to be discussed
presently.
76 Cuba: Trib. Sup. (Feb. 19, 1938): trustees of a New York bond issue
are entitled to appear in court in Cuba.
France: Cass. civ. (Feb. 19, 1908) infra n. 75·
77 France: Trib. Seine (Dec. 10, 188o) Clunet 1881, 439; (June 28, 1901)
Clunet 1901, 812, affirmed Cour Paris (Jan. 27, 1904) D. 1905.2.356; Cass.
civ. (July 29, 1901) Clunet 1901, 971 (semble); Cass. civ. (Feb. 19, 1908),
KERR, Clunet 1912, 243; LEPAULLE, Traite des trusts 363,409.
Italy: Cass. Roma (Feb. 21, 1899) Foro Ita!. 1899.I 332, Giur. Ita!. 1899 I
1.216.
Germany: constant practice in unpublished decisions of the probate courts
(Nachlassgerichte).
Netherlands: KOSTERS 631; VAN BRAKEL 186 § 142 and n. 4·
Scotland: Croskery v. Gilmoour Trustees ( 1897) 17 Session Cas. 697.
78
Seen. 77·
79
MAITLAND, 3 Collected Papers at 26, 25 Griinhuts Zschr. 32, also cited for
final analysis by SIEBERT, Das rechtsgeschaftliche Treuhandverhiiltnis 98.
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(c) Inalienability of the fund. A considerable space in
the arguments against recognition of trusts in civilian
countries is taken up by the incapacity of trustees and
beneficiaries to dispose of the property tied up in a trust.
This feature of the trust institution has often been presented
as incompatible with systems where the establishment by
private transaction of restraints on free circulation is either
exceptional or totally prohibited, as by the German Code,
§ 137· Some French authors, less negative, point to the
situations where French law does prescribe inalienability,
as for dower, substitutions in favor of children during
the life of the first beneficiary, and contract clauses in certain judicially excepted cases. 80 Batiffol contends that the
lex situs may allow or disallow the common law restraint
on alienation. 81 Commonly it is felt that French law, i.e.,
lex situs, raises no objection against the inclusion of French
assets in a foreign trust as such but objects to the lack of
protection enjoyed by purchasers who in good faith acquire
the property in French territory. This is a popular argument occasioned by a decision of 1901.
Illustration. The fourth Baronet Sir Robert Paul sold
paintings out of the family trust fund to a dealer in Paris
for 90,000 francs. The trustees sued for annulment of the
sale. The Tribunal de la Seine and the Court of Paris
dismissed the suit. Considering the trustees as mere mandataries, the seller was held to have been the true owner
and the sale valid. Moreover, prohibition of alienation is
against public order. 82

When English trustees, sued by creditors of the beneficiary, opposed the inadmissability of disposing of capital
80

PICARD in PLANIOL ET RIPERT (ed. 2, 1952) §§ 222 ff.
Traite 644 § 64 5.
82
Trib. Seine (June 28, 1901) Clunet 1901, 812, affirmed Paris (Jan. 27,

81

1904) D.I905.2.356.

TRUSTS
or income by anticipation, as well as of seizing these interests, two sections of the Tribunal de la Seine split. One
division accepted this plea and lifted the seizure. 83 The
other rejected it, since such an absolute restriction offends
public order and lacks the publicity provided by the local
law of property. 84 The Appeal Court of Paris reversed
the first decision. It recognized an English marriage settlement including a trust but held that capital and income when
brought to France entered into free commerce. 85 The
annotation repeats the necessity of protecting the public
against invisible fetters.
Why all these authors and judges have believed it necessary to set up a barrier against the application of English
law is difficult to understand. In the common law countries,
respect for the law of the situation of property has always
been very high. English trust law is inherently modified
by the conflicts rules on lex situs. But moreover, in England and the United States themselves, a bona fide purchaser of trust property is treated no worse than ordinarily.
In New York, for instance, the principles have been laid
down since I 8 2 3. 86 Of course, a trustee cannot sell trust
property or allow its seizure without a court order. Neither
can a French husband dispose of the dower. Hence, the
objects can be recovered from a purchaser knowing the
nature of the property. Yet, "equity will not aid a cestui
que trust against a bona fide purchaser (from a trustee)
without notice of the trust." 87 The seller is estopped and the
beneficiaries have only an equitable interest against which
"the transferee is entitled to hold the property free of the
83

Trib. Seine (Dec. :u, 1926) Revue 1927, 70.
Trib. Seine (Feb. 23, 1927) Revue 1927, 263.
85
Cour Paris (April 18, 1929), Bear v. Humphries, Rev. crit. 1935, 149·
86
Galatian v. Erwin (Ch. N.Y. 1823) 1 Hopk. Ch. 48, aff. 8 Cow. 301.
87
Petrie v. Myers ( 1877) 54 How. Prac. 513, 516.
84
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trust and is under no liability to the beneficiaries." 88 The
doctrine of bona fide purchase is also applicable to persons
taking the property from the first purchaser. 89
In Germany, it would seem questionable whether the
prohibition of contractual restraints on alienation ( BGB.
§ 137) is a part of unyielding public policy or only applicable to German-governed contracts and to property on
German soil. Before introducing trusts into the German
system, § 137, of course, would have to disappear. 90 But
the courts deny protection also to foreign trust property,
when a trustee alienates assets in breach of trust. 91 This
practice, again, can be justified so far as the property is
dealt with in the German territory.
The law of the new situation, according to the general
rule, governs property transactions. 92
ScoTT, 2 Trusts 1573 § 284.
Id. 1595 § 287.
90 SIEBERT, Das rechtsgeschaftliche Treuhandverhaltnis 420.
91
RG. (Feb. 19, 1937) 153 RGZ. 370; WuRDINGER, "The German Trust,"
33 ser. 3 J. Comp. L. part 111/IV, 31, 34·
92 Supra Ch. 56.
88
89

PART FIFTEEN
APPLICATION
OF FOREIGN LAW
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Ascertainment of Foreign Law

1

)\ N international discussion involving almost every
country has been directed to the following questions:
I. Is the foreign law a fact, or is it at least to be evidenced as a fact? Or is the court entitled to investigate
it on its own motion? Or is this a duty of the court?
II. Is the application or nonapplication of foreign law
reviewable on appeal?
III. What methods of evidence are admitted?
IV. What effect has the absence of proof of the foreign
law?
The debates have been so comprehensive that little can
be added. The third question concerns exclusively, the
others greatly, the rules of procedure, which are not
here considered. But a summary is advisable with the
accent upon the evolution in court practice and legislation.
Reporting on this topic in the United States and in certain
countries is sometimes anachronistic.

1"1.

I.
I.

JuDICIAL NoTICE OF FoREIGN LAw

Mere Party Evidence

(a) Foreign Law is a fact. At common law the treatment of foreign law has been connected with the idea that
only domestic law is law, hence foreign law must be proved
1 NussBAUM, "Proof of Foreign Law," so Yale L.J. ( 1941) 1018; I d.,
Grundziige des internationalen Privatrechts (1952) 235; RUDOLF B.
ScHLESINGER, Comparative Law Cases and Materials ( 1950) 32-139.
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as a fact. 2 A party basing a claim or defense on a foreign
rule must plead and prove it as "any other fact," that is,
in the same manner and time; as such, it goes to the jury,
if there is any in the case. Thus taught, following older
Continental authors, Story, 3 and his disciple Foelix in
France,' as well as Calvo in internationallaw. 5 On paper,
this doctrine remains the accepted dogma in the British and
most American jurisdictions and sometimes abroad. 6
The British aloofness from "foreign law" has gone so
far that English executors have been held justified in ignoring Scotch law when distributing inheritance assets to the
wrong beneficiary. 7 And the Restatement asserts that if
the court disbelieves the evidence offered by a party, it
cannot resort to evidence refuting the allegation. 8
However, this belief has been thoroughly shaken. Many
writers practically everywhere have protested. Compromises have been sought in various forms, as when it is said
that foreign law is to be regarded on one side as fact and
on the other side as law. Some scholars and courts have
resorted to the theory of "material" or "formal reception"
or the "local law theory" whereby the foreign law is deemed
2
DICEY (ed. 6) S66, rule 194; 3 BEALE 1664 §62J.J; STUMBERG (ed. 2)
176; on the old cases see NuSSBAUM, Grundziige 246.
3 LESSON A, Rev. Droit Int. (Bruxelles) 1905, 547·
4 STORY § 637; FOELIX § IS.
5 CALVO, 2 D. Int. § S86.
6
United States: see 67 L.R.A. 33; GooDRICH § S3; NussBAUM, so Yale L.J.
lOIS.
France: e.g., BATIFFOL, Traite 352 § 332.
Spain: long series of decisions from 18So to 1926, see YANGUAS 308; T.S.
(Dec. 4, 1935) Clunet 1936, 671.
Chile: C.C. art. 13 and note of VELEZ SARSFIELD; Trib. Sup. (Nov. 12,
1926), 24 Rev. Der. I 289; ALBONICO 152.
Colombia: RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 232 § 1923 seem to refer to the common
view, criticizing it.
7
Re Hellmann's Will ( 1S66) L.R. 2 Eq. 363.
8
Restatement § 621 comment b; contra NussBAUM, Grundziige 244 n. 40.
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incorporated into the law of the forum; 9 these immediately
come to the directly opposed result that foreign law is
within the rule jura novit curia. 10 But we know that foreign
law applies not by reception but "as such and because
such." 11
Italian and Dutch courts have largely abandoned the old
conception. 12 In the United States, the axiom has been condemned by such scholars as Thayer and Wigmore; 13 the
difficult transition may be gathered from the thoughtful
argument with which the Supreme Court of New Hampshire overruled its former adherence to the fact theory:
" ... But as grave and serious doubts of the propriety of
the treatment of foreign law as an ordinary question of
fact have presented themselves, the rule has been reexamined and consideration given its standing. Its logical
support and its practical merits are so open to objection
and inviting to criticism that the rule of stare decisis is
not strong enough to close the door to the consideration .
. . . Conceding that foreign law is a matter of fact, yet it
also is law in every true sense ... it is a fact as domestic
law is." 14
In the end, the court found that judicial notice must be
taken.
The Commissioners of Uniform state laws have drafted
9 Supra Vol. I, p. 6z f.; see most recently YNTEMA, Festschrift fiir Rabel
( 1954) 535 f. against W. W. CooK's local law theory.
10
Trib. Milano (June ro, 1949) Foro Padovano 1949 I 676.
11
CERETI, 14 Riv. Dir. Proc. (1936) II roo, 107 n. r: "non come recetticio
rna come tale e perche tale."
12
Italy formerly: Cass., (May 13, 1937) 7 Giur. Comp. D.I.P. z8r; (July 9,
1941) ro Riv. Dir. Proc. 135 with many precedents. MoNACO, L'efficacia 87
in 195Z considers this still as the dominant practice; but see infra n. 33·
Netherlands: formerly H.R. (April zr, 1876) W. 3989; now: infra n. 31.
13
THAYER, "Judicial Notice and the Law of Evidence," 3 Harv. L. Rev.
( 1890) z85; id. "Law and Fact in Jury Trials," 4 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1891) 17Z;
WIGMORE, ro System of Evidence ( ed. 3, 1940) SZ9; GooDRICH zzz: both
the fact theory and the submission to the jury "does not evoke admiration."
14
Allen, J. in Saloshin v. Houle (1931) 85 N.H. 126, 155 At!. 47; of
course, the court could have gone to the logical end, Note, 30 Mich. L. Rev.
( 193Z) 753 f.

476

APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW

their law on judicial notice "to correct two outworn rules
of the common law," namely, that the law of a sister state
is a fact and the decision is for the jury, an "inheritance
from the insular common law of England of two centuries
ago" when all foreign countries spoke foreign languages
and had alien systems. ~ 5
(b) Like a fact. Under the leadership of such writers
as Fiore and Diena, continental doctrine has abandoned
the "fact" cliche, but retained its main practical results
with a changed justification. The maxim, jura novit curia,
is considered inconvenient for application. It is inappropriate to a law not promulgated in the forum and therefore
difficult to know. Foreign law exceeds the ordinary range
of knowledge expected of the judiciary. As it was said,
long ago, in England:
"With foreign laws an English judge cannot be familiar;
there are many of which he must be totally ignorant; there
is in every case of foreign law an absence of all the accumulated knowledge and ready association which assist him
in the consideration of what is the English law ... " 16
Hence, the party must plead and prove the foreign rules
on which he bases his contention. This opinion has been
adopted throughout the world and now governs in most
countries. 17
15

9 U.L.A. (19SI) 399·

Nelson v. Bridport ( 184s) 8 Beav. S271 S34, so Eng. Rep. 207, 210.
In addition to the citations above n. 6 :
United States: Cuba Railroad Co. v. Crosby (1912) 222 U.S. 473; IS C.J.S.
840 n. 67 (speaking of avoiding the danger that the "hospitality'' of the
courts be stressed) •
Belgium: POULLET §§ 336 f.
France: Cass. req. (Oct. 31, 1923) Revue 1934, 140; Cass. civ. (May 2S,
1948) S. 1949·•· 21, Rev. Crit. 1950, 663; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6)
232 § 212.
Greece: see the reports by TENEKIDES, Clunet 1932, 589, S93 ; FRAGISTAS,
10 z. ausl. PR. ( 1936) S35; MARIDAKIS, I PIL. § 22; GOFAS, 6 Rev. Hell.
( 1953) 7816
1
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Numerous writers, it is true, have found this combination of assumptions trying. If foreign law is law, some
conclude that it must be treated like domestic law. Others
revert to the characterization as fact, because the party
has the burden of proof-non sequitur-or because the
court has to take the ready-made law from the foreign
source instead of examining its logical and social background.18 But again, the latter argument is open to doubt.
Neither is a judge in any country entirely free to create
municipal law, nor is he bound to receive the presentation
of foreign rules like an automaton. There are certainly
degrees of freedom in the two situations, but the origin of
the doctrine has caused an exaggerated emphasis on dependence on the foreign sources.
However, there is no doubt that the present doctrine is
based on real or fancied convenience. So much as possible,
the judge should be spared research in systems alien to
him and the hazards of decision. Even so, in dealing with
foreign law, he cannot be dispensed from the typical judicial
operations which are not applicable in examining facts.
Thus, it is plainly settled that the court has the right
and duty to weigh the evidence offered by the parties in its
Italy: former prevailing opinion, supported in C. Proc. Civ. art. 294;
Cass. (May 23, I930) Rivista I93I, 90, Foro Ita!. I930.1.968; (Dec. I, I930)
Clunet I93I, 76o; (July 8, I931) Giur. Ita!. I932 I I, 74I, Rivista I93I,
28o; (March 9, 1935) Rivista I935, 405; (Dec. 19, I933) Revue crit. 1935,
360; (Jan. 29, 1936) ib. 1936, 290 j see UDINA, Rev. crit. I935, 359 j PERASSI,
Lezioni 8; MoRELLI, Elementi DIP. ( I946) I6.
Portugal: C. Proc. Civ. art. 52 I.
Spain: Trib. Sup. (May 28, I88o); id. (Nov. 7, 1896); id. (Nov. IS,
1898) j 0RUE 492.
Argentina: C.C. art. I3j I ALCORTA II9, 137 f. cf., 3 Z. ausl. PR. (I929)
594i Cam. Cio. (July 7, I952) J.A. 1953, 5212.
Brazil: C. Proc. Civ. art. 212 and the writers on procedural law; Sup.
Ct. (Nov. 12, 1926) 24 Rev. Der. I 289, but see infra n. 30.
Costa Rica: C. C. art. u.
Guatemala: Law on Jurisdiction (1936) art. XXVI.
Nicaragua: C. C. art. VII.
18 BATIFFOL, Traite 352 § 332.
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judicial capacity, not as a trier of fact. 19 Although the
German supreme court goes farther than other courts in
reserving a place for its own research, its practice should
be followed, holding that the judge in construing a foreign
contract-where no formal canons of interpretation interfere-is not bound to foreign interpretations. 20
Most manifestly, the legal nature of the task is recognized in 'common law jurisdictions by transferring the
decision from the jury to the court, 21 as concerns the law
of a foreign country. 22
Judicial notice is taken, of course, of treaties to which
the state of the forum is a party, provided that these are
applied as domestic law. 23
2.

Discretionary Right of the Court to Investigate

In Brazil, article 14 (Int. C.C.), permits the judge to
require a party to prove the text and validity of an enactment which he pleads. This is a partial legislative acceptance of a faculty which is either conceded as an enlargement
of the court's power beyond passive waiting for the party
evidence 24 or borrowed from the principle of judicial
England: CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 130.
United States: I BEALE§ 54; 3 id. § 682.
France: Cass. req. (July 29, 1929) D.H. 1929, 457, Clunet 1930, 68o.
Spain: Trib. Sup. (July 12, 1904).
20
RG. (Nov. 14, 1929) Jur. Woch. 1930, I8SS· I.
21
England: J udic. ( Consol.) Act, 192 s, sec. 102; Lazard Broth. & Co. v.
Midland Bank [1933] A.C. 289, 298.
United States: Note, 30 Mich. L. Rev. (1932) 749; Uniform Jud. Not.
of For. L. Act, § 3·
New York: C. Civ. Prac. § 344 a, B.
22
United States: Uniform Act, cited, § s; Leary v. Gledhill (1951) 8
N.J. 260, 84 At!. (2d) 725.
23 Argentina: C. C. art. 13.
Germany: RG. (Feb. 25, 1904) 57 RGZ. 142: The Bern Railway Convention is irrevisible when offered as Austrian law; cf., MELCHIOR § 292.
Nicaragua: C. C. art. VII and other codes.
Spain: CASTILLO, 4 Rev. Espan. D. Int. ( 1951) 409, 447·
24
Thus also in France: Cour Paris (March 14, 1952) Rev. Crit. 1952,
325; BATIFFOL, note ibid. understands that even judicial notice is taken.
19
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notice. 25 This right may also directly follow from the
modern conception that the court is responsible for the
course of the proceedings and has to advise the parties of
failures to complete their activity. 26
The American Uniform Act expressly states:
§ 2. The court may inform itself of such law in such
manner as it may deem proper, and the court may call
upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such information.
What is here in discussion, is a mere right of the court
which is not reviewable on appeal. There is a difference
according as theories unfavorable or favorable to judicial
notice of foreign law are taken as a starting-point. The
New York rule, as well as the provision of the Uniform
Act and similar statutes, has been commonly construed to
the effect that the court would only act when a party has
pleaded the foreign law. The statute, it has been held,
removes the necessity of proof but not that of pleading, or,
at least, of drawing the attention of the court to the foreign
rule. 27
On the basis of the broadly drafted New York statute
of 1943, which literally would allow any spontaneous research by the court, thus far the Court of Appeals has only
once disapproved this position. 28 This decision still leaves

25

Italy: Cass. (May 12, 1937) 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 281; (March 28, 1938)

ib. 327·
Netherlands: H.R. (June 28, 1937) W. 1938 No. 1.
German C. Civ. Proc. § 137, as generally interpreted; ib. § 293 (infra
n. 3) had originally just this meeting.
21
E.g., Strout v. Burgess {Me. 1949) 68 Atl. (2d) 241, 12 A.L.R. (2d)
939; Scott v. Scott ( 1951) 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W. (2d) 627, 23 A.L.R. (2d)
1431; Bergman v. Lax (1951) 107 N.Y.S. (2d) 266; Allen v. Saccomanno
(Wash. 1952) 242 P. (2d) 747·
28
Plleuger v. Plleuger ( 1952) 304 N.Y. 148, 106 N.E. (2d) 495; on the
recent New York practice, see NussBAUM, "Proving the Law of Foreign
Countries," 3 Am. J. Comp. L. ( 1954) 6o.
26
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intervention to the discretion of the judge, 29 but it ruled
that any court of original jurisdiction can cure the failure
of the party to specify the foreign rule relied upon by taking
notice ex officio. Moreover, the court stated that the discretion of the court ought to be exercised with respect to
the statute of a sister state.
If this stage is reached, it is more certain than before
that judges may use their private knowledge in evaluating
party evidence. It is not probable, however, in this connection that a court may, on its own motion, introduce a
foreign law that was not pleaded into the suit otherwise
than by questioning the parties.
3. Duty to Take Judicial Notice
Is there a duty of the court to insert into the procedural
matter (a) the question of the applicable law, (b) the
materials to solve this question, (c) the solution of this
question? So far no provision seems to have stated an
absolute duty of this kind. The duty in question is always
tempered by some measure of discretion, obliging judges
to make appropriate efforts rather than to achieve results.
However, such a provision definitively changes judicial
passivity into active responsibility.
Common law procedure has not encouraged such enterprise. Central European judges could be charged with
more linguistic aptitude and familiarity with the basic
Romanistic ideas of the surrounding countries. The greatest influence, however, has come from the writers who
since Savigny infer from the position of the national laws
vithin the international community the dignity of a true
29 The Appellate Division states that it may, according to its discretion,
!ake judicial notice of the law of a sister state or a foreign country, or
m the absence of actual proof indulge in presumptions of similarity. In re
McDougald's Est. (1947) 27'1. App. Div. 176, 70 N.Y.S. (2d) 200.
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law of conflicts and the equality of the laws before the
judge. 30
The German Code of Civil Procedure provides :
The law in force in a foreign country, the customary
law and the local enactments need proof only insofar as
they are unknown to the court. In ascertaining such law
the court is not limited to the evidence adduced by the
parties; it is entitled to use other sources of knowledge
and to issue orders for providing what is necessary to such
use. 31
While the New York statute has been construed narrowly as an effect of judicial prerogative, the German provision, which verbally expresses just this conception, is
recognized as establishing a formal duty. 32 The court finds
ex officio what law is applicable to the case and, if it knows
its content, has to apply it; otherwise it must ask the
parties to supply information.
A number of other countries have joined this group;
in particular, as mentioned before, Italy and the Nether30 E.g., United States: HARTWIG, "Construction and Enactment of Uniform
Judicial Notice," 40 Mich. L. Rev. (I940) I74 advocates a federal provision
on taking judicial notice.
France: WEISS, 4 Traite ..• ; PILLET, Principes 84.
Germany: common opinion from I ZITELMANN 287 f.
Greece: STREIT-VALLINDAS § I4 j MARIDAKIS D.I.P. § 22 and many others.
Italy: FEDOZZI 442 f.; MoRELLI, Lezioni (ed. 2, I943) 46 §IS (more
determined than in D. Proc. Civ. Int. ( I938) 54 f.)
Spain: YANGUAS MESSIA, I D.I.P. 303.
Argentina: A. ALCORTA.
Brazil: 2 MACHADO VILLELA 256 j BALMACEDA CARDOSO I79; Institute of
International Law, II Annuaire ( I892) 330.
Colombia: CAICEDO CASTILLA I3S ff.
81 ZPO. § 293·
82
RG. (March 23, I897) 39 RGZ. 37I, 376; (June I8, I900) Jur. Woch.
I900, sSs; (Nov. II, I9II) Jur. Woch. I9I2, I96; (Oct. 24, I9I2) So RGZ.
262; (Nov. s, I928) Jur. Woch. I929, I434; and constantly. MELCHIOR 4ZI
§ 284 j NUSSBAUM 96.
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lands have veered to the principle of taking judicial notice.
The Latin-American treaties have adopted it. 34
In the United States, the Uniform Act and the New York
35
statute are formulated in agreement with this doctrine,
although the courts hesitate to give it full effect. The clearest expression is found in the Massachusetts statute:
The courts shall take judicial notice of the law of the
United States or of any state, territory or dependency
thereof or of a foreign country whenever the same shall
be material. 36
This sounds imperative, and foreign countries are included.
Under this approach, there is no burden of proof nor of
pleading. 37 The party has an interest to aid in procuring
the means of persuasion, and in practice the party takes the
33 Austria: ZPO. § 273; OGH. GlU No. 394, 2473, 65u, etc.; WALKER
244; WAHLE, Schweiz. Jur. Zeit. I932, I88.
Greece: isolated decisions: Trib. civ. Rhodos ( I948 and I949) s Rev. Hell.
(I95I) ZZI; Trib. civ. Athens No. zz6o/I95I, 6 Rev. Hell. (I952) 77, note

GoFAS.

Hungary: C.C. Proc. of June 6, I952, §zoo, I9 Z. ausl. PR. (I954) I50·
Italy: Cass. (June z8, I940) Rivista I942, 242, 8 Giur. Comp. D.I.P. 232;
(July 3I, I94I) Foro Ita!. I942 I 9, IO Giur. Comp. D.I.P. 73; (Aug. I2,
I946) Foro Padovano I947 I 285 (including foreign conflicts law); DE
NovA, Rev. Crit. I95I, I74·
Netherlands: foreign law is law: H.R. (June 4, I9I5) W. 987I; (March zo,
I93I) W. 12287, N.J. I93I, 89o; to state ex officio; Rb. Rotterdam (Jan. 9,
I9I8) W. I0355i Rb. Amsterdam (March 9, I9I8) W. II593, N.J. I925,
86I; VAN BRAKEL 48 § 27.
Switzerland: to the partial effect that the courts determine ex officio
whether foreign or Swiss law applies. BG. (Nov. 3, I900) 26 BGE. II 719;
(Nov. 24, I933) 6o BGE. II 433; (May I6, I95o) 76 BGE. III 6o.
ScHNITZER I72. But cantonal restrictions of judicial inquiry are maintained
by the Federal Tribunal, as NIEDERER, Allg. Lehren 346 notes.
Hungary: DE MAGYARY, Clunet I924, 590, 600.
Poland: IPL. art. 39 par. I.
Chile: Sup. Trib., I5 Rev. Der. I 253; I6 ib. II 7o; 25 ib. I 544;
ALBONICO I5.
Soviet Ukraine; C. Proc. Civ. art. 8; MAKAROV, Precis Ioo.
34 Treaty of Montevideo, art. z and Prot. Add.
C6digo Bustamante, art. 408-410.
35
9 U.L.A. 399 ff. sec. I; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act§ 344a, A.
36
Mass. Stat. I926 c. 168; Ann. L. 195I, c.233 § 70; but see Note 32 Mass.
L,Q, ( 1947) 20 j SCHLESINGER supra n. I,
37
RG. (June 2, 19I8) Warn Rspr. I918 No. I47·
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initiative. The system tends rather to cooperation than to
revolutionary intervention of judges.
For the American federal courts, the rule has been that
they should take judicial notice of federal law and all
state laws. 38 Consequently, in diverse citizenship cases,
they are not limited to the state laws of which the state
takes judicial notice. 39
In matters of "voluntary jurisdiction" (noncontentious
judicial decisions), unlimited judicial responsibility for application of the competent law is prescribed in Germany. 40
Where administrative authorities decide, they require everywhere full evidence by the petitioner.
Also within this group, the statutes and their interpretation are at variance in defining the intensity of purpose.
The German Reichsgericht insists that the court is charged
with the duty of examination, even though counsel present
concordant statements on the foreign law, 41 but this is
rarely observed anywhere. Great influence must be accorded
to the procedural law of the court. Where, for instance,
the rules of procedure require the plaintiff to indicate not
only his cause of action in terms of fact but also the legal
rule on which he relies, judicial initiative is somewhat restricted.42 The nature of the individual case and of the
foreign law involved has varying significance. For understandable reasons, many courts are reluctant to use their
power of examination, especially when the attorneys are
38 Restatement § 324. Cf., Australia: State and Territorial Laws and
Records Recognition Act I90I-I950.
39
Thus since the Erie RR. v. Tompkins case, GooDRICH 234 n. 27; Waggeman v. Gen. Fin. Co. of Philadelphia (I940) II6 F. (2d) 254.
40
SCHLEGELBERGER, I Kommentar zum Gesetz iiber freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit (ed. 4) §27 n. 26; MELCHIOR 422 n. 4; KG. (June 24, I937) Jur.
Woch. I937, 2827 over-ruling its former decisions; LG. Saarbriicken (Oct. 20,
I949) IPRspr. I945-49, No. I.
41 See infra, IV.
42
Colombia: RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 238 § I950.

484

APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW

negligent. On the other hand, it is wrong to speak of a
danger in the administration of justice when a judge invokes
a foreign law ignored by the parties. Surprise, of course,
must be avoided by a party in relation to the adverse party,
as the New York statute realizes, and quite equally by
the court in relation to both parties; they must be timely
invited to take position. That even the broadest mandate
to the court can result only in a restricted response when
libraries, experience, and funds for consultation are deficient, is too trite a truth not to be borne in mind by all
legislators.
4· Sources of Foreign Law
There are no more lawyers, we hope, who believe that
any foreign code exhausts the legal system of the country.
Decisions must be explored also for civil law countries. 43
Contrary to former errors, 44 again, a foreign rule is given
the construction adopted by the foreign courts, even though
the same text, derived from the same model or borrowed
from the forum, may be construed differently by the court
itsel£.4 5 This is by no means a limitation on the creative
intelligence of a judge; he acts simply as the foreign judge
supposedly would do; American judges are very familiar
with this operation.
43 Permanent Court of Int. Justice (July u, I929) Publications, Ser. A
No. 2o/2I.
England: Lazard Broth. v. Midland Bank [I933] supra n. 2I.
France: Cass. req. (Nov. IS, I924) Gaz. Pal. I92S.I.ISO.
Germany: RG. (March 12, I906) Jur. Woch. I906, 297.
Italy: Cass. (Dec. I9, I933) Revue crit. I93S, 360.
Anglo-German T.A.M. The Thames & Mersey v. Allianz, 8 Recueil Trib.
Arb. Mixtes 68.
44 See NussBAUM 99 n. 2; id., Grundziige 234.
45
United States: Los Angeles Inv. Sec. Corp. v. Joslyn (I939) 12 N.Y.S.
(2d) 370, 379·
France: Ap. Douai (March & May 7, 190I) Clunet 1901, I8o.
Germany: RG. (March 12, 1906} Jur. Woch. 1906, 297.
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One should not, however, forget the literature, at least
as represented by the leading handbooks. Case law as well
as statutes may lead foreign observers to strange conclusions.
Some writers hold that an American statute may be subjected in a foreign court to judicial review of its constitutionality as might occur at home. 46 This is a queer contention.
Not only would such a supervision be delicate, 47 but it is
totally unfounded. It would be tantamount to anticipating
the overruling of a decision of a foreign supreme court
which, in a system of stare decisis, binds the lower courts.
II.
1.

REVIEW ON APPEAL

48

Review of Conflicts Law

(a) No review. If foreign law is earnestly considered
to be a fact "like other facts," review is excluded where
new facts are barred in appellate courts and where review
is barred on questions of fact. 49 Not even an error in applying Spanish conflicts law has been held reviewable by the
Spanish supreme court. 50
An impediment of another kind exists in English and
American procedure, where the all important evidence by
expert witnesses on foreign law can only be offered to a
trial court. However, the upper court has various opportunities of evaluation and reversal, and statutory innovations
46

NIBOYET, 3 Traite §§ 970 f.; MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III 966.
PONTES DE MIRANDA, I Trat. (I93S) 365 § 7; BATIFFOL, Traite 355 § 334·
4 8 LEWALD, "Le control des cours supremes sur )'application des lois
etrangeres," 57 Recueil ( I936 III) 205; id., "Kollisionsfrage und revisio in
jure," in Basler Studien zur Rechtswissenschaft, Heft IS (Basel I942) 205;
RIEZLER, Internat. Zivilprozessrecht soo ff.
4 9 Spain: Trib. Sup. (Nov. 19, 1904).
Colombia: RESTREPO HERNANDEZ § 1968.
110
Spain: Trib. Sup. (June 7, 1875) despite art. I6o2 Cod. de Enjuiciamento;
likewise as to decisions of the Direcci6n dos Registros (Dec. 26, r 89 r).
47
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have permitted appellate courts to take judicial notice. 51
The principal question, in the general opinion, concerns
supervision by the highest tribunal.
(b) Review of written conflicts law. The French Court
of Cassation, following its charter of I796, reviews judicial
errors only in the application of "la loi," the written legal
rules. 52 Hence, all the conflicts rules, ingeniously developed
on the scanty ground of article 3 of the Code Civil, would
fall outside the scope of revision. This limitation was observed for a long time and is still respected in Belgium and
the Netherlands. 53 The French Court, however, usually
circumvents the obstacle by citing article 3 or some substantive code provision as violated, and thereby virtually
has passed into the following group. 54
(c) Violation of conflicts law. The system reached by
the French highest court is that most used in civil law
countries. In Germany it was predicated by Waechter in
I 84 I and adopted by the Commercial Court of Appeals
in I 8 7 5. 55 The list of the jurisdictions in the note 56 is not
exhaustive.
1

E.g., New York, Civ. Prac. Act, sec. 244 a, D.
Decree of Nov. 27, I790.
Belgium: Cass. (Feb. 2I, I907) and (March I9, I93I) Clunet I93I,
735 and constant practice; POULLET § 339; Cass. (March 26, I9S3) Clunet
5

52
53

I9S4. 42I.

Netherlands: H.R. (June 2, I937) W. I938 No. I; (Jan. 8, I943) W.
I943, No. 202; KosTERS 125, constant practice. GARDE CASTILLO, "Los problemas
del recurso de casacion en D.I.P.," 4 Rev. esp. D. Int. ( 1951) 409, 453, 447,
and RESTREPO HERNANDEZ § 1977 advocate the same principle for Spain and
Colombia respectively.
54
France: Cass. civ. (April 13, 1932) D. I932.I.89, S. 1932.1.36I; Cass.
req. (March 15, I933) S. I934.1.393; Cass. Civ. (March 22, I944) D.C. I944
J. I66; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) § 212.
55
WACHTER, 21 Arch. Civ. Prax. (184I) 3IO; ROHG. (March 2, I875) 17
ROHGE. 167.
56
Austria: ZPO. § 503; OGH. constant practice, WALKER 244.
Germany: ZPO. §549 par. I; RG. (Oct. 30, I907) 19 Z. int. R. (1909)
838; (June 26, 19I9) Jur. Woch. 1920, 40, SI; (May I3, I929) IPRspr. 1929
No. 3; MELCHIOR 425 §§ 286 f.
Greece: STREIT, Recueil 1927 V 7I.
Italy: Cass. (June 8, I93I) Rivista I93I, 28o; (Aug. 12, I946) Foro
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The effect of this system is to control the application of
the entire set of domestic rules of conflict. The supreme
court watches how "the principle of the connection with
foreign law" 57 operates, without touching the use made
by the lower court of a foreign law. What does this
mean?
The court does examine whether domestic substantive
law ought to apply instead of foreign law, or the latter
instead of the former. The Reichsgericht also usually
criticizes a judgment not precisely stating which law applies,
even though the end result seems to be the same whatever
contact of the case is held decisive. 58
Whether, however, the subordinate court erred in admitting the existence or nonexistence of a specific foreign
rule, be it substantive or conflictual, is not reviewed. The
question has arisen whether an exception should be made
when the application of the domestic law depends on renvoi
from a foreign conflicts rule. The German court answers
in the affirmative. 59 In a 1932 case, an American couple
had married in Chicago, established their first domicil in
St. Louis, and later transferred their residence to Hamburg,
where the husband sued for divorce. The proceedings
Padovano 1947 I 2S5; MoRELLI, Lezioni § rS; DE NovA, Rev. crit. 1951, 170.

Cf., infra n. 70.
Netherlands: expressly excluding review of foreign law: H.R. (June 22,
192S) W. 11S57, N.J. 192S, 14S6; (May 29, 1933) W. u661, N.J. 1934,
529; (June 26, 1937) W. 93S No. r; (April IZ, 1942) W. 1942 No. 4S;
VAN DER FLIER, Clunet 1936, 116.
Rumania: Cass. (March 21, 1932) Revue 1935. s6; PLASTARA, 7 Repert.,
Roumanie No. 139.
Spain: ORUE, Manual § 363; but contra GARDE CASTILLO (supra n. 51).
Switzerland: BG. (Feb. IS, 1910) 36 BGE. II 35; (March 17, 1926) 52
BGE. II 97·
Chile: divided authority; to the effect described above Trib. Sup. (Sept. 7,
1923) Rev. Der. 1923.1·39S; ALBONICO, esp. p. 22 and n. 47, against others.
Colombia: 2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ§ 1974•
57 LERI!BOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 23 I § 211.
58
RG. from (Oct. 30, 1907) 19 Z. int. R. 33S constant practice, MELCHIOR
§ 2S3; (July 7, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, No. 15, Revue crit. 1935, 447, Clunet
1935. 1190.
59
55 RGZ. 24S; 59 id. z6; 7S id. 234; 91 id. 41; (June 2, 1932) 136
RGZ. 361; (July 7, 1934) supra n. 56; RAAPE, Komm. 47; id. D.I.P.R.
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turned on the question of renvoi effect which should be
ascribed to American conflicts law on the law governing
divorce of American spouses domiciled in Germany. The
Reichsgericht explained that here the content of the American law is only an incident to the problem whether German
divorce law is applicable. From the formulation in the
decided cases, it has been concluded that this exception is
not allowed when the reference goes to a third law. 80 But
since not only the substantive law of the forum but
also its conflicts law is controlled, this limitation is unfounded.
Switzerland accepts the same exception; 61 other countries
reject it, 62 doubtless contrary to the purpose of conflicts law.
Analogous exceptional appraisal of foreign laws has been
justly urged in certain other situations. 5 3
(d) Indirect review of foreign law. Strangely enough,
in the same breath in which foreign law is branded as an
intolerable burden on appellate courts, "indirect," irregular
control is admitted in France 64 as well as in Germany, 65
while the highest court of the Netherlands allows review
in cases of public policy, 66 probably everywhere an official
concern. The particulars are of slight interest, except
that the breach of allegedly necessary restrictions in the
oo LEWALD, Recueil 1936 III 255.
Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 27, 1918) 44 BGE. II 453·
62 Belgium: Cass. (March 9, 1882) Pas. Belg. 188z.1.6z.
France: Cass. civ. (March 7, 1938) Revue crit. 1938, 47z; for many other
cases see MAURY, Recueil 1936 III 405.
Netherlands: H.R. (Jan. 8, 1943) W. 1943 no. 2oz; VAN PRAAG, Rechterliche
Organisatie 583, 907; VAN BRAKEL 50-5:1 § 30.
63 DoLLE, "Betrachtungen zum ausliindischen, internationalen und interlokalen Privatrecht," Festschrift fiir Leo Raape ( 1948) 149, 153·
64
BATIFFOL 363 § 343 discusses the control of qualifications, notably in the
matter of registration and (§ 344) the "controle des motifs" and the theory
of "denaturation."
65
MELCHIOR 432 § Z95, cf., 513 f. § 373•
66
H.R. (March 13, 1936) W. z8o, z81; (April z8, 1939) W. 895; VAN
BRAKEL SO n. 3•
61
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leading countries demonstrates the shortcomings of the
principle.
2.

Review of Foreign Law

In the doctrine just described, the ultimate review refrains from any opinion on the correctness of lower court
findings on what the foreign law is. The Swiss Federal
Tribunal, which at the same time must abstain from cantonal
law, has been forced to set up an entire jurisdictional system, full of hedges. 67
Authors of many nations are dissatisfied with the prevailing usage, 68 which has been abandoned in a number of
jurisdictions, 69 including most I tali an decisions. 70
No equivalent difficulty has ever been felt in common
law courts. In the framework of access permitted to the
highest state courts, no difference is made between domestic
and foreign law. The federal Supreme Court, on appeal
from the federal courts, takes judicial notice of the law of
all American states, and on appeal from a state court "of
67 See the complications in BG. (Sept. zo, I950) 76 BGE. II Z47, Praxis
I950 No. I46, Schw. Jahrb. Int. R. I9SI, 3IO. The Court recalls that even
though Swiss law was applied as foreign law against the construction of the
Federal Tribunal by a Swiss court, review is excluded.
68
See in particular I BAR I43; ZITELMANN z88; I FRANKENSTEIN Z93 and
NEUBECKER 369 (both for the present Jaw); I PONTES DE MIRANDA 369;
GARDE CASTILLO 460; DoLLE, in Festschrift fiir Raape (supra n. 63) I53·
69
Austria: ZPO. § 503; WALKER Z44; POLLACK, z Ziv. Proz. Recht. ( ed. z)
6o8.
Belgium: Cass. (July 4, I949) Pas. I949 I 5z2; (March z6, I953) Clunet
I954. 421.
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia: see LEWALD, Recueil 8936 III 288.
Finland: Int. Family L. § 56.
Greece: divided authority; see MARIDAKIS, P.I.L. 276.
Portugal: Trib. Sup. (Feb. 4, 1918) cited by MACHADO VILLELA, 2 Trat.
D.I.P. ( I9ZZ) 264.
Siam: P.I.L. art. 8.
Soviet Russia: MAKAROV, Precis 103; MAURACH, 47 Z. int. R. ( I932) I9.
70
Italy: Cass. Roma (Nov. 10, 1917) Giur. Ita!. I918 I I, z4; Cass.
(July 8, I931) Rivista I93I, 28o (with history); (Dec. 29, 1937) Foro Ita!.
I938 II I58, I2 Rivista I938, 289; (June 12, I938) 7 Giur. Comp. D.I.P. :J3I;
(Aug. 12, I946) Foro Padovano 1947 I 285, 22 Giur. Cass. Sez. Civ. I946
II 6r9; DE NovA, Rev. crit. 195I, 170.
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all law of which the state court takes judicial notice." 71
Theoretically, not a shred of an argument can be made
for the exclusion of foreign law from review. The authors
justly regard the assimilation of foreign and domestic law
in the courts of appeal as a simple consequence of a true
law of conflicts. The only real issue is procurement of the
means for easy and practical perusal of foreign documentation. On this point, the idea to entrust only the lower
tribunals with the final decision on the entire law of the
world has been rightly ridiculed.
III.

METHODS OF PROOF

Since the Sussex Peerage Case of I 844, 72 it has become
the English rule that foreign law is proved by expert witnesses.73 The particulars constitute a complicated network,
especially in the United States. 74 Statutes and decisions are
normally offered but commented upon by experts. The
usual American rule calls for such documents or experts
or both. 75 Also the English Court of Appeal does not
require the latter without exception; if statutes are presented and sufficient experts are not available, the court
must "apply its own mind." 76 American practice is "more
liberal" 77 also in other respects, and the New York legislation has perfected development by allowing the courts to
"consider any testimony, document, information or argu71

RESTATEMENT § 625, comment a.
SoMMERICH AND BuscH, "The Expert Witness and the Proof of Foreign
Law," 38 Corn. L.Q. (1951) 125; MELCHIOR 431.
73 7 WIGMORE, Evidence § 209oa.
74
See 2 WIGMORE, Evidence §§ 566, 664; 3 id. § 690 and §§ 1217, 1697.
1953·
75 Where nevertheless the evidence of an English rule left doubt, the
ascertainment was left to the jury; Electric Welding Co. v. Prince ( 1909)
200 Mass. 386, 86 N.E. 947·
76
Rouger Guillet & Cie. v. Rouger Guillet & Co. Ltd. [1948] 1949 All
E.R. 244; Clunet 1950, 642.
77
2 WIGMORE § 664.
72
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ment on the subject." 78 A recent English statute on a
special matter is similarly broad. 79
Although in Continental procedure all means of evidence
allowed by the court are admitted, 80 proposals to alleviate
the perplexity concerning foreign law that often exists,
have been devised in literature, congresses, and some
treaties; it is recommended that information be made available by diplomatic correspondence, authentic opinion of
foreign courts, or domestic or foreign Justice Departments.81 In fact, most courts and administrative agencies
for good reasons refuse to give advice. What comes forth
through consulates is frequently of no use. All available
and reliable channels of information are certainly worth
cultivating. Experience, however, shows the pitfalls in
the testimony of witnesses unilaterally appointed by one
party, and those not infrequently occurring in official communications concerning particular litigious points. 82 Judges,
parties, and experts must fully cooperate. But it is not
least in the interest of a trustworthy source of information
for the courts that I have not ceased to demand the creation
of fully adapted independent research institutes for foreign
and international private law. Where they do exist, in
very few cases will the search end in the vacuum presently
to be discussed.
78 Civ. Prac. Act§ 344a-C.
79 Foreign Compensation Act 1950, 14 Geo. VI c. 12, rule 4, see Int. L.Q.
1951, 361, 364.
80 E.g., Argentina: Cam. Fed. Ia, Jur. Arg. 1944 IV 2II, 8 Rev. Arg. Der.
Int. (1945) 378.
81 For an admirable report on the entire question see HARRY LEROY }ONES,
"International Judicial Assistance, Procedural Chaos and a Program for
Reform," 62 Yale, L.J. (1953) 515-562.
82 Example: the Kammergericht of Berlin (June 24, 1937) Jur. Woch.
1937, 2827. H.R.R. 1937, 1376, had to refute with the help of the Kaiser
Wilhelm Institute for Foreign and Internat. Priv. Law official documents
issued by a probate court in New Jersey, which asserted that the N.J.
statute of March 17, 1926, concerning intestate succession by a surviving
spouse. referred also to foreign immovables. The statute, of course, laid
down mternal and not conflicts law.
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It is the scientific approach that is generally missing,
supplanted by a mechanical routine operation. If Lord
Dennan in the Sussex Peerage Case and Coleridge in Baron
de Bode's Case are still rigorously followed and the court
is admonished not to construe the foreign code but "make
the best of the witnesses," a sterility, long forgotten in other
legal operations, is prescribed. Words neither of statutes
nor of decisions are a gospel. Foreign law is not a fact.
Its spirit and appraisal of values and interests must decide.
IV.
1.

ABSENCE OF PROOF

Rejection of the Claim

Taking conflicts law seriously and having determined in
a particular case that a foreign law governs a claim or a
defense, a court may feel impelled by logical considerations
to hold that the issue depends exclusively on the commands
of that law. Nothing entitles a judge to exchange the
governing law against any other. If then the contents
of the foreign law cannot be ascertained, eminent authority
believes it to be unavoidable that the claim or defense
should fail. 88
Thus, Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for the Supreme
Court of the United States, held in Cuba Railroad Co. v.
Crosby 84 that Cuban law concerning the liability of employers for accidental injury of the employees not having
been evidenced, the suit was to be dismissed. Against the
objection that this involved a hardship on the plaintiff
he stated: "The only just ground for complaint would be
88
I ZITELMANN 289, 293 ; NIEMEYER, Vorschliige 77; HELLWIG, 1 Zivilproz.
R. 577; ANZILOTTI, Rivista 1906, 271; MORELLI, D. Proc. Civ. Int. ( 1938)
SO ff.; DE NOVA, Rev. crit. 1951, 125 n. 4; BALMACEDA CARDOSO 186; RESTREPO
HERNANDEZ 237 § 1944 ("just and logical," citing MACHADO VILLELA).
84
Cuba RR. Co. v. Crosby ( 1912) 222 U.S. 473·
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if rights and liabilities, when enforced by our courts should
be measured by a different rule from that under which the
parties dealt." 85 Similar views have been taken in other
American 86 and foreign cases. 87 Whether the individual
issues justified these results, is a separate question. 88
Nevertheless, as a logical conclusion of general validity,
the proposition is convincing only so long as foreign law is
thought to be an ordinary element of the cause of action.
Uncertainty of an essential fact must be fatal in a law
suit; normally it leads to dismissal not only without prejudice
( ab instantia) but with full force of res judicata.
Foreign law, however, is not a fact. Neither is it entirely
equal to domestic law whose incertitude is not allowed to
prevent a positive holding, because otherwise the court
would commit a denial of justice. Failure to know a foreign
law creates a particular problem, not necessarily subject to
the treatment either of facts or of the municipal law of
the forum.
Indeed, the courts have in most cases found both conceptions unsatisfactory. But expediency has suggested experimental rather than methodical rulings.
2.

Presumptions for Similarity

The great majority of American authorities have resorted to the law of the forum by presuming that the
8 S Jd.,
86

480.
Christie v. Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. (1926) 214 App. Div. zzo, 2JJ
N.Y.S. 143 and cited cases; Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp. ( 1927) 245 N.Y. 152,
156 N.E. 617; Arams v. Arams (1943) 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S. (2d) 251.
87
Germany: ROHG. (April 20) 25 ROHGE. 53; RG. 51 Seuff. A. No. 85
Reichsober. HG. (April 28, 1879) 25 ROHGE. 13, 53·
88
NussBAUM, so Yale L. Jour. at 1042 criticizes the Cuba R.R. decision
because the railroad would certainly have been able to produce evidence of
the Cuban law if it had been favorable.
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foreign law is the same as the law of the court. 89 This
device was also once traditional in Europe 90 but has almost
vanished there.
(a) Common law courts have presumed that the common law of another state is identical with their own. 91 Yet,
whereas European analogous assumptions were less scrupulous, American courts since the Cuba Railroad Case have
become conscious that rules of civil law cannot be submitted
to such identification. 92
(b) The presumption has been extended by special provisions to the statutory law of the forum. 93
(c) German courts, failing to verify American law, have
resorted to English decisions 94 or substituted French law
for that of Belgium or Luxemburg. 95 Such replacements
within a close family of laws are better than to introduce
the municipal law of the court, but advisable only if the
foreign court itself, as in less developed countries, may be
supposed to look to another authoritative system.
89 3 BEALE r68o; rs C.J.S. 847; Peterson v. Chicago Great Western Ry.
Co. (1943) 138 F. (2d) 8o4; the domestic law determines also the burden
of proof, Menard v. Goltra ( 1931) 328 Mo 368., 383, 40 S.W. (2d) ros3,
rosS.
90
Germany: ROHGE. II 39; II 44: VII 61; VIII 12; 1 BAR 133 n. 4, 136f.
Italy: App. Venezia (July 31, 1906) Rivista 1906, 271; (March 8, 1932)
Riv. Italiana (FEDOZZI) 1932, 170. Contra FEnozzr, D.I.P. 482; MORELLI I.e.
91
Restatement §622; 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) (1911) 261; KALES, "Presumption
of Foreign Law," 19 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1906) 40; STORY § 272; WESTLAKE § 3S3;
e.g., Read v. Lehigh Valley R.T. (1940) 284 N.H. 43S, 31 N.E. (2d) 891;
Miller v. Vanderlip (1941) 28s N.Y. 116, 33 N.E. (2d) sr; Smith v. Kent
Oil Co. ( I9S3, Colo.) 261 P. (2d) 149 (no presumption for Colorado
statutory law) ; Associates Discount Corp. v. Main St. Motors Inc. ( 1953)
157 Ohio St. 488, ros N.E. (2d) 878; Michigan law not evidenced, presumed
similar to Ohio law concerning the question whether a chattel mortgage
creates a legal or an equitable title.
2
9 Supra n. So ad 82 and older cases.
93
Long list of cases in 31 C.J.S., Evidence § 133 and Supp. I9S4 also
covering this extension; GoODRICH § 83 n. 31 names four statutes. To the
same effect, the procedural codes of Zurich § roo and of some other Swiss
Cantons.
94
OLG. Hamburg (April 4, 1929) IPRspr. 1929 No. 63.
95
KG. (March 3, 1922) Jur. Woch. 1922, 1122.
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How defectively the use of presumptions works is a
known topic of criticism. Workable where similarity ts
probable, they have been used far beyond this limit. 96
3· Subsidiary Law
(a) Without employing presumptions of similarity or
at least without taking them seriously, the law of the forum
has been applied, sometimes by contending that the parties
tacitly submit to the local law or that the local law is the
only one at the judge's elbow. 97
That lex fori should be an auxiliary source of decision
has also been explained on the theory of a vast function of
the municipal law of the court. 98 It is described as an all
comprehensive, fully potent order, which automatically presents itself when the conflicts law is frustrated. Some present writers assert that foreign law is an exceptional source;
the normal rule is exclusively the domestic law, to which the
court for many reasons resorts. Or the reference to foreign
law is conceived as conditional, one condition being that it
can be proved. 99
Such nostalgic reminiscences of comity ideas and territorialism can be avoided. The law of the forum enters,
if at all, as an emergency substitute rather than as an
96 BIGELOW in STORY (ed. 8) § 853a; VON MOSCHZISKER, "Presumptions as
to Foreign Law," I I Minn. L. Rev. I (I926).
97
See KALES, "Presumption of Foreign Law," I9 Harv. L. Rev. ( I906) 40I;
GooDRICH 234; MORELLI, I D. Proc. Civ. Int. 57§ 36 and cit.
Finland: Int. Fam. L. § 56.
Germany: ROHG. (June 28, I872) 7 ROHGE. I6; I BAR I37j RAAPE,
D.IPR. 82, III.
Greece: MARIDAKIS PIL. 275·
Hungary: Draft I.P.L. § I7.
Poland: I.P.L. art. 39 par. 2.
Portugal: Draft C.C. I9SI, art. S·
Switzerland: BG. (June zo, I9I4) 40 BGE. 480; (Sept. 23, I94I) 67 BGE.
2IS; {June IS, I943) 69 BGE. II 309, 31I.
98
Most efficiently presented by BATIFFOL, Traite 368 ff.
99
FIORE §§ 270, 272 j ROLIN § 520.
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ubiquitous force happily released from its odious chains.
This role is necessitated by the present defective international order. But it is not true that if the foreign law is
not provable the domestic law has a natural vocation to
govern.
(b) Another line has been taken by some European
writers and followed by the German Reichsgericht since
18 85 100 and identically by a Massachusetts decision of
1911. 101 In 1912 Mr. Justice Holmes directed attention to
it by an obiter remark that,
"in dealing with rudimentary contracts or torts made or
committed abroad, such as promises to pay money for goods
or services, or battery of the person or conversion of goods,
courts would assume a liability to exist if nothing to the
contrary appeared." 102
A few remarkable decisions have heeded this suggestion. 103
Some scholars have advocated this approach, because no
one national law in reality is available under the premises. 104
Contra, it has been urged that a law exists and is merely
of unknown content. 105 The leading idea still seems to be
that the law of the forum is employed as representing
fundamental principles of civilized nations.
The vagueness of this idea, however, is illustrated by the
observation that Holmes used conversion as an obvious
example of this kind of jus gentium, while the New York
100
Germany: RG. (Sept. 28, 1885) 16 RGZ. 337; (March 24, 1909) 71
RGZ. 9; (July 11, 1919) 96 RGZ. 230.
101
Parrot v. Mexican Central Railway Co. (1911) 207 Mass. 184, 192, 93
N.E. 590, citing older Mass. decisions (p. 194).
2
1° Cuba R.R. v. Crosby (1912) 222 U.S. 473·
103
Esp. Arams v. Arams, infra n. 104; trial court in Riley v. Pierce Oil
Co., supra n. 85; Crane, J., dissenting vote; trial court in Leary v. Gledhill,
infra n. 108; Industrial Export and Import Corp. v. Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corp ( 1947) 191 Misc. 493, 77 N.Y.S. (2d) 541, aff'd. 302 N.Y. 342,
96 N.E. (2d) 466 (ban on repayment by the Chinese Central Bank under
~he laws of China).
104 FIORE § 272; ALCORTA 145·
105 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ § 1965.
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Court of Appeals has ruled out its application in the case
of a conversion allegedly committed in Mexico, 106 although
more recently a lower court has applied it to conversion
committed in Switzerland and other places. 107 In one case,
the same court reversed itself on the question whether a
seaman injured in the course of his duty on a Panamanian
ship and claiming damages for failure of the ship's officers
to furnish prompt and proper medical care, could be heard
under the presumption of the law of civilized countries. 108
Nevertheless there is a future in a device emphasizing
international thought in international relations.
4· Distinction of Situations
Recent writers have hinted at the differences of the
cases in which the search for a foreign rule lacks success. 109
The foreign law may be more or less alien or exotic; the
procedural matter may be more or less closely tied to the
foreign origin; and the just result of the conflicts problem
may be more or less securely felt. Assuming such circumstances, a choice is open among several methods. Their
number, however, does not include the usual presumptions
of similarity. Whatever reasons once supported them have
lost their usefulness. Not even the former community of
common law has retained significance beyond elementary
truth.
(a) Acquiescence in the law of the forum. Courts
readily accept an agreement of counsel either on the contents of a foreign law or on application of the domestic
Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp., supra n. 85.
Arams v. Arams ( 1943) 45 N.Y.S. (2d) 251 attempts to distinguish the
Riley case by distinctions not made in that case.
108
Sonneson v. Panama Transport Co. ( 1947) 272 App. Div. 948, 72
N.Y.S. (2d) 153, ending after complicated proceedings, 278 N.Y. 262, 82
N.E. (2d) 569, cert. den. 337 U.S. 919, 961.
109
NussBAUM, so Yale L.J. at 1041; GooDRICH ( ed. 3) 236.
1°6
107
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law. 110 The individual procedural law of the court must
decide whether such agreement is acceptable; generally, it
does not seem to be contrary. Yet the conditions for a
true agreement on the applicable law often are not given
and such agreements are totally excluded in suits on family
and status matters. Nevertheless, they have been recently
recommended 111 and in a recent case preferred by Chief
Justice Vanderbilt to the presumption of civilized laws/ 12
Their nature should he defined. A contract, although not
a contract of international private law, is required in my
opinion, viz. a procedural contract, valid on the basis of
procedural authorization and only for the purpose of the
law suit. Hence, the court should not he satisfied with
silence on the foreign law, possibly due to ignorance of the
conflicts problem, but inquire whether there is a binding
understanding.
(h) Dismissal. Complaints have been rightly dismissed
when a claim was brought by an alleged beneficiary in an
estate or his creditor, annulment of a marriage was sought,
or damages for wrongful death depended, on statutes not
proved. 113 This group is very much larger. It needs examination to state exactly the individual causes of action
which cannot he separated from their accrual under a
foreign law.
(c) uCivilized Laws." The resort to the law of civilized
nations is known as vague and uncertain and scarcely able
to support more than elementary principles. But it has
110
Supra Vol. II, p. 386. The Swiss Federal Tribunal {August 31, 1953)
79 BGE. II 295, applied in So BGE. II 51, has overruled its practice (referred to in my cited note and still professed in 77 BGE. II 87) ; the court
now simply recognizes an agreement expressed by counsel of the parties on
the law applicable to the litigious contract.
111
NUSSBAUM, 50 Yale L.J. at 1040.
112
Leary v. Gledhill (1951) 8 N.J. 26o, 269, 84 Atl. (zd) 725; SOMMERICH
AND BuscH, supra n. 72 at 143.
113
NuSSBAUM, so Yale L.J. at 1041.
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some features of the "general principles," which in one
sense or another are considered the subsidiary source of
public international law. Also this approach may gain a
firmer shape by closer analysis. Comparative research
teaches us what is common in closer and wider families of
legal systems. There is no need to guess that a loan must
be repayable under French law, as being a civilized law. 114
If a glimpse into any French textbook is really too much
to ask, even half-civilized peoples do not deny the rule;
it is a notorious fact. With progressive knowledge much
more than platitudes did and will result. For instance, the
dissident vote in Riley v. Pierce Oil Corporation inferred
from the facts that the defendent company must be liable
for the contract of its dummy (the Mexican subsidiary
company) "and pay for the oil taken." 115 But if the case
was not to be decided under American law (because both
parties were American corporations, a questionable ground),
it could not be based without evidence, as the dissenting
vote implied, on a nonexistent universal rule of piercing the
corporate veil nor on a universal liability of an undisclosed
principal. The claim, however, probably could well be
justified on the ground of unjust enrichment, a doctrine of
Romanistic heritage, at least now slowly being rediscovered
also in Latin-American countries. 116
(d) Lex fori. Application of the municipal law of the
forum apart from similarity presumptions ought not to appear so satisfactory to the courts as they believe it to be. At
best, the results are approximately correct. As an unavoidable last resort, it must be accepted.
114

Trial court in Leary v. Gledhill, supra n. 111.
Crane, J., dissenting in the Riley case, supra n. Ss; "Against Holmes
and Crane," RuSSELL, "Presumption of Similarity," 5 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. ( 1928)
115

29, 34·
116

DAWSON,

Unjust Enrichment

107.
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Had the trial court in the Cuba Railroad Case investigated Mexican law, or had the Supreme Court remanded
the case for such examination, the decision would have done
justice to the claim, instead of dismissing it without knowing the merits and probably with prejudice.

PART SIXTEEN
INTERTEMPORAL RELATIONS

CHAPTER

77

Transitory Relations of Conflicts Law
I. CHANGE OF FoREIGN

LAw

1

Change of the applicable substantive law. When the
foreign law invoked by a conflicts rule has been altered,
the question arises whether the former or the more recent
foreign rule applies. The primary solution is commonly
taken from the transitory rule of the applicable legal system itself. 2 This is so evidently correct that the insistence
of many writers on a broad exception in the name of public
policy of the forum appears exaggerated. Frequently the
new rule rather than the change is what may disturb the
sensitivity of a court. If state X bans miscegenetic marriages and makes the prohibition retroactive, the court in
1 Special literature in addition to the major works, mostly comparative:
ZITELMANN, "Das Verhiiltnis der iirtlichen und zeitlichen Anwendungsnormen
zu einander," 42 Jh. Jahrb. (I900) I!t9; FRANZ KAHN, 43 Jh. Jb. (190I)
299, I Abhandl. 363-479; KARL NEUMEYER, "Die zeitliche Geltung der
Kollisionsnormen," IZ Z. int. R. ( I903) 39- so; ANZILOTTI, La questione della
retroattivita (I90S) us, u8; MARIN, Essai sur )'application dans le temps
des regles de conftit dans l'espace (Paris I928) ; PAUL RoUBIER, "Les conftits
de lois dans le temps en D.I.P.," Revue I93 I, 38; BALDONI, "La Successione
nel tempo delle norme di D.I.P.," 24 Rivista ( 1932) Nr. 1-2; Full bibliography
on transitory law is given by PACE, II diritto transitorio (Studi di diritto
privato italiano e straniero, ser. II, vol. II, 1944).
2
France: Cass. req. (Nov. 18, I9t2) S. I9I4.I.258, Revue 19I3, 492, follows
art. 2 of the Italian Civil Code of x86s and therefore applies the provisions
of the former Codice Albertino on natural children.
Germany: ROHG. (June 28, 1878) 24 ROHGE. 170, 190; KG. (June 14,
1913); 27 ROHGE. to!t; RG. (July 2, 1925) Jur. Woch. 1925, 2142; MELCHIOR 68 § 43·
Hungary: Draft PIL. (1947) § 127.
Italy: DIENA, Clunet 1900, 925; id., 10 Z. int. R. ( 1900) 383; 2 Principii
90; BALLADORE-PALLIERI, D.I.P. 55·
Switzerland: 1 SCHNITZER IPR. 176.
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Y, finding the prohibition repugnant, will probably reject
it entirely, irrespective of the date of the marriage in
question. Of course, a foreign marriage valid at the time
and place of its celebration is considered valid in any case
by the normal conflicts rule. 3
If the applicable law is silent on the question of retroactivity, the general principle seems to favor the new rule.
Thus, in a famous decision, the court of Bordeaux 4 held
that a marriage celebrated in religious form in Mexico
during a period when such form was prohibited, was
validated by a subsequent decree of the Emperor Maximilian. That the victorious republicans, again retroactively,
reinstated the prior rule nullifying ecclesiastic marriages,
and that the French court refused application of the later
enactment, in favor either of marriage or of a French
national, involved in the cause, transcends the matter of
retroactivity.
Although obligations once regularly acquired are assured
against impairment by the new law if not by the constitution,
it has been submitted earlier that current foreign-governed
contracts are subject to the latest formulation of the applicable law, unless a preceding contrary party agreement, is ascertainable and permitted by the law of the
forum. 5
As is well-known, no change of private law is assumed
as an automatic effect of annexation, cession, or merger
of territories.
Change of foreign conflicts rules. The answer is the
3

Supra. Vol. I, p. 273 f. and n. I32.
App. Bordeaux (Feb. 5, I883) S. I883.2.I37, Clunet I883, 621; controversial comments by BARTIN, I Principes 299, ROUBIER, Revue I93I, 38 ff.;
I PONTES DE MIRANDA 339·
5
Supra Vol. II, pp. 546-548. The discussion on the 7th Hague Conference,
I9SI, Actes 78-SI, produced different opinions and a prevailing tendency to
leave the questions involved to the interpretation of the contract by the court.
But judges need guidance.
4
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same when a foreign conflicts law to which the forum resorts in the course of renvoi is modified during the relationship subject to it. 6
II.

CHANGE oF THE CoNFLICTs RuLE OF THE FoRUM

Occurrence. Much more serious is the difficulty inherent
in the rivalry of older and newer rules in the applicable law
of the forum itself. Previously recognized, 7 this question
was explored in numerous decisions and a massive literature
when, on January I, I900, the German Introductory Law
to the Civil Code replaced the international private laws
of the particular German territories by a unified, fundamentally different regulation. The theories developed on
this occasion in the German and international literature
continue in the center of discussion. Analogous problems
were raised by the Hague Conventions on private international law, and again by the termination of membership
in them and by the statutes and codes appearing in considerable number in the recent decades. The Introductory Law
of Brazil of I 942, changing from national law to the
domiciliary principle, provides an interesting counterpart
to the inverse German reform of I 896. However, neither
of these events has been given much attention.
The problem ought to be the same for other than
statutory amendments, for instance, when a court passes
from lex loci contractus to lex loci solutionis or from lex
domicilii to lex situs. But judicial decisions seem rarely to
be regarded as involving the creation of new conflicts rules.
No one has ever thought of excepting former legal situations after the Supreme Court of the United States took
6 I FRANKENSTEIN 241; MELCHIOR 45·
7
C. MEYER, Principes sur les questions

J.
transitoires intertemporels, nouv.
ed. par A. A. De Pinto (Leyde x8s8) 36-42, stating differences and analogies
between intertemporal and international private law.
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the momentous step from federal conflicts law to state
law in diversity of citizenship cases.
Because the questions raised by these changes are of
only temporary importance, the remarkable fact that no
convincing solution has been discovered in an abundance
of learned proposals is partly explained by short-lived practical interest. Repeated attempts to deduce positive transitory rules, that is, a division of application among successive
sets of rules, from the "nature" of private international
law naturally have been futile.
I.

Court Decisions

The judicial materials include very few reports other
than German of the decade after the Civil Code came into
force. The courts in Germany resorted without hesitation
to the copious intertemporal rules included in the Introductory Law, following articles 7-3 I, which deal with private
international law. These rules were first applied as if they
were also intended for conflicts law. When the writers
noted that the "laws thus far in force" (die bisherigen
Gesetze), which were to be continued in effect, meant only
the substantive rules, the weight of authority, both judicial
and theoretical, turned to analogous application. The result was much the same, since cases where such analogies
could be refuted rarely materialized in litigation.
Out of a considerable series of cases, 8 the following may
illustrate the method used.

Illustrations. (I) In a suit decided in 1906 in Hamburg, 9
the testator Schiegel, a naturalized American citizen, had
married in Bremen under the local unlimited community
8

MELCHIOR 64 ff.; ROUBII!R, Revue I93 I, 79·
0LG. Hamburg (June IS, I906) 18 Z. int. R. (I908) 146; accord: OLG.
Miinchen (Feb. 17, I909) ZI ROLG. Z33 (former immutability of marital
property upheld); KG. (Sept. 30, I9IS) 34 ROLG. 3Z (first marital domicil
decisive).
9
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property system. Before I 900 the conflicts rule of the courts
in Hamburg referred to the first matrimonial domicil, which
was Bremen. The new rule of the Introductory Law, E.G.,
article I 5, invokes primarily the national, American, law
of the husband. But since article 200 maintains the marital
property system that existed on December 3 I, I 899, this
provision takes precedence, including the consequence that
the old conflicts rule of the court in Hamburg still points
to the law of the first matrimonial domicil, Bremen.
In this case, Bremen was the first domicil of the spouses,
a German territory whose substantive marital property
law after I 899 was expressly continued by article 200 of
the Introductory Law. The new conflicts rule of article I 5
E.G. is held superseded by this article 200, from which
it is concluded that the former conflicts rule referring to
Bremen as the first matrimonial domicil is also maintained.
To allow an immediate word of criticism: why is the old
conflicts rule of the court of Hamburg held competent
instead of that of Bremen, which would have the same
result? And what would have happened if the court of
Baden, which applied the national law also under the older
system, had to decide? Could it not be that article 200,
irrespective of any conflicts rule, was destined to salvage
any marital property system based on the law of any
German territory? However, the courts did not decide
otherwise even though the parties at the time of the marriage were domiciled abroad.
(II) A married couple of Bavarian nationality were first
domiciled in Corfu, where since I 856 the Roman-Greek
dowry system, involving separation of property estates, had
obtained. The court of Nuremberg, Bavaria, in I909 excluded the application of the Bavarian transitory provisions
because the parties had never lived in Bavaria. It applied
its own former conflicts rule of the Pandectistic system leading to the Corfu law. This, however, contained an excep-
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tional conflicts rule for foreigners to the effect that the
national law of the husband should govern marital property; this renvoi would have led to the former community
property system of the city of Nuremberg. But since the
court followed the Pendectists rejecting renvoi, the reasoning ended with the dowry system. 10
Thus, an artful combination of artificial principles succeeded in avoiding the identical result which the conflicts
rules of the national German law, article I5, paragraph I,
E.G., and of the domiciliary law, the Greek Code of I 8 56,
would have reached.
(III) An illegitimate child was granted a decree of
legitimation in Czarist Russia after the father's death. The
former conflicts rule of the lower court was that the father's
domicil governs legitimacy. But there was an obscure renvoi
and uncertainty where the domicil as of the decisive time
should be located. The Reichsgericht went to great pains
on both questions and after reviewing a series of possible
connections wound up with the ruling that Russian law applied and the legitimation was void. 11
The same result could have been reached by the simple
statement that a foreign public act must be valid under its
own law before being recognized elsewhere.
In France, Bartin noted with approval 12 that the French
courts believe it is "natural" that the principle of nonretroactivity of laws covers conflicts law. But since the three
main decisions commonly cited deal with changes of substantive law, 13 authority to support such a rule is very thin.
While a French tribunal, as well as the Franco-German
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, have treated events affecting
marriage or marital property occurring before France de10

OLG. Niirnberg (Jan. 22, I909) 20 Z. int. R. ( I9IO) 548.
RG. (Nov. u, I9o6} I8 Z. int. R. ( I9o8} I6s.
12
BARTIN, I Principes 286 No. u7, criticized by I PoNTES DE MIRANDA 336.
13 Supra notes 2 and 4·
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nounced the Hague Conventions on these matters, in accordance with the Conventions, 14 this follows better than from
a general principle from the special conflicts rules used
everywhere in marital matters.
Theories
(a) Applying the substantive intertemporal rules of the
forum. The German practice of the early century is not
only favored by most German writers 15 but also by leading
authors elsewhere. Thus, Batiffol, rejecting all other doctrines, writes: "If the internal transitory law subjects a
marriage or a contract to the law in force at that date (of
the act), there is a priori no reason to exclude from this
law the conflicts rules on marriage or contracts." 16
However, it is recognized since Zitelmann's article that
the sections of the German Introductory Law, stating in
detail what provisions of the new code are inapplicable to
previously created legal relations, do not include conflicts
problems; allegedly they apply by analogy, but reasons for
analogy may fail to exist, 17 and the analogy itself has often
been attacked with good reasons.
On the other hand, though the "former laws" maintained
do not encompass conflicts law, they do include in the
dominant German opinion foreign substantive laws. 18 Hence,
it is commonly taught that where laws conflict simultaneously
in space and in time, the intertemporal problem must be
solved before the international one. A case belonging to the
former substantive law is subject also to the former conflicts rule of the court seized with the case.
2.

14 Trib. St. Etienne
(Jan. I92I, I9I4) 583; TAM. Franco-Allemand
(Feb. I2, I927) 6 Rec. Trib. Arb. Mixtes 922.
15 ZITELMANN, Jh. Jb. I900, I89; NEUMEYER, I2 Z. int. R. No, I4; MELCHIOR
64 ff.; LEWALD 4; WOLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 3) 2.
16
BATIFFOL, Traite 339 § 3I6; ARMIN JON, I Precis (ed. 3) 30I j SCHNITZER
I76.
17 ZITELMANN, supra n, I.
1 8 NEUMEYER, 12 Z. int. R. at 48.
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The Brazilian Introductory Law of 1942 has a short
article 6 at the end of the general provisions preceding the
conHicts rules in articles 7-18, which states that laws have
immediate effect with the exception of legal situations
definitively constituted and the execution of acts legally
perfected. This provision, like the German transitory
articles, 19 again leaves in doubt whether it extends to conHicts laws.
(b) Distinguishing foreign cases. In one of his most
penetrating, though not entirely happy studies, Franz Kahn
opposed two main theses to the view just described. He
observed that private international law is essentially different from substantive law and ought to have its own transitory rules. 20 As a rigid positivist, he coupled this statement
with the assertion that this transitory system must be established under the isolated viewpoint of a determinate
national legislation. 21 Kahn himself began the elaboration
of special intertemporal rules in this sense. Much more
attention has been devoted to his second proposition envisaging cases that had no connection with the German law
until the code came into force; these should not be treated
under the old German conHicts rules. 22 A marriage of two
foreigners domiciled abroad and lacking assets in Germany,
having nothing to do with the former German law, would
be subject to the new conHicts law.
These conceptions have often been criticized, especially
because of the vacuum they leave and the uncertainty of the
ties that the case should have with the forum. As Neumeyer objected, the sway of a conHicts rule cannot depend
on the time when a relationship is brought before the court of
19
20

KAHN,

I

Abh. 367 f.

lb. 385, followed by NEUMEYER 39 If. and others.
21
lb. 394 If., followed by ZITELMANN, NEUMEYER, ANZILOTTI, and others.
22
Contra NEUMEYER, ib. 4Z If.; other polemics against KAHN, e.g.,
MELCHIOR § 40; ROUBIER 69-73.
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the forum instead of the time of its origin or modification.
Raape attempts to combine the prevailing doctrine with
Kahn's view, which he improves. According to him, the
provisions of the uEinfuhrungsgesetz" do extend to conflicts law, but only where the relationship was "imprinted"
with the law of the forum during the former legislation.
He seems to require a substantial connection of the parties
with Germany before 1900. Thus, the marital property
system is subject to the old, mostly domiciliary criterion
when the parties before 1900 had German nationality or
domicil. If neither, the application of the old rules is
"outright senseless." 28
(c) Establishing general transitory rules. Some scholars
look for general principles valid for the change of conflictual as well as municipal law. In France and Brazil,
this approach has been strengthened by invoking the constitutional maxim that new laws do not have retroactive
effect on facta praeterita but only on facta pendentia; they
may not impair existent contracts. 24
These writers, however, join Kahn in recognizing that
the new conflicts rule may state that it operates retroactively and such effect may be presumed in a number of
situations. This is the case when public policy at the forum
changes; thus the Spanish courts after 1936 have refused
to recognize foreign divorces that they would have recognized in 1934; or the rules of the forum on evidence, qualified as substantive law, are altered, e.g., the means of
proving illegitimate paternity. 25
(d) Applying the new conflicts rules. All theories preRAAPE, Komm. 3 so.
ROUBIER 79; PONTES DE MIRANDA 335; DE CASTRO Y BRAVO, Der. Civil
de Espana, Vol. I ( 1949) 6 51 ff. contrasts legal transactions with suspended
situations; similarly MACHADO VILLELA, DIP. 479; BALMACEDA 220.
25
See the various proposals by KAHN 394 ff.; ROUBIER 678; DE CASTRO,
supra n. 24, 646; YANGUAS, D.I.P. 221.
23
24
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serving in principle the former conflicts rules of the forum
in order to connect old events with a certain legal system
are opposed by the contrary principle that new conflicts
rules immediately reach all cases. An early attempt by
Niedner to deduct retroactivity from the nature of conflicts
law as an alleged branch of public law 26 has been unanimously rejected. But Anzilotti has had an important
following, particularly in Italy, when, instead of connecting
the problem with the intertemporal rules of the forum, he
attributed it to the intertemporal rules of the legal system
to which the new conflicts rules refer. 27
While, he argues, situations entirely liquidated belong to
the old set of rules and future situations are reserved for
the new rules, the remaining problems consist simply in the
replacement of one substantive law (viz. that invoked by
the old conflicts norm) by another substantive law (viz.
the law referred to by the new conflicts norm), a problem to
be solved by the transitory law of the newly invoked system.
This is an astonishing mistake of a great scholar, illustrating the enormous difficulty of the matter. Criticizing
with mastery all the other solutions, Anzilotti directly violates the thesis defended by himself following Kahn that
substantive and conflicts rules follow heterogeneous principles, the latter being merely formal. What the foreign
system thinks of a sequence of its own substantive rules
would not even afford a model for the change of its own
conflict rules and must be completely immaterial to the
application of the forum's conflicts law. The impracti26 NIEDNER, "Kollision der ortlichen und zeitlichen Kollisionsfragen," in
Das Recht I900, 250. Inversely, I FRANKENSTEIN 24I ff. advocates retroactivity
as principle.
27 ANZILOTTI, supra n. I, 2 Rivista n5, 126, followed by AGO, Teoria I78
ff.; ARMIN JON, I Precis I88; MONACO, Efficacia; PACCHIONI, Elementi 245 ff.
The partial opposition by BALDONI (supra n. I) § 7 rests on his theory on the
nature of conflicts law; against him AGO, Teoria I79 n. I, I84; BATIFFOL, I.e.

TRANSITORY RELATIONS OF CONFLICTS

513

cability of this theory is, of course, manifest when the foreign system has never been changed and has no transitory
rules at all.
Eliminating this theory, opposition to the transitory rules
of the forum results in the principle that the new conflicts
rules apply, subject to some exceptions, particularly on the
ground of public policy. 28
Pace, the author of a voluminous new treatise on the
general subject of transitory law, rightly places emphasis
on what he calls the structure, and what we call the construction, of the new rule. 29 Conflicts rules are not included,
and the author's insistence on the adaptability of his
formula tempus regit factum has deviated too much attention from the details of the matter. Nevertheless, his extended polemics and his starting point in the new law seem
closely to associate his effort to the spirit of Kahn's search
for specialized rules, which despite all its defects is still
the best method of approaching the desperate problem.
An original and enlightening idea has been expressed by
E. M. Meijers and the Benelux draft. In principle, the
present rules apply; by exception foreign legal relations are
recognized as they were determined by the conflicts lawsall of them-of the countries essentially connected with
these relations at the time of origin or extinction. 80
III.

RATIONALE

The divergent theses of the leading writers arrive at
the application of four different sets of rules, existing or
planned:
( 1 ) The substantive transitory rules of the forum,
either by direct application or by analogy;
Thus, YANGUAS 217 f.
PACE, supra n. 1, and a summary in Rivista dir. com. 1947, 256-267.
30
Benelux draft, art. 25 par. 2; cf., MAKAROV, 18 Z. ausl. PR. (1953) 218 f.
2s
29
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( 2) An inceptive system of transitory rules of the forum,
either for the special purpose of conflicts law, or
involving the change of both substantive and conflicts rules;
(3) The substantive transitory rules of the applicable
system; or perhaps certain parts of this law;
( 4) The present conflicts rules of the forum as retroactive with exceptional cases of nonretroactivity.
I am unable to subscribe in full measure to any of the
doctrines suggesting these solutions. Each has some merits
and some severe drawbacks. In my opinion, the following
considerations are decisive.
I. With Kahn and Raape, we must deny by all means
the influence of a former conflicts rule on a relationship
which had no connection with this rule during its time. If
two Spaniards domiciled in France had married there, the
intrinsic requirements were subjected, respectively, by the
old German and the new Brazilian conflicts law to the law
of the domicil and by the new German and the old Brazilian
conflicts law to the national law. Who would dare to say
that the old or the new conflicts rule is "right," just, adequate, and better protects the interest of the parties than
the other? Naively, it has been presumed that the law of
the former time was preferable because the parties trusted
it-a very strange idea that these Spaniards should confide
in a conflicts law of whose existence they never knew. It
is likewise rather absurd to discriminate foreign-governed
family relations according to the deadlines of January I,
1900, of Germany or 1942 of Brazil. Contrary to Kahn
and Raape, however, this is not only true when the parties
never had a domicil and never brought an action in the
forum; it is always true in foreign-governed relationships.
The German transitory rules themselves were adequate
only for such legal situations as would have been governed
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by the new Civil Code, if it were applied retroactively. In
these cases, it could possibly-inconvincingly as we have
seen-have been argued also that the former conflicts rules
pointing to the relevant particular territorial laws had to
be preserved. But if French spouses fixed their first matrimonial domicil in I 899 in a German town in which separation of property obtained, a French court would tend to
presume that the parties agreed on the French community
system. Could they be presumed instead in Germany or in
a third country to have "trusted" the local system so that
this system must be perpetuated after I 900?
Even considering the relationships with which they were
connected in a drastic way, is there any "expectation of the
parties" to protect when their transaction is void under
the law applicable under the old conflicts rule? Moreover,
expectation of laymen based on conflicts law is a fantastic
invention; if the parties did not care to agree on an applicable legal system, there must be another solid ground
for exempting the case from the conflicts law in force.

lllus tration: In a case decided in I 907 by the Reichsgericht a married woman signed a release to her husband
in I 896 in Wiesbaden, where under German common law
the domicil, namely, Baden, determined the validity of
contracts. Nevertheless, as the question whether the wife
had made a valid gift between spouses belonged to marital
property law according to the conflicts rule of Baden, the
national law seemed to apply. This would have been the
law of Mark Brandenburg and "subsidiarily the Prussian
Landrecht." According to the "more recent practice" of
the court, however, further reference would be made from
Prussian to Baden law whose article I096 allowed revocation.81
What law, we may ask again, did the parties trust?
31 RG. (Oct. u, 1907) 19 Z. int. R. ( 1909) 222, Schall v. Schall.
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The right solution, therefore, cannot lie in simply going
back to the old conflicts rules, for the only reason that important elements of the case happened to appear in the
past, or even some substantial connections with the forum
thet;t existed.
2. On the other hand, "respect for the past" has always
been paid to what was called jura adquisita, vested rights,
wohlerworbene Rechte. Despite Pillet, Dicey, and Beale,
this category has lost its charm. It is also settled that
conflicts law itself never creates any indefeasible right, only
to be constituted "by the just meaning of the competent
legislation." 32 Unfortunately, the misused and demolished
vested rights doctrines have left a vacuum to this day. In
the intertemporal field, at this time, merely two assumptions
seem assured :
(a) A foreign judgment recognized as res judicata by a
decision of the forum at the time of its previous conflicts
rules remains binding, although this recognition required
that a conflicts rule of the forum, now repealed, was observed by the foreign court. We re-enter the problem, however, where no recognition was sought at the time of the old
conflicts rule.
(b) An obligation fulfilled, a marriage dissolved, an
inheritance right won or lost by the death of the decedent,
in short, a legal relationship finished under the old set of
rules remains liquidated.
(c) While these propositions are confined to the forum's
own conflicts rules, there is clearly a need for a broader
respect for the past, as in the "immemorial" prescription
of the Pandectists. A few suggestions have been made
32
ANZILOTTI, 2 Rivista at 131. The "vested right" of a natural child, born
in the period when Austrians were considered German nationals, assumed
in German decisions 1950 and later (16 Z. ausl. PR. 509) eliminates EG.
art. 212, but is based on substantive law.
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recently to fill some gaps left by the disappearance of the
vested rights category. Thus, the Benelux draft preserves
the relations recognized by the conflicts laws of "the laws"
with which they are connected, 33 and Niederer proposes
to allow the court's discretion for maintaining exceptionally
the products of a legal system that would not be competent
under the court's normal conflicts rules. 34 On these questions, transcending by far the field of private international
law, further discussions are highly desirable.
3· In a series of existing conflicts rules, reference is made
to the law of a specific time, and in particular that of a
past event. When the form of marriage, a contract, a conveyance, a will is governed by the law of the place of celebration or execution, also the law of the time is meant
The first matrimonial domicil or the nationality of the
husband or the spouses refers primarily to the initial stage
of the marriage. The status of a child is determined according to the moment of its birth or legitimation. Tort is
subject to the law of the place where, at the time when,
the harm is done. Possession and property comes into
existence at a certain time under the law of this time. Construction of agreements and wills must take into consideration the law of the time of execution.
These and other references to the past, developed within
the framework of the conflicts rules of one system, should
be greatly and consistently enlarged, especially in the interest of the validity of transactions. They serve better
than transitory rules when they concede optional application in favor of validity or when the transaction depends on
a future event, as a testamentary will does.
33 Supra n. 30.
34 NIEDERER, Einfiihrung

( 1954) 320.
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/llus trations: (I) Suppose a German when domiciled in
Brazil executed in I94I in Cuba a will in German holographic form and died domiciled in Cuba in I953· The
will was valid in the eyes of a Brazilian judge when his
old conflicts rule referred to the national, German, law
of formal requisites. Under the new domiciliary approach,
a Brazilian court would regard the will as invalid if no help
were forthcoming. The transitory rule of the I942 Law
does not help. 35 But the rule, locus regit actum, would,
provided that we suppose that the Brazilian law has merely
forgotten to mention it 36 and, moreover, that the unsound
rejection of renvoi in article I 6 were relaxed to permit
further reference from Cuban to German law.
(II) Suppose a seventeen-year-old I tali an boy, domiciled
in Florida, made there a will in I 94 I, then moved to England where he died in I944· Capacity to execute a will is
given in Italy at I 6, in Florida at I 8, and in England at 2 I
years, and must exist in Italy at the time of execution and
in Florida and England at the time of death. A Brazilian
court formerly looked to Italian law and held the will
valid. Now it must find capacity at the time of execution
missing and at the time of death still missing. Any transitory law depends on the time of the death. But if Brazil
were to recognize validity of a foreign will also in a case
where the testator had capacity by his national law at the
time of execution, conflicts law would take care of the
situation.
4· That the contacts preferred by a new determination
of choice of law should generally yield to the abandoned
standards without appropriate direction by the lawmaker
is not a very attractive idea. It has been a strange idea
when the new rules substituted a congeries of dubious provincial case laws, as in the German, Polish and other
legislations. Even elsewhere there is not much substance
35

36

Supra sro.
Supra 511·
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to suggest a presumption for the old setup, nor, it is true,
for any other a priori considerations. Discovering individual solutions needs much more detailed studies than
have been afforded thus far. To resume the principal experience of this work in a caveat as used in the Restatements, our last word may call once again for prudent
research.
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Acceptance, I 79-I So.
conditional, 205.
for honor, I82.
Accommodation paper, I8o-I8I.
Acquiescence in the Law of the
Forum, 497-498.
See also Foreign Law: proof.
Acquisition of Inheritance Rights,
Chapter 70.
See also Inheritance.
Actions. See also Real Actions ;
Possessory Actions.
in personam, 4-5.
in rem, 4-5, 54·
Administration of Decedents'
Estates. See also Fiduciaries; Probate ] udgments.
civil law, 4I0-4I2.
common law, 406-4IO.
law governing, 4I4-416.
situs of assets for purposes of,
412-414.
Administrators, Chapter 72.
ancillary, 425-426.
Administrators and Courts,
Chapter 72.
Advancements, 389-391, 402403.
See also Inheritance.
Agent, unauthorized, I95·
Agents de change, 232.
Aggregates, 69.
Agricultural estates, 69.
Aircraft, Rights in, I22-126.
recognition of foreign rights,
I25-I26.
registration, I23-I25.
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Alberic de Rosate, 268.
Aldrich v. Cooper, 434·
Alfaro, 447·
Ambulatory Chattels. See Chattels.
Amortization, 205.
Amsinck v. Rogers, ISO, 226.
Anzilotti, 512.
Arminjon, I43, 195, 2I7.
Assignment, of debt, 144-146.
Atkinson, 410.
Autonomy of the Party.
bills and notes, 147-149·
election, 349·
immovables, 31-33.
succession, 273-276.
Aval, 181-182.
negotiability, I 96, I 98.
"Bailment and lease contract,"
62.
Bar, 26, 360, 384.
Basdevant, 269, 392, 395·
Hartin, 26, 67, so8.
Bartolus, 268.
Bates, 445·
Batiffol, 468, 509.
Beale, 24, 37, 82, 160, I98, 319,
413, 415, 445, 459, sr6.
Begebungsvertrag, 139, I64.
Beneficiaries. See also Inheritance; Succession.
titre universe/, 245·
capacity, 358-36o.
corporations as, 365.
determination of status, 355358.
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effect of public policy, 364365.
rationale of conflicts rules,
36o-364.
unworthiness, 365.
Beneficium inventarii, 40I, 430.
Benelux Convention on International Private Law, 265,
306.
Berlin Convention on Copyrights,
of Igo8, 6g.
Bern Conventions. See Table of
Statutes.
Biens incorporels, 66. See also
Intangibles.
Bill of Exchange. See also Bills
and Notes; Cambial Obligations.
acceding contracts, I 50-I 5 I.
independence, I 50-I 5 I,
I69-I72.
original contract, 149-150.
principle of the basic bill, 149150, I69-I72, 207.
Billet a ordre, I32, 240.
Bills and Notes. See also Bill of
Exchange; Cambial Obligations ; Checks.
Anglo-American and Continentallaws, I32-I33·
circulation, Chapter 61.
conflicts rules, 238-24I.
creation, I 39·
formal requirements, Chapter
59·
principles, Chapter 58.
special and general rules, I 33I35·
terminology, I34-I35·
theories underlying the law of,
I35-I47·
validity in general, Chapter
6o.
Bills of lading, 55-58. See also
Documents of Title
Bona fide Holder. See Holders.

Bona vacantia, 37I-374· See
also Succession.
Bremer v. Freeman, 289-29I.
Brussels Convention for the U nification of Certain Rules of
Law relating to Maritime
Mortgages, and Liens, of
April 10, Ig26, 106, I 10,
III, II4, II5.
Bufnoir, 35.
Bullenois, I 7.
Bustamante Code. See Table of
Statutes.

Calvo, 474·
Cambial Obligations. See also
Bill of Exchange; Bills and
Notes.
concept, I37-I38.
enforcement, I46-I47·
extracambial, I34-I35·
place of creation, I58-I68.
principle of independence, I6gI72, I86-20I, 207, 208,
222-223, 240.
underlying relationships, I 39I42.
Camhiale, I32.
Gammell v. Sewell, 76.
Capacity
bills and notes, I 73- I 77.
corporations, I 75.
drawee of check, 230-232.
drawer of check, 229-230.
foreigners, 45·
lunatics, 44·
married women, 44·
minors, 44, 45 n. 10.
testamentary, 3 I9-322.
beneficiaries, 358-360.
Cavers, 445·
Celsus, 35·
Chalmers, I 55.
Change of Conflicts Rules. See
Intertemporal Relations.
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Characterization
debt secured by mortgage, 2D22.
equitable conversion, 20, 25.
fixtures, 25.
hypothec, 2o-22.
leaseholds, 18-20, 24.
liens, 64-66.
mortgage, 2o-22.
movable or immovable, 276277.
right of stoppage in transitu,
40.
Charges, 58-6o.
Chattels. See also Security Interests: Res in Transitu,· Vessels.
ambulatory, Chapter 57.
removal, Chapter 57·
acquisition of right, 7o-81.
acts in the second territory,
76-78.
adverse possession, 97-99·
conditional sale, 94-96.
public policy, 81-83.
without creditor's consent, 92-94·
Checks. See also Bills and Notes.
capacity of drawee, 23o-232.
capacity of drawer, 229-230.
certification, 233.
character of, 224-227.
conflicts rules, 226-229.
cover, 232-233.
creation of, 229-232.
form of, 229.
restrictive clauses, 235-236.
stop-payment, 233-235.
time for action, 236-237.
Cheshire, 31, 35, 41.
Circulation, Chapter 6I. See also
Bills and Notes.
Claims, Chapter 73·
single law of succession
civil law, 43I-434·
common law, 434-440.
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effect of judgments, 437439·
enforcement of, 433·
equality of, 435-436.
insolvent estates, 436-437.
liability for
definition, 429-430.
limitation, 43D-43 I.
preferences, 435-437·
multiple laws of succession
equalization, 441-442.
Claims under Foreign Law. See
Foreign Law: proof.
Clause de dessaisine saisine, 35.
Coheirship, 391-393. See also
Partition.
Collation. See Advancements.
Commorientes, 359-36o.
Confession of ] udgment, I 4 7.
Co-ownership, 39·
Constitutum possessorium, 50,
I6I.
Constitutum simplex, 35.
Contuzzi, 305.
Cook, 45·
Coke, 19.
Conditional Sales. See Chattels;
Security Interests; Transfer
of Property.
Conflicts Law. See also Intertemporal Relations.
Conversion, 52-53·
Copyright, 66-69. See also Intangibles.
Counterclaims, real actions, 5455·
Cover, I37, 144-146, 232-233.
Craven's Estate, In re, 367, 416.
Cretio, 376.
Cuba Railroad Co. v. Crosby,
492-493, 494, 500.
Damages, in Recourse, 20D-20I.
Default of Carrier, I 18.
Delatio (hereditatis), 376.
Delegation of Debt, I37-IJ8.
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Delibazione, 421.
Delivery. See also Bills and
Notes.
constructive, 161.
function, 159-168.
place, I62.
Dettes immobilieres, 44I.
Devolution. See Inheritance.
Detinue, 53·
Documents of Title
effects of issue and endorsement, 55-57·
incorporation of right in document, 56.
subsequent transfers, 57-58.
Dicey, I45, I49, 4I5, 5I6.
Diena, I63, I66, 476.
Dispossession, 52.
Divisio paterna, 385.
Donatio mortis causa
Characterization, 366-370.
Drawee of Check:, Capacity, 23o232.
Drawer of Check:, Capacity, 229230.
Dumoulin, I 7.
Distribution, 354, 399-40I.
Distributive Share, 325-326.
Droit d' aubaine, 262.
Easements, 58-6o.
Edgerly v. Bush, 81.
Effets de complaisance, I8I n.
42. See also Accommodation paper.
Eigentumsvorbehalt, 9I.
Einert, I39·
Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian
Bank, I92.
Encumbrances, 6o-66.
Enforcement
cambial obligations, I46-I47·
claims against the estate, 433.
Enrichment. See Unjust Enrichment.
Enterprises, commercial, 69.
Envoi en possession, 381.

Erbe, 245·
Erbschein, 422.
Estoppel, 22o-22 I.
Eviction de la loi hrangere, 263.
Exceptio doli, I40.
Exceptio pacti, I40.
Exequatur, 428.
Falcon bridge, 297, 368.
Fedozzi, 309, n. 78.
Feller, 227.
Fideicommissa, 33 I -333.
family 256.
Fideicommissary Substitutions,
447, 466. See also Fideicommissa ; Trusts.
Fiduciaries. See also Administration of Decedents' Estates.
extraterritorial scope of appointment, 422-424.
recognition of foreign fiduciaries, 424-428.
Fiduciary Relations. See Trusts.
Fiore, 476.
Foelix, 474·
Fixtures, characterization of, 25.
Fluvial navigation, 105.
Fonds de commerce, 277·
Foreign Law. See also Intertemporal Relations.
absence of proof, 492-493.
application, Part Fifteen.
ascertainment
by judicial notice, 478-484.
by party evidence, 473-478.
presumption, 493-495.
methods, 49o-492.
review
conflicts law, 485-488.
constitutionality, 485.
sources, 484-485.
subsidiary law, 495-500.
theory of reception, 474-475.
Forged instruments, 206. See
also Signature.
Fortune de mer, 113.
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Fraus legi facta, 273.
French Draft on Private International Law, Art. 52, 65.
Gage, 65.
Gemma, 309, n. 78.
Geneva Conventions. See Table
of Statutes.
Gestio, Pro herede, 376.
Goodrich, 82.
Goods in Transit. See Res zn
Transitu.
Griswold, 3I3, 445·
Grundwechsel, I50.
Guaranty Trust v. Hannay, I56.
Gutteridge, I66.
Hague Conventions. See Table
of Statutes.
Hague Drafts on Succession, 264
n. I37, 265, 273, 374 n. 89,
377, 384, 389 n. 58, 390,
395·
Heir
definition, 245·
forced, 324.
unworthiness, 365.
Here des extranei, 376.
Heredes, Sui, 376.
Heres, 245·
Heritier, 245.
Hibernia National Bank v. Lacombe, 226.
Holders
due course, I39, I6I, I62, I63,
I65, I66, I78, I89-I90,
24I.
good faith, I85.
negotiable instruments, rights
of, I83-20I.
Holders. See also Recourse.
Holmes, 113, 492, 496.
Hooper v. Gumm, I03.
Hupka, I75·
Hutchison v. Ross, 454, 462.
Hypothec. See also Maritime
Hypothec.

characterization in French law,
2o-2 I ; in German law, 22.
Incomplete Instrument, I 57.
Indorsee, rights of. See Holders.
after maturity, I99-200.
after protest, I99-200.
conditional, I78-I79·
effect of clause "not to order,"
I96-I99·
functions, I83-I86.
Indorsement
negotiability, I96.
partial, I87.
Industrial property, 66-69.
Inglis v. Usherwood, 4I, 75·
Inheritance. See also Claims;
Succession ; Wills.
acceptance and repudiation,
382-385.
acquisition of inheritance
rights, Chapter 70.
advancements, 389-39I.
agreement on inheritance
rights, 266-267, 385-389.
classification of conflicts systems, 25I-267.
conflicts rules, Chapter 64.
sources, 246-25 I.
devolution, 375-377·
partition, 39I-396.
terminology, 245-246.
transmission of possession,
379-382.
transmission of title, 378-379.
Injury, on Board Ship, I I8.
L'inscription au registre vaut
titre, I24 n. I IO.
Institute of International Law,
Madrid, I910, 62 n. 108.
I nstrumenta guarantigiata, I 46.
Insurance, Life, 370-371.
Intangibles, 66-69.
Intention of Testator. See Wills.
Interest
rate, 200.
stipulations, I 78-1 79·
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Interpersonal Law, 168.
Interpretation of Wills. See
Wills.
Intertemporal Relations
change of conflicts law of the
forum, 505-513.
change of foreign conflicts law,
504-505.
change of foreign substantive
law, 503-504.
criticism and suggestions, 513519.
theories, 509-513.
Intervention, 182.
Intellectual Property, 66-69.
Joint Wills, 3I5-318.
Judgments. See Claims; Probate
Judgments.
Jura adquisita, 5 I 6. See also Intertemporal Relations.
Jura in rem. See Real Rights.
lura novit curia, 475, 476. See
also Foreign Law.
Jus albinagii, 262.
Kahn, 26, 250, 3I8, 51D-5I4·
Kohler, 35.
Korvine's Trust, 366.
Land, 454·
Latin America. See Table of
Statutes for individual countries.
Law
personality of, 8.
territoriality of, 7-8.
Law Governing Succession, 319321, 324-327, 342, 360364, 370, 392-393, 4I4,
431.
Law of Civilized Nations, 498499· See also Foreign Law:
proof.
Law of the Domicil. See Lex
domicilii.

Law of the Forum. See Lex
fori.
Law of Nationality. See Lex
patriae.
Law of the Place of Contract.
See Lex loci contractus.
Law of the Place of Indorsement, 187-I96, 20D-20I.
Law of the Place of Issue, 236237· See also Bills and
Notes.
Law of the place of Payment.
See Lex loci solutionis.
Law of the Place of Situation.
See Lex situs.
Leary, 96.
Leaseholds, characterization, I820, 24.
Legacy, Specific, 382.
Legataire universe!, 245.
"Legatee," 245.
Legatum vindicationis, 382.
Legitimate Share
forced heirs, 462-463.
requirement of will, 400-401.
succession, 324, 330.
Lehman, I35, n. 14·
Letters of Administration, 410.
See also Probate Judgments.
Lettre de change, I32.
Lex causae, 305-3I I.
Lex commissoria, 63-64.
Lex fori, 26-29, 495-496, 499·
Lex loci contractus, I96-2oo.
Lex domicilii, 251-252, 257-258,
268-26g.
Lex loci solutionis, 2oo-20I,
228-229, 239-24I.
Lex patriae, 255-253, 258-26o.
Lex rei sitae. See Lex situs.
Lex situs, I5-I8, 30-42, 49-50,
5I-66, 253-257, 282-286,
3I I, 433.
scope of, Chapter 55·
Liability for Claims against the
Estate. See also Claims.
cum viribus hereditatis, 43 I.

INDEX
definition, 429-430.
limitation, 43o-43 1.
pro viribus hereditatis, 430.
Liens, 64-66. See also Maritime
Liens.
characterization, 64-66.
Limitation of Actions
law of bills and notes, 22 I 223, 236--237·
Letteralita, 135, I49·
Local law theory, 474-475.
Locus regit actum, 46, 47, I58I68, I6g-I72.
Locus verus v. locus scriptus,
I62, I67.
"Loi de police et de surete/' 3I.
Lorenzen, I32, I38, I50, 152,
I88, n. I8, Ig8, 211, 2I7,
297·
Maitland, 467.
Mancini, 268, 280.
Marital Property, 365-366.
Maritime Hypothec, 103, I I III 2. See also Vessels.
Maritime Liens, I 13-122.
foreign-created, II 5- II g.
nature, II3-II4.
priority, I I9-I22.
recognition, I IS-I I7.
Marsden, I I3.
Maturity, time of, 204-205.
Meijers, 280, 5I3.
Mobilia sequuntur personam, 8,
450.
basis of rule, 8-g.
origin of rule, 8.
scope of rule, 9-I5.
Montevideo Conventions. See
Table of Statutes.
Moratory Laws, 2I9-220.
Le mort saisit le vif, 376.
Moulis v. Owen, I77.
"Movables follow the person."
See Mobilia sequuntur personam.

N acherben, 364.
N acherbschaft, 343·
N achvermiichtnis, 343·
Negotiable Instruments. See also
Bills and Notes.
situs of, administration of decedents' estates, 4I3.
Negotiability
accessory contracts, Ig6.
determination, Ig6--Igg.
effect of clause "not to order,"
Ig6--Igg.
Neumeyer, 5 10.
Niboyet, 26, 27, 32, n. I 10, 45,
IIO, 306.
Niederer, 5 I 7.
Niedner, 5I2.
Nolde, I I7, n. 77·
Notice of Default. See also Recourse.
form, 2 I 2-2 I 4·
necessity, 207-2I2.
sufficiency, 2I4.
Obligations. See also Cambial
Obligations.
"cambial," I34-I35·
extracambial, I34-I35·
"written," I35·
Obligation and Property in a
Negotiable Instrument,
I67-I68, I84-I86.
Option
law of succession, 40I.
Pace, 5I3.
Pacta de hereditate futura, 386.
Pactum de cambiando, I37·
Paghero, I32.
Partition, 39I-396, 404. See
also Inheritance.
Patent Rights, 66--6g. See also
Intangibles.
Perassi, 282.
Payment, 202-205.
action, 223.
discharge by, 205-206.
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excuses for nonpayment, 205206.
impossibility, 2I9-220.
modalities, 204.
part, 205.
place, 203-204.
stop-payment order, 233-235·
time, 204-205.
Payment and Recourse, Chapter
62.
Perpetuities, 33 I-333· See also
Fideicommissa; Future Interests.
Personal Law. See also Lex
domicilii,· Lex patriae.
of beneficiary, 36I-364.
of deceased, 303-305.
Personal Law of the Ship, 109.
"Personalty has no locality," 8.
Petition of Recovery. See Rei
vindicatio.
Phillimore, 290.
Pillet, 360, 5I6.
Place of Publication, 68.
Planes. See Aircraft.
Pledge, 6I-62. See also Security
Interests.
Plurality of Succession, Chapter

7I.
Possession, right to, 5 I-52.
Possessory Actions, 5 I.
Portio debita, 327.
Pothier, I37, I5I, I62, 386.
Precarium, 35·
Preferences. See Claims.
Prelevement, 262-266, 325.
Presentment. See also Recourse.
mode, 2 I 2-2 I 4·
necessity, 207-2 I 2.
time, 2I4-217.
waiver, 218.
Privileges. See Liens.
Professio juris, 274.
Privileges and Immunities Clause,
436.
Probate Judgments. See also Ad-

ministrations of Decedents'
Estates.
ancillary, 4I9-42I.
collateral attack against, 409410.
effect of, in forum, 409-410.
extraterritorial effect, 4I6-422.
jurisdictional principles, 407409.
Promissory notes. See Bills and
Notes.
Property. See also Intangibles:
Real Rights; Transfer of
Property.
movable or immovable, I 5-26.
tangible, Chapter 54·
Proprietary Rights. See Real
Rights.
Protest. See also Recourse.
form, 2I2-2I4.
necessity, 207-2I2.
time, 2I4-2I7.
waiver, 2I8.
Provision. See Cover.
Public Policy
foreign trusts, 464, 469.
lex situs, 255-256.
removal of chattels, 8I-83.
security rights in movables,
88-89.
succession, 364-365, 384.
Raape, 3II, 5II, 514·
Real Actions, 5I-55·
counterclaims to, 54-55·
Real Rights
concept, 3-5.
creation by transaction, 43-5 I.
determination of structure, 4950.
distinguished from obligatory
rights, 3-5.
foreign judgments, 5D--5I.
form, 46-48.
object, 5-7.
violations, and remedies, 5 I 55·

INDEX
Reasonable Time, 215-217. See
also Presentment; Protest.
Rechtsscheintheorie, 137.
Recourse. See also Notice of Default; Presentment; Protest.
acts necessary to preserve, 207212.
duties of holder, 207-208.
exemptions from duties of
holder, 2 I 7-22 I.
time for suing for, 221-223.
Rei vindicatio, 53-54·
Relacion subjacente, 134 n. 12.
Relationships in a negotiable instrument, 134-135.
See also Cambial Obligations.
Remedies. See Real Actions;
Real Rights.
Renvoi
bills and notes
capacity, 174-175·
sufficiency of notice, 2 I 4·
maritime liens, II6-II7.
transactions respecting land
capacity, 45·
form, 47·
Res in Transitu, IOD--102. See
also Vessels.
right of stoppage, 4o--42.
Reserve, 462. See also Legitimate Share.
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, 31, 245, 363.
administration of decedents'
estates, § 467, 408 n. 4;
§ 468, 414 n. 36, 416, 425
n. 84; § 471, 413 n. 31;
§ 474; 424 n. 76, 425 n.
79; § 476; 413 n. 31;
§ 477, 413 n. 33; § 478,
413 n. 34; § 479, 413 n.
32; § 481, 425 n. 79; §
490, 342 n. 39; § 506, 438
ns. 36, 39; § 509, 413 n.
31; § 522, 439 n. 46.
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claims, § 495, 435, 438 n.
42 ; § 496, 439 n. 45 ; §
497, 435; § 498, 434 n.
I 7 ; § 499, 434 n. I 8 ;
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